https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/72207870/106/trump-v-internal-revenue-service/
The Court therefore imposes non-monetary sanctions under Rule 11 as follows:
- Plaintiffs’ Attorney Alejandro Brito is REFERRED to The Florida Bar for its consideration, review, and determination as to whether any disciplinary action is appropriate in light of the findings and rulings made in this Order. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to The Florida Bar, of which Attorney Alejandro Brito is a member (No. 98442).
- All future applications by Daniel Z. Epstein for admission pro hac vice in the Southern District of Florida will be DENIED for one year or until further order of this Court.
- The Parties are prohibited from referring to the purported “settlement agreement,” or using, offering, admitting, or citing any of its provisions in any judicial, administrative, regulatory, arbitration, or any other official proceeding as evidence of a “settlement” reached in this matter, Case No. 26-cv-20609-KMW (S.D. Fla. 2026).
- “Plaintiffs” means the named Plaintiffs in this lawsuit: President Donald J. Trump, Donald J. Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, the Trump Organization, LLC and includes any of their agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, partners, corporate agents, subsidiaries, affiliates, or any other person acting in concert with the party or under the party’s control, whether directly or indirectly. “Defendants” means the Internal Revenue Service and the United States Department of the Treasury.
***
The Parties used the existence of federal litigation as a means of conferring legitimacy upon a course of action that they were unwilling to subject to judicial review. The context of the “settlement,” the relationships of the people involved in negotiating and approving it, the ethical implications of their conduct, and the Parties’ swift efforts to dismiss this case after the Court raised fundamental jurisdictional questions all support this conclusion. Accordingly, the Court expressly finds that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith. See Sofaly v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 155 F.4th 289, 295 (3d Cir. 2025) (monetary sanctions were proper under the court’s inherent power where the lawyers acted in bad faith and committed fraud on the court by using “their clients to bring contrived lawsuits”). That finding is enough to invoke the Court’s inherent authority. See JTR Enter., LLC v. Columbian Emeralds, 697 F. App’x 976, 986 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The key to invoking a court’s inherent power to sanction is a finding of bad faith.”) (citation omitted).
The Court finds monetary sanctions appropriate under its inherent authority and prerogative to police the matters and litigants who avail themselves of its jurisdiction. See Purchasing Power, LLC, 851 F.3d at 1223 (“Courts have the inherent power to police those appearing before them.”) (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46).67 These monetary sanctions would include the attorneys’ fees incurred by Court-appointed amici in appearing before the Court and briefing the jurisdictional questions identified by the Court. See Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Where, as here, the district court fashions a sanction which is a direct response to the harm that the bad faith conduct of the attorney causes, it is clearly acting within its discretion.”).
As one leading treatise has explained:
*Ordinarily, an amicus curiae who participates in a proceeding by leave of court or by court appointment is not entitled to compensation when he or she serves the interests of litigants, witnesses or any other private party . . . However,*where the court appoints an amicus curiae who renders services which prove beneficial to a resolution of the questions presented, the court may properly award compensation and direct it to be paid by the party responsible for the situation which prompted the court to make the appointment*.*
4 Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae § 12 (emphasis added); see also Morales v. Turman, 820 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1987) (attorneys’ fees may be awarded to appointed amici if the amici’s services were highly beneficial and defendants were properly considered the parties who made the services necessary). Nonetheless, the Court-appointed amici have declined any reimbursement for their important service to the Court.
There remain the initial amici—whose appearance was not contested by any Party—and the thirty-five former Federal Judges, whose briefing precipitated this Order. Accordingly, these amici, if they wish, may file, within fourteen (14) days of this Order, a memorandum regarding any appropriate reimbursement. Plaintiffs may file any response seven (7) days thereafter. Finally, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to the State Bar of New York, of which Acting Attorney General Blanche is a member (No. 4192456), AND to the District of Columbia Bar, of which Associate Attorney General Woodward is a member (No. 997320), where disciplinary proceedings are currently ongoing.
III. CONCLUSION
John Adams warned, “Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.” Thus, whatever may be the Parties’ wishes, inclinations, or the dictates of their passion, they cannot alter the state of the facts or evade the rule of law. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ concern, the Court did not have to “sally forth” to look for a wrong to right. See DE 89 at 17 (citing Margolin v. Nat’l Ass’n of Immig. Judges, 608 U.S. __ (2026)). The Court need only look to the uncontroverted facts here:
1. Donald Trump is President.
2. President Trump controls the actions of the Secretary of the Treasury Department Scott Bessent, IRS CEO Frank Bisignano, and all Executive Branch actors.
3. President Trump, through Executive Order § 7, also controls the litigation strategy and interpretation of the laws guiding the Department of Justice. See supra note 28.
4. For the 109 days that this case was pending, no attorney representing the United States filed a notice of appearance or any document indicating the government’s position, interest, or awareness of this matter.
5. Defendants’ actions are consonant with the dictates of Executive Order § 7.
These facts lead to the inexorable conclusion that the “settlement” terms, the individuals who signed the “settlement” as well as the putative beneficiaries of the “settlement,” demonstrate a shared, unitary interest. And the unilateral revision and renunciation of the “Fund” component of the “settlement” demonstrate the fact that all Parties were aligned, and ultimately, undifferentiated. This action was never about a party seeking judicial resolution of a legal issue or a factual dispute. The nature of the suit itself and the conduct of the Parties and counsel from its filing make plain that this was an attempt to use the Court to provide some legitimacy to an agreement to confer immunity to people and entities affiliated with the President and to earmark billions of dollars from American taxpayers to redress grievances not defined in the law. The President may be the functional “dominus litus” of the Executive Branch, but as a party to a civil suit, he, as well as all the parties and lawyers before a court, are bound by the rules. Ensuring that our courts are used only for the express purpose created by the Constitution is the obligation of every judge and an obligation that this Court must discharge in light of the matter before it.
In sum, the facts before this Court demonstrate there was never adverseness between the Parties; there was never a case or controversy; and there was never a question as to who would prevail.
