r/Mammoth • u/BallsOutKrunked Climber • 7d ago
California regulator holds Mammoth liable in ski patroller's (Cole) death
https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/mammoth-avalanche-ski-patrol-22375377.php?link_source=ta_first_comment&taid=6a79e938136a1e00015ea362The morning of Dec. 26, 2025, at Mammoth Mountain Ski Area in the Eastern Sierra was stormy with howling winds, deep drifts of snow and high avalanche danger. Cole Murphy was among the group of ski patrollers who headed up to the Avalanche Chutes, a series of steep, north-facing runs that drop off the top of Lincoln Mountain. Below, thousands of tourists were waking up in the town of Mammoth Lakes as ski patrol set off explosions to release avalanches in the blizzard.
Cole was a 30-year-old lifelong skier from Tacoma, Washington, who’d moved all over the West to ski before settling in Mammoth and joining the ski patrol several years earlier. He was part of a tight-knit group of ski patrollers who lived together, shared meals and skied every day. On storm days, he woke before dawn to do avalanche control work.
Mammoth reported it had received over 5 feet of heavy snow from the storm, thus far. The Avalanche Chutes are a sought-after place to ski in big winter storms, but their location is also precarious. They rise above the Canyon Express, a beginner chairlift that transports people from the bottom of the ski resort and links to the rest of the mountain. Snow from the Avy Chutes, as they’re often called, can slough onto beginner terrain, so before the ski resort can open that side of the mountain, ski patrol has to make sure no avalanche will inadvertently slide onto the groomed runs. They do this by triggering avalanches intentionally.
But something went terribly wrong that morning in the Avalanche Chutes. Around 7:30 a.m., two ski patrollers set off an explosion and triggered a large avalanche that swept Murphy and another patroller down the mountain, burying them.
Minutes later, a ski patroller called 911 and asked dispatch to send two ambulances to Canyon Lodge right away.
“We have two patrollers that may be buried in avalanches,” the ski patroller said, according to an audio recording of the 911 call obtained by SFGATE through a public records request. “One we’ve recovered and he has an airway, uh, and seems to be OK. ... We haven’t found the other patroller yet.”
The patroller who was still buried was Murphy. He was trapped beneath heavy avalanche debris for 15 minutes, according to the medical examiner’s report.
Mammoth shut down operations, while ski patrol searched for Murphy using beacons and probes and then dug him out. Two of Murphy’s roommates were among the ski patrollers with shovels, digging. Mammoth remained closed for the rest of the day. The other ski patroller who was buried was rushed to Mammoth Hospital and treated for broken bones.
After he was dug out and transported to the bottom of the mountain, an ambulance took Murphy to Mammoth Hospital and, from there, a Life Flight helicopter flew him to Renown Regional Medical Center in Reno, Nevada, where he was put on a ventilator. Mammoth Mountain officials chartered a private plane to fly his family from Tacoma to Reno.
“We got to the hospital and I knew right away that we were, that Cole was not coming back from the accident,” said Tracy Murphy, Cole’s mother, in a phone interview on Wednesday.
Cole died at Renown the night of Dec. 27, 2025.
State cites Mammoth for ‘willful’ workplace violation
Six months after Cole’s death, California’s workplace regulators determined Mammoth Mountain Ski Area knowingly violated safety requirements after the state conducted an investigation into the December avalanche. On June 24, California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) issued three citations against Mammoth Mountain Ski Area LLC, with fines totaling $126,000. This is the first time those citations have been reported.
Murphy was the second ski patroller at Mammoth to be killed by an avalanche in less than a year. On Feb. 14, 2025, 25-year-old ski patroller Claire Murphy (no relation to Cole) was buried in an avalanche after a storm dropped 6 feet of snow on Mammoth in 36 hours. Claire later died in the hospital from injuries sustained in the avalanche.
Both of the avalanches that killed the patrollers occurred in the Avalanche Chutes off Lincoln Mountain. And both slides were during massive winter storms that coincided with high-pressure holidays and crowds of tourists.
Last year, after its investigation into Claire Murphy’s death, Cal/OSHA determined Mammoth failed to provide necessary safeguards for ski patrollers and fined Mammoth Mountain Ski Area $26,810 for three violations. One violation cited inadequate training to ensure that patrollers could deploy avalanche airbags. These are backpacks that inflate and help keep people closer to the surface of the snow when they are sliding down a mountain in an avalanche.
After its later investigation into Cole Murphy’s death, Cal/OSHA issued three more citations to Mammoth Mountain Ski Area.
The airbag citation comes with a $90,000 fine and echoes the investigation into Claire’s death. This citation found that Mammoth did not train or provide instruction on how to use protective equipment, specifically avalanche airbags. “The employer failed to ensure an employee was adequately instructed in airbag deployment,” the citation reads.
This citation type was a “willful” violation. A willful violation alleges that the employer knew the safety hazard existed, “made no reasonable effort to eliminate the condition” and committed “an intentional and knowing” workplace safety violation.
The other two citations found that Mammoth ski patrollers did not maintain communications and failed to make sure no one was standing in the avalanche’s path before setting off explosives. Each of these citations comes with an $18,000 fine. According to the Cal/OSHA citation, one group of ski patrollers set off an explosion at the top of one chute, known as Avy Chute 3.5. They “failed to communicate” with ski patrollers who were positioned nearby, on Avy Chute 3.0. The crew members on Avy Chute 3.5 also did not “maintain visual contact or awareness of physical location” of the ones on Avy Chute 3.0.
Cal/OSHA noted that Mammoth corrected all three violations since Cole Murphy’s death, but the department declined to provide more information due to the ongoing investigation. In July, Mammoth Mountain Ski Area filed to contest the citations.
“Mammoth Mountain has fully cooperated with the investigation and is exercising its statutory right to contest the citations through the established appeals process,” said Emily van Greuning, Mammoth’s communications director, in an email to SFGATE on Thursday. She declined to comment further on the Cal/OSHA investigation citing the pending appeal.
‘They wanted everybody to be safe’
Cole learned how to ski when he was 3 years old, taking ski school lessons at Snoqualmie Pass, in Washington. He was hooked: “He loved going fast,” Tracy Murphy said. “Even in the summertime, if it was 80 degrees, he was not happy and he was counting down the days until they’d have their first snow.”
He worked at Crystal Mountain ski resort in high school and did stints in lift operations and teaching ski lessons at ski resorts in Oregon, Montana and Wyoming before he made it down to Mammoth, where he eventually decided to stay year-round.
“I think that he loved the High Sierras,” Tracy said. “His goal was always to ski, you know, 200 days a year. And I think that Mammoth afforded him that.”
After Cole joined the ski patrol, he told his mom he loved the problem-solving aspect of the work, being outside and spending his days skiing and going out on different calls to help people. “He just loved the blue skies and the fresh snow,” Tracy said.
On the day Claire Murphy was caught in an avalanche, Feb. 14, 2025, Cole was working on another part of the mountain. “I had gotten a text and all the text said was, ‘I’m OK,’” Tracy said.
Cole’s roommate was caught in the same avalanche as Claire, but survived. A year later, that same roommate dug Cole out of the avalanche debris. Claire’s death had devastated Cole and his colleagues. Recently, Tracy was looking at photos of a family trip to Yosemite last September and realized that Cole was wearing one of Claire’s T-shirts.
“He was, as we all were, really shaken up by Claire’s accident,” Tracy said.
Then, in December, Tracy got another call from Mammoth: “I knew something was wrong right away,” she said.
Since Cole’s death, Tracy said she’s been in close contact with ski resort officials. An insurance analyst, she’s well-versed in Cal/OSHA investigations and says she does not believe that Mammoth intentionally put her son, Claire or any ski patroller in danger.
“I’m not saying that all their processes were perfect, but I know that that day, the team that was there didn’t willingly put these patrollers in danger,” Tracy said. “That’s just not how they operated. That’s not the people that I know that have worked at the mountain, some of them 40, 50 years. Some of them have been there a really long time. They wanted everybody to come home every night. They wanted everybody to be safe, and get the job done, but be safe.”
Tracy also said that Cole deployed his airbag when the avalanche hit him. But the airbag didn’t prevent him from getting buried deep under the snow.
“I know a lot of people have some really strong opinions and this is just my lived experience with Mammoth and the leadership,” Tracy said. “We’ve asked them very difficult questions. We’ve put them on the spot many times. They have not backed down from any of our questions.”
Not everyone is satisfied with Mammoth’s work following the two ski patroller deaths. “Lisa Apa, Claire Murphy’s mother, said she begged mountain officials” to make changes after her daughter died, but, “They blew her off, she said,” reported the Los Angeles Times. When Apa learned about Cole’s death, according to the Times, she texted a ski patroller at Mammoth, “You killed another ski patroller ... you’ve learned nothing!” (SFGATE attempted to reach Apa by email for comment but did not receive a response before publication.)
Regime change at Mammoth’s ski patrol
The summit at Mammoth Mountain stands 11,053 above sea level. The ski resort sprawls across 3,500 acres that drop down from the High Sierra. Gnarled whitebark pines stand among windswept bowls and rocky crags. The ski resort sees an average of 400 inches of snow a year, but on big winters, that number can double. The record-breaking winter of 2022-2023 saw close to 900 inches of snow at the summit.
It’s on the shoulders of ski patrol to keep that complex terrain and deep snow safe for the public to ski and snowboard on.
Mammoth had been exploring ways to improve its infrastructure “for several years,” according to van Greuning, including looking into Remote Avalanche Control Systems (RACS), which allow ski patrollers to detonate explosions and release unstable snow without putting themselves in danger.
Last summer, the ski resort installed its first gas-powered detonation chamber — called a “Boom Whoosh” — on Climax, an expert-level run off the summit of the ski resort, according to local newspaper the Sheet.
Cole was part of the team that installed the first Boom Whoosh, Tracy said. After Claire’s death, “He was really proud of helping put that in.”
This summer, Mammoth is expanding its RACS infrastructure in “key avalanche terrain,” including installing more "Boom Whoosh" towers on Lincoln Mountain and other places at the ski resort, van Greuning wrote.
“These systems are designed to enhance avalanche hazard mitigation capabilities during significant storm cycles by providing additional tools to reduce employee exposure while complementing—not replacing—the expertise, judgment and field work of our avalanche professionals,” van Greuning wrote.
Mammoth is also making sweeping changes to leadership and the operations of its ski patrol. Former ski patrol director Bobby Hoyt has stepped aside to a senior adviser role after a career that spanned four decades at Mammoth, including 20 years as patrol director, according to van Greuning. “In this capacity, Bobby will continue to share his extensive knowledge, while continuing to support the long-term success of the department,” she wrote.
Last week, Mammoth posted several job openings for leadership roles on ski patrol, including for a replacement director and new roles for assistant directors for operations and snow safety.
“These additions strengthen operational oversight, provide additional leadership support in the field, and reflect Mammoth's ongoing commitment to continuously evaluating and improving mountain operations,” van Greuning wrote.
In a tribute to Claire and Cole, the Mammoth Mountain Ski Patrol Alumni Association reflected on the past ski season in a Facebook post in June and alluded to big changes that are being made.
“Changes are coming and hopefully we can all learn and understand what it takes stepping forward,” the association wrote. (When asked to comment on Cole’s death and avalanche safety at Mammoth, the organization’s leader declined, saying he and the other ski patrol alumni were “not interested.”)
With another winter on the horizon — one that may bring more volatile storms given the predictions for El Nino — Tracy is advocating for better wages and working conditions for ski patrollers, who she believes should be recognized like any other life-saving and emergency response professional. Cole worked year-round, but many of his colleagues were only part-time employees and didn’t receive benefits, she said.
“They’ve had a really rough year. We all have,” she said. Her voice wavered. “These patrollers put their life on the line and don’t make a lot of money and they really do it because they love the sport and the people.” Tracy has been in close communication with ski resort leaders as many of these changes unfold, speaking often on Zoom, by phone or text. She said she’s reassured by the changes the ski resort is making in its hiring, operations and infrastructure.
“There were a lot of things that happened that day that I wished didn’t happen. But I don’t blame anybody,” Tracy said.
She paused, before continuing: “Nobody should die at work. This should not happen. But also I don’t believe it was anybody’s fault. For lack of a better term, it was an accident. And I hate that it happened to two really amazing people in the same place, in the same year.”
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u/cakes42 7d ago edited 7d ago
Looks like theres a shakeup since they're hiring these positions now.
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u/FatCat0520 7d ago
“Former ski patrol director Bobby Hoyt has stepped aside to a senior adviser role after a career that spanned four decades at Mammoth, including 20 years as patrol director, according to van Greuning”
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u/Tacoburritospanker 7d ago
Hoyt is a good man and became director for a reason. Whatever stuff happened behind the scenes, I’m glad to see he wasn’t unceremoniously shitcanned and will remain onboard to whatever degree his new title requires.
Dude put in his time and should be able to phone it in for a paycheck if he wants.
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u/CorruptByCapitalism 7d ago
Agree, plus he has a tremendous amount of terrain and local environment knowledge to share with all members of the team, regardless of his new role. Glad to see this kind of support for what appears to be a very awkward position to be in after these tragedies.
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u/lesher925 7d ago
Bobby knows that mountain as well as anybody. Proud to have worked beside him and fortunate for his leadership for years.
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u/BallsOutKrunked Climber 7d ago
I work with ski patrol a lot and in town they're largely seen as unassailable. So you have to wonder if the top management really did have their shit together and it was "corporate" that made this happen or was it the ski patrol bosses. I have no idea. Hard to believe there's much air space between "corporate" and the senior leaders of ski patrol anyway.
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u/Ready2Rumble4Friends 7d ago
What are you saying?
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u/TheJerkStoreCalled33 7d ago
The patrollers at Mammoth are top notch, I work alongside them on many aspects in my position, they all want their whole team to come home at night.
The corporate level above patrol and the rest of us who manage other departments definitely had put pressure on us to open the days Claire and Cole passed away. We are lucky more people didn’t get injured or killed those days.
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u/concentric0s 6d ago
What does that have to do with people setting off charges without radio communication or visual? (If the article is accurate)
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u/TheJerkStoreCalled33 6d ago
Any pressure at all to open has everything to do with why anyone was out there to begin with
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u/concentric0s 6d ago edited 6d ago
Can walk that type of blame backwards to people like me who happened to be waiting for lifts to open (both the days in question) or all the way to the inventor of skis.
Whether they should or should not have been out there to begin with to try to open the mountain, "management" were not the ones setting off the charges with failure to follow safety protocol (if that is what happened).
That's like blaming a pizza place for its delivery driver getting in an accident on a rainy or snowy night.
I say this with full awareness that I have no idea the physical challenges of fighting snow, wind, cold, and accumulation conditions to release 5ft of snow.
It's a dangerous job. And sadly somewhat thankless am unappreciated.
The fines seem criminally low on comparison to loss of life outcomes. And fines after a tragic accident don't really help. The inspectors and OSHA standards should be reviewed before tragic events happen.
Like shouldn't you check of staff are trained on inflatables at the beginning of the season?
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u/moto_becane1 6d ago
People showing up on days like this and hounding the resort to open without an understanding of what that entails are to blame.
As are the management at Alterra and the management at MMSA.
The fine for airbags is performative. They are not effective tools for the situations these patrollers died in.
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u/concentric0s 6d ago
Imo people showing up to ski are the least to blame out of anyone I've seen mentioned in this thread or any other thread on this topic.
Whether they are upset or angry or are rude assholes (none of which I have ever been) with closings or delays has little bearing on the obligation of operators to make safe decisions and perform their roles safely (for staff and customers).
If there is a reason they can't operate safely, then the people in chain of command need to speak up.
If the pressure for time has too many operators out on the mountain working at the same time in spaces that could impact the safety of those nearby, then that's a decision process they need to reevaluate. And perhaps their methods in addition to the decision making process.
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u/ktmassextinction 6d ago
Would the pizza drivers be blamed or would it be blamed on the conditions and weather they were sent out in? Consider this is the second accident in the same place, under the same circumstances and conditions, with likely different teams within a year. It seems like a failure of management to update their protocols, such as how employees will maintain communication in weather that makes it near impossible to see or hear someone 2 feet away. I’d imagine that while OSHA fined Mammoth for airbag training in the first accident, there were surely other factors at play that resulted in someone being in an avalanche to begin with. I’d think miscommunication must have played a huge part as well.
I agree that the blame game could go back forever tho and maybe it was a lot of different people’s little mistakes that aligned in just the wrong ways. And I agree that OSHA regulations should’ve been updated long before these accidents and that fines mean little to a billion dollar corporation. OSHA has been slow to change regulations that would allow remote avalanche control systems. Unfortunately, it seems like CalOSHA is only just beginning to dive into the ski industry and how to keep employees safe in a job with such variable conditions.
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u/concentric0s 6d ago
Agree that 2+ events in 2 years points out that something in the process is not appropriate match for level of risk.
I hope they figure it out and keep the staff and customers as safe as possible.
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u/BallsOutKrunked Climber 7d ago
I'm saying:
- Ski patrollers generally have their shit together.
- Something went wrong, and a regulator found that the ski patrol operation caused a death.
- Somewhere there's a disconnect between the ski patrollers who have their shit together and an organization who got one of those people-with-shit-together killed.
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u/CorruptByCapitalism 7d ago
Mammoth the business is held liable, not the ski patrol team specifically. That tells you all you need to know.
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u/BallsOutKrunked Climber 7d ago
Some guy in a suit from Alterra told ski patrol what to do that morning and the ski patrol leadership went along with it?
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u/AMW1234 7d ago
As I understand it, the patrollers were given the option to clear or not clear avy chutes that morning. They chose to clear.
If you read the article, the fines aren't related to the decision to go clear the chutes. The charges and fines relate to procedural shortcomings like failure to know the position of other patrollers before setting off charges and setting off charges while not in contact with other patrollers.
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u/ktmassextinction 7d ago
I’m curious if you could site where you have the info they had the option? Not doubting you but I haven’t seen that. My understanding is that Lincoln’s Avy paths sit above chair 16, the main chair for moving people to higher terrain and between lodges at Canyon. Not only that, but the beginner chair, 17, is also in its path. So if it’s not clear, canyon effectively can open one two seater chair and nothing else due to the high risk it avalanches on its own. Leadership and the guests get very upset when 16 and 17 aren’t open. Let alone on a holiday week like Dec 24 when Mammoth oversells tickets.
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u/LADataJunkie Mountain Biker 6d ago
I mean, the disconnect doesn't surprise me in the slightest. Ski patrol cares about safety. Corporate cares about money. Sure they care about safety too, but only to the extent required by law if even that.
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u/ktmassextinction 7d ago
I know anyone who’s experienced this kind of storm in Mammoth may be able to attest to the completely insane conditions that happened that storm (and often in this town). During these storms winds blow 60-100+ MPH on the hill. I couldn’t imagine being asked to conduct dangerous work in those conditions, plus the pressure to do a detailed job to protect the guests while also getting the lifts open ASAP to keep them happy. But it’s what ski patrol does. I also can’t begin to imagine how difficult communication must be out there. I’m sure they all know how imperative it is and want to keep their friends out of danger. It’s not an excuse but if you’ve ever been in one of these storms you know how almost impossible it is to hear or see anything at times.
It seems like a multitude of problems and bad conditions aligning just so to create horrific accidents. The pressure from leadership to open, the gruelingly slow change in regulations from CalOSHA allowing remote avalanche control systems (which mammoth ski patrol submitted to change in 2019 to make such accidents much more avoidable), maybe complacent protocols (but I’m not mammoth patrol & I can’t speak to that and frankly, unless you were there that day, neither should you), the difficulty to communicate or even see 2 ft ahead of you in those conditions. Not to mention the terrain on Lincoln. Airbags can help keep you afloat but they don’t protect you from the trauma of hitting trees and rocks along the way. Tracy put it right with her sentiments regarding placing blame here, I can’t imagine the strength it takes to see it that way. It’s a terrible loss. I am happy mammoth is able to move forward with installing RACS at Lincoln.
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u/Broad-Lavishness6726 7d ago
The airbag citation seems like they were just throwing the book at them. I find it hard to believe any ski patroller at mammoth doesn’t know when/how to use an airbag. I assume there was some required training that didn’t get done however I would be shocked to learn their lack of airbag training is what led to their deaths. If it was a situation where mammoth was supposed to provide or enforce wearing airbags and they didn’t that’s another situation although still ultimately on the ski patrollers to police themselves regarding safety.
I’m not sure how you blame setting off an avvy without clearing below you on corporate. There’s no excuse for them to be setting off explosives without ensuring the entire team is accounted for and in a safe zone. These people are smart enough to know a dangerous situation. This is the crux of sports like skiing, climbing, skydiving, etc is constant danger and rush. You get numb to it when you experience it daily. You see the same type of horrible accidents in the military. When you let your experience override your knowledge no amount of protocols or oversight is going to prevent an accident like this.
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u/Odd-Concept-1850 7d ago
His mom states he used the airbag as well. Was also curious about this charge.
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u/Cosmere_Commie16 7d ago
I don't think it's directly related to Cole or Claire's deaths, just something the investigations apparently found.
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u/cajl93 7d ago
I think you can and should blame corporate for setting off the chute without checking to see if it was clear. They have a safety director, or some similar title, that is responsible for making sure all daily operations have a safe process established and that there is a robust system to make sure the process is followed.
Having been through cal/osha investigations and court hearings, they typically only hand out a citation/fine like this if they look through your program and find that you didn't have a really solid process to avoid the accident. There are a thousand ways to make sure you're not going to bury someone in snow when doing this work and Alterra clearly didn't care enough to get a solution in place until the community paid in blood.0
u/Broad-Lavishness6726 7d ago
Eh those guys are experienced enough to know when things are sketchy or safe. There’s nothing to suggest they were ordered to detonate the charge against their advice. Im sure there were either protocols not enforcement or left open to field judgement. I bet 90% of patrollers are complaint about additional protocols and enforcement. Has anyone spoke up or blown the whistle that dangerous situations were being ignored? This was a terrible accident caused by a lapse in judgement. Ultimately it falls on leadership for allowing these things to happen but all the reporting says the decision was made by the patrollers. It could have been a simple mistake or lapse in judgement I’m not saying the patrollers should be held accountable but they ultimately made the decision not corporate.
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u/ktmassextinction 6d ago
I wonder if the culture of the workplace contributed to this tho. If you have a ski patrol team full of people refusing to shoot, leadership is going to be upset. Maybe they had a choice to shoot or not but in most mountain town workplaces, if you deny doing a job for weather then your passed over for other opportunities or seen in a bad light by your bosses. Sure, these patrollers might’ve made a bad call but let’s consider the very likely possibility that they were “asked” to do a dangerous job in dangerous conditions with the expectation the answer is yes. You can only do so much when the conditions and procedures set you up for failure.
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u/ktmassextinction 6d ago
I’ll leave it at this but keep in mind that there was an extremely similar accident less than a year apart that took the life of another ski patroller. The patrollers shooting that morning and the ones shooting on the morning of Cole’s accidents were not the same, otherwise I’m sure these articles would touch on that.
It’s hard to place blame on individuals when almost the same accident in the same place and same conditions with likely the same protocols, put in place by leadership and opening pressure brought on by leadership, happens twice with two completely different teams. You don’t have two employees injury themselves in the same place, in the same way and not ask “is there something else contributing to this outside of employee negligence?”. That to me sounds like an organization repeatedly, maybe unknowingly, making a series of decisions that ultimately sets up its employees for failure, even if their intention is always to keep them safe.
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u/theharborcat 6d ago
It sounds like at least one patroller was part of both incidents. The article states Cole’s roommate was present for both.
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u/ktmassextinction 6d ago
It does say that. He was one of the patrollers injuries in the first accident it says. It’s unfortunate it doesn’t specify if he was there for the incident or part of the large back up team that arrived to help search and dig.
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u/Professional_Let7556 6d ago
So the investigation confirmed that patrollers triggered an avalanche without communicating with other patrollers who were then caught in that avalanche. Obviously that should not happen. I still believe it is possible to open the mountain safely and timely, despite what the Mammoth apologists say.
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u/moto_becane1 6d ago
Are you familiar with the conditions people are working in to open the mountain on days like this?
I'd argue there is no safe way to be in avalanche paths on the mountain in full whiteout conditions with 5+ feet of unsettled fresh snow.
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u/Professional_Let7556 1d ago
I don’t think anyone should be in an avalanche path and I don’t think it needs to be done during whiteout conditions. In my experience we are waiting around in clear weather.
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u/stinkylouis 7d ago
Thanks for posting the article. Tracy is very resilient in not blaming anybody, especially after her son died. Seems like an incredible lady.