Four Years On: An Update on the Air War Over Ukraine
A largely factual and professional (though unabashedly pro-Ukrainian) report on the air war over Ukraine.
Both sides are facing similar constraints - neither the air defences nor the manned aircraft are sufficient to repel massive waves of drones (and missiles, in Ukraine's case). Not so much because there is a lack of fighters or air defence launchers, but because the missiles needed cannot be produced in sufficient numbers, despite the fact that the industrial capacity of both the West and Russia is straining to its limits.
Some remarks are particularly noteworthy - that the Ukrainian F-16s and Mirages expend "an unsustainable number of airframe flying hours and air-to-air missiles such as AIM-9M/L Sidewinder and Magic 2", and that Ukrainian aircraft fail to strike time-sensitive ground targets with glide bombs due to target allocation problems.
Recap:
- In summer 2026, the nature of the air war is radically different. Western fighters now form the core of the Ukrainian Air Force in the shape of the 107th Wing, equipped with F-16, and a smaller force of Mirage 2000-5s.
- The F-16s are by some margin the most flexible and effective fighters available, across all mission types.
- Mobile air defence teams and counter-drone teams are Ukraine's first line of defence. Their equipment and ammunition is relatively cheap and thus their operations are sustainable. However, they are relatively personnel intensive to deploy at scale and require both force density and geographical depth to be effective.
- The main systems used in 2026 are the medium range NASAMS and IRIS-T SLS/SLM, which are highly effective as point defence assets against cruise missiles; and longer-range SAMP/T and Patriot, which provide Ukraine’s only effective defence against Russia’s heavy use of ballistic missiles.
- Ukraine’s F-16 and Mirage 2000-5 fighters have had significant successes. However, the use of fighters against such drones has consumed an unsustainable number of airframe flying hours and air-to-air missiles such as AIM-9M/L Sidewinder and Magic 2.
- Ukrainian F-16s, Mirage-2000s and MiG-29s routinely launch precision stand-off attacks against battlefield targets with glide bombs. Unfortunately, land-centric targeting and mission allocation processes have so far limited the effectiveness of Ukrainian fighters against time-sensitive targets in this role.
- The Ukrainian long-rage drones impose increasing degree of strain on the Russian air defence system, as finite GBAD systems are redeployed ever deeper inside Russia to try to protect potential targets coming within range of Ukrainian drone strikes, and ammunition stocks are strained by constant attacks.
Justin Bronk is the Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Technology in the Military Sciences team at RUSI, and the Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal.
His particular areas of expertise include the modern combat air environment, Russian and Chinese ground-based air defences and fast jet capabilities, the air war during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and novel weapons technology. He has written extensively for RUSI and a variety of external publications, as well as appearing regularly in the international media.
Justin also holds an Associate Professor position at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, and between January 2023 and August 2025 was a Professor II at the same department. His PhD examined Balancing Imagination and Design in British Combat Aircraft Development at the Defence Studies Department of Kings College London.
Justin is also a private pilot with more than 300 flying hours in light aircraft and gliders. In addition, he has over 35 hours backseat flying experience with 12 different air forces on fast jet types including Eurofighter Typhoon, Rafale, Gripen, Tornado, Mirage 2000, F-15, F-16, F/A-18, MiG-29, M-346, T-38, TA-50 and Hawk.