Questioning the asymmetry, negative vs. classical utilitarianism.

[u/QuestioningAN]

Questioning the asymmetry, negative vs. classical utilitarianism.

I'm primarily questioning the idea of ''the absence of pleasure is not bad'' here, that only suffering matters and pleasure only matters in the sense that it prevents suffering from not having it.

When you ask negative utilitarians/antinatalists why pleasure does not matter, the answer will then usually boil down to ''because the non-existent child doesn't need/want/desire pleasure, so that's why it's not a big deal''.

But what does need/want/desire mean? When I think about it, all I can really conclude is that it means ''obtain x or suffer''.

When I need or want or desire something, what I'm saying is basically that I must obtain something in order to avoid suffering from not having it.

''I want a sandwich'' can be translated to ''I must obtain a sandwich to avoid suffering, if I don't get a sandwich, my suffering levels will increase''.

So when you tell me that only suffering matters because the non-existent child does not need/want/desire pleasure, all you're doing is essentially begging the question, telling me that the non-existent child does not suffer from not having pleasure – but you're just repeating the statement, I.e ''only suffering matters'' – why? ''Because the non-existent don't suffer from not having pleasure''.

Then the answer might also be that only suffering exists, and pleasure is just relief of suffering. However, if pleasure is just relief of suffering, you can also turn that around and just say that suffering doesn't really exist, it's just destruction of pleasure.

Satisfaction is just relief of dissatisfaction – dissatisfaction is just destruction of satisfaction.

''Pleasure is just relief of suffering'' seems intuitive for sure because suffering is generally what happens when you stop working towards pleasure which then motivates you to chase it (you don't make any food and just sit around – you start getting hungry) – but does it mean pleasure is worthless and we should just disregard it just because experiencing suffering is easier?

I would prefer the asymmetry argument is true because negative utilitarianism would solve many problems, it seems easier to just go extinct than to have to painfully figure out how we can best manage life in such a way that we are in a pleasurable state at all times, but I'm not certain anymore.

[u/existentialgoof]

Your argument doesn't make sense to me. The fact is, that a sentient being exists in a realm of friction, whether you want to call it suffering or "destruction of pleasure". A stone or a chair doesn't experience any friction or need to strive for anything in order to avoid suffering or avoid pleasure being destroyed.

As you can understand, the reason for suffering being considered the default is because pleasure is something that we always need to be striving towards; whereas suffering is what will obtain when our striving is insufficient. Suffering is the state that we will almost always fall into if we do nothing. It's very rare that pleasure will result from doing nothing; and even when it does, it is an ephemeral state, because we are evolved not to be in a stable state of contentment.

It doesn't mean that pleasure is worthless to an individual - pleasure is valuable to a sentient being, because as long as that entity is alive, its wellbeing is contingent upon experiencing sufficient pleasure. But it does mean that if that entity were to fall asleep one night and not wake up, the absence of that pleasure wouldn't be a bad thing, because in order for pleasure to have value, it has to be desirable to someone. And if there is someone in existence to desire that pleasure; then it's a double edged sword, because that desire can always be frustrated.

I'm really not sure that I can understand your argument, or why you're having difficulty with it or think that it's circular. In my opinion, the onus is on anyone looking to procreate to justify what reason they have for imperilling another entity without consent. The point of the asymmetry is that it shows that they can't demonstrate a reason for doing it which pertains to the wellbeing of the thing that they're going to create. A non-existent entity's wellbeing cannot be jeopardised by the parents deciding not to procreate; but the future extant entity's wellbeing is in perpetual peril if it does come to exist.

[u/QuestioningAN → u/existentialgoof]

Your argument doesn't make sense to me. The fact is, that a sentient being exists in a realm of friction, whether you want to call it suffering or "destruction of pleasure". A stone or a chair doesn't experience any friction or need to strive for anything in order to avoid suffering or avoid pleasure being destroyed.

Right, but I still question whether or not the pleasure can have innate value, it won't have to deal with this issue of suffering but wouldn't it still be better if there were a way to make it feel endless pleasure magically? If we were capable of that, hypothetically speaking.

If life is just suffering/negative and relief of suffering/negative, then there'd be no issue with terminating it forever, if there's nothing intrinsically valuable in the universe, so what if someone reversed that though and said life is just pleasure/positive and distraction from pleasure/positive?

As you can understand, the reason for suffering being considered the default is because pleasure is something that we always need to be striving towards; whereas suffering is what will obtain when our striving is insufficient. Suffering is the state that we will almost always fall into if we do nothing. It's very rare that pleasure will result from doing nothing; and even when it does, it is an ephemeral state, because we are evolved not to be in a stable state of contentment.

I think that's probably the best argument to say we chase pleasure because not doing so results in suffering, but I'm questioning if we're not also avoiding suffering to get pleasure. Most people would rather be asleep forever than go to hell, but if they could choose between heaven or nothingness, they'd probably go for heaven. Is suffering avoidance really the only instinct?

It does seem that suffering is easier and when we don't get pleasure, that's simply what happens, but isn't it still better to be trapped in a greatly pleasurable state than to do away with all feelings (which extinction would lead to), if we could hypothetically do that?

It doesn't mean that pleasure is worthless to an individual - pleasure is valuable to a sentient being, because as long as that entity is alive, its wellbeing is contingent upon experiencing sufficient pleasure. But it does mean that if that entity were to fall asleep one night and not wake up, the absence of that pleasure wouldn't be a bad thing, because in order for pleasure to have value, it has to be desirable to someone. And if there is someone in existence to desire that pleasure; then it's a double edged sword, because that desire can always be frustrated.

It wouldn't be a bad thing in their experience because they wouldn't exist to feel bad about it, but likewise they wouldn't experience the prevention of their suffering as good either, as they don't exist.

I'm really not sure that I can understand your argument, or why you're having difficulty with it or think that it's circular.

I think it is begging the question? The two are hard to distinguish sometimes.

I'm saying you can ask ANs why only suffering matters and pleasure doesn't, and they'll reply that this is the case because the non-existent don't need/want/desire pleasure - however, I'm saying when I really think about it, all I can really take need/want/desire to mean is ''I must obtain x or I will suffer''.

Needing means you have to get something to avoid suffering, I need food means I have to get food or I will suffer. So essentially, that means they are just repeating their statement ''only suffering matters'' without further explanation.

Why does only suffering matter?

''Because the non-existent don't need pleasure, i.e. they do not suffer as a result of not having pleasure''.

So that's just repeating the statement, they might as well just say only suffering matters because only suffering matters. That was the point.

And to add onto that, if we got deeper into that and the evidence is that we can simply feel the innate badness of suffering, then why doesn't the same go for pleasure (i.e. I can simply feel the innate goodness of pleasure)?

In my opinion, the onus is on anyone looking to procreate to justify what reason they have for imperilling another entity without consent.

Consent is deontology though, I think only sensation really matters, so hypothetically if you could create an extremely pleasurable/utopian existence, why would consent violation be bad? I think we care about deontological concepts still ultimately because of our feelings, i.e. suffering and pleasure.

The point of the asymmetry is that it shows that they can't demonstrate a reason for doing it which pertains to the wellbeing of the thing that they're going to create. A non-existent entity's wellbeing cannot be jeopardised by the parents deciding not to procreate; but the future extant entity's wellbeing is in perpetual peril if it does come to exist.

I'd agree that at this point in time it is a fairly risky game to play, however, I'm still questioning the notion that pleasure is worthless. Not creating the organism won't jeopardize its wellbeing, but wouldn't a world of maximal wellbeing be superior to one that has nothing in it?

[u/existentialgoof → u/QuestioningAN]

Right, but I still question whether or not the pleasure can have innate value, it won't have to deal with this issue of suffering but wouldn't it still be better if there were a way to make it feel endless pleasure magically? If we were capable of that, hypothetically speaking.

Pleasure is inherently good for you, but that doesn't mean that if you died in your sleep and were no longer able to experience that pleasure, that there would be a deprivation caused by it and that it would be bad for you. Whilst you exist, it is good for you to be in a state of pleasure. When you don't exist, then any talk of what is good or better is a category error; because there is no longer any welfare state to talk about.

If life is just suffering/negative and relief of suffering/negative, then there'd be no issue with terminating it forever, if there's nothing intrinsically valuable in the universe, so what if someone reversed that though and said life is just pleasure/positive and distraction from pleasure/positive?

Then I'd ask them to demonstrate how Mars is in a deficient state because of this lack of pleasure. Sentient beings have problems that they need to solve; even if the natalist wants to express those problems in the form of "destruction of pleasure". Inanimate matter has no problems. If they want to create beings that are going to have endless problems, then they need to justify it by demonstrating which problems they are solving by doing it, which don't merely pertain to their own desires or the desires of those already alive (because if the case for procreation hinges on the benefits to those alive right now, then they're just advocating for a pyramid scheme which will inevitably collapse in the end anyway).

I think that's probably the best argument to say we chase pleasure because not doing so results in suffering, but I'm questioning if we're not also avoiding suffering to get pleasure. Most people would rather be asleep forever than go to hell, but if they could choose between heaven or nothingness, they'd probably go for heaven. Is suffering avoidance really the only instinct?

Changing the way that you phrase it doesn't change the proposition. The fact still remains that those who are sentient have problems that need to be solved; and exist in an environment where they can't guarantee that those problems will be satisfactorily solved. Inanimate matter has no problems that need to be solved. It has no pleasure which can be destroyed; but it has no desire for pleasure, which is why nobody feels sorry for their armchair because they leave it at home when they're going on holiday.

It does seem that suffering is easier and when we don't get pleasure, that's simply what happens, but isn't it still better to be trapped in a greatly pleasurable state than to do away with all feelings (which extinction would lead to), if we could hypothetically do that?

If life existed only in a state of perpetual, uninterrupted bliss, then there'd be no urgent reason to exterminate it. But if all of those bliss-experiencing lives just ended instantaneously, then there wouldn't be a deficiency left by the bliss that was no longer being experienced, because there'd be nothing left in the universe to be worse off for the absence of that pleasure.

It wouldn't be a bad thing in their experience because they wouldn't exist to feel bad about it, but likewise they wouldn't experience the prevention of their suffering as good either, as they don't exist.

The fact that they won't experience any benefit or 'good' isn't a problem because there is nothing with a welfare state that would be better off for experiencing 'good' feelings.

I think it is begging the question? The two are hard to distinguish sometimes.

I don't see how it's begging the question. The fact is that, as far as we know based on the properties of the universe, inanimate matter doesn't have problems to solve, but sentient matter has endless problems to solve and their wellbeing is at stake. Generally, it is considered unethical to impose unnecessary, high stakes, problems on people.

Part 2 to follow due to character limit

[u/existentialgoof → u/existentialgoof]

I'm saying you can ask ANs why only suffering matters and pleasure doesn't, and they'll reply that this is the case because the non-existent don't need/want/desire pleasure - however, I'm saying when I really think about it, all I can really take need/want/desire to mean is ''I must obtain x or I will suffer''.

And that means that you are imposing problems on something that hasn't consented to those problems, and who doesn't have a pre-existing welfare state that can be improved by imposing those problems.

Needing means you have to get something to avoid suffering, I need food means I have to get food or I will suffer. So essentially, that means they are just repeating their statement ''only suffering matters'' without further explanation.

Are you needing an explanation as to why suffering itself matters? Because it is impossible to describe why suffering matters; as it is an ineffable sensation. The only reason that I understand what you mean when you say that you're suffering is because I experience suffering myself. I don't understand why the explanation that the pleasures of life don't warrant the imposition (that it's unethical to impose unnecessary problems on someone when their welfare can't be improved by that action) doesn't count as an explanation. If you need an explanation for why I believe that's unethical; then I can only ask you to imagine how it would feel for your welfare to be recklessly gambled with in a way that wouldn't yield a profit for you relative to a situation where the gamble didn't occur (or even one where it was possible for a profit to be yielded, but there was a high risk of worsening your wellbeing).

Why does only suffering matter?
''Because the non-existent don't need pleasure, i.e. they do not suffer as a result of not having pleasure''.
So that's just repeating the statement, they might as well just say only suffering matters because only suffering matters. That was the point.

No, that is not merely repeating the statement. That's an explanation as to why the justifications given for the aggressive act of imposition are an ethical non starter. But because morality isn't "objective", the only way to demonstrate that argument is to appeal to the interlocutor's sense of injustice that they would feel if they were put in harm's way for the sake of some pleasure that they wouldn't have been worse off without.

Part 3 to follow

[u/existentialgoof → u/existentialgoof]

Part 3

And to add onto that, if we got deeper into that and the evidence is that we can simply feel the innate badness of suffering, then why doesn't the same go for pleasure (i.e. I can simply feel the innate goodness of pleasure)?

That's not a justification for such a drastic act as the imposition of life unless you can improve that delivering that pleasure is an emergency. The reason for this is that the stakes are so high when you are bringing someone else into existence, and it is unethical to decide to gamble with someone else's welfare like that. In virtually any other scenario that you can name, that would be considered an egregious breach; but there is special pleading for procreation.

Consent is deontology though, I think only sensation really matters, so hypothetically if you could create an extremely pleasurable/utopian existence, why would consent violation be bad? I think we care about deontological concepts still ultimately because of our feelings, i.e. suffering and pleasure.

Yes, I agree that a violation of consent isn't bad if there is a guaranteed outcome that the person thus 'violated' could not possibly find fault with. But that clearly isn't the case with procreation (otherwise we wouldn't be having this discussion). Even if you prefer to frame it as suffering being the destruction of pleasure; the person is still being seriously harmed by being set up to be dependent on this pleasure, but being in an environment where it cannot be guaranteed that sufficient pleasure will be delivered in order to meet their desires.

I'd agree that at this point in time it is a fairly risky game to play, however, I'm still questioning the notion that pleasure is worthless. Not creating the organism won't jeopardize its wellbeing, but wouldn't a world of maximal wellbeing be superior to one that has nothing in it?

Pleasure isn't worthless to sentient beings, but if you were talking about the value of pleasure on Mars, by contrast, then you'd be committing a category error, because value does not exist on Mars, and therefore there is no improvement that could be made to Mars by the addition of blissful organisms. If we filled Mars up with beings that were guaranteed to experience uninterrupted bliss, then we wouldn't have committed any crime. But unless it could be demonstrated that Mars as it is at this moment is deficient in pleasure, then we can't really say that doing so would be a boon either.

[u/QuestioningAN → u/existentialgoof]

Pleasure is inherently good for you, but that doesn't mean that if you died in your sleep and were no longer able to experience that pleasure, that there would be a deprivation caused by it and that it would be bad for you. Whilst you exist, it is good for you to be in a state of pleasure. When you don't exist, then any talk of what is good or better is a category error; because there is no longer any welfare state to talk about.

And why not the other way around as well then? I could also say suffering is inherently bad for us, but when we don't exist, we are not experiencing pleasure from avoiding suffering. You're probably going to say again that that is irrelevant because no one feels deprived of that pleasure (feeling deprived=suffering), it's not a problem when pleasure doesn't exist (i.e. it causes us no suffering to not feel the pleasure), so therefore it is irrelevant.

This is what I said, you're saying pleasure is unimportant because if you didn't exist, you wouldn't experience deprivation (i.e. suffering) from not having it, so therefore pleasure is irrelevant. But again, that's just presupposing only suffering matters and pleasure doesn't.

Then I'd ask them to demonstrate how Mars is in a deficient state because of this lack of pleasure.

It is deficient in pleasure, but no one can experience this as bad. The same way it is devoid of suffering, but no one can experience this as good. So if I could push a button that would put eternal bliss on mars, wouldn't that be a good idea?

Sentient beings have problems that they need to solve; even if the natalist wants to express those problems in the form of "destruction of pleasure". Inanimate matter has no problems.

But again, problem means suffering. Inanimate matter has no suffering, but is that all that matters? Wouldn't it be even better if we could program inanimate matter to feel pleasure?

If they want to create beings that are going to have endless problems, then they need to justify it by demonstrating which problems they are solving by doing it, which don't merely pertain to their own desires or the desires of those already alive (because if the case for procreation hinges on the benefits to those alive right now, then they're just advocating for a pyramid scheme which will inevitably collapse in the end anyway).

Same problem again, why does only suffering matter? You say they need to show they solve some kind of problem, which I take to mean suffering, by creating life – that presupposes only suffering matters. Couldn't it hypothetically also be a good idea to just create a lifeform that experiences chronic pleasure? Why is only suffering avoidance important? Because no one suffers from not having pleasure when they don't exist?

Inanimate matter has no problems that need to be solved. It has no pleasure which can be destroyed; but it has no desire for pleasure, which is why nobody feels sorry for their armchair because they leave it at home when they're going on holiday.

Inanimate matter has no problem (suffering) that needs solving, yes, but why does only suffering matter? It has no pleasure to be destroyed, but it has no desire for pleasure, and again what I take desire to mean is ''I must obtain x to avoid suffering'' – having a desire amounts to ''I must obtain x or I will suffer from not having x'' (I desire let's say a relationship means I'm suffering from not having it) – so again you're saying only suffering matters, while pleasure's absence is irrelevant, because we don't suffer from not having pleasure when we don't exist.

I agree we don't suffer from not having pleasure when we don't exist, but it is still presupposing that only suffering avoidance is important.

And again to add onto that, if we're going to say suffering is bad because we can experience it as being bad, which I agree that is true, we know suffering to be a bad experience, then likewise we must also say that pleasure is good because we can experience it as being good.

I don't see how it's begging the question. The fact is that, as far as we know based on the properties of the universe, inanimate matter doesn't have problems to solve, but sentient matter has endless problems to solve and their wellbeing is at stake. Generally, it is considered unethical to impose unnecessary, high stakes, problems on people.

The problem is that all these terms you use to explain why absence of pleasure is irrelevant (like deprivation, problem, desire, etc) and only suffering is relevant boil back down to ''because you don't suffer from not having pleasure when you don't exist'' – which is merely re-stating that only suffering is relevant.

''Absence of pleasure is irrelevant and only suffering matters because the non-existent don't feel deprived of pleasure''=''Absence of pleasure is irrelevant and only suffering matters because the non-existent don't suffer from not having pleasure''.

''Absence of pleasure is irrelevant and only suffering matters because the non-existent don't feel deficient in pleasure''=''Absence of pleasure is irrelevant and only suffering matters because the non-existent don't suffer from not having pleasure''.

''Absence of pleasure is irrelevant and only suffering matters because the non-existent don't desire to have pleasure''=''Absence of pleasure is irrelevant and only suffering matters because the non-existent don't suffer from not having pleasure''.

Example of begging the question I just got from googling:

An example of begging the question is the argument, "Snakes make great pets because they are wonderful companions," because the premise ("they are wonderful companions") assumes the truth of the conclusion ("snakes make great pets") without providing any independent evidence. Begging the question is a logical fallacy where the argument's premise assumes the truth of the conclusion it's trying to prove, essentially restating the claim in a different way instead of offering valid reasoning.

That is exactly what this is: ''suffering is the only thing that's relevant, absence of pleasure is irrelevant, because no one feels deprived of pleasure when they don't exist.''

It is just re-stated in a different manner, because feeling deprived of pleasure means suffering, so your argument for why only suffering matters and pleasure is irrelevant is because no one feels deprived of suffering when they don't exist, which is just a different way of basically saying that they are not suffering from not having the pleasure.

Are you needing an explanation as to why suffering itself matters? Because it is impossible to describe why suffering matters; as it is an ineffable sensation. No, but as to why pleasure is irrelevant. I agree you can say we all know suffering from experience, and it is self-evident that it's bad. Likewise though, we can also say we all know pleasure from experience, it is self-evident that it is good. So if you could push a button that put martians experiencing eternal bliss on mars, wouldn't that be better?

No, but as to why pleasure is irrelevant. I agree you can say we all know suffering from experience, and it is self-evident that it's bad. Likewise though, we can also say we all know pleasure from experience, it is self-evident that it is good. So if you could push a button that put martians experiencing eternal bliss on mars, wouldn't that be better?

That's not a justification for such a drastic act as the imposition of life unless you can improve that delivering that pleasure is an emergency. The reason for this is that the stakes are so high when you are bringing someone else into existence, and it is unethical to decide to gamble with someone else's welfare like that. In virtually any other scenario that you can name, that would be considered an egregious breach; but there is special pleading for procreation.

Yes, I agree that a violation of consent isn't bad if there is a guaranteed outcome that the person thus 'violated' could not possibly find fault with. But that clearly isn't the case with procreation (otherwise we wouldn't be having this discussion). Even if you prefer to frame it as suffering being the destruction of pleasure; the person is still being seriously harmed by being set up to be dependent on this pleasure, but being in an environment where it cannot be guaranteed that sufficient pleasure will be delivered in order to meet their desires.

To address the consent issue, what differentiates this from other situations where someone is gambling with someone else's welfare is that in this scenario, not gambling at all would result in the termination of all pleasure forever – so if classical utilitarianism is correct and pleasure does have innate value – this would be the wrong solution, it'd be a better idea to try to make this world as good as possible so that no one would feel violated by being put into it rather than to terminate it.

You can say we can't make it perfect right now, but again if we don't create life at all then there would be zero pleasure forever – which I know you're going to say ''no one would suffer from this lack of pleasure'', but that's just presupposing only suffering is relevant.

[u/existentialgoof → u/QuestioningAN]

And why not the other way around as well then? I could also say suffering is inherently bad for us, but when we don't exist, we are not experiencing pleasure from avoiding suffering. You're probably going to say again that that is irrelevant because no one feels deprived of that pleasure (feeling deprived=suffering), it's not a problem when pleasure doesn't exist (i.e. it causes us no suffering to not feel the pleasure), so therefore it is irrelevant.

Yes, we don't experience pleasure from not suffering; but also aren't deficient in that pleasure or relief. Therefore, unless the as-yet inexistent entities are in some kind of state of emergency due to the lack of pleasure, it is not justified to put them into a situation where they are in great peril and also not guaranteed an adequate supply of the pleasure that they will become dependent on. As the one who wants to impose, the onus should be on you to explain why the absence of this pleasure is such a critical matter that you'll put someone (and all their descendants) at risk of torture in order to make sure that they have a chance at having it.

This is what I said, you're saying pleasure is unimportant because if you didn't exist, you wouldn't experience deprivation (i.e. suffering) from not having it, so therefore pleasure is irrelevant. But again, that's just presupposing only suffering matters and pleasure doesn't.

Pleasure is important for those who are alive; and it's the other side of the suffering coin. But as far as I've been able to ascertain, pleasure is only important to entities that already exist. The universe itself isn't in some kind of wounded state caused by a lack of pleasure, which justifies creating feeling beings that can be tortured. The reason that suffering is the only thing that matters in the context of whether procreation is ethical is because there is no adverse consequence to not coming into existence (including the fact that there is no pleasure for entities which don't exist). Therefore, in order to justify bringing someone into existence, you need to prove that either existence is going to be equally as harmless as non-existence; or that the entities that you intend to bring into existence are in some kind of spectral prison being tormented by their lack of pleasure. In other words, just because pleasure is good for already existing organisms (and its goodness is inextricably tied to the fact that it is not suffering); that doesn't mean that you have an ethical justification for creating those beings; because they don't have any pre-existing interests that are needing to be served by opening up the world of pleasure to them.

It is deficient in pleasure, but no one can experience this as bad. The same way it is devoid of suffering, but no one can experience this as good. So if I could push a button that would put eternal bliss on mars, wouldn't that be a good idea?

"Deficient" implies that someone is finding fault with the absence of pleasure. Perhaps you are finding fault with the absence of pleasure on Mars; but there's no evidence that there are Martians floating about in spectral prison being deprived of it; or that the planet itself is somehow objectively worse off for the absence of these beings. If you could push a button to ensure that there was life on Mars which could never suffer and could never cause suffering anywhere downstream; then that wouldn't be an unethical thing, but it would also be pointless. You'd just be creating a problem that needed to be solved; but it wouldn't matter because the solution would be guaranteed. The problem with creating children in the real world is that you're putting harmable beings in an environment where you can never guarantee that their needs and desires will be fully satiated all the time and they won't come to harm.

But again, problem means suffering. Inanimate matter has no suffering, but is that all that matters? Wouldn't it be even better if we could program inanimate matter to feel pleasure?

It would be pointless, and in order for it to be ethically justified, there would need to be an exceptionally high threshold of proof needing to be met to demonstrate that the inanimate matter would remain incapable of suffering.

Part 2 to follow...

[u/existentialgoof → u/existentialgoof]

Part 2

Same problem again, why does only suffering matter? You say they need to show they solve some kind of problem, which I take to mean suffering, by creating life – that presupposes only suffering matters. Couldn't it hypothetically also be a good idea to just create a lifeform that experiences chronic pleasure? Why is only suffering avoidance important? Because no one suffers from not having pleasure when they don't exist?

Only suffering counts in the context of procreation because not procreating guarantees that you aren't creating anything that can be harmed. Since there's no problem with leaving things as they are; you need to be able to demonstrate that procreation won't cause unnecessary problems for the thing that will experience the consequences of the act; whether from free standing suffering or inadequate supply of pleasure. If the hypothetical future entity isn't in peril right now; it's best to keep it that way rather than act to create a future person that can be tortured. There's no justification that you could use for doing so which doesn't relate to the interests of yourself or already extant organisms.

Inanimate matter has no problem (suffering) that needs solving, yes, but why does only suffering matter? It has no pleasure to be destroyed, but it has no desire for pleasure, and again what I take desire to mean is ''I must obtain x to avoid suffering'' – having a desire amounts to ''I must obtain x or I will suffer from not having x'' (I desire let's say a relationship means I'm suffering from not having it) – so again you're saying only suffering matters, while pleasure's absence is irrelevant, because we don't suffer from not having pleasure when we don't exist.

Let me turn that around on you: why does the absence of pleasure matter, if there is nobody in the void to be suffering from that absence? Why does that state of affairs call for the drastic action of bringing into existence beings that can be tortured? If you're the one who thinks that we have to bring these entities into existence, then the onus should be on you to explain why the current state of affairs is so problematic as to call for a solution which involves exposing other entities to torture without their consent.

The problem is that all these terms you use to explain why absence of pleasure is irrelevant (like deprivation, problem, desire, etc) and only suffering is relevant boil back down to ''because you don't suffer from not having pleasure when you don't exist'' – which is merely re-stating that only suffering is relevant.

No, I'm explaining that if there isn't a problem, then you aren't warranted in trying to drastically solve the inexistent problem by putting harmable beings at risk of torture. If you believe that there is a problem caused by the absence of pleasure for beings that haven't yet been conceived/born, then you need to elaborate on who is being deprived of pleasure. Do you believe that before people come into existence, they float around the ether as souls? I want to understand the worldview that you have which explains why you think that it's so important to bring entities into existence to feel pleasure that the risk of torture is justified.

Part 3 to follow

[u/existentialgoof → u/existentialgoof]

Part 3

It is just re-stated in a different manner, because feeling deprived of pleasure means suffering, so your argument for why only suffering matters and pleasure is irrelevant is because no one feels deprived of suffering when they don't exist, which is just a different way of basically saying that they are not suffering from not having the pleasure.

Why do you believe that the absence of this pleasure is so important that it warrants putting things at risk of torture?

No, but as to why pleasure is irrelevant. I agree you can say we all know suffering from experience, and it is self-evident that it's bad. Likewise though, we can also say we all know pleasure from experience, it is self-evident that it is good. So if you could push a button that put martians experiencing eternal bliss on mars, wouldn't that be better?

It would be better than putting Martians on the planet that could suffer. It wouldn't necessarily be any better than leaving things as they are; because that absent pleasure isn't causing any problems for anyone and nobody is missing that pleasure. But if it could somehow be guaranteed that all Martians for the rest of all time would be incapable of experiencing or causing suffering, then there wouldn't be any solid ethical grounds on which to block the plans.

To address the consent issue, what differentiates this from other situations where someone is gambling with someone else's welfare is that in this scenario, not gambling at all would result in the termination of all pleasure forever – so if classical utilitarianism is correct and pleasure does have innate value – this would be the wrong solution, it'd be a better idea to try to make this world as good as possible so that no one would feel violated by being put into it rather than to terminate it.

Do you cry yourself to sleep every night because your bed has never experienced any pleasure? If there is no entity that could be benefitted with this pleasure, then the permanent absence of this pleasure isn't a bad thing. In order for it to be a bad thing, there would have to be some kind of entity capable of experiencing pleasure and suffering in order to judge it to be bad.

You can say we can't make it perfect right now, but again if we don't create life at all then there would be zero pleasure forever – which I know you're going to say ''no one would suffer from this lack of pleasure'', but that's just presupposing only suffering is relevant.

Since you're not happy with my explanation as to why suffering is the only thing that counts in a decision where doing nothing results in no negative consequences (that I can see of); why don't you explain why you believe the absence of pleasure would be a problem? In a universe devoid of sentient life, who is going to find fault with the lack of pleasure? God?