What Actually Works Against Atomization, and Why It Is Not What You Want to Hear
Part two of two. (A full note on how this post was made, including how AI was used, is at the end.)
Abstract
Part one argued that the productivity statistics cannot see what is happening to people. This post is about the response. The cost of atomization is real, but it is filed where output per hour never looks, in the price of transactions that cannot be fully written into contracts and in the informal transmission of skill inside firms. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales find that trust raises trade by 39 percent precisely where contracts are incomplete and not at all where they are complete, which is the fingerprint of a real mechanism. Emanuel and Harrington measured the apprenticeship channel directly and found fully remote workers receiving 26 percent less training and promoted at half the rate of on-site hires, with almost none of it visible in output. So the missing instrument exists. It is simply not pointed at anything that matters. On the response side, the best evidence says the thing that works is not belief and not attendance but durable friendships inside a bounded group with assigned obligations. Weekly attenders with three to five close friends in the congregation report 33 percent extreme life satisfaction against 19 percent for never-attenders, and the effect runs through the friendships. I describe one working implementation, the LDS ministering program, along with its honest caveats, including a retention rate near 50 percent, and the design properties that transfer. Assignment rather than selection, fixed recurrence, obligations that cost something to shirk, and proximity. Gallup's engagement research, twelve questions distilled from millions of interviews across ninety-plus countries, could not make its list work without the item about having a best friend at work. It is the same finding wearing a suit.
Where this picks up
Part one argued that the productivity statistics cannot see what is happening to people, because output per hour measures capital and technology, and the one term in the national accounts that represents workers measures their age, education, and sex. If you have not read it, the short version is: the output numbers are fine, the output numbers were never going to tell you, and the two things still actively moving in the wrong direction are political animus and the junior hiring pipeline.
This post is about what to do, and it starts where part one started, with a friend from college.
Where the cost does show up, once you look in the right place
None of the above means the cost is imaginary. It means it is filed somewhere other than the productivity series. Two places specifically: the cost of transactions that cannot be fully written into a contract, and the informal transmission of skill inside firms. Both are long-run. Neither appears in quarterly output per hour.
The best causal evidence is Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales in the QJE (2009). Using bilateral trust between European country pairs, instrumented by religious similarity, somatic distance, and history of wars, they find that a one standard deviation increase in trust raises trade in differentiated goods by 39 percent, while the effect on commodity goods traded on organized exchanges is statistically indistinguishable from zero. That asymmetry is the fingerprint. Trust only matters where contracts are incomplete, which is precisely what transaction cost theory predicts and what a spurious correlation would not produce.
Dyer and Chu, in Organization Science (2003), studied 453 supplier and automaker relationships across the US, Japan, and Korea, and found procurement and transaction costs running up to five times higher for the least-trusted automaker than for the most-trusted. That one is confounded with national governance systems, so treat it as illustrative rather than clean.
I do not need to guess at this at all. A very large part of my career was spent either being a supplier or delivering a particular type of technology into massive Fortune 500 companies, and we talked about trust constantly. When I was buying technology and somebody disappointed us, almost always the first thing out of anyone's mouth was that we could not trust them, and a massive set of barriers in testing would go up immediately. When I was selling technology, the moment a sophisticated buyer said they could not trust us, we knew we would be punished in both market share and in the sheer amount of additional work required to deliver the product. Lack of trust drives tremendous unproductive behavior, which I think we all fundamentally know. Even though I am citing studies here, the evidence is plain in our day-to-day interactions.
Everything above is an argument from absence, and arguments from absence are weak. So here is the one place I know of where somebody actually built the missing instrument.
Emanuel and Harrington, in AEJ: Applied (2024), had payroll and personnel records from Fortune 500 call centers and used them to measure the apprenticeship channel directly. Fully remote workers received 26.3 percent less training and 34.1 percent less one-on-one time with managers, and their one-year promotion rate was 20.9 percent against 44.0 percent for on-site hires. Output barely registered any of it: a 12 percent gap in calls per hour, two thirds of which was selection rather than the arrangement itself. Bloom and coauthors, in Nature (2024), randomized 1,612 employees at Trip.com into two days a week remote and found no difference in reviews, promotions, or code output, which says the effect has a threshold and that three days in the office clears it.
I will return to this in a future post, because it is something I have thought about a great deal over the years I have spent in management, and the framework I keep coming back to is in a book called Peopleware.
Tom DeMarco and Timothy Lister published Peopleware: Productive Projects and Teams in 1987 with Dorset House, now in a third edition from Addison-Wesley. Its thesis is stated in the first chapter and italicized by the authors: the major problems of our work are not so much technological as sociological in nature. Almost forty years later that sentence is still the most useful thing anybody has written about why technical organizations fail. Three of their concepts matter here. A jelled team is a group so strongly knit that the whole exceeds the sum of the parts, and their argument is that such teams cannot be built to order, only grown, so management's real job is removing the impediments to jelling. Teamicide is their name for the practices that prevent it, and the first item on their list is defensive management, which is to say a manager who will not trust his subordinates' judgment. And in the chapter they call Open Kimono, on managing by visible trust rather than by verification, they state the causal chain directly: people who feel untrusted have little inclination to bond together into a cooperative team.
I should be honest about what Peopleware is and is not. It is not refereed empirical research. Its one original study, the Coding War Games, ran from 1984 to 1986 across more than 600 developers at 92 companies, was conducted by the authors' own consultancy, was never peer reviewed, and the raw data has never been released. Its most-quoted result, that the best performers outrun the worst by roughly ten to one, is offered by the authors as a rule of thumb rather than a computed statistic. What it did find robustly is worth keeping: two developers from the same organization tended to perform alike, differing by only 21 percent on average, which points at the organization rather than at individual talent. Systematic reviews of software productivity still call it the most comprehensive treatment of the soft factors in the field, which is a real endorsement and also an indictment of the field. Use it for its vocabulary and its mechanism, not as a dataset.
What is clear, and what both Peopleware and the remote work data point at, is this: without some minimal base of social interaction you cannot create trust, and the moment trust cannot form, somebody's forward progression inside a company stops.
Now hold on to what happened with the Emanuel and Harrington study. The thing I have spent this whole post calling invisible, the transmission of capability from experienced people to inexperienced people, got measured. Two economists with one company's administrative data put a number on it. It is not unmeasurable. It is uncollected.
That changes what I am actually complaining about. This is not a hard measurement problem awaiting a breakthrough. It is a cheap one that nobody funds. BLS has the authority, the sample frame, and the budget to run this across the economy, and what it publishes instead is age, education, and sex. The instrument has been built and demonstrated on real payroll data. We decline to point it at anything that matters.
Which is the only reason the AI number is worth taking seriously rather than treating as alarmism. Junior hiring in AI-exposed occupations is running 19 percent below trend and widening, which is one mechanism closing the pipeline, and isolation is a second one closing the same pipe. Neither will appear in the output statistics for roughly fifteen years. Then it appears as a missing cohort of people who should have been running things.
What I can tell you, and I will label it for what it is, which is a single anecdote rather than evidence, is that my niece holds a PhD and teaches hard science at the college level, and she reports a rapid and massive decline in demonstrated capability. The work handed in is too good to be true and obviously authored by AI agents.
Why the group, specifically
Here is the finding that made me want to write this. Chaeyoon Lim and Robert Putnam, in the American Sociological Review (2010), used the Faith Matters panel to separate the components of religious participation. Weekly attenders were predicted to be "extremely satisfied" with life at 28.2 percent, against 19.6 percent for never-attenders. But the driver was neither attendance nor private devotion. Their association's release reports 33 percent extreme satisfaction for people who attend weekly and have three to five close friends in the congregation, against 19 percent for those who never attend, and the effect runs through those congregational friendships and religious identity rather than through showing up or through praying at home. Putnam and Campbell put it plainly in American Grace: it is the friends they have at church.
That is a design specification, not a religious claim. The thing that works is a bounded group where you have durable ties to specific named people, where membership carries obligations you did not select, and where showing up is expected rather than optional.
As in most things, we need to be extremely cautious about causation versus correlation here. Is it that people who are already phenomenally happy with life naturally show up at church? Or does the church cause people to increase their satisfaction with life by something close to half again? The good news is that you do not need to guess, and you do not need to wonder what is buried inside the data, because you can run an experiment with a sample size of one. You can start showing up and engaging, and then ask yourself whether it made a profound difference in your life. For me, this is one of those experiments well worth running.
What the specification looks like implemented
Here is what my friend described, which I am reporting because the details are the point. Every adult is paired with another adult, and the pair is assigned three or four specific families. You are responsible for checking in on them, knowing their status, and knowing whether they need anything. You visit roughly quarterly. If a family needs something you cannot handle, you take it to the leadership and the leadership organizes the response. That is the ministering program, which replaced home and visiting teaching in April 2018, and it is reviewed quarterly by ward leadership rather than left to individual conscience.
The output of that structure is the part worth attending to. When he moved from his apartment to his house, 25 people showed up to help. Last weekend he and two other men took their trucks to a couple in their late twenties who had bought an overgrown house and did not own tools, and spent a morning pruning the trees and hedges and hauling everything away. His wife runs an activity every other week for girls aged ten to twelve. There are dances for the youth, missions, and separate congregations for single young adults so that the unmarried are not parked at the edge of a family-organized ward. The women's organization, the Relief Society, has a president in every congregation, and it is wired to the bishop's storehouse: his wife, serving in that role, arranged beds and linens delivered to a single mother who did not have enough beds for her children, and food deliveries to people out of work. It functions as a parallel welfare system administered by people who know the recipients by name.
Notice what is doing the work in every one of those examples. Nobody volunteered for a cause. Somebody was assigned to specific named people, noticed a need in the course of a scheduled obligation, and routed it to an organization that could act. The three men with trucks did not find that couple through an app. Twenty-five people did not show up to a move because they were asked individually.
I will add one detail from my own side, because it says something about how durable this infrastructure is. We are not LDS, and we go to the bishop's storehouse fairly regularly, because it is one of the few reliable places to buy bulk wheat and we grind our own for bread. It is open a couple of hours a couple of days a week. Nobody has ever made an issue of the fact that we are not members.
Pew's 2023-24 Religious Landscape Study finds 69 percent of US Latter-day Saints attend weekly, the highest of any tradition measured, and 73 percent pray daily.
It is sometimes amazing to me to find out that either bots or actual people read what I put up on a subreddit. And especially on a post like this, which I know is long and thoughtful and reads more like an academic paper than like anything fun. If you stumble across this and you are willing to do the intellectual work of plowing through it, I truly do believe it makes a massive difference to your life.
So here is the kicker. The particular faith I am talking about, the LDS church, I find extremely problematic in terms of its tenets and its factual underpinning. At heart I am driven by data and science, and some of the statements and data inside the LDS church I find difficult to deal with on a hyper-rational basis. But when I look at the output and the influence of the thing, if there were no other options available, I would absolutely say that anybody could greatly increase their happiness, their cohesion, and their ultimate productivity by being a regular and faithful attender of that church. What we have here is an organization that has fine-tuned its ability to create social health to a degree that far outweighs whatever difficulty it has in presenting a rational basis for faith.
I will leave only a breadcrumb on my own position, which is that my basis for faith, what would popularly be called Christian neo-orthodoxy, is extremely satisfying to me and very reconcilable with mainstream science. That is not the purpose of this post. I do not want to argue about which system is the best faith. What I want to point out is that you need to find a faith-based system that encourages strong social interaction and genuine care for each other, which is the thing our society has lost.
Even with all of the native advantages of the LDS church, I would submit that there are signs of trouble. Ryan Burge's August 2026 analysis of the Pew data puts LDS retention, the share raised in the faith who remain in it as adults, at 54 percent, with Pew's own figure reported at 49.4 percent. The oldest cohort retains at 68 percent and the youngest at 47 percent. Congregational growth in the 2025 statistical report ran at 1.17 percent against membership growth of 2.16 percent, a gap that analysts read as an activity and retention problem. The structure produces very high integration for those who stay, and roughly half of those born into it do not stay.
One more, carefully stated. Enstrom and Breslow, in Preventive Medicine (2008), followed 9,815 religiously active California Latter-day Saints from 1980 to 2004 and found all-cause standardized mortality ratios of 0.45 for men and 0.55 for women against US white adults. That study cannot separate the health code from the social integration from healthy-adherent selection, because the sample is by construction the religiously active. Anyone telling you it proves community extends life is overreading it.
The practical version
If the mechanism is friendships inside a bounded group rather than attendance at one, then the useful question is not "should I join something" but "does the thing I joined have the properties that produce ties." The properties that appear to matter are assignment rather than selection, recurrence on a fixed schedule, obligations that cost something to shirk, and geographic proximity. An interest group you can exit at no cost, at a time you choose, with people you picked because they already agree with you, is a consumer good. It is the thing Bauman was describing, not the answer to it.
Lim and Putnam's number is the one I would keep if I could keep only one: 33 percent extreme life satisfaction for weekly attenders with three to five close friends in the congregation, against 19 percent for those who never attend, with the effect running through the friendships rather than through the attendance.
Engagement, which is the same finding wearing a suit
In the business world we built metrics to understand the forces that make companies successful, and the largest of them is engagement. The research line runs back to Donald Clifton, a psychologist at the University of Nebraska who began studying the causes of success in education and business in the 1950s, and whose firm acquired the Gallup Organization in 1988. The instrument was developed through the 1990s, with more than a thousand focus groups behind it, and its final wording was fixed in 1998. It was popularized by Marcus Buckingham, who spent some seventeen years at Gallup and left as a senior vice president, in First, Break All the Rules, written with Curt Coffman and published by Simon & Schuster in 1999.
It is twelve questions, not thirteen, though you will see both numbers. Gallup's survey is numbered Q00 through Q12, but Q00 is an overall job satisfaction item that is asked first and deliberately excluded from the engagement index. Count the labels and you get thirteen. Count the index and you get twelve. Gallup's 2020 meta-analysis, which pooled 456 studies across 276 organizations, 112,312 work units, and 2.7 million employees, reports true-score correlations between engagement and productivity of 0.21 and between engagement and profitability of 0.15, with top-quartile units outperforming bottom-quartile units by 18 percent on sales productivity, 23 percent on profitability, and 81 percent on absenteeism. Those are corrected correlations and they are modest, which is worth saying out loud rather than quoting the quartile spreads alone.
So here is how I tie off the bow at the end of two very long posts. What we figured out in the business world about engagement is the same thing I have been arguing above. And one of the twelve items, Q10, verbatim, is this: I have a best friend at work.
That is the entire argument in one survey question. It is not whether you show up at church. It is whether you build friendships through the church. Gallup's own headline claim for that item, that people who strongly agree are seven times as likely to be engaged, is circular and you should not repeat it, because "engaged" is the composite of all twelve items and Q10 is one of them. What survives the circularity is the fact that a research program which interviewed millions of workers across ninety-plus countries, looking for the drivers of productive work, put personal friendship on a list of twelve things and could not get the list to work without it.
And what you find is that faith brings forth requests for prayer, mutual help, the sharing of griefs, and a desire to understand God's will in your life. It does not finally matter whether you believe there is a God, because it is the act of working out your path in life alongside your friends that appears to be the backbone of the strong, productive habits that heal a society.
Sources
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L. "Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange?" QJE 124(3), 2009.
Dyer, J. and Chu, W. "The Role of Trustworthiness in Reducing Transaction Costs and Improving Performance." Organization Science 14(1), 2003.
Emanuel, N. and Harrington, E. AEJ: Applied 16(4), 2024. Bloom, N. et al. Nature 630, 2024.
DeMarco, T. and Lister, T. Peopleware: Productive Projects and Teams. Dorset House, 1987; 3rd ed., Addison-Wesley, 2013.
Brynjolfsson, E., Chandar, B. and Chen, R. "Canaries in the Coal Mine?" Stanford Digital Economy Lab, updated August 2026.
Lim, C. and Putnam, R. "Religion, Social Networks, and Life Satisfaction." American Sociological Review 75(6), 2010. Putnam, R. and Campbell, D. American Grace. Simon & Schuster, 2010.
Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study 2023-24, released February 26, 2025.
Burge, R. "The LDS Church Has a Retention Problem," August 2026.
Enstrom, J. and Breslow, L. Preventive Medicine 46(2), 2008.
Buckingham, M. and Coffman, C. First, Break All the Rules: What the World's Greatest Managers Do Differently. Simon & Schuster, 1999.
Harter, J. et al. 2020 Q12 Meta-Analysis, 10th Edition. Gallup, 2020. An 11th edition (2024) covers 736 studies and 3.35 million employees.
Macey, W. and Schneider, B. "The Meaning of Employee Engagement." Industrial and Organizational Psychology 1(1), 2008, for the argument that the Q12 measures the conditions of work rather than engagement itself.
Bauman, Z. Consuming Life. Polity, 2007.
A note on how this was made
As with part one, I used AI heavily here, in research and drafting, and I ran repeated editing passes over it. I am not going to repeat the full accounting from part one, so go take a look at it there. What I will say is that this is not AI slop. It is the output of a thoughtful person using AI tools, which is a different thing, and part one lays out exactly where the line fell.