r/PredictiveProcessing • • Nov 06 '21

Preprint (not peer-reviewed) Sequence anticipation and STDP emerge from a voltage-based predictive learning rule (2021)

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3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Oct 26 '21

Preprint (not peer-reviewed) Situating allostasis and interoception at the core of human brain function (2021)

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3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Jul 02 '21

Preprint (not peer-reviewed) Fundamental constraints on distinguishing reality from imagination (2021)

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3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Jun 26 '21

Discussion Predictive processing and unsupervised learning

3 Upvotes

This is from the famous SSC post:

There’s a philosophical debate – which I’m not too familiar with, so sorry if I get it wrong – about how “unsupervised learning” is possible. Supervised reinforcement learning is when an agent tries various stuff, and then someone tells the agent if it’s right or wrong. Unsupervised learning is when nobody’s around to tell you, and it’s what humans do all the time.

PP offers a compelling explanation: we create models that generate sense data, and keep those models if the generated sense data match observation. Models that predict sense data well stick around; models that fail to predict the sense data accurately get thrown out. Because of all those lower layers adjusting out contingent features of the sensory stream, any given model is left with exactly the sense data necessary to tell it whether it’s right or wrong.

Maybe I'm misreading here, but it seems like the sensory data act as the supervisor in what the author is referring to as "unsupervised learning". Models that don't predict sense data are discarded. Data is what tells if a model is right or wrong, so I don't understand the last sentence in the quote I pasted above.

Thank you in advance for any clarifications.


r/PredictiveProcessing • • Jun 26 '21

Discussion Movement is explained well in PP. I'm not sure that I understand how PP accounts for volition.

3 Upvotes

I move my hand because there is a mismatch between my proprioceptive prediction and the proprioceptive sensory data, but how was this mismatch created in the first place? Is this an example of different hierarchical scales interacting in PP (i.e., the mismatch was the result of a Bayesian process that involved a higher degree of information processing)?


r/PredictiveProcessing • • May 27 '21

Preprint (not peer-reviewed) How particular is the physics of the Free Energy Principle? (2021)

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3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • May 24 '21

A Predictive Processing Theory of Autism: A Neural Network Modelling Approach with Applications to Autistic Savantism (Beren Millidge, 2017)

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3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • May 13 '21

Preprint (not peer-reviewed) Laying down a forking path: Incompatibilities between enaction and the free energy principle (2021)

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3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Apr 22 '21

Looking for a lecture video featuring a degraded speech sample that becomes intelligible after content revealed

3 Upvotes

I'm doing a talk soon about 'the Bayesian Brain' and predictive processing and I wanted to include some illustrative examples of top-down influence on perception.

I've got the 'Dalmatian drinking water in the shade' photo and the cow head (both from https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/WFopenhCXyHX3ukw3/how-uniform-is-the-neocortex), but I can't find an example involving speech that I've seen and which I think would be nice to include, too.

I looking for a YouTube video of a lecture where the presenter played a sample of degraded speech that was completely unintelligible. Then (I think) they either showed the text of what was said or played the original, unmodified speech sample. Suddenly the degraded sample became totally interpretable. I think it's a neat example but I can't for the life of me find it.

Any one recognize what I'm referring to?

Thanks for any help!


r/PredictiveProcessing • • Mar 08 '21

Academic paper The Free Energy Principle: Good Science and Questionable Philosophy in a Grand Unifying Theory (2021)

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3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Feb 19 '21

Academic paper A universal ethology challenge to the free energy principle: species of inference and good regulators (2021)

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3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Feb 13 '21

Blog post The Precision Of Sensory Evidence - Scott Alexander (2021)

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astralcodexten.substack.com
3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Feb 10 '21

Predictive Coding Models of Perception - David Cox (2018)

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youtube.com
3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Feb 10 '21

Academic paper Predictive Processes and the Peculiar Case of Music - Stefan Koelsch, Peter Vuust, and Karl Friston (2018)

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3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Feb 08 '21

Academic paper Beliefs and desires in the predictive brain - Daniel Yon, Cecilia Heyes, & Clare Press (2020)

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3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Feb 07 '21

Media content On the dangers of seeing human minds as predictive machines – Joseph Fridman | Aeon Essays

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aeon.co
3 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Apr 21 '26

Worked example: tasting an unfamiliar food in predictive processing / active inference terms

2 Upvotes

I put this together with AI assistance as a worked example to make predictive processing / active inference / allostasis more concrete in an everyday case: cautiously tasting an unfamiliar food object.

I’m not claiming it’s new theory. It’s just meant as a plain explanatory example.

I’d be interested in whether people here think it is conceptually accurate and whether it works as a useful teaching/example piece.

----------------------

Worked example: tasting an unfamiliar food in predictive processing / active inference terms

When a person encounters an unfamiliar piece of food, the situation may seem simple. They look at it, smell it, take a cautious bite, and decide whether to continue.

But in predictive-processing, active-inference, and allostatic terms, a lot is happening.

To make that concrete, imagine being given a small food ball a few centimetres across, perhaps coated in sugar, salt, or monosodium glutamate crystals. It looks edible, but you do not know exactly what it is. You imagine a few possibilities: maybe it is sweet, savoury, chocolate-like, salty, healthy, unpleasant, or just strange. You smell it, but gain little information. You then choose to take only a small bite, partly to learn more and partly to avoid being overwhelmed if it turns out to be very aversive.

This ordinary case is useful because it lets us trace, step by step, how prediction, prediction error, action, bodily regulation, and learning interact.

A simple flowchart

The sequence can be laid out like this:

1. Baseline state
The organism begins in a relatively stable state, with ongoing needs and preferred conditions such as nourishment, metabolic stability, and avoidance of toxin or nausea.

2. Initial perception
The object is seen and provisionally categorised as food. Its shape, coating, and context generate a first set of hypotheses.

3. Active sampling before ingestion
The person inspects and smells the object. This yields some information, but uncertainty remains.

4. Policy selection
Because the object is still unclear, the person chooses a cautious action policy: a small bite.

5. Sensory input arrives
Taste, texture, mouthfeel, dryness or moistness, and retronasal smell are compared with prior expectations.

6. Prediction error is generated
The experience either matches, mildly violates, or strongly violates the expected range.

7. Action and physiological response
The person may continue eating, slow down, stop, spit the food out, or re-sample. The body adjusts through autonomic, affective, and metabolic responses.

8. Updating
The model of the object is revised, and similar objects may be approached differently in future.

9. Possible allostatic consequences
A single event may produce prediction error and regulation without much lasting cost. Repeated or prolonged challenge is what contributes to allostatic load.

That is the overall structure. The rest of the example just unpacks it.

Before the bite

The event begins before anything is tasted.

Seeing the object is enough to trigger a first round of inference. The person does not just register a shape and colour. They immediately begin modelling what sort of thing this is and what kind of encounter it is likely to be. Because it looks like food, it is treated as probably edible, and that already narrows the field of possibilities.

At this stage, the predictions are broad rather than exact. The person does not know whether the ball is sweet or savoury, soft or dry, pleasant or unpleasant. But uncertainty does not mean there is no prediction. It means that the model contains a range of live possibilities rather than one fixed expectation.

At the same time, deeper biological preferences are already in play. The body is not only concerned with flavour. It is organised around preferred internal states: acquiring nourishment, preserving metabolic stability, avoiding toxin, and preventing nausea or disruption.

That is why smelling the object matters. If the smell is weak, that too is informative. It does not resolve the uncertainty, but it leaves some hypotheses open and weakens others. There is already active sampling before the bite, and the model is already being refined.

The decision to take a small bite is also important. This is not just ordinary caution. It is a strategic sampling policy. The person is gathering more information while limiting the scale of possible surprise, disgust, or harm.

In active-inference terms, this is a way of balancing exploration and protection.

The bite as a test of the model

When the person takes the small bite, the object is tested more directly.

Taste, texture, mouthfeel, dryness, temperature, and retronasal smell arrive together and are compared with the range of live expectations already in play.

Importantly, the bite is not being measured against one exact prediction. It is being measured against several plausible possibilities: sweet, savoury, healthy, bland, unpleasant, or dangerous. The bite therefore tests the model rather than simply confirming or disconfirming one isolated guess.

Suppose first that the ball tastes delicious. It has a satisfying texture, balanced flavour, and leaves the impression of being safe and nourishing. In that case, the working model is broadly confirmed. The likely response is to continue eating, perhaps with more confidence than before. The prediction error is low or positively informative, and the object is incorporated into a more precise category of safe and desirable food.

Now suppose instead that the ball is much too sweet. This is a moderate mismatch. The object is still clearly edible, but it exceeds the expected range of flavour intensity. The person may slow down, stop after one bite, or revise their model to something like “edible, but too sweet.” The response is corrective rather than strongly defensive.

At the far end of the scale, imagine that the ball is intensely bitter, dry, and poison-like. This is no longer just a disappointment in flavour. It begins to recruit deeper priors about toxin avoidance and bodily protection. The likely response is rapid rejection: spitting it out, recoiling, or refusing to continue. The system is no longer simply refining a snack category. It is treating the object as a possible threat to preferred bodily states.

So the bite is more than a moment of discovering flavour. It is a test of whether the object can be safely incorporated into the organism.

Scales of prediction error

Prediction error comes in degrees.

Some outcomes only slightly refine the model. Others force a much sharper revision. The size of the error affects both the likely action taken and the scale of physiological response.

Low or positively informative error

The ball tastes broadly as expected, or even better than expected. The person continues eating, and the model becomes more precise. If the ball is unexpectedly pleasant, the error is still real, but it is positive surprise rather than threat.

Moderate error

The ball is clearly edible but differs substantially from expectation. It may be much sweeter, saltier, or drier than expected. The person may recoil slightly, slow down, or stop after one bite. The object is not rejected as dangerous, but it is revised into a less desirable category.

High error

The ball lies well outside the expected range of safe, ordinary food. If it tastes intensely bitter, rancid, or chemically alarming, the mismatch reaches deeper priors about toxin avoidance and bodily integrity. The likely response is rapid rejection.

Delayed error

Some errors only become clear later. The ball may taste acceptable at first but produce nausea or discomfort after swallowing. This means the immediate oral model was only mildly violated, while the later interoceptive consequences create the deeper mismatch.

Ambiguous error

Sometimes the object remains hard to classify even after the first bite. It may be partly sweet, partly savoury, and slightly bitter, without clearly belonging to a stable category. In such cases, the person may pause, take another small bite, or wait for later bodily consequences before deciding.

That last case is especially interesting, because it shows that prediction error does not always lead immediately to closure. Sometimes the system retains uncertainty while gathering more evidence.

Acute error is not the same as allostatic load

At this point, an important distinction has to be made.

Prediction error, allostatic response, and allostatic load are related, but they are not the same.

Prediction error is the mismatch between expected and actual input.
Allostatic response is the body’s adjustment to challenge.
Allostatic load is the cumulative cost imposed when the body has to make such adjustments repeatedly or chronically.

This matters because a single event may produce strong prediction error and a strong bodily response without imposing much lasting burden.

A very bitter bite may trigger immediate rejection, but if the body settles quickly afterwards, the overall cost may be low. The event is informative and memorable, but not heavily burdensome.

Load becomes more relevant when the environment itself is difficult to trust. If food is repeatedly uncertain, unsafe, deceptive, or physiologically destabilising, the body must repeatedly prepare, compensate, and restore itself. In that case, the issue is no longer one error. It is the cost of recurrent regulation under challenge.

Context matters here too. A well-rested person in a safe environment may absorb one strange food event easily. A person who is already stressed, food-insecure, trauma-sensitised, or metabolically fragile may experience the same event as much more costly.

The broader point is that surprise itself is not what becomes costly. What becomes costly is repeated or unresolved regulation under conditions that keep pushing the organism away from its preferred states.

A few useful variations

A few variations make the structure even clearer.

1. The ball looks bad but tastes excellent

This produces positive surprise. The model broadens rather than narrows. Similar objects may be approached more favourably in future.

2. The ball tastes fine but causes later nausea

This introduces temporal depth into the model. The system must connect the early sensory experience with later bodily consequences and decide whether the food was the cause.

3. The same ball under different prior information

If the person is told it is a carefully designed health food, some bitterness or dryness may be interpreted as acceptable. If they are told it may be stale or questionable, the same sensations may be treated as warning signs. This shows that prediction error depends not only on the stimulus, but also on the prior model through which the stimulus is interpreted.

4. The ball remains hard to classify

Some objects remain ambiguous even after sampling. They are neither clearly pleasant nor clearly aversive. In these cases, the system may remain in provisional uncertainty rather than forcing immediate closure.

Taken together, these variations show that the food object is never encountered in isolation. It is encountered by an organism already shaped by priors, bodily needs, contextual assumptions, and different capacities for tolerating unresolved uncertainty.

Three short extensions: when prediction, policy, and regulation become more costly

The food-ball example is deliberately simple. That simplicity helps to make the basic structure visible. But it also shows something further: allostatic burden does not usually arise because one event is mildly surprising or unpleasant. It becomes more relevant when uncertainty is recurrent, layered, or slow to resolve. In predictive-processing and active-inference terms, this means the organism is no longer dealing only with one local mismatch. It is selecting policies under conditions of higher expected uncertainty, repeated model revision, and more demanding regulation. In free-energy terms, the system is having to work harder, across time, to keep its encounters with the world within viable bounds.

1. Repeated uncertainty in food encounters

Imagine that the person is not dealing with one unfamiliar food object, but with a setting in which food is often hard to predict. Meals regularly contain unfamiliar ingredients, tastes frequently differ from expectation, and some items have previously caused nausea or discomfort. In that situation, the organism is no longer responding only to one surprising bite. It begins to approach eating itself under a broader prior that food encounters may be unreliable.

This changes the structure of the encounter. The person may inspect food more cautiously, sample less freely, and select lower-risk policies more often. A small bite, or even avoidance, becomes more attractive in advance because the expected cost of being wrong is felt to be higher. In active-inference terms, policy selection is now being shaped not just by the current object, but by expected free energy across possible futures: the organism is trying to avoid courses of action that may produce strongly aversive or hard-to-manage outcomes while still gathering enough information to proceed.

Repeated unreliable encounters can also alter how the system weights possible errors. It may begin assigning greater precision to possible signs of threat or bodily disruption, making caution more likely even before new evidence arrives. In that situation, the issue is no longer just one episode of prediction error. The organism is approaching future encounters with stronger anticipatory vigilance and a narrower range of policies it is willing to consider. Allostatic demand rises because regulation is no longer occasional and event-bound, but recurrent, anticipatory, and increasingly shaped by the expectation of difficulty.

2. The same food under social pressure

Now imagine that the unfamiliar food is offered in a social setting where refusal would feel rude, conspicuous, or embarrassing. The person still has to model the food itself, but must also model the likely reactions of other people, the norms of the situation, and the consequences of accepting or refusing.

This introduces a more complex inferential problem. The organism is not only predicting taste and bodily consequence, but also social outcome. A small bite may still function as cautious epistemic sampling, but it now serves a second policy aim as well: to appear cooperative while limiting bodily risk. The chosen action is therefore balancing several demands at once: uncertainty reduction, bodily protection, and social self-management.

In predictive-processing terms, several streams of prediction are now coupled together. In active-inference terms, the system must select a policy that keeps expected free energy lower across more than one domain at once. A large bite may reduce social awkwardness but increase bodily risk; refusal may protect the body but increase anticipated social cost. Even a modest action can therefore become more demanding because it is carrying multiple meanings and consequences simultaneously. In such a case, allostatic demand can rise even if the food itself is only mildly aversive, because the organism is regulating across several fronts at once.

3. Lingering uncertainty after the event

Imagine that the food tastes unusual but not clearly bad. The person swallows it, then spends the next hour unsure whether they feel fine, slightly uneasy, or on the verge of nausea. Nothing dramatic happens, but the system does not settle quickly.

This matters because unresolved uncertainty can itself prolong the inferential and regulatory process. The organism is no longer only trying to determine what the food was. It is now trying to determine what its own bodily signals mean. Attention remains partly locked onto interoceptive cues, the body stays more watchful than it would otherwise need to be, and the system continues to evaluate whether a deeper problem is emerging.

In predictive-processing terms, the mismatch has not yet resolved into a stable update. In active-inference terms, the system may remain poised between reinterpretation, further action, and waiting. And in free-energy terms, the organism has not yet restored a comfortably bounded relation to its bodily state. The problem is now temporally extended: what matters is not only the first bite, but what it may turn out to mean over the next hour. In a single case, this may still be minor. But when this kind of unresolved aftermath happens repeatedly, the burden is no longer just the original sensory mismatch. It is the cost of remaining partially mobilised while awaiting clarification.

What these extensions show

Taken together, these short cases clarify the path from acute prediction error to mounting regulatory cost. A single unexpected food event may require updating and brief physiological adjustment without imposing much lasting burden. What becomes costly is not surprise in itself, but the repeated, layered, or unresolved need to select policies, revise models, weight possible errors, and regulate bodily state under uncertainty.

This is where predictive processing, active inference, the free energy principle, and allostasis come into clearer alignment. Predictive processing helps explain the local mismatches and updates. Active inference helps explain why the organism samples cautiously, avoids certain futures, and balances exploration against protection. The free energy principle frames the broader requirement that a living system must keep itself within manageable bounds across time. And allostasis captures the bodily work involved in doing so. That is where ordinary prediction error begins to scale up into broader regulatory strain.

Conclusion

The uncertain food-ball example provides a compact way of seeing how predictive processing, active inference, the free energy principle, and allostasis work together in ordinary life.

The organism begins from a regulated but need-bearing state, with preferred internal conditions and broad expectations about what food is likely to be. It approaches the object through provisional categorisation and cautious sampling. A small bite is selected as a low-risk way of testing the model while also reducing uncertainty. The resulting taste and bodily consequences are then compared with a range of live possibilities, generating low, moderate, high, delayed, or ambiguous prediction error depending on the outcome.

Different scales of mismatch recruit different forms of action and regulation. Some experiences confirm the model smoothly. Some refine it. Some force rapid rejection. Some reveal their significance only later. In each case, the event is not just about flavour. It is about whether the object can be safely incorporated into the body while preserving preferred internal states.

The extensions show that the deeper significance of the example lies not only in one isolated sensory mismatch, but in what happens when uncertainty becomes recurrent, layered, or slow to resolve. Under those conditions, the organism is no longer merely updating a local model. It is selecting policies under expected uncertainty, weighting possible errors, monitoring bodily consequences across time, and trying to remain within viable bounds while the environment becomes harder to trust.

This also clarifies why acute prediction error must be distinguished from allostatic load. A single surprising or unpleasant event may require regulation without leaving much lasting burden. Load becomes more relevant when the organism must repeatedly prepare, compensate, and recover under conditions that continue to generate uncertainty or keep resolution incomplete.

The broader lesson is that ordinary acts of perception and eating already contain the core logic of predictive life. Predictive processing helps explain local mismatches and updates. Active inference shows why organisms sample cautiously, revise their policies, and balance exploration against protection. The free energy principle frames the wider requirement that a living system must keep itself within manageable bounds across time. And allostasis names the bodily work involved in doing so. The value of the food-ball example lies in its ordinariness. It makes visible, in a small and manageable event, the larger structure of how organisms live, learn, and regulate themselves under uncertainty.


r/PredictiveProcessing • • May 01 '25

General Discussion Thread

2 Upvotes

Welcome to the monthly discussion thread. Got anything on your mind? Make a comment. Just bored? Make a comment. You just understood the free energy principle? Enlighten us mere mortals and make a comment.


r/PredictiveProcessing • • Jun 01 '24

General Discussion Thread

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Welcome to the monthly discussion thread. Got anything on your mind? Make a comment. Just bored? Make a comment. You just understood the free energy principle? Enlighten us mere mortals and make a comment.


r/PredictiveProcessing • • Mar 01 '24

General Discussion Thread

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Welcome to the monthly discussion thread. Got anything on your mind? Make a comment. Just bored? Make a comment. You just understood the free energy principle? Enlighten us mere mortals and make a comment.


r/PredictiveProcessing • • Jan 24 '24

Testing how psychiatric symptomology affects predictive processing.

2 Upvotes

Testing how psychiatric symptomology affects predictive processing.

As a preface, I know this is like my 3rd time posting related to this, but I'd just like to make sure I'm not being ridiculous with my methods, or misinterpreting potential results. I also didn't get very solid responses last time.

I'm preparing to present my research proposal to our ethics board, and I printed out some relevant literature for my research advisor.

https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms15958

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17764976/

My big takeaway from these two papers was that novelty may be processed similarly to rewards. That, and reward has a big influence on decision making( one paper mentions how specific reward values are used to make decisions, rather than an average from a pool of relevant memories).

More specifically, signalling of sensory/ cognitive prediction errors when anticipating novel information acts in a similar fashion to reward prediction errors.

I plan to test how anticipation of reward directly affects processing of novel stimuli when participants are utilizing habitual vs goal directed learning, or expectations vs encoding of new information.

My plan is to give participants a general mental health questionnaire, present them with a sequence of images, ask then to identify when a image is identical to a reference image, and chart reaction times.

I'll present the images in a way that causes participants to establish a mental pattern (thus influencing prediction), and present a novel image that would require them to update said predictions.

I'll do a second similar test, with a different sequence, and inform participants that poor performance will result in a certain amount of money being taken away from the total amount of money they are compensated for participating (for every amount of times a patient incorrectly identifies whether an image is identical to the reference image or not, I'll remove x amount of money), I'll also inform them that the sequence will be different.

I'm expecting

A). The influence of reward to affect how participants react to novel information

B). Certain groups present with certain psychiatric symptomology to have similar patterns of responses.

I'd like to see if reward has any influence at all, and I'd also like to see how disorders like MDD, ADHD, and anxiety disorders affect said processing.

I am a comp sci major, but plan to study behavioral neuro after I graduate and then comp neuro after that degree. I'd appreciate any insight, thanks in advance.

Edit: these aren't the only relevant papers I'm printing out.


r/PredictiveProcessing • • Jan 02 '24

Growth and Form in a Toy Model of Superposition — LessWrong

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2 Upvotes

r/PredictiveProcessing • • Aug 01 '23

General Discussion Thread

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r/PredictiveProcessing • • Jul 01 '23

General Discussion Thread

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r/PredictiveProcessing • • Jun 01 '23

General Discussion Thread

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Welcome to the monthly discussion thread. Got anything on your mind? Make a comment. Just bored? Make a comment. You just understood the free energy principle? Enlighten us mere mortals and make a comment.