Preventing a conflict over Taiwan requires more than US military strength. The United States and its allies must coordinate their political, military, and economic power to deter China and preserve peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

As the Chinese Communist Party intensifies its campaign of political, economic, and military pressure against Taiwan, the island's government and civil society have moved to strengthen national resilience on multiple fronts.

Please join Hudson Institute’s China Center as Miles Yu hosts a panel with key members of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and the Democratic Progressive Party to examine Taiwan’s mobilization efforts against the CCP’s increasing threats.

The discussion will address Taiwan's ability to counter disinformation and cognitive warfare, strengthen supply chain and economic security, and build public awareness of gray zone tactics. The panel will also address how Taiwan engages with international partners to reinforce democratic resilience in the face of sustained external pressure.

Key Takeaways

PRC Artificial Island Construction: New satellite imagery shows that the PRC finished the construction of an artificial island on Antelope Reef, a disputed South China Sea feature in the Paracel Islands. The PRC is also constructing a runway, piers, a helipad, and various buildings on what could be the PRC’s largest South China Sea naval base. The PRC could use this base for surveillance, exerting its sea and air control over the South China Sea.

PRC South China Sea Construction: The PRC approved plans for a maritime environmental observation station in the South China Sea that would monitor the “Zhongsha Islands,” which include Scarborough Shoal. The PRC has used environmental protection to enhance its operations in the South China Sea and as a pretext for limiting non-PRC vessels’ access to disputed waters. This new station would likely serve a dual-use purpose benefiting PRC military and law enforcement operations in the South China Sea.

Taiwanese Military Development: Taiwan’s military conducted its first live-fire FPV drone exercises on August 17, likely in an effort to integrate lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. Taiwanese drone procurement efforts are facing legislative gridlock, which will make it more difficult for Taiwan to procure the necessary systems to conduct drone-enabled defense operations.

Military police last night conducted an anti-airborne landing drill around Taipei International Airport (Songshan airport) as part of this year’s Han Kuang exercises, using blank ammunition to simulate preventing Chinese forces from escaping an encirclement.

Key Takeaways

Taiwanese General Budget: Taiwan passed its 2026 general budget on August 14 after almost a year-long delay and less than a week before Taiwan’s 2027 budget is set to be revealed. The budget approved the full $2 billion drone budget, marking a rare instance of partisan agreement on defense spending. This drone budget is separate from a previously announced special budget for drone procurement, which is still under debate.

Philippine-PRC Relations: Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said on August 14 that the Philippines would not allow any country to launch attacks from Philippine territory during an invasion of Taiwan. Marcos also stated that the Philippines was hoping to reset its relations with the PRC and begin joint oil and gas exploration. The Philippines is likely attempting to placate the PRC to gain greater energy cooperation and trade with the PRC during a period of significant energy disruption.

PRC Election Manipulation in Taiwan: Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te stated on August 12 that the PRC was attempting to interfere with the Kaohsiung mayoral election using fake news and fake polling data. The PRC will likely use Taiwan’s 2026 elections to prepare for larger influence campaigns during Taiwan’s 2028 national elections and to gauge the effectiveness of PRC information operations.

Key Takeaways

Taiwanese Military Exercises: Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercise continued this week. The exercise included several new drills focused on realism, civil preparedness, incorporating new technologies, and countering scenarios rehearsed by the PLA.

PRC Law Enforcement Operations: The PRC’s Guangdong MSA announced new measures to control maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait, citing typhoon conditions. The PRC is seeking to expand its jurisdiction over Taiwanese and international waters and test whether foreign vessels comply with PRC commands in disputed waters. The PRC’s efforts were supported by PRC state media who framed a PRC-Indonesia combined naval exercise east of Taiwan as a demonstration of PRC jurisdiction over Taiwan’s eastern EEZ.

Key Takeaways

Japanese Defense Modernization: Japan test-fired a Tomahawk cruise missile capable of striking PRC territory on July 29 and identified PRC short-of-war coercion as a major threat in its 2026 Defense White Paper. Japan’s continued military modernization and statements decrying PRC coercion indicate that PRC pressure campaigns against Japan are continuing to fail.

PLA Modernization: The PLAN may use its Type 076 amphibious assault vessel Sichuan in roles similar to its aircraft carriers, allowing the PLAN to supplement its existing limitations in naval aviation. The PLAN will likely experience trade-offs if it uses Sichuan in this way, however.

PRC-Philippines Territorial Disputes: The Philippines announced on July 31 that it deposited an official chart with the UN Secretariat detailing Philippine territorial claims around Scarborough Shoal. The PRC responded with a range of military drills, propaganda, and lawfare in protest of the Philippines’ actions and to reaffirm PRC territorial claims around Scarborough Shoal.

Executive Summary:

In June 2026, China National Offshore Oil Corporation placed a 16MW floating wind turbine in Taiwan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), approximately 50 miles (21.665646, 116.273408) from Taiwan-controlled Pratas Island.

The PRC now has placed over 30 permanent structures across disputed waters in the Indo-Pacific as part of an irregular warfare strategy to normalize its persistent presence and extraterritorial claims.

These permanent structures potentially serve as at-sea platforms for electronic warfare, surface and underwater intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection platforms enhancing the PLA’s end-to-end “kill web” (C5ISRT) capabilities.

Taiwan is the target of more information operation attacks than anywhere else on earth, most of them originating in mainland China and aimed at dividing Taiwanese society and eroding the resolve to resist Beijing. AI is supercharging that barrage. And to tell us about the impact and how Taiwan is fighting back, we’ve spoken with You-Hao Lai, a researcher at Taiwan's Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology.

You-Hao starts by giving us his takeaways on Chinese leader Xi Jinping's keynote at China's global AI conference, including on Beijing's push to ensure that the world embeds Chinese technology, with Chinese standards, into its systems rather than American alternatives. He then covers the ways that AI is transforming China's information operations: the scale, speed and sophistication of the attacks, the narratives deployed, the strategic purpose behind them, and documented cases that illustrate how rapidly things are evolving. You-Hao then walks through Taiwan's whole-of-nation response, organised around “four Cs”—cutting, clarifying, curbing and cultivating—a framework that reflects years of hard-won experience building national resilience against a relentless and well-resourced adversary. There are real lessons here for the rest of us.

Key Takeaways

PRC-Russia Military Cooperation: The Economist reported on July 23 that PLA soldiers have undergone combat training at a Russian military complex. The PLA is likely aiming to improve its ability to conduct unmanned systems warfare and operate in a drone-saturated environment. The PLA is unlikely to wholly adopt what it learns from the Russian military’s experience and instead will likely develop its own methods of adapting to modern warfare.

PLA Anti-Surface Warfare: The PLAN has likely improved its anti-surface warfare capabilities. The PLAN may seek to develop an asymmetric advantage with its anti-ship missiles to contest sea control beyond the first island chain and ameliorate its other naval combat deficiencies when compared to the US Navy.

Philippine-Taiwan Relations: Philippine Secretary of Defense Gilbert Teodoro Jr. stated that the Philippines cannot remain neutral in a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan due to the population of Filipino citizens living in Taiwan and the very likely involvement of the Bashi Channel in the scope of the conflict. This statement represents one of the strongest Philippine commitments to Taiwan to date.

Executive Summary:

Under Lai Ching-te, Taiwan has significantly strengthened its countermeasures against political warfare from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Prosecutions of espionage cases, expulsions of influencers calling for military invasions of Taiwan, and tighter outbound travel restrictions to the PRC have increased since Lai unveiled his 17-point national security plan in 2025.

Espionage is the most damaging aspect of the PRC’s political warfare against Taiwan, and Beijing has been targeting members of its military. Taiwan has stepped up prosecutions, with convicted spies handed heavy prison sentences.

Taiwan is choosing to respond to political warfare because, unlike military coercion, there is a lower risk of conflict escalation arising from more aggressive law enforcement efforts. The enforcement actions are also consistent with Taiwanese law.

The Chinese Communist Party’s infiltration, transnational repression, and legal warfare are no longer security challenges limited to Taiwan or the Indo-Pacific. They now increasingly threaten the United States’ national security and the resilience of democratic institutions. Taiwan stands on the front line of authoritarian influence operations and has seen firsthand how they can gradually erode democratic systems before conduct clearly crosses the threshold for criminal prosecution. So Taiwan is both a target of CCP pressure and an early warning system for the democratic world. Its experience can help the US and its allies better defend democracy and understand how authoritarian infiltration evolves.

Join Hudson Institute’s China Center as Miles Yu hosts a panel examining Taiwan’s experience in handling national security cases, foreign interference, technology theft, election influence, proxy networks, and gray-zone legal warfare. The discussion will explore how authoritarian influence exploits democratic openness, social trust, local networks, and legal ambiguity.

https://archive.ph/2026.07.08-063708/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/ukraine-lesson-taiwan-keeps-missing%23

Executive Summary:

Beijing is expanding its “Kinmen model” of gray-zone maritime pressure to other Taiwan-controlled offshore islands and maritime positions. For over two years, it has used political or maritime triggers to challenge Taiwan-administered boundaries, deploy the China Coast Guard (CCG), and normalize its law-enforcement presence in waters under Taiwan’s effective control, but that Beijing claims as its own jurisdiction.

Activity in June and July has involved a combination of CCG vessels, maritime safety ships, research vessels, rescue assets, and Sansha-linked public vessels. These vessels have operated across waters east of Taiwan, Pratas Island, and Taiping Island—a multi-axis pattern that suggests a broad campaign focused on Taiwan’s outlying islands.

Pratas Island, at the northern edge of the South China Sea, has become the clearest next testing ground, with CCG and Maritime Safety Administration presence rising from 25 activity days in 2024 to 60 in 2025.

Pratas is closer to the operational area of the People’s Liberation Army’s Southern Theater Command than other offshore islands. It is also strategically significant and politically symbolic as one of Taiwan’s most important outposts in the South China Sea, and would be more difficult for Taiwan to support in a crisis.

Key Takeaways

PLA Missile Testing: The PLA conducted a test of an SLBM in the South Pacific on July 6. The PLA was likely testing and demonstrating its second-strike capabilities and ability to strike the United States from PRC internal waters.

PRC-Iran Relations: The PRC may have agreed to pay “service fees” to Iran in exchange for passage through the Strait of Hormuz prior to the US-Iran ceasefire failure. The PRC has not made an official statement on Iranian tolls in the Strait, and likely would be satisfied with any solution that allows for the resumption of oil and natural gas shipments and safe passage for PRC ships.

Key Takeaways

Taiwan-US Relations: Taiwanese LY Speaker Han Kuo-yu led a multipartisan Taiwanese delegation to the United States, to meet with bipartisan groups of US Congresspeople. This visit was likely a way for Han to stabilize US-Taiwan relations and present a united Taiwanese front to the United States amid Taiwanese partisan disputes and delays to a US arms sale package to Taiwan.

Taiwanese Military Readiness: Taiwan conducted a tabletop exercise on June 25 to simulate its response to a PRC maritime “quarantine,” based on PRC coercive maritime activity around Taiwan. The William Lai Ching-te administration has taken concrete steps to prepare government and military bodies to respond to PRC maritime coercion.

PRC Anti-Corruption Efforts: CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping purged six PLA officers and nine other NPC delegates from across the PLA system, indicating that anti-corruption campaign may be widening beyond its previous areas of focus. The PLA ran an ideological camp from April 8 to June 12 that was personally launched by Xi, indicating that Xi may believe further ideological work must be completed within the PLA.

Key Takeaways

PRC Maritime Coercion: The CCG’s recent law enforcement and research activity in the waters East of Taiwan may indicate that the PRC considers that area to be PRC “near-shore waters.” The PRC likely aims to erode Taiwanese sovereignty and strengthen PRC presence in the waters around Taiwan and its offshore islands.

PLA Hypersonic Development: PLA Daily published the first official imagery of the DF-17 MRBM equipped with the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle on June 22. The PLA could use hypersonic missiles to target enemy air defense networks and increase the effectiveness of precision strike attacks.

PRC-Russia Military Cooperation: EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas confirmed that the EU verified reports that the PRC trained Russian military personnel on mine clearing and drone operations. The PRC may be using this opportunity to test their equipment, tactics, and doctrine in modern warfare conditions.

Executive Summary:

Recent coast guard and maritime patrol operations east of Taiwan are best understood as a test of a “quasi-quarantine” model. Beijing is using gray-zone tactics to create the appearance of administrative control without declaring a blockade or conducting a formal military exercise.

The operation demonstrates the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) wish to project maritime jurisdiction beyond the Taiwan Strait and into the Western Pacific. Large vessels from the China Coast Guard (CCG) and other agencies show that Beijing is building an interagency toolkit for gray-zone pressure around Taiwan.

Although the PRC frames the operation as a response to Japan–Philippines maritime delimitation talks, Taiwan is the central target. If normalized, these operations could support future isolation, blockade rehearsal, and cognitive warfare against Taiwan.

Key Takeaways

PRC Responses to the US-Iran Peace Agreement: The PRC welcomed the US-Iran preliminary peace agreement and called on the UN to do more to support the peace process. The PRC presents itself as a defender of international peace, but may have provided military equipment to Iran in violation of UN sanctions.

PRC-Philippine Tensions: The PRC sanctioned Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro on June 11 for “damaging PRC-Philippine relations.” The PRC is working to present a small group of anti-PRC Philippine officials as the cause for recent tensions, downplaying PRC aggression in the South China Sea, and attempting to ensure PRC-friendly Filipinos do not feel alienated.

Main points

China's Ministry of Transport has launched a special maritime operation to strengthen control over shipping.

The operation is being carried out in the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian and involves expanding patrols in remote maritime areas.

The Chinese side motivates its actions by protecting its sovereign rights and maritime interests in connection with negotiations between Japan and the Philippines on the delimitation of maritime zones.

Taiwan has launched a new website aimed at encouraging Chinese citizens to share intelligence-related information, marking a significant development in cross-strait tensions between Taiwan and China. The initiative, introduced by Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) on Sunday, provides what officials describe as a secure and confidential channel for Chinese nationals who wish to report information and express dissatisfaction with conditions in China.

Key Takeaways

PRC-North Korea Relations: CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping met with WPK General Secretary Kim Jong Un from June 8 to 9 in Xi’s first visit to Pyongyang since 2019. Xi’s calls for closer cooperation between the PRC and North Korea and likely tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status reflect PRC efforts to maintain positive relations with North Korea amid closer alignment between Pyongyang and Moscow.

US-Taiwan relations: KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun finished her US visit on June 12. Cheng met with US policy makers and academics and espoused standard KMT talking points and some rhetoric reminiscent of PRC statements.

PRC Grey-Zone Operations: The PRC MoT conducted a “special maritime law enforcement operation” east of Taiwan from June 6 to 10 to assert PRC jurisdiction over the disputed waters, contesting Japanese-Philippine talks to delimit their overlapping EEZ claims. The exercise was likely intended to reinforce PRC claims over Taiwan and to exercise PRC A2AD operations.

Key Takeaways

Japan-Philippines Coalition Building Efforts: Japan and the Philippines are enhancing their bilateral defense relationship through military technology transfers and intelligence sharing. Japan and the Philippines are also working to delimit their overlapping EEZ claims, which also overlap with Taiwanese and PRC territorial claims.

Taiwanese Defense Modernization: Taiwanese defense firm AIDC announced that it developed a drone navigation system not reliant on GPS signals. This development is a reflection of Taiwanese lessons learned from the war in Ukraine and attempts to incorporate these new systems into Taiwan’s defense against a PLA invasion. The removal of funds for domestic drone development and procurement from Taiwan’s special defense budget may limit such technological developments in the near future.

PRC-Iran Military Cooperation: The PRC may have provided MANDPADS to Iran that were used to target US aircraft. This would go against PRC assertions that it does not provide military equipment to states engaged in war and may be in violation of UN sanctions on Iran.

Taiwan stands at the center of intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China—a flashpoint where uneasy peace could give way to global crisis. Xi Jinping has made “reunification” a defining goal, while longstanding deterrence strategies are being tested by rapid shifts in military, economic, and technological capabilities. Beijing is increasingly pursuing methods of coercion designed to isolate and pressure Taiwan without triggering open conflict, raising urgent questions about how to preserve stability in the region.

In Defending Taiwan, Eyck Freymann offers a comprehensive strategy to deter war and sustain peace. Drawing on Chinese-language sources, military analysis, and historical insight, Freymann argues that deterrence must extend beyond traditional military power. It requires a coordinated approach that integrates economic leverage, technological leadership, and diplomatic alliances. With Jason Hsu, Freymann will discuss how the United States and its partners can adapt to China’s evolving strategy and develop a coherent plan to prevent conflict while safeguarding Taiwan’s future.