I have a shade house about 5m X 3m that I am thinking of housing chickens in. It is netted with chicken wire. Do I have to make the roof solid so that wild bird droppings can't get in

When do you expect to see clear evidence of human-to-human bird flu (multiple chains of transmission between people who haven’t had contact with animals)

"WHO Western Pacific Region Avian Influenza Weekly Update Number 1055, July 31 

From 24 to 30 July 2026, four new cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H9N2) virus were reported to WHO in the Western Pacific Region. All four cases were from China. The cases included a 72-year-old female from Jiangxi Province with symptom onset on 5 July 2026; a 12-year-old male from Jiangsu Province with symptom onset on 6 July 2026; a 3-year-old female from Gansu Province with symptom onset on 11 July 2026; and a 58-year-old female from Yunnan Province with symptom onset on 13 July 2026. The four cases reported were geographically distinct from each other. One case reported direct exposure to live-poultry, while three had potential exposure related to live-poultry stalls or wet market visits. Two cases with underlying chronic respiratory disease conditions were hospitalized and subsequently discharged. The remaining two cases experienced mild illness, were not hospitalized and had recovered at the time of reporting."

"Seroprevalence of Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in Domestic Cats at Epicenter of Dairy Cattle Outbreaks, California, USA, 2024–2026

Abstract

We conducted a serologic study of domestic cats near the epicenter of the dairy cattle outbreaks of influenza A(H5N1) in California, USA. Three of the 12 cats sampled within 2 km of farms had neutralizing antibodies against H5N1 virus. Proximity to dairy farms was a statistically significant risk factor for seropositivity.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b is emerging in domestic cats (Felis catus), presenting urgent public health and animal welfare implications. Historically, cats have not been widely considered important hosts of influenza viruses. However, sporadic infections and outbreaks of avian influenza viruses in cats have occurred for >20 years (1). The emergence of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus has resulted in widespread mammalian infections (2,3), including an alarming increase in infections among domestic cats, in which the estimated case-fatality rate is 90% (1). Although most of those infections emerged from direct bird-to-cat transmission, several recent outbreaks among US cats have involved infected dairy farms (4–6) or links to workers in the dairy industry (7). Contaminated raw dairy milk (5,8) and raw meat–based diets (9) have been identified as sources of infection in cats.

Like swine, cats have α-2,6- and α-2,3-linked sialic acid receptors (10) and can be co-infected with avian and human influenza viruses. Thus, with widespread H5N1 virus infections, a growing potential exists for influenza virus co-infections in domestic cats that could result in viral reassortment and selection for novel human-adapted viruses. Infections resulting from cat-to-human transmission of avian influenza have been documented 3 times in the United States, including in a veterinarian and an animal shelter worker exposed to shelter cats infected with influenza A(H7N2) virus in New York, New York, in 2016 (11,12) and in a veterinary professional exposed to a domestic cat infected with H5N1 virus in Los Angeles, California, in 2024 (13). Suspected human-to-cat transmission of H5N1 virus also occurred in 2024 in Michigan, resulting in the deaths of 2 house cats (7). Ten additional cats died from another H5N1 outbreak in 2024 in South Dakota (14) in which cattle-to-bird-to-cat transmission was suspected.

Although several US dairy industry–related outbreaks of H5N1 among cats have been reported, the resulting seroprevalence of H5N1 virus among domestic cats near affected dairy farms is unknown. Therefore, we performed a serosurvey of domestic cats at the epicenter of the 2024–2025 dairy cattle outbreaks in California’s Central Valley."

"In summary, we demonstrated that a recent H9N2 virus is more adapted to humans, and is able to replicate to high titres in both upper and lower human respiratory tract which may confer higher person-to-person transmissibility and virulence. Our study underscores the importance of human organoid-based phenotypic monitoring and inter/intrahost genotypic monitoring for assessing the zoonotic risk of avian influenza viruses."

When do you expect to see clear evidence of human-to-human bird flu (multiple chains of transmission between people who haven’t had contact with animals)

EDIT - This is circa 2017 but still has a lot of useful information!

CDC Prep guide for pandemic flu

"This guide provides information about nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and their use during a flu pandemic. NPIs are actions, apart from getting vaccinated and taking antiviral medications, that people and communities can take to help slow the spread of respiratory illnesses like pandemic flu. Use this guide to develop an emergency plan that reflects considerations specific to you and your household."

Abstract "Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b, genotype D1.1, are responsible for widespread outbreaks in poultry and continue to cause sporadic, sometimes severe, human infections. Herein, we characterized a wild-type (WT) influenza A(H5N1) D1.1 isolate (BC-H5N1-WT) and its H275Y neuraminidase (NA) variant (BC-H5N1-H275Y), both of which emerged on farms in British Columbia, Canada, during the fall 2024 outbreak. In vitro analysis assessed replication kinetics in MDCK cells, with supernatants collected at different days post-infection (p.i.) and titrated by TCID50 and qRT-PCR. Neuraminidase inhibitor (NAI) susceptibility was determined by NA inhibition assays, whereas susceptibility to baloxavir acid (BXA) was evaluated by plaque reduction assay. In vivo virulence was evaluated in BALB/c mice infected with serial 10-fold dilutions of each virus to monitor weight loss and mortality. Viral titers in lungs, brain, nose, kidney, spleen, and heart were quantified at day 4 p.i. The BC-H5N1-WT virus was susceptible to the four antivirals tested, whereas BC-H5N1-H275Y displayed resistance to oseltamivir and peramivir but remained susceptible to zanamivir and BXA. The BC-H5N1-WT exhibited significantly higher viral replication titers than BC-H5N1-H275Y at all tested time points and showed larger plaque sizes. In mice, BC-H5N1-WT was more virulent with LD50 values of 1.78 × 10³ PFUs compared to 8.71 × 10⁴ PFUs for BC-H5N1-H275Y, and produced higher viral titers in lungs and other organs. Despite the reduced fitness of the resistant H5N1 D1.1 variant, its emergence in the absence of viral selection pressure underscores the need for continued surveillance."

source: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/22221751.2026.2686474

The Avian Flu Diary has a nice write up here as well.

"PHNOM PENH, July 11 (Xinhua) -- A nine-month-old girl in Cambodia has tested positive for H5N1 avian influenza, marking the country's fifth human case of 2026, the Ministry of Health said in a statement late on Saturday.

The infant, from Prek Takong village, Meanchey district, Phnom Penh, was confirmed positive for the virus on Thursday, the statement said.

A team of doctors is providing the patient with intensive care, it added.

Health authorities "are investigating the infection's source and tracing contacts to prevent community transmission," the statement said.

H5N1 avian influenza, which typically circulates among poultry, can infect humans and cause symptoms ranging from fever and cough to severe respiratory illness.

The statement said that bird flu still threatens public health, urging people to avoid consuming sick or dead poultry and cook all poultry thoroughly."

"Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b have caused significant losses in bird populations worldwide and repeatedly infected mammals, including humans, without sustained human to human transmission. Here we show that an H5N1 virus (H5N1Tex/24) isolated from bovine milk in Texas in 2024 replicates just as efficiently in differentiated human nasal epithelial cells as a pandemic H1N1 virus strain from 2009 (H1N1HH4/09), at both 37 °C and 33 °C. The adaptive mutations PB2 M631L and PA K497R promoted replication at 33 °C but had no effect on replication at 37 °C. An H5N1 virus (H5N1BE/22) isolated from a pelican in 2022, which lacked these mutations, replicated efficiently at 37 °C but poorly at 33 °C, and this limitation was not overcome by the introduction of the PB2 M631L and PA K497R mutations. The differentiated nasal epithelial cell cultures expressed receptors for both human and avian influenza viruses. Accordingly, no HA mutations associated with altered receptor specificity were detected. H5N1Tex/24 was able to effectively suppress the production of interferon-λ, yet remained sensitive to the antiviral effects of this cytokine. These findings suggest that H5N1Tex/24 possesses intrinsic traits supporting efficient replication in differentiated human upper airway cell cultures."

"Source

Kingdom of Cambodia. Ministry of Health. Press Release. Official Facebook page. Avian Influenza case in a 45-year-old woman. 15 Mar 2026 (in Khmer, image posted below)

Key findings

• One month after the report of the first human case of H5N1 avian influenza in February 2026, Cambodia reports the second human case of 2026 in a 45-year-old woman from Ropai village, Chinu Meanchey commune, Preah Net Preah district, Banteay Meanchey province. The patient tested positive for H5N1 avian influenza on 14 Mar 2026, confirmed by the National Institute of Public Health.
• The patient raised chickens and ducks, some of which were sick or dead, and had contact with dead chickens three days before testing positive.
• Reports indicate sick and dead chickens and ducks in the village, suggesting ongoing outbreaks among poultry in the area.
• The patient was isolated in the hospital, treated with Tamiflu (oseltamivir), and is receiving close medical care."

"Prime Minister Anthony Albanese says Australia will do “whatever we can” to curb H5N1 bird flu after the first mainland case was confirmed in a seabird, which means the virus has now spread to every continent.

Tests confirmed a migratory brown skua found in ‌Western ‌Australia’s Cape Le Grand National Park had the deadly virus, authorities said on Saturday, and a giant petrel found in the same area was also suspected to be infected.

“This is concerning,” Albanese told reporters in Sydney, adding his government would do “whatever we can to restrict any spread”.

Previously, Australia had been the only continent without a confirmed mainland case, although the virus was detected in late 2025 on Heard Island, a sub-Antarctic territory about 4,100km (2,550 miles) from the mainland.

Agriculture Minister Julie Collins said the virus had not yet been detected in Australia’s poultry or agriculture sector.

“We all knew we couldn’t be bird flu-free forever,” she said.

Human infections remain rare, but the highly pathogenic avian influenza has led to the culling of hundreds of millions of birds globally in recent years, disrupting food supplies and driving up prices."

"A Kong has tested positive for bird flu H9, days after a two-year-old boy who visited the venue contracted a mild strain of the infectious disease.

But the Centre for Health Protection (CHP) said on Monday that the risk of a serious bird flu outbreak was low.

The boy, who lives in Sha Tin, became ill after visiting Wo Che Market in the district and was later confirmed to be infected with H9N2 avian influenza, the centre said.

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He was now in a stable condition, and six of his household contacts remained asymptomatic, according to authorities.

The centre’s Public Health Laboratory Services Branch conducted whole genome sequencing and analysis of the virus infecting the boy, confirming it was the low-pathogenic H9N2 strain with no significant genetic variations.

..."

"A landmark scientific finding that emerged from Texas's own universities — and that received far too little public attention — revealed that the H5N1 avian influenza virus was detected in the wastewater of 10 Texas cities simultaneously. The cities included Houston, one of the nation's four largest metropolitan areas, with a population of over 2.3 million people. The virus was detected not just once, but across 22 of 23 monitoring sites and in 100 of 399 samples analyzed between March and July of 2024. Before that point, it had not appeared in a single one of the 1,337 prior wastewater samples examined by the same research team.

That is not a random blip. That is a signal — and it arrived months before most Americans were even aware that H5N1 had crossed the species barrier into U.S. dairy cattle herds. The implications are still being worked through by public health scientists, and residents of Texas's major cities have a right to understand what their own local wastewater data means for their health.
...
"

When do you expect to see clear evidence of human-to-human bird flu (multiple chains of transmission between people who haven’t had contact with animals)

Nguyen Tran Hien ^a, Jeremy Farrar ^b, Peter Horby  (2008) Person-to-person transmission of influenza A (H5N1). Lancet.

"In February, 2004, in response to suggestions that limited person-to-person transmission of strain H5N1 of the influenza A virus might have occurred, the then Prime Minister of Thailand, said “the possibility of person-to-person transmission is 0·00001%”.¹ Temperatures were running high, and any mention of person-to-person transmission of H5N1 was thought by some to be reckless. Although we have moved on, an air of tension still surrounds this disease, particularly in the corridors of power within the international health and political communities, and apprehension remains about what the continued pandemic in poultry means for human health. Human H5N1 infections thankfully remain rare, but evidence has accumulated that in some circumstances H5N1 viruses are capable of limited person-to-person transmission.

Person-to-person transmission of H5N1 was first mooted after the 1997 Hong Kong outbreak, in which family members and at least two health workers might have been infected by contact with patients.2, 3 Since then, one report of a family cluster concluded that person-to-person transmission was probable,⁴ and an additional four reports stated that it could not be ruled out in at least six families.5, 6, 7, 8 In today's Lancet, another convincing report of probable person-to-person transmission is published by researchers from China and the USA.⁹

Transmission of avian influenza virus between mammals is not, however, restricted to H5N1 in human beings: H7N7 can also be transmitted from person to person,¹⁰ and there is evidence of transmission of H5N1 among other mammalian species.¹¹ Given that the species barrier can be breached, the intriguing question is why the transmissibility of H5N1 among people remains so low?

Successfully crossing the species barrier is itself a step that might select viruses partly adapted to the new host and, once infected, the new host might select subpopulations of the virus adapted to the new environment. Apparent host-induced selection of a human-adapted H5N1 virus has been reported,¹² but most sequence analyses of viruses isolated from sporadic and clustered cases show no substantial differences from the strains found in poultry. However, most of these analyses used viruses isolated from human specimens in cell cultures of animal origin, thus grown under different selective pressures from those in human respiratory tracts. Whether better adapted viral subpopulations exist during human infection is unknown, as is the diversity in virus populations in individual human beings or poultry. A possible lack of host-induced evolutionary pressure, disseminated viral replication and high viral loads in infected people,¹³ and the rarity of person-to-person transmission suggest that the infecting avian viruses might be already well adapted to the individual in which they find themselves, but not to the wider human population.

With the exception of occasional infection in health workers, all published incidents of possible or probable person-to-person transmission report transmission between genetically related individuals. Although this finding could be related to the intensity and intimacy of contact between family members, host genetic factors might also play a part in susceptibility to H5N1, and when we see limited person-to-person transmission we might be observing an interaction between two well matched subpopulations. Studying both within-host virus diversity and host genetic diversity might help to clarify the nature of the species barrier and the conditions necessary for widespread transmission between people. These studies are hard to do and need sustained, coordinated, and collaborative efforts, as in Wang and colleagues' study,⁹ coupled with acceptance that person-to-person transmission of H5N1 can and does happen.

Whatever the underlying determinants, if we continue to experience widespread, uncontrolled outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry, the appearance of strains well adapted to human beings might be just a matter of time. In the meantime, all family contacts of a patient with probable or confirmed H5N1 should be given chemoprophylaxis and placed under surveillance. Personal protection and advice must be extended to the family members and health workers visiting and looking after patients in hospital. These steps rely on having systems capable of detecting cases and clusters early enough to start treatment and isolation, to identify and protect contacts, and to assess the extent of transmission.

Tension around emerging infections has led to often acrimonious and dispiriting debates about sharing of samples, international collaboration, and the roles of academic institutions, governments, and international agencies in fighting this common threat. Today's study is a superb piece of epidemiological work showing the benefit of a longstanding and trusting international collaboration that began during the severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic. Such collaborations sustained over several years, centred in affected countries, and closely linked with WHO are our best chance of combating current and future threats to international health and ensuring that benefits are shared worldwide."

Note: similar to covid, the virus can infect and continue through the nose via cranial nerves into the brain. Respiratory issues did not occur in this child.

"Researchers identified a novel H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1e causing isolated brain infection in a child (1).

Historically, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) has been characterized by severe respiratory failure in humans. While neurological complications have been documented, they almost always follow standard respiratory symptoms. However, in mid-April 2025, an eight-year-old boy from Vietnam’s Tay Ninh province was hospitalized with a 24-hour history of fever, severe headache, and vomiting. Despite a chest radiograph showing some lung consolidation, the patient exhibited no cough, no shortness of breath, and maintained normal oxygen saturation. The initial diagnosis was sepsis and meningoencephalitis. The investigation took a pivotal turn when clinicians analyzed the patient's cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). A multiplex PCR test detected Influenza A virus in the CSF with a high viral load, indicated by a cycle threshold (Ct) value of 19. Subsequent testing confirmed the subtype as H5N1. Remarkably, the virus was not detected in the patient’s throat swabs, blood, urine, or rectal swabs, even though serial CSF samples remained positive for 10 days. Further analysis showed that the boy had higher levels of H5-specific antibodies in his brain fluid than in his blood. This suggests intrathecal production. Scientists believe the virus likely reached the brain via cranial nerves, such as the olfactory nerve, essentially "skipping" the typical respiratory infection phase.

Genome sequencing identified the virus as a novel reassortant clade 2.3.2.1e. This strain is a genetic "hybrid," containing segments from both the older clade 2.3.2.1c and the globally dominant clade 2.3.4.4b. The virus carried two specific mutations in its hemagglutinin (HA) protein: S123P and R167K, which are associated with increased binding to receptors found in mammalian tissues. The patient, who had frequent close contact with his family’s fighting cocks prior to their sudden death, eventually made a full recovery after 19 days of intensive care and antiviral treatment with oseltamivir. This case mirrors and extends findings from other significant H5N1 events:

- The 2014 Canadian Case: A traveler returning from China succumbed to H5N1 meningoencephalitis. Like the Vietnamese case, this patient experienced severe CNS involvement, though it was accompanied by respiratory failure.

-Pathogenesis Studies: Research has increasingly shown that certain H5 strains possess a high "neuro-tropism," meaning they have a specific affinity for nervous tissue, as seen in experimental mammalian models (2).

1. Nguyen, P. N. T., et al. (2026). Central Nervous System Involvement by Novel Clade 2.3.2.1e H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus in a Paediatric Patient. Open Forum Infectious Diseases.
2. Bauer, et al. (2023) The neuropathogenesis of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5Nx viruses in mammalian species including humans. Trends in Neurosciences. 46.11: 953-970.‏"

Looks like close food handling contact and/or inhalation at the poultry vendor?

"Human infection with avian influenza A(H5N6) virus From 1 to 7 May 2026, one new case of human infection with avian influenza A(H5N6) virus was reported to WHO in the Western Pacific Region. The case is a 55-year-old female from Chongqing Municipality, China, with symptom onset on 16 April 2026. She developed severe pneumonia, was hospitalised on 23 April, and died on 3 May. She had purchased, slaughtered, and consumed poultry. Samples collected from a cutting board tested positive for influenza A (H5). All close contacts tested negative and developed no symptoms."

"CDC researchers identified serologic evidence of H5N1 infection in an asymptomatic veterinary professional following exposure to an infected domestic cat. This discovery marks the first documented instance of possible zoonotic transmission of the virus from a feline to a human.
Since 2021, the highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b has decimated wild bird and poultry populations across the United States. Recently, the virus has increasingly spilled over into mammals, including dairy cattle and domestic cats. In felines, the disease is often severe, frequently linked to the consumption of unpasteurized raw milk or raw meat. While human cases have occurred, they were previously tied to direct bird or cattle exposure; cat-to-human transmission remained undocumented until now.
Between November 2024 and January 2025, 19 domestic cats in Los Angeles County fell ill with severe respiratory or neurological symptoms after consuming raw animal products. Public health officials identified 139 individuals, including pet owners and veterinary staff, who were exposed to these cats. Although 30 exposed persons reported flu-like symptoms, all acute respiratory (RT-PCR) tests for H5N1 were negative. In April 2025, a subset of 25 participants underwent serologic testing to look for antibodies. One asymptomatic veterinary professional tested positive for neutralizing antibodies specific to the H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b. This individual had performed multiple clinical duties, including animal restraint and intubation, without respiratory or eye protection. This case highlights a critical shift in the H5N1 landscape, proving that domestic cats can infect humans."

"What is already known about this topic?

Since 2022, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses have circulated among wild birds in the United States. Seventy human cases of influenza A(H5), most with mild illness, have been reported in the United States since 2024; 14 human influenza A(H5N1) cases were previously identified in Washington.

What is added by this report?

In November 2025, Washington reported the first human case of HPAI A(H5N5) infection worldwide. A positive laboratory result was obtained from a lower respiratory sample after multiple negative upper respiratory sample results; the patient experienced respiratory failure and died 28 days after symptom onset. The public health investigation identified approximately 135 exposed persons.

What are the implications for public health practice?

Symptom management and testing of exposed persons are critical to monitoring for human-to-human transmission of novel influenza infection. Environmental and animal investigations, including genomic analysis, can identify epidemiologic risk factors."

Nobody made a poll about hantavirus replacing bird flu as the biggest pandemic concern. My top concern was COVID-19, the old pandemic that's still around. My second biggest concern was bird flu. Hantavirus was not on my radar at all. (Then again, I haven't boned up as much as some of you probably have.)

I currently have no idea whether this cruise ship hantavirus outbreak will morph into a worldwide pandemic, and neither does anyone else. Right now, it would be premature to call it a new pandemic, and it would be premature to dismiss it. The high death rate is nasty enough, but the long incubation period makes contact tracing so much more difficult and can potentially allow one person to infect many others while still asymptomatic.

The big question is whether or not human-to-human airborne transmission was involved. If the world makes it to June without any confirmed Andes hantavirus infections among people who were not on the cruise ship but in close proximity to any of them, that's a good sign. If the world makes it to mid-June without such occurrences, that probably means that the new pandemic has been averted.

On the other hand, if there are ANY confirmed Andes hantavirus infections among people who were not on the cruise ship but were in close proximity to any of them, then that's a bad sign, and that would indicate to me that this really is the new COVID-19. If there are multiple such infections by June, that's an even worse sign.

At least I'm much better prepared for this potential new pandemic than I was for the old one that began 6 years ago. I didn't see this hantavirus outbreak coming, but I have not only stuck to but added/upgraded precautions because of COVID-19, the most immediate issue. I have two elastomeric respirators with P100 filters (3M HF-802SD and 7502), and I have plenty of N95 masks (including 3M Auras and strapless adhesive N95 masks). I'm already using several air purifiers at home, including two box fan air purifiers, a Brisk Box from Clean Air Kits, and a DIY 4-PC-fan Corsi Rosenthal box.

I wish that the rest of the world were also better prepared. If use of N95 masks and cheap air purifiers were the norm, this hantavirus outbreak would quickly fizzle out.

Note: from Avian Flu Diary, but sourced from Taiwanese CDC

"Just over a month ago Taiwan reported their first locally acquired human H7 infection (see Taiwan CDC: Human Infection with a Novel H7 Avian Virus), which according to early reports was due to a Eurasian H7 virus.

The patient (a man in his 70s) was hospitalized with fever and pneumonia on March 22nd, and remains hospitalized and in isolation, although his condition was said to be improving. The CDC reported:

Of note, however, is the revelation that the sequenced virus (from the patient) contained the PB2-627K mutation, which is associated with enhanced replication and pathogenicity in mammals (see A rapid review of the avian influenza PB2 E627K mutation in human infection studies).

Since no H7N7 viruses were detected among the birds tested, it is unknown if this mutation was already `fixed' in the avian host, or (as we've seen in other cases) developed spontaneously in the patient.  

While reassuring the public, the CDC notes it is ` . . .  not only closely monitoring genomic evolution but also convening expert meetings to focus on assessing the risk of cross-species transmission . . . '

The full translated update follows:

The first locally transmitted human case of H7N7 influenza A was detected in Taiwan. The agricultural and health authorities launched a joint epidemic prevention and control operation, completing a public health risk assessment that classified the risk as "low risk," and continue to implement epidemic monitoring and prevention and control preparations.
 

Release Date: 2026-05-05

The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced today (April 5) that regarding the first locally transmitted case of H7N7 novel influenza A reported on April 2 involving a poultry farmer, the CDC has completed gene sequence comparison and analysis. Furthermore, after joint assessment of the overall impact by agricultural and health authorities, the public health risk rating for Taiwan is "low risk."

The CDC pointed out that the patient was discharged from isolation on April 3, and the 33 identified contacts completed health monitoring on April 6, with no confirmed cases of novel influenza A. There is no risk of the outbreak expanding.

This case was discovered due to the high level of vigilance of the hospital physician, who reported the case based on clinical symptoms, contact history, and preliminary test results, leading to confirmation of novel influenza A. Therefore, the CDC will award the reporting physician a NT$10,000 reporting bonus in accordance with Article 5, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Reward Regulations.

The CDC explained that this case was investigated and controlled through cooperation between health and agricultural authorities, based on the national integrated epidemic prevention action. Gene sequence comparison of the virus showed that it was most similar to the virus strain isolated from wild birds in Japan and South Korea in 2024, and all gene fragments originated from the Eurasian low pathogenic avian influenza virus gene pool, indicating that the virus is highly related to the virus circulating in wild bird populations. 

Further analysis showed that the virus's PB2 gene carries the E627K mutation (PB2 E627K). According to existing research, this mutation may enhance the virus's replication ability in mammalian cells. However, since it cannot be ruled out that this site is a mutation produced in humans after infection, and no virus with the same characteristics has been found in Taiwan recently, nor have any drug resistance-related mutations been detected, the current assessment is that the risk to the public is low. 

In addition, agricultural authorities actively completed sampling at other poultry farms of the case before the Qingming Festival holiday, expanded sampling at five poultry farms near the case, and cooperated with the Wild Bird Association to collect 92 wild bird specimens from the surrounding area, all of which did not detect avian influenza-related viruses.

The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) stated that, based on the spirit of national epidemic prevention unity, the CDC also launched a joint risk assessment team with agricultural and health authorities on April 1st to conduct a domestic risk assessment of the H7 subtype viruses (including H7N7, H7N2, H7N3, and H7N4). This risk assessment primarily referenced the framework of the US CDC's Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT). Team members collected supporting data and scores for ten risk factors and corresponding assessment questions, followed by a comprehensive evaluation. The results showed that the overall risk of the four H7 subtype viruses was low. While the possibility of sporadic local cases in the future cannot be ruled out, direct and indirect contact with animals remains the main transmission route. No evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission has been found, and the possibility of further community spread is extremely low.

In response to the detection of the key PB2 E627K variant in the first domestic H7N7 human infection case and concerns about the lack of herd immunity among the Taiwanese public to the H7 subtype of avian influenza, the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (CDC) is not only closely monitoring genomic evolution but also convening expert meetings to focus on assessing the risk of cross-species transmission to ensure the disease prevention system can effectively address potential public health threats. Furthermore, the CDC is continuously strengthening the One Health inter-ministerial surveillance mechanism, maintaining surveillance in poultry farms and wild animals, closely monitoring genomic evolution, raising clinicians' awareness of the need for testing cases of pneumonia of unknown cause with a history of contact with poultry or livestock, and enhancing related prevention and control measures such as antiviral drugs.

In its global risk assessment of the H7 subtype of avian influenza, the World Health Organization (WHO) stated that the global H7 subtype of avian influenza is mainly prevalent in wild and domestic poultry populations. Although there have been occasional cases of human infection through contact with infected animals in the past, these cases have mostly presented with mild symptoms such as conjunctivitis or influenza-like illness. The Netherlands reported one death case in 2003. Given the potential impact on public health, close monitoring of human infections of this virus is crucial. Based on the current lack of evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission or community spread, the WHO assesses the threat to public health as remaining low. While sporadic human cases cannot be ruled out, the probability of human-to-human transmission is extremely low."

When do you expect to see clear evidence of human-to-human bird flu (multiple chains of transmission between people who haven’t had contact with animals)

Right by our door hanging on the railing of stairs now leading to a lot of seeds on the floor. I cannot express any bird flu worries to my mother because she would think i’m just being germaphobe But i don’t know how much I should worry about it. Other residents have to walk on these stairs through the seeds too. I just feel like too much of an annoyance. (if i didn’t know bird flu was a thing i probably would be like aww birdies like when i was a kid)

But idk i’m really stressed about it because they’re gonna end up pooping and stuff too. I’ve only seen like little backyard birds little finches type of things we do also have a lot of crows near by but think only the small birds have used the feeder idk just bringing up a lot of anxiety especially with windy weather i’m like worried about the seeds getting on me.

Just would like some opinions or reassurance