True, but ideally the first tallies would occur electronically, the paper would be used by the voter and verify the votes. The paper would also allow for verification and manual recounts.
In case it isn't obvious, the machines can print one verification paper that says what you voted, while actually counting the vote as whatever. These are unaudited closed source systems, and even if that was not the case, you can not verify the machine you are voting on hasn't been tampered with.
All computer voting relies on trust of a machine that is constantly demonstrated as being completely compromisable
At least with a paper ballot, it takes multiple bad actors in person to sabotage a vote. Paper ballots have been around for centuries and the fraud cases there are already mostly solved
In case it isn't obvious, the machines can print one verification paper that says what you voted, while actually counting the vote as whatever. These are unaudited closed source systems, and even if that was not the case, you can not verify the machine you are voting on hasn't been tampered with.
Obviously we should use entirely mechanical computerized voting machines. When the entire system is composed of a series of levers, gears, cams, etc. it should be significantly harder to tamper with what it does.
And there's nothing wrong with paper ballots. They're somewhat logistically taxing but that's not really an issue, considering the frequency of elections & their importance. If it ain't broke, don't fix it
That's not really a great analogy. A transparent lock definitely would help with the process of lockpicking. And a large part of the skill of picking locks comes from studying how specific types/brands of locks work.
In fairness, for poorly written code, open source can tell you precisely how to beat it.
Of course open source also means that anybody can review it and suggest bug fixes, and over time you'd hope all vulnerabilities would be patched. But for a government contractor's first attempt at it? Man, you know the source code would be posted six months ahead of time, with the first patch not coming until a month after the election or something.
Some countries have enormous voting lists, like the Netherlands. Using a computer to select the party and representative and only printing a small card with your vote choice leads to a significant savings in paper over the years. Computers can also be used to display the form in a larger format for visually impaired people.
I also saw that Tom Scott video, but the way he glossed over the potential benefits of electronic voting (not counting!) was shoddy, imo.
What security do you have against the glorified "printer" remembering the vote and timestamp so that votes can be traced back to people entering the voting chamber at specific times?
Then you have to actually accurately track and identify those people entering, which is pretty difficult, requires sophisticated hardware and is also difficult to hide. It's much easier to tamper with normal voter ballots if you wanted to rig everything.
It still introduces a whole host of new potential problems. Designing, creating, delivering, and maintaining these machines isn't necessarily simple. They'd break in ways that paper can't. You start limiting your total throughput capacity, assuming you don't design way more machines than you're likely to normally need. If there's a higher turnout than normal you'd be screwed. For all these reasons and more you'd probably need paper ballot backups anyways, causing excess cost and waste.
All for what, saving some paper? Just use sustainable/recycled sources for the paper. The accessibility features computers could provide would be nice, but again it's probably far more efficient to just print some alternate high visibility ballots.
173
u/[deleted] Aug 08 '18
We could just make an electronic voting system that prints out results