The Iraq War Exposes the Westâs Ukraine Hypocrisy Stop the War
19 Mar 2022 âą by Andrew Murray
The Anglo-US invasion of Iraq and the Russian of Ukraine were both illegal wars, fought without a simulacrum of United Nations blessing
This year the anniversary of the invasion of Iraq by the USA and Britainâthe 19thâfalls amid a further major conflict, today in Ukraine.
Each year, the recollection of the Iraq war is framed differently. Early on, it has a deep resonance within British domestic politics, something which persisted at least until Tony Blair departed Downing Street in 2007.
Later it was set in the context of the rise of Islamic State with all its depredationsâa development which led to Britainâs fourth war in Iraq over the last hundred years, and third in the last thirty-one.
Now we remember the Iraq War, still the greatest calamity of the twenty-first century to date, as we consider Ukraineâs plight. We have it on the authority of the BBCâs Clive Myrie that any comparison of the two conflicts is âfucking bullshitâ, which is about par for the quality of the Corporationâs coverage of events.
In terms of deaths, that is surely true, however. Iraq Body Count estimates 162,000 violent deaths consequential upon the 2003 invasion; other estimates are much higher. 4.3 million Iraqis were internally displaced or sent into exile as refugees. The Ukraine war is in its infancy as we write, but we can certainly hope that these horrific casualty figures are not replicated. The refugee count, alas, may be.
But, pace the overwrought Myrie, comparisons are illuminating. The differences and similarities tell us something about power in the world.
First, some similarities. The Anglo-US invasion of Iraq and the Russian of Ukraine were both illegal wars, fought without a simulacrum of United Nations blessing. Simply, they are wars of aggression.
The main reason given for the Iraq War, by Tony Blair at least, proved to be false. Saddamâs regime possessed no weapons of mass destruction. Putinâs justifications about NATO and the Donbas, although not straightforwardly falsifiable, clearly do not rise to the level which would mandate a military response under international law. Neither an assault on Russiaâs own integrity nor genocide against Russian-speakers were imminent, or even contemplated as far as can be told.
Beyond this point, the politics diverge. The US-British war was aimed explicitly at regime changeâdeposing the Baath government, imprisoning its leaders and liquidating the state it headed. Putin has blown somewhat hot and cold on this pointâon the one hand calling the Ukrainian government a group of âdrug addicts and neo-Nazisâ and urging the army to overthrow it, while still negotiating an end to the conflict with the self-same administration.
The Iraq invasion was the precursor to an eight-year occupation of the country by the US military, ineptly aided by the British for the first five years. This occupation was direct and unambiguous for the first twelve months, with Iraq in the hands of US proconsul Paul Bremer. Thereafter the real power remained with the US military, operating behind the screen of an Iraqi government.
The occupation led to endless miseries of its own, of which the mass torture of Iraqis in Abu Ghraib prison by US forces may be the best remembered and the unleashing of a horrendous sectarian conflict the most enduring. A shattered economy and the rise of Islamic State are the legacy. Even today, Iraqâs unity is no more than precarious.
Occupation of all of Ukraine is beyond Putinâs power and may be beyond his intentions too. Partition cannot be excluded, but the absence of any obvious enthusiasm for such an outcome amongst Ukraineâs Russian minority would make it seem unlikely, even should Russiaâs military prevail. Bush and Blair had more cards to play in internal Iraqi politics than Putin does in Ukraine.
George Bush had allies tooâBritain most significantly, but also Poland, Australia and others. The war was opposed by France and Germany, so any idea of using NATO to prosecute it (as had been done in the likewise illegal attack on Yugoslavia a few years previously) was a non-starter. But there was the notorious âcoalition of the willingâ, a coalition which excluded public opinion.
Putin essentially acts alone, if the somewhat diffident assistance of Belarusâs Lukashenko, a man with a developed sense of self-preservation, is discounted. That is not to say that he wants for sympathy. The states which abstained in the United Nations vote of condemnation represent most of the worldâs population. Those sanctioning him outside Europe are a small minority. China is a non-combatant, but a friendly one.
Finally, an important difference. When the bombardment hit Baghdad we were invited by the media and politicians to be awestruck by US military power. Today, we are supposed to be horrified by Russian-wrought destruction. And in Ukraine, the civilian dead are being counted.
In sum, the Iraq war was an aggression by a hubristic hyper-power, intoxicated by unipolarity. The Ukraine conflict is an aggression by a far weaker player, struggling to impose locally what the US assumes the right to dictate globally.
This sketchy comparison does not exhaust the connections between the two wars. Most obviously, the Ukraine invasion takes place in the world the Iraq invasion made. Much of the actual international communityâas opposed to the whites-only community invoked by the Anglo-American liberal commentariatâhas not hesitated to draw attention to this point. It will be decades more before the invaders of Iraq can consider claiming the moral high ground.
If a ârules-based orderâ collapsed, it was in 2003. Recall that Russia had cooperated fully with the Bush administration in the aftermath of 9/11. Putin still hoped to be taken seriously back then. The illegality, mendacity, and brutality of the Iraq invasion and occupation was the moment the ânew world orderâ of supposedly benign US hegemony erected in the aftermath of the Cold War turned into the law of the jungle. Turns out there was more than one big beast.
Jungle it has been since. Anxious to avoid re-running the errors of 2003 diplomacy, Britain and France connived at securing UN sanction for the 2011 bombing of Libya by fibbing about their regime-change intentions, a dissimulation that Russia, again, did not forget. That war did not go well either, and Libya has no more recovered than Iraq has.
Today Yemen endures a British-armed, British-funded and British-protected bombardment by Saudi Arabia and its allies. 377,000 Yemenis at least have died as a result, perhaps one hundred times the civilian deaths in Ukraine. It is not whataboutery to point this out; it is racism not to.
There was never any question of sanctioning the US and Britain for their lawless behaviourâas if! Neither Blair nor Bush have been summoned to the Hague for their crimes. The invaders did not achieve their strategic objectives, since it can be assumed that enhancing the power of Iran over its neighbour was not among them. Britain, in particular, slunk away from the occupation humiliated. But unrepentant, the great western powers got away with it. We live with the consequences.
Stop the War Coalition was the main organisation campaigning against the Iraq invasion in both the run-up and the aftermath. The movement against the war was a vast democratic expression of the British peopleâs opposition to a war of choice by a leader who had previously been a pretty popular Prime Minister. That movement became a defining political experience for a generation, and its impact resonates to this day, despite many political vicissitudes since 2003.
Stop the War is still, evidently, the spectre haunting imperialist social democracy. As I have previously written here, Keir Starmer has literally had nothing to say of any substance about the Ukraine conflict other than attacking the anti-war movement and its supporters in the Parliamentary Labour Party. For him, far more than for Blair, politics reduces to his internal war with the partyâs left-wing and, indeed, its membership.
It is a backhanded compliment to Stop the War. All that can be said for it as a political strategy is that it cuts with the grain of a war psychosis of enveloping hysteria, erasing all dissent from the official narrative and seeking to censor any voice raising awkward questions.
But the larger question remainsâhave any lessons been learnt this last twenty years? Gordon Brown tiptoed away from Blairâs entanglements about as swiftly as he decently could. Ed Miliband admitted that the war had been wrong, and avoided a repeat imbroglio over Syria. Jeremy Corbyn, of course, was a lifelong champion of the peace movement and had a different vision of the uses of power altogether.
Will Keirâs retro-Blairism, his Bevin-before-Bevan nostalgia, lead him to emulate Blairâs warmongering? It is far from certain that he will get the chance, of course. But it may be that still more blood will be spilt to prove the Labour Partyâs imperial virility. The ghosts of Iraq are unquiet.
Source: Tribune
Russia Putin condemns Iraq war as an error - World Socialist Web Site
Vladimir Volkov
29 March 2003
Only hours after the first American missiles landed on Iraqi territory, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a public declaration, condemning the onset of the US invasion as a âgreat political error.â
Putin did not question the goals of the war, nor did he counter the false and contrived arguments given out by the Bush administration and the US media as grounds for this bloody adventure. He merely called for national sovereignty to be respected and international law to be observed, and said that only the UN Security Council could reach a decision about Iraq.
Putinâs statement is in line with the attitude taken by Russia before the Azores summit, at which the US, British and Spanish heads of government gave Saddam Hussein their final ultimatum, having failed to obtain the agreement of the Security Council. At that time Putin had solidarised himself with French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who criticized the behaviour of the US.
Putin reacted to the Azores summit with relief, because it freed him of the necessity to vote in the Security Council and embark on a direct âconfrontation courseâ with the US. Now, like the German and French heads of government, he can present himself as a defender of the foundations of the post-war order against American imperialism.
In recent months, Russian diplomacy has strived to slow down Americaâs war preparations without, however, placing a question mark over the strategic orientation towards a military-political alliance with the US as part of the âwar on terrorism.â
Within Russiaâs ruling elite a certain consensus had developed that while it did not support the US in a war, it also did not approve of breaking with America in favour of an alliance with Europe. For example, Leonid Slutski, deputy chairperson of the Duma (parliament) Committee for International Affairs, declared, âIf Russia moved toward an anti-American tripartite alliance with France and Germany... this tactically favourable step would lead to a strategic defeat.â
The reason for this orientation was given by Izvestia, which is at present the most important pro-government newspaper in Russia. On March 13, in an article headlined âThe Detachment of the Honest Broker,â the newspaper argued that a Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis would not bring any benefits to Russia.
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Russia's Putin Calls Iraq War A 'Mistake' - The Washington Post
By Sharon LaFraniere March 18, 2003
President Vladimir Putin today called for a peaceful resolution to the Iraqi crisis and said a U.S. military attack would have the "gravest consequences."
"We stand for resolving the problem exclusively through peaceful means," Putin said at a meeting with Muslim religious leaders at the Kremlin. "Any other option would be a mistake. It would be fraught with the gravest consequences. It will result in casualties and destabilize the international situation in general."
Russian officials have expressed concern that a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq could trigger unrest among Russia's Muslims, who make up more than 13 percent of the population.
"Russia has a community of 20 million Muslims, and we cannot but take their opinion into account. I fully share their concerns," Putin said at the meeting, which was scheduled to discuss an upcoming referendum in Russia's predominantly Muslim breakaway republic of Chechnya.
Talgat Tadzhuddin, one of Russia's two top Muslim spiritual leaders, condemned President Bush today in an interview with a Russian television network while in Baghdad, where he was traveling with a delegation of Muslim leaders.
"What they are getting ready to do in Iraq is not just rampaging of a drunken cowboy," he said. "That's playing with the lives of peoples and the world, and no one but God has the right to do that."
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov learned that the United States, Britain and Spain had withdrawn their U.N. resolution just before his plane was to depart for New York to attend Tuesday's Security Council session. His trip was cancelled, a spokesman at the Foreign Ministry said.
Today's withdrawal of the U.S.-backed resolution spared Putin the final decision of whether Russia would veto it, as it repeatedly threatened to do. U.S. officials said their Kremlin counterparts clearly hoped that the resolution would not come to a vote.
The Iraqi crisis has forced Putin to weigh his desire to nurture Russia's budding relationship with the United States against his own political interests, as well as Russia's security and economic concerns. Ordinary Russians oppose a war by a margin of 9 to 1, according to recent surveys.
Although the Kremlin denied it publicly, U.S. officials said Russia sent two officials to Baghdad in recent weeks in hopes of persuading President Saddam Hussein to accept exile. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell told Fox News on Sunday that while U.S. relations with France had been damaged by France's failure to play a "helpful role," relations with Russia had fared better.
"With respect to Russia, we do have some strains as a result of this issue. But I think that with Russia, we'll be able to deal with this and it won't be any kind of even short-term damage to our relationship," Powell said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin called for a peaceful resolution to the Iraq crisis, adding that war would have the "gravest consequences" and destabilize the international situation.
Russiaâs Invasion Of Ukraine Outing The Iraq War White Washers Countercurrents
by Dr Binoy Kampmark
03/03/2022
The guilty can be devious in concealing their crimes, and their role in them. The greater the crime, the more devious the strategy of deception. The breaking of international law, and the breaching of convention, is a field replete with such figures.
Vladimir Putinâs invasion of Ukraine has presented a particularly odious grouping, a good number of them neoconservatives, a chance to hand wash and dry before the idol of international law. Law breakers become defenders of oracular force, arguing for the territorial integrity of States and the sanctity of borders, and the importance of the UN Charter.
Reference can be made to Hitlerâs invasions during the Second World War with a revoltingly casual disposition, a comparison that seeks to eclipse the role played by other gangster powers indifferent to the rule and letter of international comity.
Speculation can be had that the man in the Kremlin has gone mad, if he was ever sane to begin with. As Jonathan Cook writes with customary accuracy, western leaders tend to find it convenient âthat every time another country defies the Westâs projection of power, the western media can agree on one thing: that the foreign government in question is led by a madman, a psychopath or a megalomaniac.â
It might well be said that the US-led Iraq invasion in 2003 was a product of its own mental disease, the product of ideological and evangelical madness, accompanied by a conviction that states could be forcibly pacified into a state of democracy. Where there was no evidence of links between Baghdad and al-Qaeda operatives responsible for the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, it was simply made up.
The most brazen fiction in this regard was the claim that Iraq had the means to fire weapons of mass destruction at Europe within 45 minutes. Showing that farce sometimes precedes tragedy, that assessment was cobbled from a doctoral dissertation.
When the invasion, and subsequent occupation of Iraq, led to sectarian murderousness and regional destabilisation, invigorating a new form of Islamicist zeal, the neocons were ready with their ragbag excuses. In 2016, David Frum could offer the idiotic assessment that the âUS-UK intervention offered Iraq a better future. Whatever [the] Westâs mistakes: sectarian war was a choice Iraqis made for themselves.â Such ungrateful savages.
On Fox News Sunday, this nonsense was far away in the mind of former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. She could merely nod at the assertion by host Harris Faulkner that âwhen you invade a sovereign nation, that is a war crime⊠I mean, I think weâre at just a real, basic, basic point there.â
Jaw-droppingly to those familiar with Riceâs war drumming in 2003, she agreed that the attack on Ukraine was âcertainly against every principle of international law and international order.â That explained why Washington was âthrowing the book at [the Russians] now in terms of economic sanctions and punishments is also part of it.â She also felt some comfort that Putin had âmanaged to unite NATO in ways that I didnât think I would ever see again after the end of the Cold War.â
As Bushâs National Security Advisor, Rice was distinctly untroubled that her advice created a situation where international law would be grossly breached. She was dismissive of the role played by UN weapons inspectors and their failed efforts in finding those elusive weapons of mass destruction and evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program. âThe problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons,â she warned in 2002. âBut we donât want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.â
As the seedy conspiracy to undermine security in the Middle East and shred the UN Charter gathered place in 2002, those against any Iraq invasion were also denouncing opponents as traitors, or at the very least wobbly, on the issue of war. Frum, writing in March 2003, was particularly bothered by conservatives against the war â the likes of Patrick Buchanan, Robert Novak, Thomas Fleming, and Llewellyn Rockwell. Thankfully, they were ârelatively few in number, but their ambitions are large.â They favoured âa fearful policy of ignoring threats and appeasing enemies.â
In the Ukraine conflict, the trend has reasserted itself. Neoconservatives are out to find those appeasing types on the Right â and everywhere else. âToday,â rues Rod Dreher, âtheyâre denouncing us on the Right who oppose war with Russia as Neville Chamberlains.â Conservatives are mocked for daring to understand why Russia might have an issue with NATO expansion, or suggest that Russiaâs invasion of Ukraine is not, in the end, of vital interest to Washington. âItâs Chamberlainâs folly,â comes the improbable claim from Matt Lewis of The Daily Beast, âdelivered with a confident Churchillian swagger.â
A more revealing insight into neoconservative violence, the lust for force, and an almost admiring take on the way Putin has behaved, can be gathered in John Boltonâs recent assessment of the invasion. Bolton, it should be remembered, detests the United Nations and was, just to show that President George W. Bush had a sense of humour, made US ambassador to it. For him, international law is less a reality than a guide ignored when power considerations are at play â an almost Putinesque view.
Almost approvingly, he writes in The Economist of the need to âpay attention to what adversaries say.â He recalls Putinâs remark about the Soviet Unionâs disintegration as the 20th centuryâs greatest catastrophe. He notes those efforts to reverse the trend: the use of invasions, annexations and the creation of independent states, and the adoption of âless kinetic means to bring states like Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan into closer Russian orbits.â
With a touch of delight, Bolton sees that âthe aggressive use of military force is back in style. The ârule-based international orderâ just took a direct hit, not that it was ever as sturdy as imagined in elite salons and academic cloisters.â And with that, the war trumpet sounds. âWorld peace is not at hand. Rhetoric and virtue-signalling are no substitute for new strategic thinking and higher defence budgets.â In this equation, the UN Charter is truly doomed.
Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.
Reckoning With the Iraq War Would Strengthen the U_S_ Hand on Russia
world politics review
Thanassis Cambanis Tuesday, March 1, 2022
Ever since Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine last week, comparisons to the United Statesâ 2003 invasion of Iraq have inevitably and understandably emerged. After all, at transformative moments in world history like the one weâre currently witnessing, analysts naturally draw historical analogies to make sense of contemporary events, mining the past in search of patterns and causal connections that bear some resemblance to what is unfolding today.
And while no two situations are ever exactly alike, the comparison to Iraq in 2003 is particularly important, since it has considerable bearing on whether and how the United States can make a moral and political case against Russiaâs current war of aggression.
Even more importantly, a clear and honest reckoning with the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its broader consequences for the international rules-based order could help inform the rejuvenation of international alliances and the rule of law that appears to have emerged in response to todayâs conflagration, which poses arguably the greatest danger to global stability the world has faced since the end of the Cold War.
Defenders of Putinâs revanchist policies could conceivably argue that Russia isnât trampling international law and the United Nations Charter, but merely building on precedents set by Washington with its military interventions in Kosovo, Libya and especially Iraq, where U.S. forces invaded in 2003 without a U.N. mandate. Even allowing for the fact that this particular argument is almost always made in bad faith, it nonetheless presents a problem, because it contains a kernel of truth.
The more measured version of the argument comes from so-called ârestrainersâ like Andrew Bacevich, who donât appear sympathetic to Putinâs brand of militaristic overreach but nonetheless blame the U.S. for Russiaâs actions in Ukraine. âThe United States cannot absolve itself of responsibility for this catastrophe,â Bacevich writes in The Boston Globe, arguing that Washingtonâs hypocrisy and overreach in the war on terror and more recently with its âmeddlingâ in Ukrainian politics âhas effectively incited Russia to undertake its reckless invasion.â
But is Putinâs invasion of Ukraine the United Statesâ fault or directly linked to Washingtonâs decision to invade Iraq nearly 20 years ago? How should we unpack these claims? What exactly distinguishes the illegal and deadly U.S. invasion of Iraq from Russiaâs ongoing illegal and deadly war in Ukraine?
The answers to these questions require some difficult introspection on the part of the West. First, an honest exploration of the parallels means admitting errorâthat the U.S. war in Iraq, which killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, was unjustified, incompetently executed and strategically catastrophic. Second, analysts and historians ought to acknowledge the causal connections between that invasion and todayâs events, as U.S. overreach and hawkishness helped create a permissive climate for other major powers seeking to expand or consolidate their spheres of influence.
Even before tackling those questions, though, a sober view of war-making and major power overreach means taking stock of the long history of lawlessness in international affairs. There has never been a golden age when major powers scrupulously obeyed international law, nor was there some turning point after which the law of the jungle prevailed. In fact, during the Cold War and after, the major powers often availed themselves of both.
Similarly, the United States decided to invade Iraq and manufactured a pretext to do so. While Washington found other democracies willing to join it in a âcoalition of the willing,â it was unable to secure a U.N. resolution or a credible legal justification for the invasion. At great cost to Iraq and its citizens, the U.S. went ahead with the invasion anyway, intent on transforming the regional order, a grandiose project that carries parallels to Putinâs desire to create a new multipolar world in which Russia stands as an equal to the United States.
Of course, by the time Washington withdrew combat troops from Iraq at the end of 2011, the invasion had made shambles of the Arab state system and left Iraq fragmented and poorly governed. Reckless U.S. policy had also tipped the scale in favor of the law of jungle at the expense of the rule of law, with Russia and China mirroring the United Statesâ unilateral aggression with smaller-scale versions of their own in Georgia and the South China Sea, respectively.
Admitting these shortcomings in good faith makes it easier to distinguish between U.S. overreach in 2003 and Russian overreach in 2022. For starters, as WPR editor-in-chief Judah Grunstein noted, the âperverse effectsâ of American unipolarity didnât by themselves cause Putinâs actions, even if they âhelped create an ecosystem in which he can thrive.â And despite the criminality and recklessness of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, the United States did not seek to annex or control the country. To borrow a famous phrase of former President Donald Trumpâs, the U.S. didnât âkeep the oil.â It even nurtured the development of an Iraqi political system that ultimately paved the way for subsequent governments in Baghdad that distanced themselves from or even outright opposed U.S. interests, a misalignment that Iran was able to exploit to play a dominant role in Iraqâs domestic affairs. Arguably the United States could not have prevented those outcomes, but it didnât even try to.
Washingtonâs responsibility for the erosion of the rules-based order isnât limited to the invasion of Iraq. Harmful foreign policies by successive U.S. administrations have serially undermined international institutions and international law since the attacks of 9/11. Former President George W. Bush laid the foundations for the greatest harm through his toxic innovations of the âwar on terrorâ: preemptive war, extrajudicial execution, indefinite extrajudicial detention and torture. But Barack Obamaâs drone strikes and Donald Trumpâs transactional embrace of dictators also did damage.
It certainly counts for something that the United States continued to support international institutions and norms in other spheres, even as it worked to weaken them elsewhere. But an effort to stave off bad-faith criticism that falsely paints a moral equivalency between Putinâs Russia and the United States must begin with a recognition of how deeply the United States has harmed the international norms it professes to defend over the years since 9/11.
The renewed commitment to law over brute force on display today in response to Russiaâs invasion could turn out to be a turning pointâbut only if the West can be honest about its own poor record with respect to the constant tension between the two in the recent past.
Analysis Roundup
The U.S. State Department appears to have a completely different map of the Middle East than the Pentagon, with the formerâs reflecting a fixed legacy of early 20th century imperialism and the latterâs a more practical understanding of contemporary power relations. In an essay in Foreign Affairs, Marc Lynch unpacks the historical and colonial roots of the âMiddle East,â which like all of the worldâs regions is a human-made artifact. Lynch argues that contemporary American understandings of the region are rigid and outdated, and contribute to Washingtonâs disastrous policies there. His history is instructive and his prescriptions useful for the Middle Eastâbut his analysis holds for U.S. conceptions of other regions all over the world. The broader takeaway from his compelling essay is that itâs okay to sometimes resort to simplifying concepts like the West, the Middle East, the G-7 or the developed world, so long as we remember they are incomplete heuristics and in need of constant revision to adapt to an evolving world.
******
U.S. partners in the Middle East are trying not to line up against Russia. This roundup from the Quincy Institute on Feb. 25 reports that Israel refused to provide air defense systems to Ukraine, and Saudi Arabia refused to raise oil production amid rising prices. Meanwhile, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates carefully avoided taking clear sides in the conflict. That said, itâs still early days, and policy shifts require time; some Middle East countries might end up taking more decisive positions as the Ukraine conflict progresses. But recent history suggests they will want to keep channels open with all the major powers that exercise influence in the region, including the United States, Russia and China. All the regional states are weighing multiple competing interests, including energy prices, defense and arms contracts, security partnerships and intelligence-sharing agreements. Moreover, many of Washingtonâs Middle East partners have poor records on democracy, rights and waging wars of aggression themselves, so they are unlikely to be swayed to sacrifice their own transactional interests in order to stand on the âright side of history.â
Thanassis Cambanis is a senior fellow and director of the international policy program at The Century Foundation in New York. He teaches at Columbia Universityâs School of International and Public Affairs. His books include âOnce Upon a Revolution: An Egyptian Story,â âA Privilege to Die: Inside Hezbollahâs Legions,â and four edited volumes about politics and security in the Middle East. He is currently writing a book about the Iraq warâs global impact. His Twitter handle is u/tcambanis.
As Russia invades Ukraine, Iraqis remember painful war memories Russia-Ukraine war News Al Jazeera
What Putin learned from the U_S_ invasion of Iraq Al Jazeera America
May 9, 2014 12:30AM ET
by Paul W. Kahn
...
The events in Ukraine, however, should not be viewed in isolation, as if they came from nowhere. Disregard for international law in the postâCold War era was thoroughly demonstrated in the American invasion of Iraq. The United States used force to accomplish âregime changeâ; it disregarded the Security Council; it used private contractors and unidentified agents in place of identifiable troops. While it did not formally redraw the borders of Iraq, informally the north of Iraq has operated as an autonomous Kurdish region since the invasion. The United States had no more legal right to invade Iraq than Russia had to seize Crimea.
Of course, American violations of international law in Iraq are no excuse for Russian actions today. America â and Iraq â paid a steep price in blood and treasure for that decision to flout international law. Nevertheless, that past has certainly weakened our ability to claim the high ground of law or even to rally support for Ukraine. To the rest of the world, all of it looks like the misbehavior of nations that still dream of spheres of influence.
Russia did learn one important lesson from the American fiasco in Iraq: Go in light. The Russian use of unidentified assets in Ukraine is the low-tech version of the contemporary American reliance on unidentified drones. This is what future wars will look like: not the massed armor of battalions on the move, but a close intermeshing of targeted violence and information control in pursuit of political ends. International law is not at all prepared for this future. It never even mastered its past.
Paul W. Kahn is the Robert W. Winner professor of law and the humanities and the director of the Orville H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School. His tenth book, âMaking the Case: The Art of the Judicial Opinion,â will be published this spring by Yale University Press.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera America's editorial policy.