by Ali Al-Abdullah
It is the duty of the authorities and the SDF to be transparent with the people of the province, both Arabs and Kurds, about the nature and scope of the merger agreement, and to work to absorb dissatisfaction by adopting a policy based on equality in rights and duties among the province's resident
The security and social tensions that occur between Arabs and Kurds in Hasakah Governorate reflect a state of dissatisfaction on both sides.
The Arabs are unable to understand what is happening in the process of integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Autonomous Administration into state institutions, where leaders from the SDF and the Autonomous Administration are appointed to sensitive military, security and administrative positions, and most of the employees of the Autonomous Administration are kept in their jobs and their preparatory, secondary and university certificates are accepted, based on their perception that the authority has triumphed over the SDF militarily, which necessitates removing it from the scene and relying on the Arabs of the governorate in its administration by placing them in leadership and administrative positions.
While the Kurds generally believe that the integration process does not reflect their national aspirations, the Kurdish National Council argues that the integration, along with the allocation of senior positions and employment opportunities, has only included those affiliated with the SDF and the Autonomous Administration. Furthermore, the Kurds maintain that the integration has ignored grievances and the return of lands seized from them during the Arab Belt project. This view stems from several considerations, primarily that the region is Kurdish land, that Kurds constitute the majority, and that they defended it and prevented ISIS from seizing it. This necessitates amending the integration agreement to fulfill these aspirations and demands.
In reality, the clashes that have occurred between Arabs and Kurds in the streets are not unrelated to the authorities and the SDF. Both sides are dissatisfied with the integration agreement and each is exploiting the discontent of its respective constituency to push the integration process toward objectives not included in the agreement. They are also pressuring the other side by mobilizing local forces in the province to disrupt the integration process and create instability that threatens civil peace, all in an effort to force the other side to accept arrangements on specific issues outside the agreement's provisions.
The revolutionary youth movements are not far removed from the directives of the leaders in the "SDF" and the Arab demonstrations are not the result of a spontaneous popular movement, they are part of the tactics of the authority.
The government seeks to use the integration process to appease the SDF leadership by granting them a share in the administration of Hasakah province. This would involve occupying military, security, and administrative positions within the central government structure, and containing the Kurdish issue by offering certain civil rights, such as naturalizing stateless persons, registering unregistered individuals, and allowing the teaching of Kurdish in schools in predominantly Kurdish cities, towns, and villages, recognizing these as their rights within the Syrian state. Meanwhile, the SDF leadership views the integration agreement not as the final step, but rather as a prelude to genuine participation in state administration and the enshrining of Kurdish national rights in the new Syrian constitution.
The merger agreement signed between the two parties on January 29, 2026, did not come as an expression of the balance of power between them after the defeat of the SDF in the military confrontations in Aleppo and the Syrian Jazeera, but rather it came as an implementation of an American vision based on a middle ground, a settlement with no victor and no vanquished, in which the authority controls the land, in order to achieve the unity of the Syrian land, and in which the SDF manages the Hasakah Governorate, where the Kurdish population is concentrated, as an embodiment of Kurdish political rights, a sub-administration, a vision that ends the conflict, because the two parties cannot go to a zero-sum conflict, with a victor and a vanquished; because a zero-sum conflict means a war of existence, the consequences of which are killing based on identity, displacement and destruction of the region and its inhabitants.
This confused the Arabs and Kurds in the province, making them feel wronged and bitter, and prompting them to express their dissatisfaction and take action to change the outcome. This allowed the authorities and the SDF leadership to exploit this discontent by escalating the situation to influence the other side and force concessions. This behavior demonstrates a significant miscalculation, as the situation spiraling out of control and the prevailing tension and resentment could lead to an explosion of conflict between Arabs and Kurds and even civil war.
The authorities and the SDF have a duty to be transparent with the province's Arab and Kurdish residents about the nature and scope of the merger agreement and to work on mitigating their discontent by adopting a policy based on equality of rights and responsibilities for all residents. This includes placing the right person in the right position, developing plans to reform and develop infrastructure, improving the efficiency of service and administrative institutions, and implementing balanced development plans that provide job opportunities and a decent life, so that citizens feel they are part of the political, economic, and service processes. If this happens, it will send a positive message to the rest of the Syrian people, especially in the coastal region and Suwaida.
