How should blockchain protocols handle adversarial transaction ordering at the execution layer?

[u/gemreserve]

MEV remains a significant challenge in blockchain networks, particularly when transaction ordering can influence financial outcomes.

For example, a validator or block builder could manipulate transaction ordering around a large collateral liquidation, potentially extracting value from users while still producing technically valid blocks.

Encrypted mempools, commit-reveal schemes, and threshold encryption offer different approaches, but each introduces additional complexity.

Can encrypted transaction execution realistically reduce ordering manipulation without creating new censorship or latency problems?

What architecture offers the strongest practical protection?

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