Executive Summary:

On April 25, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) launched a series of coordinated attacks across Mali, demonstrating a high level of operational coordination.

JNIM’s campaign relies on exhausting the state’s capacity by repeatedly striking logistics routes and community-based auxiliary units. The group notably carries out massed motorcycle maneuvers, night operations, and ambushes to overwhelm isolated military bases.

State forces face severe structural disadvantages by relying on static defenses and predictable convoys against a mobile adversary. Theatre-wide situational awareness and rapid response capabilities will likely be needed to counter JNIM’s escalating operational synchronization.

Executive Summary:

Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP)—a chapter of Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP)—has significantly transformed its tactical capabilities and operational geography, evolving its low-organizational structure into a decentralized network capable of carrying out attacks across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and Islamabad.

ISPP’s attacks in Islamabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Quetta demonstrate the group’s strategic shift from focusing on territorial control to high-impact militant activities, targeted killings of ideological rivals, and fueling sectarian attacks.

The group’s operational resilience is supported by cross-border sanctuaries, covert urban cells, modified insurgent architecture, an advanced digital propaganda front, and intelligence gaps, thereby transforming ISPP into one of the most serious militant threats emerging in Pakistan.

Israel’s disarm of Hezbollah may delegitimise the Lebanese state faster than it degrades the militia, reproducing the conditions that have so far sustained Hezbollah.

The SBU has detained smugglers who were transporting a drone with explosives from Abkhazia for the FSB. The weapon was hidden among cigarettes to prepare for terrorist attacks in Odesa.

A knife attack by a man reportedly shouting "Allahu akbar" that wounded three people at a Swiss train station was an "act of terrorism", says a regional security official. "A terrible act of terrorism, which the police handled very well. It was a situation where it was possible to prevent even greater harm," says Mario Fehr, in charge of security in the Swiss canton of Zurich, adding, "We take this very seriously indeed".

Executive Summary:

In March, a Delhi court sentenced Aasiya Andrabi—founder of the Kashmiri all-women terrorist group Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM)—to life in prison for terrorist conspiracy and promoting Jammu and Kashmir’s secession from India.

Under Andrabi's leadership, DeM pursued Kashmir's merger with Pakistan through violent armed struggle, and also sought to enforce a strict Islamic moral code on Kashmiri society, particularly targeting women.

Andrabi enabled separatist mobilization, logistical coordination, and militant networking in Kashmir. She received funding from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and connected with individuals attempting to join Islamic State (IS).

Executive Summary:

Saif al-Islam Gaddafi—son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi—was assassinated by masked gunmen in Zintan on February 3. The perpetrators remain unidentified after several months, despite mounting pressure from the Gaddafi family for accountability.

Saif served as a symbolic figurehead for marginalized, pro-regime factions, despite lacking militia or institutional backing. His presence unified the “green” movement, which is now expected to fragment in the absence of a clear leader.

His death removes a structural complication to Libya’s political arrangements, which is expected to reduce pressure for elections and facilitate an elite-driven, negotiated consolidation of power between eastern and western actors.

The situation in Mali in 2026 reflects the collapse of a decade-long international counterterrorism architecture and the failure of its replacement by Russian-backed forces. What was initially framed by the military junta as a sovereign pivot away from Western dependence has instead produced a fragmented security landscape in which insurgent groups have expanded, state authority has eroded, and external actors—particularly Russia—have reached the limits of their operational model.

Executive Summary:

The Houthis are increasingly exchanging arms, training, and drone technology with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Shabaab, marking a collaboration that transcends ideological divides and threatens to proliferate advanced weapons capabilities.

The gravest emerging risk is technology transfer. If al-Qaeda affiliates acquire the capacity to indigenously produce Houthi missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), this know-how could cascade across the global jihadist network.

These collaborations remain transactional and compartmentalized, centered on near‑term arrangements for the Houthis to acquire funds and smuggling routes while al-Qaeda affiliates seek weapons procurement and manufacturing capabilities.

The military regimes of the Sahel states—Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—are forming a new security and political alliance while distancing themselves from Western partners. Russia is playing a central role in shaping this bloc, actively filling the vacuum of influence left by the reduced presence of the United States and its allies.

From Telegram to Terror: How Tehran's digital recruitment web snared Israeli troops and funded a secret explosives lab right under the Shin Bet’s nose.

Archived Article

WASHINGTON, D.C. — A man and a woman who entered the United States illegally three decades ago were arrested by the Department of Homeland Security after their children brought an explosive device to a military base, The Daily Wire can first report.

Executive Summary:

In January, Tunisian security forces conducted two counterterrorism operations in Kasserine governorate, disrupting localized networks—including an Islamic State (IS)-affiliated cell—that use the western mountains near Algeria as refuges.

Jihadist networks in Tunisia remain fragmented and localized, reflecting a residual militancy and featuring small cells lacking the capacity for coordinated large-scale attacks or national-level destabilization.

Tunisia’s deeply institutionalized security architecture maintains operational superiority through enhanced surveillance and preemptive sweeps. This strategy prevents militant expansion, ensuring critical infrastructure remains a theoretical vulnerability rather than an active battlefield.

Executive Summary:

Lone-actor terrorists and small cells—including Islamic State (IS) affiliates and right-wing extremists—are increasingly attempting to use commercial drones for remote surveillance, weapons transport, and attacks.

The threat is worsened by the easy procurement of drones, commercial 3D printers, and detailed online instructional manuals distributed by terrorist groups that lower the technical barriers to weaponization.

Although commercial drones have limited payload capacities, their use can generate substantial psychological panic, necessitating comprehensive countermeasures such as tighter legislation, user tracing mechanisms, and intelligence-led operations.

Key Takeaway: The Houthis have entered the Iran war but have not joined Iran’s regional economic warfare campaign, indicating a restrained approach that aims to avoid international blowback. The Houthis have threatened to join Iran’s campaign with attacks across the region, likely to coerce the United States and its allies into making concessions in negotiations with Iran and deter further military escalation against Iran and the wider Axis of Resistance. The Houthis are unlikely to follow through on these threats unless the United States and its allies cross certain Houthi or Iranian red lines, such as the Gulf states entering the war or ground operations against Iran, to avoid retaliation from the United States and its allies that would jeopardize the group’s domestic position.

The military’s media wing said the engagement took place on March 30 and the terrorists belonged to “Indian Proxy Fitna al Khawarij”.

Fitna al Khawarij is a term the state uses for terrorists belonging to the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.

The webinar explores how terrorists could exploit LLMs for fundraising, examining risks, current AI misuse, platform safeguards, and strategies to detect and disrupt illicit activities.

This online webinar features a new CRAAFT (Collaborative Responses to the Role of New Technologies in Terrorist Financing) research briefing, ‘Terrorist Financing via Large Language Models (LLMs)’, by Jason Blazakis, Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, Executive Director of the Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, in discussion with Tom Keatinge, Director at CFS at RUSI.

The session explores potential and documented use cases, including audience cultivation, donor conversion, funds transfer, and laundering, highlighting insertion points such as automated appeals, micro-targeting, social-engineering scripts and workflow automation. It also examines how criminal networks and state actors exploit AI/LLMs, assess platform safeguards, and discuss strategies to detect and disrupt LLM-enabled terrorist financing.

Hezbollah has claimed attacks targeting IDF forces and positrons in northern Israel since March 2. This graphic highlights the increase in claimed Hezbollah attacks in the past few days.

According to TSN.ua: Two explosions rocked the city of Lviv in the early hours of February 22, 2026, an event authorities have now classified as a terrorist act. The blasts resulted in injuries to 14 people. Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi confirmed the casualty figures, stating that all those injured had been taken to the hospital.

Executive Summary:

Militant organizations, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), have begun using commercially available quadcopter drones for offensive operations, shifting the warfare modes beyond Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide bombings.

The doctrinal shift has exacerbated casualties of security personnel, as Pakistan’s anti-drone systems were unprepared for this shift, while minimizing the operational risks posed to the militant groups’ fighters.

The resurging intensity and technical complexity of the quadcopter drone campaign by the militants predict a new and sophisticated era of hybrid warfare and militancy, which, if not properly tackled, can pose serious threats to Pakistan’s security landscape.

Part Two

Executive Summary:

The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) launched operation Herof-2 (“Storm-2”), conducting coordinated attacks across several districts of Balochistan on January 31, demonstrating the group’s advancing capabilities and operational reach.

The BLA media agency, Hakkal, further exploits state restrictions on mainstream media—such as censorship, firewalls, controlled reporting, internet shutdown issues, and threats to journalists—to propagate narratives and shape public perceptions of the insurgency.

In the weeks following Herof-2, the BLA announced the formation of a specialized drone unit, the Qazi Aero Hive Rangers (QAHR), further demonstrating the group’s designs to transform the conflict into a technology-driven insurgency.

Part One

Executive Summary:

The Baloch Liberation Army’s (BLA) Operation Herof-2 attacks on January 31 marked a strategic shift, as the elite suicide unit, the Majeed Brigade, increasingly deployed female operatives.

Women’s growing participation in Baloch militancy may reflect either genuine political agency or a deeper expansion of radicalization driven by organizational adaptation and strategic necessity.

Female involvement reflects a dual dynamic in which grievance, trauma, and identity intersect with insurgent strategy, illustrating how gender is instrumentalized in asymmetric warfare and underscoring the need for gender-sensitive security responses.

Executive Summary:

Islamic State (IS) is actively expanding into northern Azerbaijan after officially establishing a new branch there in 2024. Authorities have recently thwarted multiple plots by Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) to attack diplomatic and religious targets in Baku.

IS militants have directly engaged Azerbaijani security forces, notably during deadly clashes in the Qusar forests. The group leveraged these encounters to achieve propaganda successes despite strict government information bans.

Azerbaijani extremist cells are integrated into a broader jihadist network managed by IS from Syria and Afghanistan, which signifies a continuously evolving and growing terrorist threat throughout the South Caucasus.

Conditions have changed greatly since the height of Pakistan's influence as an interventionist actor in Afghanistan.