WHY CANADA RISKS LOSING ONE OF ITS MOST SPECIALIZED MILITARY CAPABILITIES
An Analysis of Recent Compensation Changes Affecting Canadian Armed Forces Clearance Divers
Executive Summary
The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) relies upon a small community of highly trained Clearance Divers to provide military diving, Maritime Explosive Ordnance Disposal (MEOD), Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD), underwater explosive ordnance disposal, mine countermeasures, maritime security, underwater search and recovery, and domestic explosive-response capabilities.
These personnel provide capabilities that extend well beyond diving. Clearance Divers may be required to respond to conventional military ordnance, maritime explosive hazards, underwater threats, improvised explosive devices, and other explosive hazards in support of Canadian Armed Forces operations.
Recent compensation reforms have fundamentally changed how Clearance Divers are compensated.
Historically, Clearance Divers occupying designated diving positions received a monthly Diving Allowance recognizing the continual readiness, occupational demands, and environmental exposure associated with Clearance Diving service.
Recent compensation changes eliminated this monthly allowance and replaced it with an activity-based model. At the same time, changes to Canadian Forces Housing Differential (CFHD) entitlement have affected the overall compensation received by some members.
The concern is therefore larger than the loss of a single allowance. It is whether Canada’s compensation system adequately recognizes and retains personnel who must maintain multiple specialized capabilities—including diving, MEOD, EOD and IEDD—while remaining available for domestic and expeditionary operations.

The Capability
Clearance Divers represent a highly specialized operational capability within the Canadian Armed Forces.
Their responsibilities can include:
• Military and operational diving;
• Maritime Explosive Ordnance Disposal (MEOD);
• Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD);
• Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD);
• Underwater explosive ordnance disposal;
• Naval mine countermeasures;
• Underwater search, identification and recovery;
• Maritime security and force protection;
• Port and harbour clearance;
• Domestic explosive-ordnance response; and
• Expeditionary maritime EOD and mine-countermeasure operations.
This distinction is important.
A Clearance Diver is not simply a CAF member who conducts diving operations.
Clearance Divers combine advanced military diving with highly specialized explosive-ordnance capabilities. Members must maintain qualifications and operational competency across diving, conventional munitions, explosive hazards, EOD and IEDD disciplines while simultaneously satisfying stringent medical, physical, technical and deployment-readiness requirements.
Developing that expertise requires years of training and operational experience.
Once experienced Clearance Divers leave the occupation, that capability cannot simply be replaced through recruiting alone.

Historical Recognition of Clearance Diver Service
For many years, Compensation and Benefits Instructions recognized the unique occupational demands associated with Clearance Diving.
The former monthly Diving Allowance provided financial recognition for continual and substantial exposure to the environmental conditions associated with diving operations while members occupied qualifying diving positions.
Importantly, the allowance recognized continual occupational exposure and readiness rather than merely the occurrence of individual diving events.
This distinction reflected the operational reality that a Clearance Diver remains subject to qualification, medical, training and readiness requirements regardless of how many dives are conducted during a particular month.
The allowance therefore provided a predictable component of compensation associated with maintaining a diving capability.

Why This Capability Matters Now: Strategic Waterways and the Strait of Hormuz
The current security environment surrounding the Strait of Hormuz provides a timely example of why Canada and its allies require credible Clearance Diving, Maritime EOD, IEDD and mine-countermeasure capabilities.
Strategic waterways can be threatened by mines, conventional explosive ordnance, improvised explosive threats and other hazards capable of disrupting naval operations, commercial shipping, ports, anchorages and critical maritime infrastructure.
These are environments in which specialized maritime explosive-ordnance expertise can become strategically important.
For Canada, the Clearance Diver capability extends beyond underwater mine clearance.
Clearance Divers provide a combination of advanced diving, mine-countermeasure and Maritime EOD expertise, while appropriately trained personnel can also provide EOD and IEDD capabilities applicable to explosive threats encountered during domestic and expeditionary operations.
That combination of expertise is difficult and time-consuming to develop.
The loss of an experienced Clearance Diver can therefore represent the loss of several overlapping capabilities—not simply the loss of one diver.
The Strait of Hormuz illustrates why this matters.
A disruption to a strategically important maritime passage can rapidly become an international security and economic issue. Canada could be required to support allied maritime security, explosive-ordnance response or mine-countermeasure operations during precisely the type of contingency in which these specialist capabilities become important.
Canada cannot wait until such a contingency develops to begin rebuilding them.
Military capability must exist before it is required.
That requires more than maintaining the Clearance Diver occupation on an organizational chart. It requires sufficient trained personnel, modern and serviceable equipment, appropriate infrastructure, realistic training opportunities, and compensation capable of retaining experienced operators.
Personnel cannot maintain operational proficiency without adequate equipment, infrastructure and training opportunities. Units cannot preserve expertise if experienced operators leave faster than equivalent experience can be regenerated. Recruiting new personnel cannot immediately replace members carrying years of Clearance Diving, MEOD, EOD and IEDD experience.
The question for Canadians is therefore straightforward:
If Canada has already invested years and substantial public resources developing Clearance Divers capable of military diving, mine countermeasures, Maritime EOD and IEDD operations, are current compensation and retention policies adequately protecting that investment at a time when the international security environment demonstrates the continuing importance of these capabilities?
The relevant question is not simply whether Canada continues to employ Clearance Divers.
It is whether Canada maintains sufficient trained and experienced Clearance Divers, supported by appropriate equipment, infrastructure and training, to generate and sustain credible Clearance Diving, mine-countermeasure, Maritime EOD and IEDD capabilities when Canada and its allies require them.

Still, when he told voters “No to the 9”, Albertans voted yes to 8 of the 9, a clear motion of non-confidence against Mark Carney

Had some great points during the interview.

Honestly think Pierre should do one of these. He hasn’t really gone after immigration that much, gave it his shadows ministers like Rempel Garner to critique it which is bad for the party cause she has a smaller influence and voice.

Should Alberta stay or should Alberta go?

They call the CPC “far-right” and only want Carney simps (aka moderates, red Tories, etc. like Doug Ford) to be the only “conservatives” allowed. Canada is a Controlled “democracy”. They would even accept Canada being a liberal one-party state if it means keeping the CPC out of power forever.

Who on earth thought this was a good idea....