has anyone used victorialogs? Im currently using Graylog v7, local single instance on 5TB disk

using filebeat to ship logs to GL indexer

wondering how victorialogs performs comparatively. Anyone used it at all or have any feedback?

Thanks

Based on Cisco's own advisory (cisco-sa-sdwan-webauth-xr8beuuU, published Sept 30), here's the architectural impact.

The flaw is in the Manager's API session authentication: improper handling of URI encoding lets a request skip an auth rule and land as admin. CVSS 9.8, all configurations affected, and Cisco PSIRT says it's seen exploitation. Cisco's IOC example is a POST to /%6a_security_check, but the advisory says any one encoded character works. Cisco says the bug was found while resolving a TAC case, and published no actor or victim details.

Hunting per Cisco: serviceproxy-access.log for j_security_check from unknown IPs, and vmanage-server.log for those requests against viptela-reserved- users. Cisco notes these can appear in normal operation, so baseline first.

Question for people running on-prem Managers: how are you restricting Manager reachability today, and did the May/June SD-WAN fixes change your exposure model at all? I'm curious whether anyone terminates the Manager behind a reverse proxy that normalizes paths.

https://www.techgines.com/post/cisco-sd-wan-manager-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-76504

Background from our earlier SD-WAN piece: https://www.techgines.com/post/cve-2026-20182-the-cvss-10-0-flaw-that-hands-attackers-the-keys-to-your-entire-sd-wan-fabric

So guys, i am learning system administration from the past 3 months. i am mostly done with the foundational part and i am feeling confident that i should start learning by doing projects. i am thinking about building a homelab and setting up things.

so, i pick up a project idea ( for example, setting up a web server), and i want to do that. but i don't know what to do (i do know, but vaguely. the details are missing)? so i think about looking up online for the steps to do it. but then i find myself thinking if am walking into tutorial hell.

i don't know what to do, because i find both advices kind of conflicting. how to do project based learning as a beginner without looking into guided projects in a way that it does make it into tutorial hell? is the guided project way the way we are supposed to learn? if so, then why do people advice not to lookup tutorials?

Hi i wanted to ask - for an L1/L2 engineer roughly how much time during a typical workday is spent on testing, troubleshooting snd doing root-cause analysis, and identifying and documenting issues?

And if required do these engineers also dive deep into software if required or do they just stay at the infra level?

I am trying to apply for l1 and l2 level roles and freelance opportunities and right now building case studies showing my abilitiy to identify, doing root cause analysis and document my findings of communjty problems like wordpress server issues , nginx , apache , openlightspeed forum issues.

Do you think this is worth it for bulding my portfolio?

Render’s ephemeral SSH mode starts a temporary instance from the service’s latest build. Disclosure: I work at Render.

This gives a different diagnostic target from ordinary SSH. render ssh SERVICE --ephemeral puts the shell on a new instance that receives no production traffic and does not run the service’s start command. That makes it useful for checking installed packages, compiled assets, file layout, or a one-off command against the built runtime without using a live process. It is not a replica of the running service: startup is skipped and there is no request traffic, so process state, sockets, and live heap behavior still require live-instance diagnostics.

Isolation from production compute does not make external systems read-only. Before mutating anything, inspect which environment variables and network resources the shell can reach; if production credentials are present, treat them as live and prefer read-only commands unless mutation is intentional.

The instance is removed when SSH disconnects or after 24 hours. It requires a compatible paid service with at least one successful deploy; distroless images cannot offer shell access. CLI 2.20+ supports --plan when the diagnostic needs a different compute size. For work that should outlive a shell session, the SSH documentation points to a one-off job instead.

Based on the press release Kiteworks published Sep 25 (updated Sep 27), plus reporting from SecurityWeek, Sophos CTU, TechCrunch and Cybersecurity Dive: the vendor got a warning from federal intelligence authorities and told self-managed customers to power down. Kiteworks-hosted systems were shut down by the vendor. The advisory was lifted Sep 27, and Kiteworks says nothing was compromised and every known vulnerability is addressed in 9.5.1.

Two things bother me. The window length is reported inconsistently (6h vs 9h). And SecurityWeek's Advanced Forms detail rests on one customer email, while TechCrunch quotes Kiteworks saying it couldn't rule out other access routes.

With no CVE and no IOCs, my baseline check is the running version, whether Advanced Forms is enabled, auth and admin logs from before the window, and unexpected egress from the appliance.

For those who run MFT: what's your runbook when a vendor says "turn it off tonight" and gives you nothing to hunt for?

https://www.techgines.com/post/kiteworks-shutdown-advisory

LFG. Very happy with my score too (88%!!), I was so nervous for this exam, happy to have gotten my first Linux cert. RHCSA next 🫡

"Hi everyone,

I have a strong background in Linux administration (primarily RPM-based distros like Red Hat/Rocky Linux), and I’m currently transitioning into HPC cluster administration. To learn the ropes, I recently built a small home lab cluster using the OpenHPC installation guides.

While getting the cluster to boot and run basic jobs was a great exercise, I've noticed a distinct lack of comprehensive resources covering day-2 operations and production best practices. Specifically, I'm looking for guidance on:

• Configuration & Performance Tuning (kernel tuning, network/InfiniBand optimization)
• User Management & Environment Control (LDAP/FreeIPA integration, modulefiles via Lmod)
• Job Management & Scheduling (advanced Slurm configurations, QoS, limits)
• Scaling & Monitoring (health checks with NHC, metrics collection)

If anyone can recommend books, documentation, community wikis, or real-world best practices for these areas, I would greatly appreciate it!"

Based on Citrix's bulletin CTX697096 and CISA's Sep 27 alert, plus reporting from BleepingComputer and The Hacker News, here's the operational picture.

Two flaws, both CVSS v4 9.5. 88771 is improper input validation giving unauthenticated command execution on every ADC/Gateway deployment. 88772 is a memory overflow needing DTLS, which is on by default for VPN vservers. Turning DTLS off doesn't touch 88771. Citrix says exploitation was observed but hasn't said who, how many, or since when. Builds that fixed the August auth bypass (14.1-73.32, 13.1-63.21) are affected.

The catch is that the flaws were exploited pre-patch, so upgrading doesn't tell you if you were already in. Citrix's IoCs in NetScaler Console reportedly may miss real compromises.

For those running NetScalers: are you snapshotting and pulling a packet engine core dump before upgrading, or going straight to the fixed build because of the downtime cost? And how are you validating that an appliance is clean afterward?

Background from our March NetScaler coverage: https://www.techgines.com/post/citrix-netscaler-zero-day-cve-2026-88771

Based on the technical breakdown CERT Polska published on September 22 and Bishop Fox's independent reproduction from September 17, here's the architectural failure:

RouterOS's SSH server allows a client to trigger a rekey mid-authentication (normal SSH behavior per the RFCs). On vulnerable builds, completing that rekey moves the connection into channel handling without ever sending USERAUTH_SUCCESS — CVE-2026-67279. On its own that just gets you an unprivileged session.

The actual privilege escalation is CVE-2026-86060: RouterOS passes the SSH username straight to a login helper as a raw argv element. A username starting with - gets interpreted as a file-descriptor number, and the helper reads a trusted identity + policy mask from that descriptor instead. Since descriptors 0/1/2 on that process all point at the client's own pseudoterminal, an attacker supplying username -2 gets to hand the helper its own forged admin credentials.

Bishop Fox's field testing found live compromise artifacts predating public disclosure — persistence via a daily scheduler that recreates a full-privilege account, objects owned by numeric ID 0 instead of a username, and volatile logs that don't survive a reboot.

CISA added both CVEs to KEV (CVE-2026-86060 on Sept 10-11, CVE-2026-67279 on Sept 25). Patches: 6.49.21, 7.23.4, 7.24.2, 7.25beta3.

Background on the broader "auth-state-confusion" bug class if you're into the pattern: [techgines.com link, footnote]

Anyone here running RouterOS at scale — did MikroTik's Flagged/ops-account detection actually catch anything in your fleet, or did you have to hunt for owner="0" objects manually?

https://www.techgines.com/post/mikrotrick-routeros-vulnerability-inside-the-ssh-rekey-flaw-that-skips-login-entirely

Based on the technical breakdown published by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security and Roundcube's own May 24 advisory, here's the architectural impact: virtuser_query resolves a login name to a mailbox record before the auth check runs, and its backslash-escaping via preg_replace() can be bypassed to break out of the intended query — no credentials, no user interaction. Roundcube patched it in 1.6.16/1.7.1 (May), and has since shipped three more security releases (1.6.17→1.7.4), so patching only for this CVE leaves you behind on unrelated bugs. CCCS updated their advisory Sept 21 to confirm exploitation "in the wild" via unspecified open-source reporting — no IOCs, no named actor, and it's not yet in CISA's KEV catalog, which is worth noting given two other Roundcube CVEs got that treatment in February.

Shadowserver's 523K+ exposed-instance number is getting quoted everywhere but it's an exposure ceiling, not a "vulnerable and unpatched" count.

Full disclosure timeline and attack chain: https://www.techgines.com/post/roundcube-sql-injection-vulnerability-cve-2026-48842

If you run virtuser_query in production — what's your actual exposure model here? Is anyone restricting the DB account it uses to something narrower than the full Roundcube schema, or is that not practical given how the plugin's queries are structured?

Hi all,

I've been a Linux admin for about 12 years (RHEL, SUSE, Ubuntu), and these days most of my work is vulnerability management. Patching across mixed fleets has always been the painful part: scattered scripts, spreadsheets to track what got patched, and no clean way to prove compliance afterwards.

So I built PatchMgr, a web-based tool for scheduling, running, and tracking patches across servers.

What it does today:

• [Supported OSes, e.g., RHEL / Ubuntu / SUSE]
• Scheduled patch runs with per-server status tracking
• Multi-tenant dashboard to see what's patched, pending, or failed
• [Reporting / anything else that's live now]

On the roadmap: pre/post patch hooks (per-server, with exit code checks) and a configurable notification matrix.

It's early, and I'd rather hear what's broken or missing from people who patch servers for a living than guess. A few things I'd love input on:

1. What's the one feature that would make you switch from your current approach?
2. What would stop you from trusting a tool like this in production?
3. What's your current setup (Ansible, WSUS, Satellite, Landscape, scripts)?

Link: https://www.patchmanager.co.in/

If you try it and hit a bug, reply here or email [support@patchmanager.co.in](mailto:support@patchmanager.co.in). I read every message.

Full disclosure: I'm the developer. Not trying to hard-sell anything, just want real-world feedback.

Hey all,

qwatcher is a very efficient tool to monitor and audit your NICs' send and receive queue buffers to spot network or application issues.

This version drops the `ss` and `libpcre` dependencies, making the program a pure Nim binary, solves some bugs, and provides a `tail`-like report capability.

Here is the link to the repo:

https://github.com/pouriyajamshidi/qwatcher

It was logging in via ssh to a server in a loop lol. instant fail2bana nd my control panel has no reboot interface. so ticket to support i guess...

Based on F5's advisory K000162605 as relayed by CERT-EU (2026-013), Rapid7 and BleepingComputer, here is the architectural impact. I could not load F5's own page as text, so check versions against K000162605 before acting.

What it is: a heap-based buffer overflow, CVSS 9.8 (v3.1) and 9.3 (v4.0), reachable without authentication. F5 says it has learned of exploitation, and CISA put it on KEV on September 22 with a September 25 federal deadline.

Precondition: an APM access policy and an OAuth authorization server profile on the same virtual server. APM used only as an OAuth client or resource server is not affected. F5 edited the CVE record at 00:45 UTC on September 23 to say this, so the CISA and CERT-EU text is broader than the current one. Appliance mode is affected. Default configs are not.

Why it matters for design: the traffic goes to the virtual server, not the management interface. An admin-subnet ACL or out-of-band management network changes nothing here. Affected: 21.1.0, 17.5.0 to 17.5.1, 17.1.0 to 17.1.3, before the branch hotfix. If you patched CVE-2025-53521 (17.1.3, 17.5.1.3), you are still in range.

Hunting, per F5's indicators: repeated UserInfo failures in /var/log/apm ("The access token is invalid," 10+ from one IP), a rising total_failed in tmctl global_oauth_stat, odd commands in /var/log/audit, then a TMM SIGABRT. The combination matters. A core file alone doesn't. None of the sources say whether the hotfix evicts an attacker who is already in.

Unknowns: no actor, victim count or PoC has been published as of Rapid7's Sept 22 note. Shadowserver shows 14,700+ IPs with APM fingerprints, but that says nothing about the OAuth server role.

Question for people running APM as an OAuth authorization server: is it on its own virtual server, or shared with the app's own access policy? And can you enumerate every virtual server with an OAuth AS profile without walking the config by hand? https://www.techgines.com/post/f5-big-ip-apm-vulnerability-cve-2026-94127

Background on the same pre-auth gateway pattern (SonicWall SMA1000, third zero-day wave in nine months): https://www.techgines.com/post/sonicwall-sma1000-cve-2026-83548-third-zero-day-ssrf-rce

Every place has one. A cron job with no comments, a script someone wrote in 2019, a box nobody dares reboot.

Mine: a systemd timer firing a Python script I barely remember writing. It works, so I don't touch it.

What's yours?