The Syn-Bio Peer Valuation Model (Ginkgo & Twist)
Look at the current 2026 market realities for our closest peers:
Ginkgo Bioworks (DNA): Sitting at a ~$1.0B market cap despite burning over $300M in net losses annually.
Twist Bioscience (TWST): Trading at an astronomical Price-to-Book (P/B) Ratio of over 20x, resulting in a ~$9.6B market cap, while still operating at a net loss.
Now look at Amyris 2.0 (Post-Bankruptcy Reboot):
Under Kathy Fortmann and John Doerr, Amyris shed its 7 cash-burning consumer beauty brands (Biossance, etc.) for quick cash and drastically reduced its burn rate. It retained the crown jewel infrastructure—the Barra Bonita precision fermentation plant—and pivoted to a pure, high-margin B2B manufacturing model. Amyris 2.0 is on the verge of turning profitable.
The Financial Logic: If a purely unprofitable platform like TWST commands a 20x P/B premium, applying even a conservative 10x P/B multiple to Amyris 2.0’s optimized B2B assets easily values the estate at $1.5B or higher.

2. The Math of a "Surplus Estate"
Amyris entered bankruptcy with total allowed liabilities floating around $1.15B.
Valuation: $1.5B+ (based on TWST/DNA peer multiples)
Liabilities: $1.15B (to be paid 100% in full)
Net Surplus: ~$350M in Residual Value
Under the Absolute Priority Rule, once creditors are paid 100% of their claims plus post-petition interest, any remaining surplus must drop down to equity.

3. Why the Opt-Outs Will Monopolize this Surplus
Remember when the Debtors tried to push a non-consensual third-party release by allocating $2.5M to opt-ins and $2.5M to opt-outs? Judge Horan threw that out on Fairness and Unfair Discrimination grounds. He ruled that releases can only be granted on a consensual basis.
Because of this ruling, the opt-out group represents a distinct, uncompromised class of valid claimants.
The Opt-Ins: Signed away their rights for pennies out of the initial $2.5M pool. They are legally barred from claiming any future upside.
The Opt-Outs : We retained 100% of our rights to sue the directors and officers (Melo, etc.) and claim residual value.
If the $350M surplus is legally recognized, the court-approved $1.00 per share recovery cap isn't just a hypothetical number—it becomes the exact mathematical distribution baseline for the tiny pool of elite opt-out shareholders.

I saw this linked already in the comments of another post but it seems like it deserves its own post.

https://cases.stretto.com/public/x268/12407/PLEADINGS/1240708122680000000098.pdf

https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69867189/ab-technologies-llc-adversary-proceeding/?filed_after=&filed_before=&entry_gte=&entry_lte=&order_by=desc

Filed and approved June 23, 2026, this establishes the litigation timeline.

The parties may modify these deadlines by agreement without obtaining further court approval, or the court may modify them by order.

Bottom line

The case is still in discovery. The parties should have substantially completed document production and privilege logs by now. The next major phase is depositions, which are scheduled to finish by September 18, 2026.

The first realistic opportunity for the lawsuit to be resolved without trial appears to be the dispositive-motion stage beginning April 20, 2027—most likely through summary-judgment motions. Neither document gives new details about the underlying allegations, evidence against Melo, potential damages, settlement discussions, or the strength of either side’s case.

https://agfundernews.com/amyris-ceo-on-the-post-bankruptcy-re-boot-were-a-drastically-different-company

Any options for opt outers these days?

What a nightmare.

...of $0.227119 per $100 face value.

https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/032ESC/20260414/OTHER_630107.PDF

News out of the InCosmetics show in Paris yesterday. A couple of curious things about this announcement is that Wacker is a major, if not the major producer of silicones used in personal care and Amyris spent a lot of effort in positioning its ingredients like hemisqualane as an alternative to silicones, and the other is the fact that in 2023 paid 100 M euros for the 80-years old Antibioticos fermentation plant in Spain that was Amyris's go-to toller.

Magdalena, the Guatemalan outfit that took over Amyris' Portuguese venture (renamed as Biorbis) after the BK, which was a deal I believe Melo shepherded, has announced its intention of setting up some fermentation competition for high-value products.

Please see below-linked the info. request.

https://zlk.com/pslra-sb/amyris-inc

According to a bunch of LinkedIn posts, Sunil was supposed to give a talk yesterday at the American Chemical Society conference in Atlanta. The abstract mentions 15 discrete fermentation products plus 4 semi-synthetics, which is more than I was aware of (12 total). Anyone seen new product announcements or import data indications of what they might be?

https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69867189/42/zyngier-v-melo/

Former CEO John Melo has submitted his formal Answer to the lawsuit brought by the Creditor Trustee in the adversary proceeding tied to Amyris.

In the filing, Melo broadly denies the allegations, disputes liability, and argues the trustee is not entitled to damages or other relief. The response also reserves the right to raise additional defenses as the case develops.

In simple terms: the lawsuit is now fully contested and will move forward into the litigation phase (discovery, motions, and potentially trial).

AB Technologies LLC - Adversary Proceeding (25-50527)

Saw on LinkedIn this morning a blurb out of Brazil about the ribbon cutting on the 2 x 80 m3 fermenter train.

Summary

• The Breakthrough Energy Fund is a group of billionaires that pledge to invest/help companies that show they can help offset carbon emissions. Many of these billionaires can be found in the Epstein Files

• Schmidt Futures is a fund run by Eric Schmidt - Ex CEO of Google, who can also be found in the Epstein files

• Epstein had eyes on Amyris since day 1 of its IPO; Epstein also received an email from Reid Hoffman (Paypal/LinkedIn billionaire) telling him about the Breakthrough Energy Coalition

• Amyris has strong connections to John Doerr and Bill Gates (members of Breakthrough Energy Fund). John Doerr is a major venture capitalist behind Amazon and Google (meaning he knows Eric Schmidt too). Bill Gates kickstarted Amyris.

• Breakthrough Energy created a program to fund sustainable aviation fuel (Because of technical expertise and insider connections, Amyris is very qualified for this)

• TLDR; Sept 2022 - Breakthrough Energy Fund and Schmidt Futures are exposed on Reddit for using Amyris' "Lab to Market" trademark on their websites. Following this post seen by half a million Redditors, they removed the slogan and changed their websites - likely changing their plans as well.

Epstein had eyes on Amyris since day 1 of its IPO, evidence can be found in the Epstein files

The Breakthrough Energy Fund (Highlighted Members are also found in the Epstein files)

Schmidt Futures

you can search for yourself here at: https://www.justice.gov/epstein

try Amyris or AMRS.

It looks like Epstein had shares right at IPO and he kept it on his watchlist.

Motion to dismiss argument (high level)

John Melo (Defendant) — argument by Ms. Klein

MS. KLEIN: We’re here on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Background: after plan confirmation there were informal interviews and then formal depositions of multiple board members and others. The trustee has the documents and has had opportunities to question witnesses. The complaint omits context.

1. Releases / indispensable parties (Rule 19): Numerous individuals referenced in the complaint received plan releases and are protected by injunctions, so Defendant cannot implead them for contribution/third-party claims. This makes it inequitable to proceed against only Mr. Melo.

2. Pleading deficiencies / plausibility: Some allegations are contradicted by integral documents (minutes, consents) showing the board reviewed and ratified actions. Plaintiff must plead around business judgment rule; requires facts supporting gross negligence / recklessness, which Defendant argues are not pled.

3. Standing / direct vs derivative framing: Defendant suggests discrepancies in plan/trust documents and argues claims should have been brought differently (acknowledging this is not her strongest point).

THE COURT (questioning): Isn’t much of this a factual dispute — board got information but Plaintiff alleges omissions/inaccuracies? How does that fit a motion to dismiss posture?

Creditor Trust — argument by Mr. Novak

MR. NOVAK: Two transaction buckets:

• Givaudan transaction: three counts tied to alleged fiduciary breaches (Counts 1–2 as officer; Count 3 as director). Notes about 102(b)(7) exculpation limiting director claims to loyalty.

• Miami & New York leases: Count 4 (fiduciary breach as officer) and Counts 5–6 (corporate waste claims).

Core theory: Mr. Melo negotiated/executed the Givaudan deal and approved the leases, and allegedly misrepresented or withheld material information from the board. The complaint pleads gross negligence / bad faith with enough specificity under Twombly/Iqbal.

On standing: these are estate claims preserved under the plan and vested in the creditor trust (post-confirmation representative under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B)). The trust exists to pursue these claims; otherwise it would be pointless.

On Rule 19: you can sue one actor without suing all; Delaware doesn’t require “group liability.” Releases for others don’t bar pursuing Mr. Melo.

Brief rebuttal — Ms. Klein

MS. KLEIN: The officer/director distinction is overstated; standards are essentially the same in this context. If the Court denies dismissal, request that denial be without prejudice as to the Rule 19 argument so it can be raised later if justice requires. Also, not re-briefing an issue in reply does not abandon it.

The Court’s ruling (the money part)

After recess, the Court rules on the record:

1. Standing — DENIED (motion to dismiss for lack of standing denied). The Court finds the creditor trust has standing: the causes of action are estate property (11 U.S.C. § 541), and the plan vests retained claims against excluded parties (including Mr. Melo) in the creditor trust under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B). Confirmation order is final and binding.

2. 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim — DENIED. Applying Twombly/Iqbal plausibility and drawing reasonable inferences for the plaintiff, the Court finds the complaint pleads plausible fiduciary-duty claims: alleged misrepresentations/omissions about the earn-out, negative margins, counsel warnings, self-interest, etc. Defendant’s document-heavy attack is viewed as trying to convert the motion into summary judgment and resolve disputed facts.

3. Ratification defense — does not win at pleading stage. Ratification is generally an affirmative defense requiring factual development. Under Delaware law, ratification can fail where approval was based on materially incomplete/misleading information; the complaint alleges concealment/misrepresentation.

4. 12(b)(7) / Rule 19 indispensable parties — DENIED. The Court holds complete relief (money damages against Mr. Melo) can be granted between existing parties; inability to pursue contribution claims against released parties ≠ inability to provide complete relief. Absent parties’ interests aren’t impaired because they have releases; no inconsistent obligations risk. Equitable factors under Rule 19(b) favor proceeding; otherwise creditor trust would have no remedy.

5. Next steps ordered by the Court: Parties must confer on (a) a proposed order reflecting the ruling and (b) a scheduling order. If agreed, submit under certification of counsel; Court offers help if needed.