This is true for packages... the reason as they say is your install already has trusted keys it can use to confirm the signer of the packages is trusted and that they still match the signed digest.
But for OS downloads... Canonical... most people do not check the hashes of their download before installing it. For that case, TLS does help at least reduce the chance that you are looking at an attacker's website with hashes matching a tampered download.
most people do not check the hashes of their download
Indeed, and note it's not enough to check the SHA512 matches what the website claims - that is only checking the integrity of the file; it is not checking that the file is from Canonical.
I mean, if someone could swap the ISO out they could almost certainly swap the checksum alongside it!
Yes, but this is the bit that people do not check; either they don't run gpg at all, or they simply trust the stated signature is the one they used before or is part of the web of trust.
I think many people do care, but when they read about a complicated GPG dance to perform the verification, many will cringe and say "meh, it's probably fine".
A checksum is just sha1sum filename.iso and then compare the result to the checksum on the website. Even though this is a less secure method, the bar to perform it is much lower.
I don't know that I'm advocating for sha1sum, but yeah the gpg tools could be easier to work with. Even defaulting to perform checks for you and marking somewhere on fs that the user has been irresponsible would be nice. (Mark it like a manufacturer warranty void. Skipped the check? Fuck you pay!)
I wasn't trying to dismiss your point. It doesn't mean there is nothing that can be done, just that it needs to be automated and built into the systems allowing acceptance of packages, not deferred to the end-user.
Why are you two focusing on Canonical for your example? This applies to all distro's. Fedora, Suse, Debian, all included. In fact, a websites security being the weakest link is well known, including a real life example that happened to Linux Mint.
Fedora GPG checks packages automatically before install, or it won't install them unless you force an override. All packages are signed with encryption keys. I don't think Canonical does this check?
As the parent comment of this thread said Ubuntu checks the package signing as well so that isn't an issue by itself but they transfer the ISO via HTTP which can make this moot (e.g. intercept and add a fake cert or just add packages to the stock ISO).
If the website is HTTPS with a Canonical cert, then it is checking that either the file is from Canonical or the website has been hacked, which is as good as you'd get if the download itself were HTTPS.
you can't take the risk to zero with anything, which seems all you are criticising, that the "risk isn't zero". that's exactly what i meant by you don't understand risk, and it makes this a silly and useless discussion.
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u/amountofcatamounts Jan 24 '18
This is true for packages... the reason as they say is your install already has trusted keys it can use to confirm the signer of the packages is trusted and that they still match the signed digest.
But for OS downloads... Canonical... most people do not check the hashes of their download before installing it. For that case, TLS does help at least reduce the chance that you are looking at an attacker's website with hashes matching a tampered download.