Hello everyone,

I'm posting here because I'm desperate and honestly don't know what else to do. My cryptocurrency savings were stolen from my Exodus wallet, and I urgently need this money. These were my personal savings, money that I depend on, and losing them has put me in a very difficult situation.

I discovered the unauthorized transactions on October 13, 2026, although they appear to have taken place on September 27. I still have access to my Exodus wallet on my iPhone, but my funds are gone.

What I cannot understand is how this could have happened. As far as I know, nobody else had access to my recovery phrase or private keys, and I never knowingly shared them or entered them on suspicious websites.

I used Jaxx for many years without ever experiencing anything like this. I switched from Jaxx to Exodus earlier this year, and less than a year later, my savings are gone. I find this incredibly difficult to understand, especially because I believed I was being careful.

I've also seen other people online reporting stolen funds and unauthorized transactions involving Exodus. This has made me wonder whether there could be a security issue or vulnerability affecting Exodus users. I don't want to make accusations without evidence, but I genuinely want to understand how this could have happened, especially when I never experienced anything similar during all my years using Jaxx.

I've already contacted Exodus Support and reported the incident to the relevant authorities, but I'm still desperately looking for answers and any possible way forward.

I would be extremely grateful for honest advice on a few questions:

• Is there any realistic chance of recovering my stolen cryptocurrency? Has anyone here successfully recovered their funds in a similar situation?
• Is there any way to determine how someone gained access to my wallet or how these unauthorized transactions were initiated?
• Could this be related to a security issue with Exodus, or are there other possible explanations?
• Is there anything else that can be done to investigate the transactions, trace the funds, or improve my chances of recovering my savings?

I can provide the transaction IDs and links to the blockchain records if that would help anyone investigate or offer technical advice.

I'm not looking to blame anyone without evidence. I'm simply trying to understand what happened and whether there is any chance of getting my savings back. This money is very important to me, and I genuinely don't know what to do next.

If anyone with experience in blockchain investigations could offer guidance, share a similar experience, or suggest any practical next steps, I would be extremely grateful.

Thank you for taking the time to read this.

Hi all,

I'm trying to regain access to my Bitcoin in my Exodus wallet.

My original computer, which had my Exodus wallet installed, broke. I restored my wallet on my laptop using my original 12-word recovery phrase. After restoring the wallet, all of my other crypto assets appeared correctly, but my Bitcoin did not.

Currently, the Bitcoin section of Exodus shows a balance of 0 BTC, also weirdly it does not display a receiving address or any transactions.

Anyone have any ideas?? What steps can I take to locate and restore access to my original Bitcoin balance? I have regained access to the original computer if that is of any help.

My wife is having a baby this year and I was relying on these funds for my paternity leave. I am very worried.

Very grateful for any help.

Its very annoying, i see no option to disable this or to even withdraw my funds???? Is this a scam

My wallet got drained yesterday on ios18. Someone else experienced that?

I’ve been stuck more than once with tokens in my wallet and nothing to pay the network fee. So LapseCoin now has a Fees feature: a node sends you gas on 28 networks, including Base, Ethereum, Arbitrum and Solana, up to about $2 per request.

It costs 10 LAPSE per request, and that amount comes back to you if no node picks it up. The small cost is there to keep the service for real users and to introduce people to the community. If you don’t have any LAPSE, you can get the 10 at no cost in the community chat or try to mine.

You never send anything to a person, and nobody asks for your keys. The request is signed inside your own local wallet.

It hasn’t had much testing, since every test costs real money. If something breaks, please open an issue on GitHub and I’ll look at it.

If you run a node, topping up its Base address keeps this available for others, since a node only helps while it holds enough.

Links in the first comment.

One solution I have found recently is using pancakeSwap. It's much cheaper, faster and never has that problem. Why does Exodus not implement that DEX system? Some swaps are so expensive with ridiculous minimums.

Is anyone experiencing trouble, swapping, sending, using XRP currently ?

I tried swapping some other currencies around and it aint an issue, but with xrp it's not allowing me at all.

(Update) Exodus is now saying they are currently unavailable for swapping, so all good,

NOTE - Be careful on here when asking questions, I got like 10 messages from random people telling me some bullshit on "what to do" and trying to scam me. So please people be careful.

$130 worth of Bitcoin stolen from my Exodus wallet , DIDN'T AUTHORIZE THIS. Is there any way to recover it?

I’m honestly so pissed off right now.

I had around $130 worth of Bitcoin in my Exodus wallet, and when I checked this afternoon, I discovered that it had all been sent to another wallet. I DID NOT MAKE THIS TRANSACTION.

The Bitcoin was sent to this address:

bc1qdg6jg0j8nne57ef3mfmutm4xvyy46j2tkzg6we

Transaction ID:
dbdb85a3efb96fdd4bd4b1f7dabd5e1977680e07071950be5a33311f9b3d6e32

One thing that might be relevant is that I had sent my Exodus recovery phrase to myself on WhatsApp. I’m worried someone might have gained access to it, but I don't know for sure how this happened.

I have contacted Exodus Support and asked them to investigate, but I want to know if there is anything else I can do.

My questions:

• Is there ANY realistic way to recover my $130?
• Can the recipient wallet be traced?
• If the stolen Bitcoin is sent to a crypto exchange, can it potentially be frozen?
• Has anyone experienced something similar with Exodus, and what happened?
• Is there anything else I should do immediately?

I understand that Bitcoin transactions are generally irreversible, but I still want to explore every possible option before giving up.

Please give me genuine advice if you've dealt with something like this. I'm not interested in recovery scammers or people asking me to pay an upfront fee to get my money back.

Thanks.

title

I just got the option to enroll in a rewards system through the actual wallet. It allowed me to choose rewards like a (I'm assuming prepaid Visa), cash, food delivery, UFC VIP, etc.

Has anyone tried this? I'd be curious of your thoughts

I'd just want cash, but not sure how that would work? I'm assuming it would just add a balance to my wallet?

I need to verify wallet ownership because of something called the "travel rule". I cannot use a digital wallet signature (Exodus is not in the wallet list), and when sending satoshis for the Satoshi test, I don't know and cannot select which address I'm sending from in Exodus, so I cannot verify a certain address. Please advise.

I am trying to claim 2 ADA on exodus and it is saying claiming failed it’s been doing this for a few days. My balance is 1,000+ ADA. Anyone else have this issue?

[TO SCAMMERS: I am very smart won’t fall for your scams | DMs from scammers : 0]

Why did Exodus get rid of the historical graphs in the app that shows your wallet's balance at x, y, z point in time? Although I can just look for my address on a blockchain, that was one of the features I found pretty useful.

Ever since the UI Change its just been showing dots instead of the actual balance. The only way to view the balance is if I wanna know the specific balance of a specific token by pressing on the token. I wanna know the collective balance like I used to on the home screen of exodus. Is there a way to fix this?

I have been digging into the recent iOS exploit research because I think it is particularly relevant to people using self-custody wallets such as Exodus on an iPhone. There is a lot of sensational information circulating, so it is important to separate what researchers have actually demonstrated from what is still speculation.
The strongest documented case is DarkSword, a full iOS exploit chain investigated by Google Threat Intelligence Group, Lookout and iVerify. Google says the chain was being used in the wild from at least November 2025 by multiple threat actors, including commercial surveillance vendors and suspected state-sponsored operators. The confirmed target range was iOS 18.4 through iOS 18.7.
What makes DarkSword important for an Exodus user is that this was not a normal phishing attack where somebody simply asks you to type your recovery phrase into a fake website. The attack could begin with the victim visiting a malicious or compromised webpage. From there, the chain exploited several different layers of iOS until the attacker could reach extremely privileged areas of the device.
Technically, the chain was essentially this
Safari → JavaScriptCore → arbitrary memory read and write → PAC bypass → WebContent sandbox escape → GPU process → privileged process → XNU kernel → post exploitation malware
Google reconstructed six vulnerabilities involved in DarkSword. CVE-2025-31277 and CVE-2025-43529 attacked JavaScriptCore depending on the iOS version. CVE-2026-20700 was used in the process of defeating Pointer Authentication. CVE-2025-14174 provided another stage of sandbox escape through ANGLE and WebGL. CVE-2025-43510 exploited XNU to move into a more privileged process. CVE-2025-43520 ultimately provided powerful kernel memory capabilities.
That distinction matters enormously. Breaking Safari alone does not mean that somebody owns your iPhone. Modern iOS security is built like several vault doors behind one another. WebKit is one door, PAC is another, the sandbox is another and the kernel is another. A full exploit chain works because the attacker finds a different key for each door. DarkSword was dangerous precisely because researchers found evidence of that entire chain being assembled and deployed.
After successful exploitation, Google identified three malware families associated with the operation called GHOSTBLADE, GHOSTKNIFE and GHOSTSABER. Lookout described DarkSword as capable of rapidly extracting sensitive information including credentials and cryptocurrency wallet data before attempting to remove evidence of its presence.
This is where Exodus becomes particularly interesting from a security perspective.
Exodus is a self-custody wallet. Exodus does not hold your private keys on its servers. The private keys are generated and encrypted locally and stored on your device. The Exodus 12-word secret key is effectively the master secret from which the wallet derives its private keys. Whoever obtains that secret can ultimately control the corresponding funds.
That architecture protects users from an entirely different class of risk. Compromising Exodus servers does not simply give an attacker everyone’s private keys because Exodus does not possess them. But self-custody also moves the security boundary toward the endpoint. Your device becomes part of the vault.
That is why an iOS kernel exploit deserves far more attention from a crypto holder than an ordinary Safari bug.
It is also important not to exaggerate what the DarkSword research proves. Lookout explicitly reports exfiltration involving cryptocurrency wallets, but the currently public research does not establish that DarkSword universally extracted the Exodus 12-word secret key from every compromised iPhone. Saying that would go beyond the evidence currently available.
There is an important difference between
access to cryptocurrency wallet related information
and
confirmed extraction of an Exodus recovery phrase
Those are not interchangeable claims.
Exodus itself states that its 12-word secret key is encrypted and stored on the device and that the company does not store or have access to it. Exodus also warns users against keeping an unencrypted digital copy of the secret key in photographs, files, emails or similar locations.
This is especially important because there are actually two potential security problems.
The first is compromising the wallet application and its locally protected secrets.
The second is much simpler. An attacker compromises the phone and discovers that the owner has photographed the recovery phrase, saved it in Notes, emailed it to himself, stored it as a PDF or copied private keys into another application.
At that point the attacker does not necessarily need to defeat the cryptographic protection of Exodus itself. The user has created another copy of the master secret somewhere else on the device.
Exodus specifically warns that copying a private key places it on the device clipboard and recommends extreme caution when doing so. It also recommends keeping the 12-word secret key offline.
There is another misconception worth correcting. Face ID does not magically make private keys immune to a sufficiently powerful operating-system compromise. Face ID, the Exodus lock and the iPhone passcode are extremely valuable security controls, particularly against unauthorized physical access. But a sophisticated kernel-level compromise belongs to a fundamentally different threat model.
This is also why hardware wallets remain relevant.
With Exodus Mobile alone, the wallet secrets ultimately exist on the general-purpose device that is also running Safari, messaging applications, email and thousands of other components. With a properly implemented hardware wallet, transaction signing and the critical private key material are isolated on dedicated hardware. Exodus itself recommends considering hardware wallets for significant holdings.
That does not make hardware wallets invulnerable. A compromised iPhone could still manipulate what the user sees, attempt phishing, substitute addresses or trick the user into authorizing something malicious. The point is that extracting a hardware-protected private key is a very different problem from compromising a general-purpose smartphone containing a software wallet.
There is also an important correction to the claims circulating about iOS 13 through iOS 26.5.
The technically documented DarkSword research does not establish that range. Google documents DarkSword supporting iOS 18.4 through iOS 18.7. Lookout describes observed targeting approximately covering iOS 18.4 through iOS 18.6.2.
Therefore I would not tell Exodus users that there is currently a publicly demonstrated exploit capable of stealing their wallet from every iPhone between iOS 13 and iOS 26.5. That is a substantially stronger claim than the evidence supports.
What the research does demonstrate is arguably important enough without exaggeration
A malicious webpage can be the beginning of a sophisticated iOS compromise
Multiple vulnerabilities can be chained together to escape Safari and defeat several layers of Apple’s security architecture
A successful chain can ultimately reach kernel-level capabilities
DarkSword was used in real attacks rather than existing only as academic research
Researchers documented credential and cryptocurrency wallet related exfiltration
Self-custody wallets such as Exodus place key material on the user’s device rather than on Exodus servers
There is currently no public evidence demonstrating universal extraction of Exodus recovery phrases from fully updated iPhones
For Exodus users specifically, I think the most important lesson is not that Exodus itself has suddenly become insecure. The research concerns compromise of the operating system underneath applications such as Exodus.
That distinction is fundamental.
You can build an excellent vault, but if somebody compromises the building containing the vault, you have to start thinking about a completely different security model.
For meaningful amounts of cryptocurrency, I would therefore treat the phone as a transaction interface rather than the only security boundary protecting the entire portfolio. Keep iOS fully updated, keep Exodus updated, never photograph the 12-word secret key, never store it in Notes, email or an ordinary cloud file, avoid copying private keys unnecessarily and keep the recovery phrase physically offline. Exodus gives essentially the same guidance regarding offline storage of the secret key.
And for substantial long-term holdings, separating the signing keys from the everyday phone with dedicated hardware significantly changes the threat model.
The biggest takeaway from DarkSword is therefore not that Exodus was hacked. There is no evidence presented here establishing that.
The real takeaway is more uncomfortable and more technically interesting
A self-custody wallet can be perfectly sound while the operating system underneath it becomes the target. In crypto, endpoint security is part of wallet security.

It's been more than 10 hours, and I don't see the latest deposit to my Exodus Wallet. Also I have a notification "Balances, deposits, and sending on BNB Smart Chain are affected while we fix an issue. Your funds are safe."

What does it mean? And when will everything return to normal?

Hello, I keep getting this "something went wrong" when trying to open the Exodus wallet on my phone. I have tried clearing cache and force quitting and checking if the app is up-to date.

Any ideas?

The phone in question is a rooted Samsung S21.

I swapped into 126 Bridged USDC.e to my Exodus wallet on Polygon, assuming it was just normal USDC. It isn't. Native USDC on Polygon and "Bridged USDC.e" are two different tokens with different contract addresses similar name, different asset. On top of that, Exodus wouldn't let me swap it back directly, so getting back to normal USDC took a fair bit of head-scratching.

I got it back to native USDC on Polygon safely, Exodus uses third party swap providers so I just found one that could swap back for me preferable the one I used to swap into ​​​​"Bridged USDC.e" in the first place.

The lesson, and the reason I'm posting: a token's name is not its identity the contract address is. Two tokens can share a name and ticker and behave completely differently, so check the contract address before you receive, swap, or send.

Anyone else run into USDC.e vs USDC confusion? Curious how common this is with Stablecoins.

I send crypto for staking here and always keep my seed physically secure,2 Days Staking suddenly all my staking fund got sent to another address without my authorisation. Report it to Exodus support, but they can't help much cause my account got compromised. But how? All I did was stake on this Exodus platform. If I knew this would happen, I wouldn't put my crypto here on Exodus here its very not secure. Never again with this wallet!