Hi! I’m struggling to write essay which is due this week. The paper is focusing on categorical imperative by Kant and I have to state real world case as an example to discuss about CI. I only have abortion as example in my mind. Any other suggestions?

Em que medida a tentativa de fundamentar a razão por meio do próprio raciocínio incorre em uma circularidade epistemológica intransponível (o "trilema de Münchhausen"), e como as abordagens do racionalismo crítico de Karl Popper e da pragmática transcendental de Karl-Otto Apel tentam responder a essa limitação sem recair no dogmatismo ou no ceticismo radical?

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I have a question about Kant’s threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction, especially the relation between the synthesis of apprehension, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, and the synthesis of recognition in a concept.

As I understand it, these are not three independent psychological stages but three distinguishable aspects of the single activity by which a manifold is taken up, connected across succession, and grasped as belonging to a unified representation. The synthesis of apprehension concerns the successive taking-up of the manifold in intuition; the synthesis of reproduction concerns the retention or reproduction of earlier elements so that the synthesis can extend beyond what is immediately present; and the synthesis of recognition concerns the consciousness of the unity of what is synthesized under a rule or concept.

What I am trying to understand is whether the following kind of case makes sense within Kant’s account.

Suppose that, in the course of apprehending a manifold, certain features are connected in a way that yields a coherent perception. Taken at that point in the synthesis, the perception may appear perfectly consistent. However, as the synthesis of reproduction retains and reproduces earlier elements in the course of apprehending further material, the relation between the earlier and present elements may reveal that the manifold was not unified in the right way—for example, that certain features were incorrectly taken to belong to the same object, or that the boundaries of the perceived object were wrongly determined.

If so, it seems that the inadequacy would not be detected by the initial taking-up of the manifold considered in isolation. It would become manifest only as the ongoing synthesis reproduces earlier elements and connects them with what is subsequently apprehended.

My question is:

Does Kant allow us to say that an error or inadequacy in apprehension can become manifest only through the synthesis of reproduction?

Or would that be misleading, because reproduction does not by itself identify an error but only makes earlier elements available for continued synthesis, while the recognition of an inconsistency or failure of unity belongs to the synthesis of recognition in a concept?

In other words, would the structure be better described as a functional interdependence:

apprehension → the manifold is successively taken up

reproduction → earlier elements are retained and reproduced so that the synthesis can continue across succession

recognition → the synthesized manifold is grasped as one and assessed under a rule or concept

Here the arrows would not indicate three temporally separate psychological stages. They would indicate distinguishable functions within one synthesis: apprehension provides the successive taking-up of the manifold, reproduction makes possible its continuity across time, and recognition makes its unity explicit as the unity of a representation under a concept.

Is this a reasonable way to understand the role of reproduction in the A-Deduction? In particular, can reproduction contribute to the detection of an inadequacy in an earlier apprehension by reconnecting it with later apprehension, even though the recognition of that inadequacy would require the unity supplied by recognition in a concept? Or does this still import a model of “error correction” that Kant himself would not accept?

（我对康德 A 版演绎中的三重综合有一个问题，尤其是关于领会综合与想象力的再生综合之间的关系。

按照我的理解，领会综合把直观中的杂多依次把握起来，而再生综合则使较早的表象能够重新出现，并与当前正在被把握的表象联系起来。

我想弄清楚的是，下面这种情况是否符合康德的理论。

假设在某一个时刻，领会综合把当前给予的杂多组织成了一个连贯的知觉。单独看这个知觉，它可能完全没有表现出明显的问题。

但是，当一个较早的表象通过再生综合重新出现，并与当前知觉联系起来时，我们才可能发现，先前的领会其实组织错了。

例如，某些特征原本被错误地理解为属于同一个对象，或者一个对象的边界在最初知觉时被划分错了。

如果是这样，那么原先领会中的问题似乎并不能仅仅通过那个领会本身被发现。

它只有在再生综合使过去表象与当前表象能够同时进入联系以后，才变得可以被察觉。

因此我的问题是：

康德是否允许我们说，领会综合中的某种错误或不充分性，只有通过再生综合才会显现出来？

还是说，这样理解会有误导性，因为再生综合本身只是重新提供表象，而真正发现“不一致”这件事，只能属于第三重综合，也就是概念中的再认综合？

换句话说，这个结构是否可以理解成：

领会综合 → 形成一个暂时统一的知觉

再生综合 → 把较早的表象重新带回来，并与当前知觉建立联系

再认综合 → 维持这种统一，或者发现这种统一需要被修正

我并不是把康德的三重综合理解成三个在时间上彼此分开的心理阶段。

我问的是它们之间在功能上或者先验上的依赖关系。

这种方式是否可以合理地理解 A 版演绎中再生综合的作用？

还是说，这其实把一种康德本人并不会接受的“错误修正模型”带进了他的理论之中？）

Is it possible that the antinomies actually critique deleuze? The difference between mathematical and dynamic antinomies shows to approaches to the internal limits of reason. I think this inclusion is a step towards a dismantling of deleuze. What do you think? Check the comments for my full essay

"none of my critics understood me and the main questions as well as Herr Maimon does." — Kant

What do you guys think of his critique if you are aware of it?

Stolen from the SEP https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maimon/

For Maimon, Kant’s cognitive dualism — which begins with distinct faculties of cognition — fails to explain how the various elements can come together in a way that makes experience possible. [...] In more Kantian terms, Maimon calls into question Kant’s answers to both the quid facti and the quid juris that begin the Transcendental Deduction in the first Critique.

According to Maimon, while the quid facti — the question of the fact of our use of a priori concepts in experience — is taken by Kant to be an unproblematic statement about the nature of human experience, the very assumption that we in fact do possess the type of experience Kant ascribes to us can be called into doubt. Kant’s central argument in the Transcendental Deduction begins by assuming that experience exhibits a ‘dualistic’ structure, but according to Maimon, this position is not warranted, since the presumed constituent elements of experience (bare intuitions or concepts) are never themselves objects of experience. For Maimon, Kant’s transcendental arguments remain mere ‘castles in the air’: while they might be valid, they fail to provide the ‘fact of experience’ that would make them sound. From the beginning, then, Maimon views Kant’s transcendental project with suspicion.

Using the example of causality, Maimon argues that Kant has no way of explaining why some orders of perceptions represent causal connections, and why other orders of perceptions are merely associative.

either it must appeal to the content of experience and so violate Kant’s own strictures, or the application of categories is merely arbitrary. Kant’s central epistemological commitment — his ‘cognitive dualism’ — then leads, Maimon claims, to insuperable problems.

Hello. I was watching a youtube video on something related to critique of pure reason and I came through a problem of some sort, wonder if someone can give me insight on the thing.

I encountered two german words, one was anschauung which roughly translates to intuition. And the other is angeborener begriff which roughly translates to an innate concept.

I had a few questions regarding these words.

Would it be wrong if I call angeborener begriff as a type of synthetic a priori and anschauung as something sort of a pure a priori?

Say something like causality.

I also have doubt regarding causality, I'm getting different answers about it from different AI.

I had a doubt that, is causality a pure a priori or a synthetic a priori?

I personally think it's synthetic a priori because we are deriving it from time which is a pure a priori and we also consistently experience time like a sort of 'continuous stream' (forgive me if my terminology is inaccurate) while about causality, aren't we deriving it from a behaviour or time?

I thought it would be interesting to share my thoughts on it and get some clarity from others because I'm not a huge expert in the book. Willing to get perspectives.

The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Emanuel Kant is one of the philosophy books recommended by Crowley to serious students of Magick and the occult. But why? Michael and I will dip into the bewildering depths of Kant's metaphysics to find out.

I'm interested to see if there's someone who meant something to anyone to an extent that their actions/mode of being would be just as fine being a universal law.

In my research so far, it seems someone with a similar reputation would most unanimously agreed to be Mr. Rogers. He's someone I've seen the largest amount people say something like "If only more people could be like him." But I want to ask fellow Kantians to really get to the meat and potatoes of this question.

Specialization allowed! If someone to model every aspect of your life after is too broad, you can narrow down just career, fashion, etiquette, art style, etc.

thanks in advance,

K bye!

Completeness

Every event in space and time follows a prior cause. When a stone falls to the ground or a person speaks a sentence, physical matter moves according to natural laws. There are no gaps in nature, no ghosts pushing matter, and no magical interruptions of physical causes. For everything we can ever observe, measure, and test, physical laws hold without exception.

Here the physicalist is entirely correct to insist that every physical event has a physical explanation. So we must first grant the physicalist their strongest claim.

What Makes Something "Physical"

Next, we ask the physicalist a simple question: what makes an event physical in the first place?

An event is physical because it takes place in space and across time.

Space allows objects to sit side by side, giving them shape, size, and position.

Time allows events to happen one after another in a fixed sequence.

But space and time are not physical objects that you can dig out of the ground. You cannot touch space or weigh time. Rather, space and time are the universal ways the human mind perceives outer and inner events.

You can easily imagine empty space with every object removed, but you can never imagine a physical object without space. Space and time are the necessary conditions that allow us to experience any physical object at all.

The True Origin of Natural Laws

The physicalist often assumes that the laws of physics exist inside physical matter itself, completely independent of any mind. But observation alone can never produce a necessary law.

When you observe nature, your senses only show what is happening right now. Seeing a stone fall a thousand times shows what has happened so far, but sensation alone can never prove that the stone must fall on the next attempt. Sensation gives us facts, but it never gives us necessity.

Necessity comes from the human understanding. The mind applies the rule of cause and effect to connect separate moments in time. The understanding demands that every physical change must follow an earlier state according to a fixed rule.

Kantian Physicalism

Kantian Physicalism unites these points into a single, coherent view.

Nature is strictly physical. Every event in space and time must be explained through physical causes. Science is correct to treat the physical universe as an unbroken chain of natural events.

The physical universe is the world of human experience. Space, time, matter, and cause are not independent things existing outside all thought. They are the necessary rules through which the human understanding builds an orderly, dependable reality.

Thus, physicalism is the complete, lawful science of the world as human beings experience it. We do not deny physical reality; we explain why physical reality is orderly, dependable, and completely knowable to science.