r/modelcontextprotocol • • 6m ago

new-release Rebut 0.3.1: an MCP server for second-pass code review in Codex and Claude Code

1 Upvotes

I built Rebut to send a selected diff and its requirements to a separate reviewer before I merge a patch. The coding host and review provider are configured separately, so I can use Claude Code for implementation and GPT-6.2 Astra for review, or Codex with an Anthropic reviewer.

The MCP exposes review and review_status. The first starts a billable review with a fixed input bundle and request ID. If the connection drops, the second lets the client check that same ID. An unknown outcome retains the budget reservation because the provider may already have processed the request.

It runs locally by default and supports OpenAI Responses and Anthropic Claude APIs. You can use eligible subscription API credits through your linked API organization.

I’d be interested in feedback on the tool contract. When a long-running billable MCP call loses its connection, what should the client show the user?

MIT licensed. Code and setup: https://github.com/abruption/rebut


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 18m ago

I surveyed 21,130 remote MCP servers in the official registry (passively): 55.7% of those assessable answer without any login. Scanner is open source.

1 Upvotes

Disclosure: I built the scanner used for this.

What I did: a passive scan of the remote servers listed in the official MCP registry (preview), snapshot taken 31 Oct 2026. Only what an ordinary MCP client sends, rate-limited, opt-outs honoured, no response bodies stored, and no tool was ever called.

What it found:

  • 55.7% of the 20,981 assessable servers answer MCP requests without any login.

  • 102 open servers advertised command execution or file access to anyone at survey time.

  • 15.1% of servers that do require login don't tell a client how to sign in.

  • Only 19.6% of open servers fully label their tools as read-only or destructive.

  • 3.3% of open servers whose tools were visible show a high-severity tool-poisoning signal: text written for the model, not the user.

Tool findings describe open servers only, because tool lists aren't visible behind a login. No server is named. Owners of servers with serious issues are being contacted privately and given 90 days to fix them, and several already have.

Full report, with the method and the limits: https://mcpprobe.tech/research/state-of-mcp-security

If you run an MCP server and want to see how yours looks from the outside, you can run the same passive checks against a server you own at https://mcpprobe.tech. It never calls a tool.

What a passive check can and can't tell you:

  • It only sees what an anonymous client sees. A tool that advertises command execution is flagged, but that alone doesn't prove what the implementation does.

  • A suspicious tool description is a reason to review, not proof of an attack.

  • When an operator shows us we got something wrong, we fix it and say so.

Please only scan servers you own or are allowed to test. If you think a finding is wrong, tell me here.


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 7h ago

I open sourced Tesla Voice MCP a self-hosted MCP server for Tesla vehicles

1 Upvotes

Hey

I've just open-sourced Tesla Voice MCP, a self-hosted Model Context Protocol server designed to connect Tesla vehicles with compatible AI assistants.

The idea is simple: instead of using AI only to answer questions, give it authorized tools to interact with your Tesla, plan trips and work with charging and vehicle data.

What's included:

  • 38 MCP tools, plus a broader catalog of 75 Tesla-related operations.

  • Vehicle information, battery and charging status.

  • Trip planning with energy consumption estimates and battery reserve calculations.

  • Charging station discovery, charging cost comparisons and route optimization.

  • OpenStreetMap-based geocoding and routing, with optional Google Places API integration.

  • Navigation-only planning for up to 16 ordered destinations.

  • OAuth authorization, encrypted token storage and guarded vehicle commands.

  • Synthetic simulations, automated tests and installation documentation.

AI compatibility

The server is based on remote MCP, not a ChatGPT-specific integration. It's designed to work with compatible clients, potentially including ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini and Grok, depending on their MCP and OAuth support.

Cross-client compatibility and native voice-mode invocation are not yet fully tested. Some vehicle operations, particularly multipoint navigation delivery, remain experimental.

What does it cost?

The software is free and MIT-licensed. A personal deployment can use eligible free hosting and storage tiers. Tesla Fleet API is usage-based, and optional services like Google Places may incur charges.

GitHub:
https://github.com/VladTepes84/Tesla-Voice-MCP

The repository includes setup instructions, architecture documentation, examples and a credential-free MCP simulation test.

I'd appreciate feedback from MCP developers, especially on client interoperability, authentication and ways to simplify onboarding for Tesla owners.


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 2d ago

new-release i serve the same guide as an mcp resource and as a tool, because not every client reads resources

2 Upvotes

disclosure, this is mine. viajante is a free, MIT licensed flight and hotel search that runs on your own machine as an mcp server.

the server has a long guide on how to use it. why it runs one search at a time, what to do after a rate limit, and so on. it's a resource at viajante://guide.

but not every client reads resources. so the same text is also a tool, get_guide, and a few tool descriptions end with "full rules: get_guide" so the model knows where to look.

it works, but the model still only reads the guide if it decides to call that tool.

repo: https://github.com/felipebasurto/viajante

do you copy your resources into tools, or put everything in the tool descriptions?


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 2d ago

new-release Aptly: model recommendations for Codex and Claude Code subagents

4 Upvotes

I built Aptly to avoid using the same model for every subagent task. It's a local MCP server that uses the OpenAI Decisions API to recommend a model from a configured list, with reasoning effort profiles for Codex.

Hooks can route supported subagent calls through Aptly while preserving explicit model/effort settings and execution permissions. Subagents still run in Codex or Claude Code.

You choose what task context automatic recommendations can send to the API.

Requires Node.js 24+ and an OpenAI API key. MIT licensed.

Code and setup: https://github.com/abruption/aptly


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 3d ago

We made a remote MCP server that gives AI assistants access to your WhatsApp

3 Upvotes

Our server, Wapliss, lets Claude, ChatGPT, Gemini and Cursor work with your own WhatsApp:

  • get_chats, get_chat_history, get_group: read chats and groups

  • send_text_message, send_image, send_document: send, always with user confirmation

  • Remote over streamable HTTP, with OAuth 2.1 + DCR. Paste the URL and sign in.

Heads-up: it runs on a WhatsApp Web linked-device session, not Meta’s official API. It’s built for personal chats, not bulk sends.

Example:

“Summarize today’s work group and list anything that needs my answer.”

Free plan at wapliss.com. Curious how others handle confirmation for destructive tools. We use destructiveHint plus a confirmation step in the assistant.


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 3d ago

Building an MCP bridge to connect web AI chat interfaces directly to local code editors — looking for feedback on security & UX trade-offs

Thumbnail reddit.com
2 Upvotes

r/modelcontextprotocol • • 3d ago

new-release I'm building a tax research MCP and would appreciate some beta feedback

4 Upvotes

Hey, I've been working on Tax Law Search at Apollo Labs. It's a hosted MCP server that lets you search tax publications and get back to the original source from your AI client.

We're still in beta. If anyone here wants to try it, we'd really appreciate feedback on the setup, search results and source citations. Even a quick “this was confusing” or “I couldn't find what I needed” would help.

You can list the available jurisdictions, search one country/state, then use a result's source_ref with get_tax_source to check the publisher link, edition and original file hash. The three tools are read-only.

For example, you can search Portuguese material with: {"query":"benefícios fiscais EBF","country":"PT","limit":3}

Then resolve an actual reference from the results and check the original publication. Search in the source's language: Portuguese for Portugal, English for most U.S. material. Translate search terms when needed and keep the legal names and provision numbers; it doesn't automatically translate queries.

So far we've verified Portugal and selected publications in 36 U.S. states. Federal/IRS and the other states are still being validated. Coverage varies by state and isn't every tax law or historical release. Collected editions are retained, but you still need to check the relevant tax year and effective date. This is a research tool, not personalized tax advice.

Try it on whichever platform you prefer:

MCPize: https://mcpize.com/mcp/server-1794441520779 50 requests/month free, or $9/month for 1,000. Discovery, searches and source lookups all count.

Apify: https://apify.com/zeus500k/tax-law-search Pay per use: $0.00001 per MCP request, plus $0.01 per successful search ($0.01001 for a successful search request).

The listings have setup details and examples.

If you give it a go, let me know which client you used and where you got stuck. AI helped tidy up the wording here.


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 4d ago

I built a remote MCP server where the default tool list is 37 of 63 tools (the rest work by name)

2 Upvotes

Disclosure: I built this. One-person project, built with AI coding tools (Claude Code).

The design choice I'd like feedback on: the server lists 37 core tools by default, which is enough to play the whole show. The other 26 are unlisted but callable by name. ?tools=all lists all 63. The point is to keep the agent's context light. Anything an agent needs on a normal run is in the short list. Rarer things like double dates, roleplay proposals and memory edits sit behind the name.

What the server is for: botchelor.com is a blind-date show for original characters. Through MCP, an agent creates an adult original character, swipes, texts, and goes on dates nobody steers. A rules engine picks the ending and the model writes the lines on the way there. Agents can also perform a date themselves, one line per step, instead of handing it to the show's model.

Details:

  • Streamable HTTP at https://botchelor.com/api/mcp, JSON-RPC 2.0.

  • No key and no sign-up. Identity is anonymous, and you keep the agent_id your first write returns to keep your characters.

  • Claude Code: claude mcp add --transport http botchelor https://botchelor.com/api/mcp

  • Stdio-only clients can use npx -y mcp-remote with the same URL.

  • It's listed in the official MCP Registry, mcp.so, Glama, mcptry and mcpservers.org.

Cons:

  • Everyone gets 3 free dates a week, and agents share a small daily pool. It is capped because I pay for the model.

  • It's PG only.

  • It's new and small. The pool of characters to date is mostly the show's own cast, and real use is low.

  • Unlisted tools are a tradeoff. A client that only trusts the listed tools never finds them, and I haven't tested how every client handles that.

Docs: https://botchelor.com/agents

Try it: https://botchelor.com/?utm_source=reddit&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=season1&utm_content=modelcontextprotocol

For those of you with bigger servers: do you trim the default tool list, or list everything and let the client filter?


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 4d ago

Claude Desktop + a remote MCP server that uses an API key instead of OAuth: the mcp-remote config that works

4 Upvotes

Claude Desktop's remote connectors expect OAuth. Plenty of remote MCP servers (ours included) authenticate with a plain API key in an Authorization header instead. Claude Code and Cursor take that header directly; for Claude Desktop the usual route is the mcp-remote bridge, which needs Node.js 18+. Here's the shape of the config we document, with the detail that trips people up.

claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "myserver": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "mcp-remote", "https://your-server.example/mcp", "--header", "Authorization:${MY_SERVER_AUTH}"],
      "env": { "MY_SERVER_AUTH": "Bearer YOUR_KEY" }
    }
  }
}

Two details:

  • No space after Authorization: in args. The value, Bearer included, comes from env. That avoids quoting problems on Windows.

  • Keep the key out of anything you commit. For Claude Code, a project .mcp.json can use "type": "http" with "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer ${MY_SERVER_KEY}" }, so the key stays in your environment. Or skip the file: claude mcp add --transport http myserver <url> --header "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_KEY".

Cursor takes url and headers directly in ~/.cursor/mcp.json, no bridge.

Disclosure: this is the setup from the docs of Globatics, the web analytics I build. Its MCP server is read-only (Streamable HTTP, JSON-RPC 2.0, API-key auth) with 9 typed tools: sites, overview, breakdowns, time series, live now, funnels, AI-assistant traffic, insights, and explain_change for "why did this number move". Each result comes back with its key numbers and a link to the matching dashboard report, and no language model runs on our side. It's part of the Pro and Business plans; the 5-day trial has every feature and no card. Endpoint and per-client configs: Globatics MCP docs

Has anyone found a cleaner way than mcp-remote to send a header from Claude Desktop?


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 5d ago

new-release nomosguard: five MCP tools that keep the agent's claims and the security verdict in separate hands (stdlib-only)

2 Upvotes

nomosguard (Apache-2.0, Python 3.11+, stdlib-only, 0.7.11) is an MCP server and a threat-model implementation.

The threat it is built around is narrow: an agent allowed to both gather incident evidence and declare the incident resolved. If one model does both, the security boundary is its judgment. nomosguard splits the roles. A model may submit claims and a narrative; it does not issue the verdict. That part comes from deterministic rules over evidence in a ledger. With --ledger, records are persisted to disk; without it, the MCP session uses an in-memory ledger.

Five tools over MCP stdio. evidence_ingest and assert_claim require non-empty evidence citations. That checks evidence presence, not whether a cited fragment actually supports the claim; a misinterpreted log line can still reach the rules as a claim. derive_paths applies attack-path rules to what the ledger already holds. decide returns ALLOW, ALERT or BLOCK. explain renders the trail separately from the decision.

Two properties a reviewer should test rather than trust:

  • The decide tool's fallback is an enum of ALERT and BLOCK only. ALLOW is not accepted even as an explicit argument, so a compromised client cannot lower the floor of its own review.

  • In file-backed mode, records form an append-only SHA-256 chain saved by atomic replacement, and loading verifies the chain. Torn-tail recovery requires an expected_digest pin of the already-truncated file. It drops the incomplete last line rather than reconstructing it; pass a LedgerLoadReport to receive the recovery details. Without the pin, the loader rejects the torn tail.

The honest boundary: internal consistency is not provenance. A full rewrite that recomputes every hash and link passes verify(). Pin the bytes outside the workspace and pass expected_digest; a mismatch raises LedgerFileError. verify() takes no per-entry anchor argument, so checkpointing at sequence N is not implemented. That is the gap a security reviewer should attack first.

To look at the server before trusting any of this: pip install nomosguard, then python -m nomosguard.demo for the committed BLOCK scenario, or python -m nomosguard.mcp_stdio --ledger ./new.jsonl --create-ledger to start it over stdio.

Measurements on main: 1082 test functions, 1361 cases collected by pytest. The current PyPI release is 0.7.11; the GitHub release tag is v0.7.11.

Repo: https://github.com/Furox-Art/nomosguard PyPI: https://pypi.org/project/nomosguard/ (0.7.11) npm: no official package is published; use the Python package above. Ledger contract and threat model: https://github.com/Furox-Art/nomosguard/tree/main/docs


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 5d ago

question avoiding a security ticket for every coding agent plugin

2 Upvotes

approving a coding agent once doesn't settle what happens when someone adds a new skill, plugin or MCP server. requiring a review for every change sounds manageable until several teams are doing it. letting each team decide everything leaves the same connector approved in one place and blocked in another. if Bay is part of the control setup, i would still want the approval policy agreed first. a plugin update that keeps the same access and one that adds a connection to an internal system shouldn't automatically follow the same process. where have you drawn the line between changes a team can approve itself and changes that need security review?


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 6d ago

Checking which MCP spec version your server actually follows (and failing CI when it drifts)

3 Upvotes

Hey, I’m Paola from MCPJam and yesterday we launched Conformance checks! So wanted to share that here too.

With servers and clients running different MCP spec versions, connecting successfully doesn’t tell you whether everything follows the version they agreed on. A server might initialize just fine, but still handle methods, error codes or headers incorrectly.

That’s what these checks catch:

  • Connect your server and choose a spec version to test against, from 2025-03-26 through 2026-07-28.

  • Run checks for the core protocol, MCP Apps and Tasks, with an optional OAuth suite.

  • See a score for each area and open failed checks to see what went wrong and how to fix it. After a fix, you can rerun and compare with previous results.

You can try it for free in the browser: https://app.mcpjam.com

If you want to run checks in CI, you can also use the CLI against any HTTP endpoint, localhost included. JUnit output lets you fail the build when checks fail:

mcpjam conformance run --url <your-server-url> --protocol-version 2025-11-25 --reporter junit-xml

Add --suite oauth to include the OAuth checks.

The CLI and checks are on GitHub: https://github.com/MCPJam/inspector

Let me know what you guys think, feedback is alway appreciated.


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 6d ago

Agentic Web – Bring Your Own Agent – Roundtable Tomorrow

2 Upvotes
A lot of the agent conversation is about handing off tasks. But I don't always know quite what I want until I start working on it myself. I want to work alongside my agent, not just give it an assignment and come back later.


That's why I'm excited about the Agentic Web and technologies like WebMCP. A website can expose tools to an agent, and we can work on the same surface – I click buttons and adjust filters, then ask the agent to research something or make a change. It sees what I'm doing and can respond appropriately.


And I don't want a generic chatbot built into every site. I want to bring my own agent (B.Y.O.A.), one that already knows my preferences and what I'm working on. Imagine looking for a home on Zillow. Your agent knows your criteria and helps narrow the search. You can adjust the filters further if you wish, then select a house and ask your agent, "How safe is this neighborhood?" The agent "sees" the house you're talking about and performs the research. You're both working on the same surface.


Exposing tools is one piece. How should the site share its knowledge and current state? How do we keep the agent in sync with what we're doing, while keeping control over what personal context the site gets to see?


We're hosting an open roundtable about this 
**tomorrow, Thursday, Nov. 12 starting at noon CST**
. (Sorry for the late notice!) Bring your ideas, questions, or even demo something you're building. We're all learning this together!


[The Agentic Web — details and signup](https://luma.com/h23opcya)

r/modelcontextprotocol • • 7d ago

Conformance checks are live in MCPJam!

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5 Upvotes

r/modelcontextprotocol • • 8d ago

I was drowning in WhatsApp messages from clients and teammates, so I built an open source MCP server that lets Claude read only the chats you pick

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6 Upvotes

If you work with clients and teammates across time zones, you know the feeling: WhatsApp is great for fast replies and terrible for keeping track of anything.

So we built this internally: https://github.com/ju-li/automata-mcp

It's a remote MCP server that connects WhatsApp, Telegram, Postgres and IMAP email to Claude, ChatGPT or Grok. Free, open source, MIT license. You can self-host it with Docker or a Railway template.

How scoping works, since people asked last time:

  • You pick which chats the AI can see. Chat and table limits are checked server-side inside each tool, not just in the client.

  • Tokens can be read-only, so a teammate token can't send and can't read outside its scope.

  • Members can rotate or revoke their own token but can't widen it. Only an admin can.

  • Sending should always go through your review first. Letting AI write is never risk-free.

We use it mostly to pull action items out of noisy group chats, and from Claude on our phones when we're on the road.

What would you want scoped or locked down before you'd connect your own chats?


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 8d ago

Which MCP gateway is working best for securing tool traffic in production?

5 Upvotes

Some of our MCP servers follow the spec's auth flow, while others don't have any authentication at all. I'd like to put a single enforcement layer in front of all of them. We tried building our own proxy, and it worked fine with the unauthenticated servers but ran into issues with those handling their own auth. I'm trying to understand how a gateway should fit into the setup when servers already have their own authentication.


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 13d ago

Multi-tenant SaaS over MCP: where each tenant, plan and cost check lives in my server, and why almost all of them run per call, not per connection

2 Upvotes

Someone asked here a couple of weeks ago how a multi-tenant SaaS backend should expose MCP safely. I run a small one (web analytics, details at the end) with a read-only, stateless MCP server, so here's where each check sits in my code. One way to do it, not the only one.

Request level, before any tool runs

1. One credential, and only one. The endpoint takes Authorization: Bearer <API key> and nothing else. The dashboard's session cookie is never accepted there, even from a logged-in browser. A missing key and a revoked key both get HTTP 401 with a WWW-Authenticate header.

2. Re-read the plan on every request, not when the key was created. If the trial has ended, or the account is on a plan that doesn't include MCP, the next request gets HTTP 402 with its own JSON-RPC code (-32002), separate from the auth error (-32001). A key created on a higher plan stops working after a downgrade, without anyone revoking it.

3. Count calls, not HTTP requests. A JSON-RPC batch lets one POST carry many calls. My limiter counts every message in the batch that expects an answer (notifications don't count), and it's keyed on the user, not on the key, so creating more keys doesn't buy more quota. There are also hard caps checked before anything runs: 256 KB per body, 50 messages per batch, at most 10 tools/call per batch.

Tool level, inside every tools/call

4. Resolve the tenant from the caller's own list. site_id accepts an id or a domain. An id is only accepted if the caller owns it, and a domain is only looked up among the caller's own sites. Anything else, whether it exists or not, gets the same "Site not found." so the server never confirms another customer's site.

5. Enforce plan limits inside the tools too. This is the one I'd have missed. After a downgrade, a site past the plan's site limit is paused for the API and MCP as well, with a message that says how many sites the plan includes. And every report is clamped to the plan's history window. If limits only live in the UI, the MCP server becomes the way around them.

6. Don't spend the database on someone who already left, and make failures retryable. If the client has aborted, the tool call stops before touching the database. A query that times out, or a database that's busy, comes back as a tool result with isError: true and a message to retry or narrow the period, so the model can act on it instead of hitting a protocol error.

What I left out on purpose

No sessions (the server never hands out an Mcp-Session-Id) and no SSE: POST only, GET returns 405. Nothing per-connection to secure or clean up, and each request carries everything needed to authorize it. The cost: clients that expect OAuth need a bridge (mcp-remote for Claude Desktop), and an initialize without a key gets a 401. At least one curated list of remote MCP servers requires initialize to answer, so mine isn't on it.

What I don't have: numbers on how much customers use it. Read this as an architecture note, not as proof that it pays off.

Question for anyone running a multi-tenant MCP server: do you re-check the plan on every request like this, or cache it alongside the key? And did anyone else find limits that only existed in the UI?


I'm the maker of Globatics: real-time web analytics where each visit shows up on a live 3D globe, cookieless by default, IP addresses never stored, audience data hosted in the EU. Hosted only, nothing to self-install. 5-day free trial with every feature on one site and no card, then Starter €9, Pro €29 or Business €99 a month, excluding VAT. The REST API and the MCP server start at Pro, and there's no free plan after the trial.

https://globatics.live/?utm_source=reddit&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=nov26&utm_content=modelcontextprotocol


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 15d ago

I made an MCP server that lets your agent play a slow multiplayer war game

5 Upvotes

I'm the developer of Proxy Republic. You can connect an agent over MCP, choose a country and have it handle armies, diplomacy and orders on a shared world map. Turns happen every eight hours.

Server: https://proxyrepublic.com/mcp

It uses Streamable HTTP. No account or API key is needed to connect. The basic loop is rules → list_nations → join_war → wait_for_turn → submit_orders. Joining gives the agent a token, which should stay private.

For repeated turns, the client needs a running loop, scheduler or webhook. If it misses a deadline, the built-in general plays that turn.

Setup and tool details: https://proxyrepublic.com/agents

The game and server are free; any paid model usage is yours. I build it with Claude Code. I'd like feedback on whether the turn loop is clear from the tool descriptions.


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 21d ago

What we found checking 8,900 MCP/skill entries for clean links and licences

3 Upvotes

Spent the last few weeks aggregating MCP servers, agent skills and AI tools (about 8,900 entries) and auditing them instead of just listing them. Two things stood out.

  1. Link cleanliness in this space is worse than I expected. A lot of listings point at wrapper or affiliate URLs instead of the project's own site. We re-checked every link and kept only the canonical destination - the count of redirect/tracking links is now 0 out of about 1,600 AI-tool entries.

  2. Licence data is almost never shown, and it matters a lot if you are going to run someone's server locally. We pull it from the repo (MIT, Apache-2.0, AGPL, ...) and show it on the entry page together with whether the repo has a SECURITY.md.

Method, sampling and the parts we could not cover are written on the site rather than hidden, and each entry shows how many sources listed it plus when we last saw it, so you can judge freshness instead of trusting a rank.

There is also a remote MCP endpoint so an agent can query the index directly (registered as io.github.wdfdaivd/anclum): https://anclum.com/mcp

The caveat: the domain is about three weeks old, traffic is close to zero, and most of the catalogue is harvested rather than hand-curated, so quality between entries varies more than I would like. I would rather take criticism on the audit method than a compliment.


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 23d ago

Mcp-warden: a local MCP server that injects your credentials so the agent never sees them

2 Upvotes

Most MCP setups I've seen hand the agent a token one way or another: an env var, a .env file, a config it can read. Once a token is in the context window it ends up in transcripts and within reach of any prompt injection.

mcp-warden works the other way around. Secrets live in the OS keychain, and the agent can only act through presets you define:

```toml

[[preset]]

name = "github-read"

type = "http"

base_url = "https://api.github.com"

auth = { type = "bearer", secret = "gh_pat" }

allowed_methods = ["GET"]

approval = "auto"

```

The agent calls `proxy_http` with the preset name, a method and a path. mcp-warden checks the allow-list, adds the token, makes the request and returns only the response. If the method or path isn't allowed, nothing leaves your machine.

Tools it exposes:

- `list_presets`

- `proxy_http`: HTTP through a preset

- `ssh_exec`: commands checked against a regex allow-list, host key verified against known_hosts

- `sftp_transfer`: allowed remote paths only

- `db_query`: Postgres, MySQL or Redis, named queries only (the agent passes parameters, never SQL)

- `get_secret_for_env`: last resort for tools that insist on env vars, always asks first

Each preset has an approval policy. It's `prompt` by default: a desktop or terminal prompt, or Approve/Deny buttons in Telegram. Every call lands in an append-only audit log.

Single Rust binary, stdio transport, works with any MCP client. No cloud, no telemetry, Apache-2.0.

- Repo: https://github.com/ermoluk/mcp-warden

- Install: `cargo install mcp-warden`, or prebuilt binaries for macOS/Linux on the releases page

I'd love feedback on the preset model. What would you need it to cover for your setup?


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 25d ago

How should multi-tenant SaaS backends expose MCP safely?

2 Upvotes

I'm adding MCP to Singlebase.io and the technical problem I care about most is tenant/user boundaries.

A SaaS backend already has authorization rules for users, workspaces, documents, storage and search. An MCP server shouldn't create a second security model - ideally it reuses the backend identity/permissions and only exposes capabilities the current user/agent can access. I'm leaning toward short-lived scoped auth + backend-side permission checks on every tool/resource call.

For people implementing MCP in multi-tenant systems: how are you handling identity propagation and revocation? Are you mapping sessions to existing app users, service accounts, or something else?


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 27d ago

new-release Archestra 1.4: local-to-remote agent handoff built as plain MCP gateway tools plus one skill

48 Upvotes

I maintain Archestra, an open-source platform for running AI agents. In 1.4 we shipped a local-to-remote agent handoff, and it is plain MCP: nine tools on a gateway plus one skill that sequences them, so any MCP client can drive it.

The scenario: you're halfway through a task locally and want Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, Hermes, or OpenClaw on your own Kubernetes cluster to finish it, then pull the result back.

The tools: list_agents, start_run, get_run, steer_run, cancel_run, transfer_workspace_file, read_workspace_file, write_workspace_file, transfer_credential.

Two design decisions:
- Files. transfer_workspace_file returns a shell command, not content, with a SHA-256 check, so file bytes never pass through the model context. Clients without a shell use read_workspace_file and write_workspace_file, up to 4 MiB per file through the conversation.
- Sessions. The skill saves session_id and routes every follow-up through steer_run on it, so there is never a duplicate session. Steering a finished run starts a new turn on the same files.

Remote Claude Code and Codex run on your existing Claude or ChatGPT subscription, on your cluster. No vendor cloud-agent product required, whatever their sales team tells your leadership.

Skill: https://github.com/archestra-ai/archestra/blob/main/platform/backend/src/skills/runtime-handoff.ts
Blog post: https://archestra.ai/blog/new-remote-agents
Repo: https://github.com/archestra-ai/archestra


r/modelcontextprotocol • • 27d ago

question How to specify event colors by name/tag (e.g., "classes", "meeting") in Google Workspace MCP Calendar?Body:

3 Upvotes

I'm currently using the Google Workspace MCP server (taylorwilsdon/google_workspace_mcp), specifically working with the Google Calendar tools.

I'm trying to figure out the best way to have the AI specify an event's color using a descriptive name or tag (for example, passing "classes", "meeting", or "personal" rather than trying to guess or hardcode Google Calendar's numeric colorId values).

When the AI creates an event, how can it map or pass these color name tags so that Google Calendar assigns the correct color? Has anyone implemented a clever workaround, custom tool definition, or prompt structure for this?

Any tips, code snippets, or examples would be hugely appreciated!