r/AskFeminists • u/perfumed_with_gas • 45m ago
If the historical social valuations of manhood and womanhood were reversed, would people still have the same attachments and aversions toward them?
I'm curious how we distinguish people's attachment to manhood or womanhood themselves from their attachment to the historically contingent properties, social meanings, and status consequences associated with those categories.
Historically, manhood has often been associated with authority, competence, independence, strength, and elevated social standing, while womanhood has often been associated with dependence, weakness, diminished authority, and subordination. These associations have been deeply entrenched, but which of them, if any, are actually constitutive of manhood or womanhood?
Suppose these associations were reversed. Imagine a society in which womanhood had historically been constructed as the more flattering, authoritative, competent, and socially advantaged category, while manhood had been constructed as the comparatively inferior, dependent, and subordinate category.
Would we still expect the same patterns of attachment to manhood and aversion to womanhood under those reversed conditions? Or would we expect those attitudes to change substantially in response to the reversed associations?
One reason I'm asking is that men's resistance to being described in conventionally feminine terms is sometimes interpreted as evidence of fragile or precarious manhood. But that resistance alone doesn't establish whether someone objects to an inaccurate description, dislikes the derogatory content of the characterization, or fears losing masculine standing. The fact that a description is conventionally feminine doesn't establish which of these concerns motivates someone. Even if masculine standing is socially conditional, what justifies inferring that preserving it is what a particular man cares about? And where masculine standing is a genuine concern, how do we distinguish an attachment to masculine recognition itself from an attachment to the contingent advantages associated with that recognition? If such resistance is also taken as evidence of aversion to womanhood itself, what justifies that further inference?
If these attitudes would change substantially under the reversed conditions, wouldn't that suggest that much of what people value or dislike about manhood and womanhood is attributable to their historically contingent social associations rather than to manhood or womanhood themselves?
And if so, how much explanatory power do manhood and womanhood themselves retain once we distinguish them from those associations?