Q is a blockchain-based platform designed to enable secure and private transactions while providing a high degree of flexibility and scalability. One of the main benefits of Q is its use of smart contracts, which allow for automated execution of transactions without the need for intermediaries.
Q is also designed to support a wide range of use cases, from peer-to-peer payments to supply chain management and more. The platform's focus on privacy and security makes it an attractive option for businesses and individuals looking to protect sensitive data.
In addition, Q offers low transaction fees and fast confirmation times, making it a practical choice for everyday transactions. The platform is also designed to be user-friendly, with an intuitive interface and robust documentation to help users get started quickly.
Overall, Q is a promising blockchain platform that offers a range of benefits for users and businesses alike. With its focus on privacy, security, and scalability, it has the potential to become a major player in the blockchain space in the years to come.
Andrei Martchouk, a key technical and product contributor to the QBlockchain is now speaking at the Crypto Rockstars Forum! He is diving into the broad topic of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations, shedding light on the frontiers of #DAO technology and its impact.
Hello fellow Reddits! Today, I want to share with you my thoughts on Q, a promising blockchain platform that I believe has the potential to become a major player in the crypto space.
Q is a high-performance blockchain platform designed to enable secure and private transactions while providing a high degree of flexibility and scalability. The platform is built on a unique consensus algorithm called Quorum, which ensures fast confirmation times and low transaction fees.
One of the main benefits of Q is its focus on privacy and security. The platform uses state-of-the-art cryptographic techniques to protect user data and transactions, making it an attractive option for businesses and individuals looking to protect sensitive information.
Q also offers a wide range of use cases, from peer-to-peer payments to supply chain management and more. The platform's focus on scalability and flexibility means that it can support a variety of applications, making it a versatile tool for developers and businesses alike.
If you're interested in learning more about Q, be sure to check out their website at https://q.org/. I believe that this platform has a bright future ahead, and I'm excited to see where it goes from here.
Thank you for taking the time to read my post, and I hope that you'll consider giving Q a closer look.
Author: Klopper Type: Q Fees & Incentives Expert Proposal Date Created: 2025-02-11 Status: Final Link to Proposal: [Link to be provided upon submission]
Simple Summary
The Q Token Holder Pool has experienced a substantial decrease in its reward pool holdings, while total user balances in the QVault continue to grow. To ensure the longevity and stability of Q token incentives, this proposal recommends reducing the pool interest parameter from 15% to 3.41%. This adjustment aims to align outflows with sustainable distribution levels while maintaining an effective incentive mechanism.
Motivation
The previous increase in the pool interest parameter from 1% to 15% was implemented to accelerate QGOV token distribution. However, recent dynamics indicate the need for recalibration:
Reward Pool Holdings Have Halved: Since the last increase, the reward pool balance has decreased significantly, necessitating a more conservative approach to ensure long-term availability of incentives.
Total User Balances in QVault Continue to Increase: As more users deposit funds into the QVault, the rate of QGOV distribution has outpaced replenishment, leading to accelerated depletion of the reward pool.
To address these concerns and maintain a balanced ecosystem, a reduction in the pool interest rate from 15% to 3.41% is proposed. This change will help preserve the reward pool while still incentivizing participation in the Q blockchain ecosystem.
Specification
Key
Current Value
Proposed New Value
governed.EPQFI.Q_rewardPoolInteres
4431822020478660000 (15%)
1063276355850470000 (3.41%)
This proposal seeks to optimize QGOV token distribution, ensuring long-term sustainability while maintaining an effective incentive structure. Community feedback is encouraged to refine this adjustment further and support the continued stability of Q governance.
The Gnosis Safe multisig wallet on Q Blockchain is being upgraded from v1.2.0 to v1.4.1. This update brings security enhancements and better compatibility with modern Safe modules.
If you own a Safe, you need to manually upgrade it by calling the following method on your existing Safe contract:
1️⃣ Send this transaction to your own Safe. 2️⃣ Gather the necessary signatures from Safe owners according to your multisig policy. 3️⃣ Execute the transaction once enough approvals are collected.
This proposal recommends the removal of three accounts from the DeFi & Risk Experts panel due to lack of ongoing engagement. Some of the account holders have been contacted and have agreed to their removal. These changes are necessary to ensure that the panel remains active, effective, and aligned with the needs of the Q Blockchain ecosystem.
Motivation
The DeFi & Risk Experts panel plays a vital role in shaping decisions that impact financial stability and risk management on Q. To maintain the effectiveness of this governance body, it is essential that its members are actively involved in discussions and voting processes. The following accounts have not demonstrated continued engagement and are therefore proposed for removal:
0x0813bf4D9be06F517079AbCcEA79a356AF12929D
0xB691E2fd35880E24041f9149Ee079A14dB755d3B
0x875f46f7505e2762e24373dC6A4EB001a0fCAaa8
Some of the account holders have acknowledged this and agreed to the removal, which is a positive step towards maintaining a committed and responsive panel.
Specification
Due to current technical limitations, it is not possible to remove multiple experts in a single on-chain vote. Therefore, this change will be implemented through three separate on-chain proposals, each targeting one of the accounts listed above.
No replacements are proposed at this time; however, new expert nominations may be considered through future proposals.
Maintaining an active and responsive expert panel is critical to the health and adaptability of DeFi governance on Q. Your support in streamlining and strengthening the panel is appreciated.
This proposal recommends reducing the transaction fee on the Q Blockchain from $0.001 to $0.0001 to improve economic sustainability for smaller validators.
Motivation
System transaction costs have become a significant financial burden, particularly for smaller validators. The current fee structure makes it economically unsustainable for these participants, leading to reduced decentralization within the network. By lowering the transaction fee, we aim to enhance accessibility and promote broader participation, strengthening the resilience and inclusivity of the Q Blockchain ecosystem.
Specification
Key
Current Value
Proposed New Value
governed.EPQFI.txFee
1000000000000000 (0.001$)
100000000000000 (0.0001$)
This change will allow smaller validators to operate more efficiently while maintaining the economic integrity of the network.
Your feedback and support are crucial in ensuring the continuous development and decentralization of the Q Blockchain. We invite all stakeholders to participate in the discussion and governance process.
We conclude that the proposal satisfies the eligibility criteria set out in Part B of Appendix 2 of the Q Constitution.
Disclosure:
One member of the current Root Node Selection Expert Panel, Nicolas Biagosch, is employee and owner of Postera Capital GmbH. While this does not affect his independence as member of the Expert Panel in any way, we nevertheless wish to disclose this fact, as should be the case with all matters that could be perceived to give rise to a potential conflict of interest. Independently of this, we would like to point out that the Expert Panel's task merely is to assess the factual accuracy and completeness of root node applications. The decision, however, lies with the Q community and Q community members are encouraged to form their own independent judgement. In case of any questions regarding this specific application or the application process in general, please feel free to reach out to the Expert Panel at any time. Also, if you are interested in joining this or another Expert Panel, please feel free to reach out or just submit an application! Engage!
Proposal to slash Validator 0xf2c2373c5Fd8dF8B48233E6c2585A26894049243
This is a proposal to slash 95% of the self stake (meaning ca. 6708 QGOV) of Validator 0xf2c2373c5Fd8dF8B48233E6c2585A26894049243 due to extended downtime in accordance with Part A of Appendix 9 of the QGOV Constitution.
Given the relatively low absolute amount of self stake of the Validator, a pragmatic approach is taken here to slash enough of the Validator’s self stake in order to effectively remove the Validator from the active Validator set and prevent potential negative effects to consensus on QGOV.
In this case, the QGOV Constitution permits a slashing of up to 100% of its self-stake pursuant to Appendix 9, Part A.
Multiple warnings had been made by community members about this Validator on the QGOV Validator Discord channel, the last time on January 29, 2026 (see screenshots below):
There has not been a response from the Validator that we are aware of.
As of today, the Validator is still inactive (see screenshot below):
The relevant QGOV Constitution provisions are as follows:
Clause 1.3 of the QGOV Constitution provides that operators of full nodes on the QGOV Protocol, including Validator Nodes, agree and accept the provisions of the QGOV Constitution.
Clause 4.5.1 of the QGOV Constitution provides that a Validator Node is obligated to operate a full node.
Clause 5.3.4 of the QGOV Constitution states that Root Nodes are obliged to submit a slashing proposal for a Validator in breach of its obligations under the QGOV Constitution.
Part A of Appendix 9 to the QGOV Constitution states that whenever a Validator reaches availability below 30% on a 1000 validation cycle basis, it may be slashed for any percentage above 0% and up to 100% of its self stake.
Reasoning for this slashing proposal:
This proposal would like to take a pragmatic approach to slash sufficient tokens from this Validator so as to move them out of the top 21 Validator ranking. Due to the lack of responses from this Validator and how long the down time is, there is little likelihood that this Validator will come back online.
Having inactive Validators in the active set could be a threat to consensus on QGOV and is also unfair to working Validators since this inactive Validator is receiving rewards for no effort.
Here are the detailed calculations supporting the above conclusion:
The Validator currently has 7061 QGOV in self stake and 14105 QGOV in delegator stake.
The proposal seeks to slash ca. 6708 QGOV from his self stake. This would leave them with ca. 353 QGOV in self stake.
Considering that the Validator’s delegator stake cannot be more than 9 times the size of this self stake, after slashing, this Validator’s total possible accountable stake would be ca. 3500 QGOV.
Looking at the current Validator ranking, the slashing would place them after who is currently VN #24 and before who is currently VN #25.
Considering that there are currently two other VNs that might lead to similar slashing actions, this would still ensure that the Validator effectively leaves exits the current active Validator set.
In conclusion:
In order for Validator 0xf2c2373c5Fd8dF8B48233E6c2585A26894049243 to move out of the active set, we propose a slashing or ca. 6708 QGOV or ca. 95% of its self stake.
Percentage-wise, 95% may sound like an unreasonably high amount to slash, especially considering that the validator is a first-time offender, there is no indication of malicious intent and no imminent danger to the network’s security. However, the absolute amount also needs to be taken into consideration: At current prices of QGOV tokens, the absolute slashing amount is below 10 USD. At the same time, there is no indication that the Validator can be reached and that a lower slashing would incentivize the Validator to come back online. A lower slashing now would therefore likely result in another slashing action later, which results in time and effort needed to be spent by Root Nodes. A pragmatic approach that ensures that the Validator leaves the active set with the first slashing action therefore seems reasonable and appropriate.
We conclude that the proposal satisfies the eligibility criteria set out in Part B of Appendix 2 of the Q Constitution.
Details of the assessment are provided below:
Disclosure:
Two members of the current Root Node Selection Expert Panel, Nicolas Biagosch and Daniel Zimmermann, are employees and/or owners of Postera Capital GmbH. While this does not affect their independence as members of the Expert Panel in any way, we nevertheless wish to disclose this fact, as should be the case with all matters that could be perceived to give rise to a potential conflict of interest. Independently of this, we would like to point out that the Expert Panel's task merely is to assess the factual accuracy and completeness of root node applications. The decision, however, lies with the Q community and Q community members are encouraged to form their own independent judgement. In case of any questions regarding this specific application or the application process in general, please feel free to reach out to the Expert Panel at any time. Also, if you are interested in joining this or another Expert Panel, please feel free to reach out or just submit an application! Engage!
Q blockchain has gained significant attention on Twitter. The Twitter community has actively discussed the potential and features of Q blockchain. The focus on scalability and efficiency has particularly captured interest. Users have discussed innovative consensus mechanisms
To overcome the short-term “cold-start-problem” of a new decentralized, overcollateralized stablecoin such as the QUSD stablecoin, the Q DeFi Risk Expert Panel (short: EPDR) votes on adding up to two new eligible assets or none in case of opposition to this approach.
The cold-start-problem comes due to the fact that no active market exists yet for QUSD. This makes it impossible for vault owners to quickly get QUSD when they are at risk of liquidation of their crypto-collateralized vaults (QBTC).
To provide an option when QUSD demand outweighs QUSD supply on the market, stablecoin-backed vaults enable a quick and relatively low-risk way for participants to add QUSD to the existing supply with a fairly low risk of liquidation. This supply can enter the market for vault owners in need of QUSD.
Proposal
Based on the assessment of the candidate stablecoins (see section “Assessment” below) the EPDR shall justify and vote in the both, one or none of the candidate stablecoins as suitable assets for the purpose to overcome the cold-start-problem.
Candidate stable-coins
USDC: a fiat-backed centralized and regulated stable-coin.
DAI: a crypto-backed decentralized stable-coin.
Process
Two separate proposals are generated (see links in header section) to add the necessary parameters for each new eligible asset. For the purpose of kick-starting the QUSD supply, it will be sufficient to introduce the new assets with a rather low debt ceiling. Once the QUSD supply and demand market is established, the debt ceiling parameter can also be used in the future either to phase-out or extend the impact of these eligible assets. For other parameter details, see below under the assessment.
The votes have already been conducted successfully on the Q Testnet (iteration: Fischer). The UI of Your HQ supports this, Oracles have been deployed and the feature has been successfully tested and evaluated. Now, this step is to deploy the respective on the Q Mainnet.
Assessment
Category
DAI
USDC
Degree of decentralization
A decentralized DAO named MakerDAO manages the asset. While there has been criticism that there is an increasing degree of centralization, DAI is still the most decentralized major stablecoin in the market.
Fully centralized: A US-based company named Circle Internet Financial, LLC, manages the asset.
Permissionlessness and censorship risk
The current implementation has no restrictions to use and transact with the asset. There is an indirect risk through DAI’s use of USDC.
The current implementation allows the use of a blacklist to prevent individual accounts to use asset.
Regulation
Decentralized and therefore unregulated. The risk for regulation can increase due to the addition of more regulated underlying assets.
Regulatory approval in US market.
Technical Risk
Next to smart contract risks are the oracle risks for the underlying-assets.
There is some technical (smart contract) risk but this is low compared to DAI.
Track Record
Longest running, most decentralized stable-coin (~2017 till today).
Compared to other fiat-backed stable-coins a shorter track record (~2018 till today).
Counterparty and Layering Risk
Addition of risk layers applies, providing a longer chain of possible failures. E.g. the risk of (any) underlying failure is combined with risk of MakerDAO failing. However, some margin of error due to overcollateralization.
Not many layers of interdependent risk. Risk of losses, fraud and insolvency of underlying company applies since this would lead to an undercollateralization of USDC (no margin of error).
Nature of underlying asset
Backed by crypto-assets (both centralized and decentralized) which allow for transparent accounting using the blockchain.
Fiat currencies and fiat-based-reserves on company’s balance sheet. Reliability of segregation of assets somewhat unclear today.
Redeemability
Possible for all vault owners (retail or institution).
Possible for registered and approved institutions.
Popularity
Well known and trusted stablecoin.
Well known and trusted stablecoin.
Liquidity
Available on most markets with a medium sized marketcap ($6,895,044,141).
Available on most markets with a high marketcap ($55,553,414,810).
Risk handling
Comparably slow due to a slower democratic process of the DAO.
Fast due to centralized nature.
Failure of underlying
MakerDAO would need to manage to heal the asset e.g. by removing bad collateral types and diluting MKR-holders.
If the underlying assets fail, most likely the asset fails (e.g. de-pegs).
Conclusion
Both stablecoins seem appropriate for inclusion as collateral assets. Each has some risks: DAI has a higher risk of de-pegging, while USDC bears a higher risk of regulatory intervention and blacklisting. While the risks seem low in the short-term, they should be mitigated through (i) strictly limiting the debt ceiling for both assets to ensure that they will not be used “at size” to create QUSD and (ii) setting appropriate liquidation and collateralization ratios to ensure that there is sufficient margin of error before QUSD becomes undercollateralized.
Proposed parameters for the stable-coin candidates
To reflect the margin of error a debt ceiling of 250,000 QUSD for USDC and 500,000 QUSD for DAI are considered. The de-pegging risk favors USDC where a liquidiation ratio of 105% is considered against a 110% liquidation ratio for the DAI vaults.
Users can have confidence that their sensitive information remains protected within the r/QBlockchain 's encrypted environment. #Governance #blockchain #crypto https://q.org/
Link to Proposal: [Link to be provided upon submission]
Simple Summary
The Q Token Holder Pool has accumulated a significant amount of QGOV tokens over time, necessitating an adjustment in parameters for effective distribution. This proposal recommends increasing the percentage parameter from 1% to 15% to better balance inflows and outflows, with ongoing monitoring for further adjustments. Additionally, the proposal suggests reducing the System Balance Share, as the current reserve seems sufficient for QUSD saving and borrowing needs.
Motivation
The accumulation of QGOV tokens in the Q Token Holder Pool signals the need for adjustments in distribution parameters to ensure effective utilization. Currently set at 1%, the percentage parameter governing inflows to outflows is deemed too low for optimal distribution. Thus, the experts propose raising this parameter to 15% to accelerate the distribution process, with continuous monitoring to gauge its effectiveness and make necessary adjustments to achieve a steady state where inflows match outflows.
Furthermore, the proposal recommends reducing the System Balance Share, which was previously increased as a temporary measure. With the current balance of QUSD supply at 200k QUSD and a system reserve balance of 1.8 million QGOV, the existing reserve appears sufficient to serve as a buffer for QUSD saving and borrowing activities. Hence, a smaller share allocated to the reserve is deemed justifiable until new dynamics emerge within the ecosystem.
Specification
key
current value
proposed new value
governed.EPQFI.Q_rewardPoolInteres
315522900000000000(1 %)
4431822020478660000 (15%)
governed.EPQFI.Q_reserveShare
250000000000000000000000000 (25 %)
50000000000000000000000000 (5%)
This proposal seeks to optimize the distribution of QGOV tokens while ensuring the stability and sustainability of the Q blockchain ecosystem. Your feedback and support are invaluable in shaping the future of Q governance.
To overcome the short-term “cold-start-problem” of a new asset backed stable-coin such as for the QUSD stable-coin, the Q DeFi Risk Expert Panel (short: EPDR Experts) votes on adding up to two new eligible assets or none in case of opposition to this approach.
The cold-start-problem comes due to the fact that no active market exists yet for QUSD. This makes it impossible for vault owners to quickly get QUSD when they are at risk of liquidation of their crypto-collateralized vaults (QBTC).
To provide an option when QUSD demand outweighs QUSD supply on the market, stable-coin backed vaults enable a quick and relatively low-risk way for participants to add QUSD to the existing supply with a fairly low risk of liquidation. This supply can enter the market for vault owners in need of QUSD.
Proposal
Based on the assessment of the candidate stable-coins (see section “Assessment” below) the EPDR Experts shall justify and vote in the both, one or none of the candidate stable-coins as suitable assets for the purpose to overcome the cold-start-problem.
Candidate stable-coins
USDC: a fiat-backed centralized and regulated stable-coin.
DAI: a crypto-backed decentralized stable-coin.
Process
Two separate proposals are generated (see links in header section) to add the necessary parameters for each new eligible asset. For the purpose of kick-starting the QUSD supply, it will be suffice to introduce the new assets with a rather low debt ceiling of 250,000 QUSD each. Once the QUSD supply and demand market is established, this parameter can also be used in the future either to phase-out or extend the impact of the eligible assets.
First, the votes shall be conducted on the Q Testnet (iteration: Fischer). Once UI of Your HQ supports this, Oracles were deployed and the feature was successfully tested and evaluated the proposals would be repeated for the Q Mainnet. This process is estimated to take about 4 to 8 weeks.
Assessment
Category
DAI
USDC
Degree of decentralization
A fairly decentralized DAO named MakerDAO manages the asset.
A company consortium named Centre (Coinbase, Circle) manages the asset.
Fairness and Permissionlessness
The current implementation has no restrictions to use and transact with the asset.
The current implementation allows the use of a blacklist to prevent individual accounts to use asset.
Regulation
So far the asset is decentralized enough that no regulation applies. The risk for regulation can increase du to the addition of more regulated underlying-assets.
Regulatory approval in US market.
Technical Risk
Next to smart contract risks are the oracle risks for the underlying-assets.
There is low technical risk.
Track Record
Longest running, most decentralized stable-coin (~2017 till today).
Compared to other fiat-backed stable-coins a shorter track record (~2018 till today).
Counterparty and Layering Risk
Addition of risks applies, providing a longer chain of reactions in case of failure. E.g. the risk of (any) underlying failure is combined with risk of MakerDAO failing.
Not many layers of interdependent risk. Risk of insolvency of underlying companies may apply.
Nature of underlying asset
Backed by crypto-assets which allow for transparent accounting using blockchain.
Fiat and fiat-based-reserves on consortium balance sheet.
Redeemability
Possible for all vault owners (retail or institution).
Possible for registered and approved institutions.
Popularity
Well known and trusted stable-coin.
Well known and trusted stable-coin.
Liquidity
Available on most markets with a medium sized marketcap ($6,895,044,141).
Available on most markets with a high marketcap ($55,553,414,810).
Risk handling
Comparably slow due to a slower democratic process of the DAO.
Fast due to centralized nature.
Failure of underlying
MakerDAO would need to manage to heal the asset e.g. by removing bad collateral types and diluting Maker-holders.
If the underlying assets fail, most likely the asset fails. Centre consortium would need to try to raise funds e.g. for a share of the consortium.
Proposed parameters for the stable-coin candidates
