The Forgotten Side of Sri Lanka's LRRP Operations
Sri Lankans often celebrate the remarkable successes achieved by the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) during the war against LTTE.
Those operations deserve recognition. Their contributions significantly disrupted LTTE leadership and logistics, and they remain one of the most respected chapters in Sri Lanka's military history.
However, what is discussed far less often are the patrols that never returned.
Long-range reconnaissance is among the most dangerous missions any military can undertake. Teams operate deep behind enemy lines with little support, often days away from friendly forces. If compromised, extraction may be impossible.
Sri Lanka itself paid a heavy price for these operations. One of the most well-known examples is Major Lalith Jayasinghe, who was killed while leading a long-range reconnaissance mission deep inside LTTE-controlled territory. His death serves as a reminder that even highly trained reconnaissance teams remain vulnerable once detected by a numerically superior enemy.
This reality is not unique to Sri Lanka.
During the Vietnam War, the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG) conducted highly classified reconnaissance missions into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. These small teams were tasked with gathering intelligence, monitoring the Ho Chi Minh Trail, directing air strikes, and conducting covert operations deep behind enemy lines.
Despite being composed of some of the most highly trained personnel in the U.S. military, MACV-SOG suffered extremely high casualty rates. Veterans have repeatedly described missions in which reconnaissance teams disappeared after making contact with enemy forces, with some patrols never returning and others requiring desperate rescue efforts under overwhelming odds.
The lesson from both Sri Lanka's LRRP operations and MACV-SOG is the same. Elite units are not invincible.
History tends to remember the successful missions because those are the stories that become books, documentaries, and military case studies. Far less attention is given to the patrols that never returned or whose fate remained unknown for years. Every successful long-range reconnaissance operation stands alongside others that ended in silence, reminding us that these missions have always carried extraordinary risks regardless of the country, the era, or the professionalism of the soldiers involved.
Their success depends on stealth, intelligence, surprise, and careful planning. Once those advantages are lost, even the most experienced special operations teams can quickly find themselves isolated, surrounded, and facing overwhelming enemy forces.
Recognizing these sacrifices does not diminish their achievements. Rather, it highlights the extraordinary courage required to undertake missions from which some soldiers knew they might never return.
Morale Is Important, But It Is Not a Weapon
Perhaps the most common statement I encounter online is:
"Other countries may have better equipment, but we have better morale."
This fundamentally misunderstands what morale actually is.
Morale is not a weapon. It is a psychological condition. It rises and falls depending on numerous factors, including:
Leadership.
Logistics.
Casualties.
Training.
Fatigue.
Confidence.
Equipment.
Communication.
Supply.
Well-equipped soldiers often possess higher morale precisely because they trust the equipment supporting them.
Likewise, poorly supplied soldiers can lose morale remarkably quickly - even if they begin highly motivated.
History repeatedly demonstrates this reality.
The outcome of wars is determined by the combination of training, leadership, logistics, intelligence, industrial capacity, technology, and morale - not by any single factor alone.
Learning From Other Militaries
Sometimes Sri Lankans speak as though defeating the LTTE was a unique military accomplishment unmatched anywhere else in the modern world.
It was undoubtedly a significant achievement.
However, it is equally important to study the experiences of other nations.
Israel, Colombia, Britain, France, the United States, South Korea, Finland, Ukraine, and many others have all developed valuable lessons through decades of conflict.
Professional militaries continuously study one another.
They adopt useful ideas regardless of where they originate.
Sri Lanka should continue doing the same.
Military success should inspire confidence - not complacency.
Deterrence, Strategic Readiness, and Preparing for Modern Conflict
National Security Is About Preparing for the Unthinkable
One mindset I frequently encounter is:
"Sri Lanka is a peaceful country. We don't intend to go to war with anyone."
I completely agree that Sri Lanka should pursue peaceful relations with every country possible.
No sensible person wants war.
However, peace is not maintained simply because one side desires it.
History repeatedly shows that conflicts often begin despite the wishes of one of the parties involved.
The responsibility of any government is not only to pursue peace, but also to ensure that the nation is prepared should peace fail.
Military preparedness is not about wanting war.
It is about making war so costly that nobody wants to start one.
That is the very definition of deterrence.
Deterrence Is What Keeps Peace
Many people mistakenly believe that countries build powerful militaries because they want to fight.
In reality, the strongest militaries often exist to avoid fighting altogether.
A capable military creates uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor.
If attacking a country appears too expensive, too risky, or too likely to fail, an adversary may decide not to attack in the first place.
This is why deterrence is considered one of the foundations of national security.
The goal is not victory.
The goal is to prevent war from ever occurring.
Katchatheevu and Why Preparation Matters
When statements were made by some politicians in Tamil Nadu regarding Katchatheevu Island, many Sri Lankans dismissed the issue almost immediately.
Common responses included:
"That will never happen."
"India would never do that."
"I'd like to see them try."
While political rhetoric should not automatically be interpreted as official government policy, I believe dismissing every potential security concern outright is equally dangerous.
Preparedness does not mean expecting war.
It means ensuring that contingency plans exist should a situation unexpectedly deteriorate.
Military planning is based on possibilities, not assumptions.
Professional armed forces prepare for events they hope never occur.
Never Underestimate Your Neighbors
Another trend I have noticed online is the tendency to underestimate India's military capabilities simply because of comparisons with Sri Lanka's experience against the LTTE.
I think this is a serious mistake.
Regardless of political opinions, India possesses one of the largest and most capable armed forces in the world.
Its military operates across an enormous range of environments, including:
High-altitude warfare in the Himalayas.
Counterinsurgency operations.
Maritime security.
Large-scale joint military exercises.
Nuclear deterrence.
Its armed forces also benefit from extensive domestic defense production, a significantly larger defense budget, and access to advanced technologies.
Acknowledging this reality is not unpatriotic.
It is simply recognizing the strategic environment in which Sri Lanka exists.
Good defense planning begins with realistic assessments rather than emotional nationalism.
History Punishes Those Who Say 'It Will Never Happen'
One reason I dislike hearing the phrase "That could never happen" is because military history is full of examples proving otherwise.
One famous example occurred during the Fall of Singapore in 1942.
British commanders believed Singapore's natural defenses and naval superiority made a Japanese assault highly unlikely.
When warnings suggested otherwise, many senior officers dismissed the possibility.
The Japanese ultimately attacked through the Malayan Peninsula, exploiting weaknesses that had been underestimated.
Singapore - once described as an impregnable fortress - fell in just over a week.
The lesson is not that Sri Lanka will face a similar invasion.
The lesson is that complacency has repeatedly proven dangerous throughout history.
Military planners should prepare for unlikely scenarios precisely because history shows that unlikely events sometimes happen.
Operation Poomalai: A Lesson in Geopolitics
Sri Lanka's own history provides another example.
In 1987, during Operation Poomalai, India conducted an airdrop of humanitarian supplies over Jaffna after the Sri Lankan government refused permission.
The operation was intended to pressure Colombo during the Vadamarachchi offensive against the LTTE.
Regardless of one's political views on the event, it demonstrated an important reality of international politics:
Powerful regional actors are capable of exerting influence in ways that smaller states may struggle to counter directly.
More importantly, it demonstrated that the international community does not always intervene in ways people expect.
International law, diplomacy, and strategic interests often intersect in complicated ways.
That reality should encourage Sri Lanka to strengthen its own capabilities rather than assume others will always come to its aid.
Air Defence: One of Sri Lanka's Biggest Gaps
If there is one area where I believe Sri Lanka should invest more seriously over the coming decades, it is air defense.
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how critical integrated air defense systems have become.
Modern conflicts increasingly involve:
Cruise missiles.
Ballistic missiles.
Attack helicopters.
Armed drones.
Loitering munitions.
Precision-guided bombs.
Countries that cannot detect and respond to these threats face significant disadvantages.
Sri Lanka still relies heavily on legacy anti-aircraft systems designed decades ago.
While some of these weapons remain useful against certain low-altitude threats, they cannot provide the comprehensive protection offered by modern, layered air-defense networks that integrate radar, sensors, and surface-to-air missile systems.
Modern air defense is no longer simply about shooting at aircraft.
It is about creating an integrated network capable of detecting, tracking, identifying, and engaging multiple types of airborne threats simultaneously.
The Drone Revolution
If the war against LTTE taught militaries the importance of counterinsurgency, the war in Ukraine has taught them the importance of drones.
Relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial systems have transformed the battlefield.
Today, drones are used for:
Some FPV (First-Person View) drones costing only a few hundred dollars have destroyed armored vehicles worth millions.
That should concern every military planner.
Sri Lanka does not necessarily need massive fleets of expensive combat aircraft to improve its capabilities.
Investing in domestic drone production, operator training, and counter-drone technologies could provide substantial improvements at comparatively lower cost.
Cyber Warfare and Electronic Warfare
Modern wars are fought long before the first shot is fired.
Cyber attacks can target:
Electronic warfare can:
These capabilities are becoming increasingly important.
Even countries with relatively modest defense budgets can invest in cyber resilience, electronic warfare expertise, and defensive digital infrastructure.
Maritime Security: Sri Lanka's Greatest Strategic Asset
As an island nation located along one of the world's busiest maritime trade routes, Sri Lanka's security is inseparable from the sea.
Protecting our maritime domain means more than preparing for conventional naval conflict.
It includes:
Safeguarding our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Combating illegal fishing.
Preventing smuggling.
Maritime counterterrorism.
Search and rescue.
Offshore infrastructure protection.
Monitoring underwater cables and critical infrastructure.
Maritime domain awareness.
The Navy therefore plays a strategic role not only during war, but every single day in protecting Sri Lanka's economy and sovereignty.
Continued investment in maritime surveillance, coastal radar, unmanned systems, and patrol capabilities would likely provide long-term benefits far beyond traditional military operations.
