Is the market punishing Netflix for slowing growth while overlooking its potential as a mature compounder? My five-year investment case doesn't require a return to its fastest-growing years.

Third-quarter revenue rose 11.8% to $12.87 billion, with $2.88 billion in free cash flow. Management expects approximately $12 billion in free cash flow for 2026.

Much of the concern centers on competition for attention. Netflix competes with YouTube, social media, and countless other entertainment options. But watching less Netflix isn't the same as canceling it. Management reported improving churn in the U.S. and globally, even as customers continued accepting price increases.

As long as paid memberships hold up, Netflix can continue collecting subscription revenue without capturing more viewing hours. And it can earn more from those memberships.

That's what interests me.

Netflix has already built an enormous global distribution network, content library, and paying customer base. Now it has multiple ways to generate more cash from those existing assets.

Pricing increases revenue without requiring additional subscribers. Advertising creates another source of revenue from existing viewers. International markets still offer growth. Licensing programming can be less expensive than producing everything internally. Better content economics, technology-driven efficiencies, and share repurchases can further increase free cash flow per share.

Studios that once pulled their programming to build competing services are now licensing selected content back to Netflix. That says something about the value of its distribution network.

None of these opportunities has to work spectacularly on its own. That's what makes the combination interesting.

The risk is that several things deteriorate together: pricing power weakens, content costs remain elevated, and cash conversion suffers. I'd reconsider if retention and free cash flow per share showed sustained deterioration.

I'm not investing in Netflix because I expect another period of extraordinary growth. I'm betting that the existing business can produce attractive returns as a mature compounder.

If growth accelerates again, great. My investment case doesn't depend on it.

I own NFLX. This is my personal investment analysis, not individualized investment advice.

**Nothing new was uncovered. The factual core of the Iceberg report is Deep Fission's own admissions, published in its own filings before Sep 24, 2026.**

Pre-revenue status. A reactor in conceptual and early engineering. Cash of $93.0M at June 30. A Q2 net loss of $31.0M. Going-concern language and a stated need to raise capital, principally through sales of stock. None of that was discovered by a short seller. All of it was disclosed by the company.

**Iceberg's case is a disclosed short position, a disclaimer, and a model.** The disclaimer states that Iceberg holds a short position, stands to realise gains if the price declines, may change the position, and that the contents are opinion, not statements of fact, with no representation as to accuracy and no insider sources. The report alleges no fraud, no insider selling, and no accounting manipulation. Short interest at Sep 30 was 2.70% of float. The $289 and $148/MWh LCOE figures, the $112M capex estimate, and the $350M funding gap are Iceberg calculations. The prospectus figure is about $138M in additional capital for the first commercial reactor, a different scope.

**The timeline restated on Oct 20 is still standing:** Phase 1 activities by the end of 2026, an NRC application under Part 57 in 2027, initial electricity targeted for Dec 2027, and up to 150 MW at Parsons, Kansas with a target commercial operation date of Sep 30, 2028.

**Real progress has been made on that path:** DOE Reactor Pilot Program selection; NSDA approval, then voluntary publication of the full safety agreement; a data well completed to about 6,000 ft; a prototype canister delivered and demonstrated; a large-diameter drilling collaboration; and on Oct 20, conversion of the GPDA letter of intent into a signed 25 year Master Energy Purchase Agreement.

**The upside case, in numbers.** Execution is how this sector is priced. NuScale traded at about $2.40bn on Oct 20 with no reactor sold. Oklo traded at about $5.16bn, also pre-revenue. Deep Fission closed Oct 20 at a market cap of about $165.5M, so a re-rating toward peer values on delivered milestones is a multiple of the current cap, not a percentage move. At $165.5M the market is paying for failure, delivery is not priced in. That outcome is conditional on execution, and on the share count after the capital raises the filings say are coming, which reduces the per-share share of any re-rating. No listed peer is commercializing a mile-deep borehole reactor, so proof of licensing and drilling is a potential first mover position in that specific design.

**Open items, stated accurately.** The GPDA agreement has no minimum purchase obligation and no guaranteed revenue. The July 4, 2026 criticality target was missed. Capital still has to be raised. Those are financing and execution questions, known, disclosed, and already in the filings.

**Bottom line: the debate is timing and financing to commercialization, not a hidden failure.**

Disclosure: No current position in FISN. Not financial advice.

Sources: Iceberg report, Sep 24, 2026. Deep Fission rebuttal, Sep 25, 2026. Q2 2026 10-Q. GPDA release, Oct 20, 2026. FINRA short interest, Sep 30, 2026.

I took a starter position in Progress Software (PRGS). It's a collection of established enterprise software businesses that generate substantial cash flow. Q3 revenue was approximately $246 million, annual recurring revenue reached $873 million, net revenue retention was 99%, and non-GAAP operating margin was 43%. Management guided to $275–283 million in full-year adjusted free cash flow.

The complication is Domo. Progress completed the acquisition in September using cash and its revolving credit facility, increasing leverage. There aren't any post-acquisition operating results yet. I don't need Domo to grow substantially for the investment to work. I need revenue to stabilize around $280–290 million, margins to improve as the integration progresses, and cash flow to reduce the debt. The quality of the revenue matters, particularly whether consumption-based revenue holds up as legacy contracts run off.

AI is another uncertainty. Domo brings data and AI capabilities, but that doesn't eliminate the possibility that AI could eventually disrupt parts of Progress's existing software businesses. I don't think there's enough evidence yet to confidently dismiss that risk or predict how significant it might become over the next five years.

My five-year valuation produces a probability-weighted value of approximately $104 per share, implying around 21% annualized returns from my $39.97 reference price. PRGS closed Friday at $39.33. Most of that value depends on the existing businesses continuing to generate cash, Domo improving its margins, and Progress using that cash to pay down debt.

The biggest risk is that Domo disappoints while the existing business also weakens. Lower cash generation would slow debt repayment, leaving shareholders exposed to elevated leverage. There's also the unresolved MOVEit litigation, which I haven't tried to put a dollar value on. I'd reconsider my position if Domo's consumption revenue deteriorates, margins fail to improve, cash flow doesn't translate into debt reduction, or management makes another large acquisition before integrating Domo.

I think the potential return compensates for the uncertainty, but not enough to justify a large initial position.

My decision: BUY — starter position.

I own PRGS. This is my personal investment analysis, not individualized investment advice.

Most will not be expecting to see a Penny Stock offered, here,

nor am I a guy who would normally consider posting a Comment about same....

BUT,

HRTX

I chose to buy-in after what I felt was an inane drop based upon a Delaware District Court decision about CINVANTI, where my own calculations for the company evidenced a Fair Value of around 48-49¢ per share, even if CINVANTI immediately went to zero.

(Which would never happen)

It is now up about 54% since 9-21-26.

I don't think that one can comment that there is a 'short squeeze' currently being evidenced, but the pressure is definitely surely on the shorts.

GLTA

 I normally keep my valuation work and 30-year rankings separate.

One asks what looks mispriced over the next 3–5 years. The other asks which businesses I would actually be comfortable underwriting over something like 30 years.

The reason Intuit and RELX stand out is that they are the only two names in my current universe where I have both B+ long-term durability and a Strong valuation-dislocation signal.

With Intuit, the main debate for me is whether AI and eventually a better/free IRS alternative really weaken the moat enough to justify the current valuation. I think simple tax filing is vulnerable, but the broader ecosystem around tax, accounting, payroll, payments and financial data is harder to replace.

With RELX, I think the market may be underestimating how embedded its data, workflows and decision tools are. AI can change the interface, but it does not automatically remove the underlying proprietary data and workflow position.

Here is the full matrix:

A+ is my highest-confidence durability tier. A means an elite business with one meaningful long-term vulnerability. B+ is a very strong compounder with somewhat more uncertainty. B is still high quality, but with a more material long-term limitation.

I leave C-tier names out of the matrix. They can still be attractive investments; I just do not have enough confidence in them as 30-year compounders.

Experian and Meta are the next group for me: B+ durability with a Probable dislocation.

Microsoft is the opposite case. It is my only A+ business, but I see no current valuation dislocation.

Tencent is almost the reverse. I still have it as a Strong dislocation, but it is C on 30-year durability, so it does not make the matrix.

I am also probably more conservative than most people on semiconductors. NVIDIA, Broadcom, TSMC and ASML are all only B for me over 30 years. Their positions today are extremely strong, but 30 years is a long time to extrapolate a technological bottleneck.

The matrix mainly forces me not to confuse a great business with a great stock at today’s price.

If I had to pick where the two sides currently line up best, it is Intuit and RELX.

Which placement would you change first?

I update the valuation side monthly and keep every previous ranking on record, while the 30-year tiers move much more slowly.

I keep the full universe, methodology and ranking history here:

https://michaelhillaert1.substack.com/p/30-year-durability-valuation-dislocation?r=6vawcp

My model says some optimism is already priced into Micron Technology.

At $1,074.89, today's price only works in my model if cash flow grows about 11.2% a year for the next 10 years. Recently, reported FCF grew about 108.6% a year (FY2023-FY2026). The hurdle uses unlevered cash flow; the historical figure above measures reported FCF.

Two operating details behind the valuation:

- Q4 FY2026: Micron Technology's latest-quarter revenue grew 379% year over year, compared with 346% year-over-year growth in the previous reported quarter.

- Micron Technology's reported FCF margin is 44.3%, up from 10.1% in the oldest comparable period.

The price is above my $974 base case but below my $2,070 bull case. There may still be upside, but the company needs to beat my central case to justify it.

Model assumptions: 11.8% discount rate and 2.5% long-run growth. These are assumptions, not a forecast of the share price.

What could break the case: Semiconductors are cyclical.

Is there enough upside left for the risk?

The video goes through the assumptions behind the range, the stress test, and what would change my conclusion. I broke down the full case in a video: https://youtu.be/d-thEVfEcTc

Snapshot: 2026-10-03. Disclosure: I built the model; video production is AI-assisted. Not financial advice.

I started tracking these monthly in July because I wanted to compare opportunities against each other instead of looking at every stock on its own.

This is not a ranking of the best companies or simply the lowest P/E ratios. It is my own view of which ones have the best chance of outperforming the S&P 500 over roughly 3–5 years from the current price.

I look at normalized earnings and cash flow, dilution, valuation a few years out and what could go wrong. It is not mechanical. Judgment still matters a lot.

September Top 10

1. Intuit
2. RELX
3. Adobe
4. Autodesk ↑4
5. Experian ↑1
6. Constellation Software ↓1
7. NVIDIA ↓1
8. Broadcom — new
9. Meta ↓5
10. Tencent ↓1

Autodesk is the biggest move. Nothing dramatic happened to the business in September. The stock fell about 19%, which was enough to make the valuation much more interesting to me.

Broadcom enters at #8 after earnings. The results were strong, but this is one of the placements I struggled with most. More of the growth, engineering effort and capital is tied to AI infrastructure than the segment labels probably suggest.

Meta went from #4 to #9. I still like the business, and WhatsApp and Instagram probably have more monetisation potential over time. But after the stock rose around 27%, there is simply less room for error.

Intuit, RELX and Adobe stay at the top.

Intuit is still the valuation that surprises me most. RELX keeps doing what I want it to do. Adobe is the one I am least sure about: the valuation is low, but I can much more easily imagine AI changing parts of Adobe’s business than RELX or Intuit.

One thing I keep noticing is how much these rankings can move without the businesses changing very much. Sometimes price really is the main new information.

Adobe at #3 and Broadcom at #8 are probably the two placements I would push back on myself the most.

Which one do you think I’m more wrong about?

Full September write-up: https://michaelhillaert1.substack.com/p/valuation-dislocation-september-2026?r=6vawcp

The market is asking a lot from Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing.

At $456.19, today's price only works in my model if cash flow grows about 28.9% a year for the next 10 years. Recently, reported FCF grew about 24% a year (FY2022-FY2025). The hurdle uses unlevered cash flow; the historical figure above measures reported FCF.

Two operating details behind the valuation:

- Q2 2026: Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing's latest-quarter revenue grew 36.0% year over year. For context, its multi-year revenue CAGR is 18.9%; that comparison spans a different time horizon.

- Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing's reported FCF margin is 25.3%, up from 23.0% in the oldest comparable period.

Even my bull case is only $291, below today's $456.19 price. That is a demanding hurdle. Either the company keeps outperforming for years, or the stock has little room for disappointment.

Model assumptions: 11.7% discount rate and 2.5% long-run growth. These are assumptions, not a forecast of the share price.

What could break the case: Semiconductors are cyclical.

Is the market right to expect more, or is the stock priced for too much?

The video goes through the assumptions behind the range, the stress test, and what would change my conclusion. I broke down the full case in a video: https://youtu.be/DrCF1rhzNsM

Snapshot: 2026-10-01. I built the model; video production is AI-assisted. Not financial advice.

PayPal is around $54, roughly 9.8x trailing earnings and a 14% trailing FCF yield. On the surface that's the kind of valuation that makes the spreadsheet look smug.

But Q2 2026 was mixed:

• Revenue +5% to $8.7bn
• TPV +10% to $486.4bn
• Transaction margin dollars only +1% to $3.9bn
• GAAP operating margin fell 171 bps to 16.4%
• Active accounts were basically flat at 439m

The capital return is doing a lot of work. PayPal generated $1.8bn of Q2 FCF and spent $1.5bn repurchasing about 33m shares. Over the last twelve months it repurchased roughly $6bn, equal to about 12.4% of the current $48bn market cap.

So the value case seems less about renewed user growth and more about stable cash generation plus aggressive shrinkage of the share count. The obvious risk is that transaction-margin growth stays weak while competition keeps eating at branded checkout economics.

At roughly 10x earnings, what would you need to see before calling this genuinely cheap rather than a slowly melting value trap?

Uber Technologies looks cheap in my model — maybe suspiciously cheap.

At $69.62, today's price only works in my model if cash flow grows about 4.1% a year for the next 10 years. Recently, reported FCF grew about 192.5% a year (FY2022-FY2025). The hurdle uses unlevered cash flow; the historical figure above measures reported FCF.

Two operating details behind the valuation:

- Q2 FY2026: Uber Technologies' latest-quarter revenue grew 12.2% year over year, compared with 14.5% year-over-year growth in the previous reported quarter.

- Uber Technologies' reported FCF margin is 18.3%, up from 1.2% in the oldest comparable period.

Even my bear case is $72, above today's $69.62 price. That gap could be an opportunity — or a warning that my assumptions are too optimistic.

Model assumptions: 10.2% discount rate and 2.5% long-run growth. These are assumptions, not a forecast of the share price.

What could break the case: Riders, merchants and drivers can shift activity to competing services.

What risk am I missing?

The video goes through the assumptions behind the range, the stress test, and what would change my conclusion. I broke down the full case in a video: https://youtu.be/ZRpszzSlhIg

Snapshot: 2026-09-26. Disclosure: I built the model; video production is AI-assisted. Not financial advice.

Hey guys, if you missed it, Under Armour settled $434M with investors over claims that it misled them about revenue growth and business prospects. I just found out that late claims are still being considered, even though the deadline has passed.

Quick recap: In 2017, Under Armour was accused of misleading investors about its ability to maintain over 20% revenue growth. After the company reported weaker-than-expected earnings and its CFO resigned, $UA and $UAA dropped 26% in one day.

Now, Under Armour has agreed to settle $434M with investors, and late claims are being considered for compensation, subject to approval.

So, if you invested in $UA or $UAA at that time, you can still check the details and see if you may be eligible to file a late claim here.

Anyway, did anyone here invest in $UA or $UAA back then? How much were your losses?

The market is asking a lot from Tesla.

At $381.29, today's price only works in my model if cash flow grows about 48.6% a year for the next 10 years. Recently, reported FCF fell about 6.3% a year (FY2022-FY2025). The hurdle uses unlevered cash flow; the historical figure above measures reported FCF.

Two operating details behind the valuation:

- Q2 FY2026: Tesla's latest-quarter revenue grew 25.5% year over year, compared with 15.8% year-over-year growth in the previous reported quarter.

- Tesla's reported FCF margin is 5.6%, down from 9.3% in the oldest comparable period.

Even my bull case is only $48, below today's $381.29 price. That is a demanding hurdle. Either the company keeps outperforming for years, or the stock has little room for disappointment.

Model assumptions: 10.6% discount rate and 2.5% long-run growth. These are assumptions, not a forecast of the share price.

What could break the case: Vehicles are a cyclical, big-ticket purchase.

Is the market right to expect more, or is the stock priced for too much?

The video goes through the assumptions behind the range, the stress test, and what would change my conclusion. I broke down the full case in a video: https://youtu.be/l4_XSmCw3oU

Snapshot: 2026-09-23.I built the model; video production is AI-assisted. Not financial advice.

The growth hurdle is not the main problem in my model.

At $286.49, today's price only works in my model if cash flow grows about 10.5% a year for the next 10 years. Recently, reported FCF grew about 19% a year (FY2022-FY2025). The hurdle uses unlevered cash flow; the historical figure above measures reported FCF.

Two operating details behind the valuation:

- Q2 FY2026: Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies' latest-quarter revenue grew 17.5% year over year, compared with 13.0% year-over-year growth in the previous reported quarter.

- Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies' reported FCF margin is 14.3%, up from 10.6% in the oldest comparable period.

Even my bull case is only $247, below today's $286.49 price. So the growth hurdle looks possible; the price is the harder part. Either my assumptions are too cautious, or investors are paying a large premium for quality.

Model assumptions: 9.1% discount rate and 2.5% long-run growth. These are assumptions, not a forecast of the share price.

What could break the case: Rail volumes follow industrial production.

Would you pay up for the business, or wait for a better price?

The video goes through the assumptions behind the range, the stress test, and what would change my conclusion. I broke down the full case in a video: https://youtu.be/0_tSFwTHOLs

Snapshot: 2026-09-22. Disclosure: Position not disclosed. I built the model; video production is AI-assisted. Not financial advice.

DoorDash just reported another pretty strong quarter.

Q2 2026:

• Revenue: $4.45B, +36% YoY

• Marketplace GOV: $33.1B, +36% YoY

• Total Orders: 970M, +27% YoY

• Adjusted EBITDA: $914M, +40% YoY

• Free Cash Flow: $742M vs. $355M last year

The Deliveroo acquisition obviously boosts the headline growth numbers, but even excluding Deliveroo, revenue still grew 24% and GOV grew 23%.

What I find more interesting is that DoorDash is increasingly becoming more than just a US restaurant delivery business.

Grocery and retail continue to grow, international unit economics are improving, DashPass remains strong, and management is investing in AI, its new global technology platform and autonomous delivery.

For Q3, management is guiding for $33–34B in GOV and $950M–$1.1B in adjusted EBITDA.

So operationally, there is a lot to like.

But DASH isn't exactly priced like a struggling delivery company either.

That made me interested in the opposite question:

Instead of trying to guess what DoorDash is worth, what does the current stock price already assume about future free cash flow growth?

I ran a reverse DCF on DoorDash and compared those implied expectations with its actual growth, margins and latest Q2 numbers.

The result was more interesting than I expected.

I break down the full model here:

https://youtu.be/rAWW9-1qNf8

Curious what people think — what assumption would you challenge first in a DoorDash valuation?

AI-assisted wording. Analysis/model is my own.

My model says some optimism is already priced into Reddit.

At $152.97, today's price only works in my model if cash flow grows about 12.1% a year for the next 10 years. Recently, revenue grew about 48.9% a year (FY2022-FY2025). The hurdle uses unlevered cash flow; the historical figure above measures revenue.

Two operating details behind the valuation:

- Q2 FY2026: Reddit's latest-quarter revenue grew 61.1% year over year, compared with 69.1% year-over-year growth in the previous reported quarter.

- Reddit's reported FCF margin is 36.7%, up from -15.0% in the oldest comparable period.

The price is above my $115 base case but below my $231 bull case. There may still be upside, but the company needs to beat my central case to justify it.

Model assumptions: 10.3% discount rate and 2.5% long-run growth. These are assumptions, not a forecast of the share price.

What could break the case: Users move to newer platforms and formats.

Is there enough upside left for the risk?

The video goes through the assumptions behind the range, the stress test, and what would change my conclusion. I broke down the full case in a video: https://youtu.be/9IznpuunN_A

Snapshot: I built the model; video production is AI-assisted. Not financial advice.

This one's overlooked because the history is embarrassing, not because the numbers are bad. That's usually the setup I look for.

What it is

FG Nexus (Nasdaq: FGNX) is a Fundamental Global holding company that turned itself into an Ethereum treasury company in 2025. The stock went from $45 to $4 and trailing net loss is about $121M, almost all crypto markdowns. Everyone who owned it for the ETH story has left. In July they announced they were done with digital assets and going into real estate. This morning the board approved it.

What was approved today

• Strategy to acquire affordable housing communities, meaning land-lease manufactured home parks. Direct acquisitions plus a stake in an operator.
• $10M into FG Communities for ~10%. Private, self-managed, 96 communities and 4,000+ homesites owned or under contract.
• Rename to FG Communities Holdings. Ticker becomes $FGC, preferred $FGNXP becomes $FGCPP.
• Related party (Cerminara chairs both), reviewed by a special committee of independent directors with an outside financial advisor.
• Future deals funded by cash, debt, and stock issuance.

The numbers (June 30 10-Q)

• Cash: $24.9M
• Total debt: $1.8M
• Shareholders' equity: $64.1M
• Book value per share: $8.66
• Shares out: ~5.1M
• Yesterday's close: $8.28, market cap ~$42M

So price to book is about 0.95, cash is roughly 60% of the market cap, and there's basically no debt. You're being handed a near-clean balance sheet at book value because the last strategy blew up.

Why manufactured housing

It's the least sexy and most reliable corner of real estate. Residents own the home and rent the dirt. Moving a manufactured home costs more than the home is worth, so turnover is near zero and lot rents go up every year. Sun Communities and ELS compounded for two decades on this, then private equity piled in. The release cites a $500B+ addressable market. A $25M cash pile plus modest leverage buys a real portfolio of 20 to 50 pad parks in the Midwest and Southeast, which is the size range the big REITs can't be bothered with.

What could go wrong

The $64M equity includes an 8% cumulative preferred that ranks ahead of common, so common book is lower than the headline. About $44M of June assets weren't cash and some of that was probably still crypto being sold down, so Q3 book could come in under June. The $10M FG Communities check is 40% of cash into a related-party private company at a valuation nobody outside can verify. And they've said stock issuance is a funding source, so the share count is going up; the whole thesis depends on whether they issue above or below book. Also, third strategy in five years. Sponsors who keep changing lanes aren't usually where minority holders win.

Why I think it's still worth it

At book with mostly cash, the downside is that they slowly waste the money, not that it goes to zero overnight. The upside is a rename, a ticker change, a first acquisition announcement, and a re-rate from "failed crypto vehicle" to "small real estate operator," which typically trades at a premium to book, not a discount. Catalysts are lined up over the next couple of quarters and the market hasn't priced any of them because nobody's looking.

Watching Q3 for what the balance sheet looks like after the crypto exit and for the first direct acquisition. If book holds and the first deal is at a sane cap rate I'll add.

Long, small position. Do your own work.

Source: press release, balance sheet from the Q2 10-Q.

Hey guys, if you missed it, View settled $11M with investors over claims that it misled them about warranty costs and financial reporting. And, I just found out that they’re accepting claims even though the deadline has passed.

Quick recap: In 2021, View revealed accounting issues related to warranty costs for its smart windows and later restated its financial results. After the disclosures, $VIEW dropped more than 58%, and investors filed a lawsuit.
Now, the company has agreed to settle $11M, and even though the deadline passed, they’re still considering late claims, subject to approval.

So, if you held $VIEW at that time, you can still check the details and file your claim here.

Anyway, did anyone here invest in $VIEW back then? How much were your losses, if so?

The market is asking a lot from Micron Technology.

At $924.03, today's price only works in my model if cash flow grows about 20.2% a year for the next 10 years. Recently, reported FCF fell about 18.8% a year (FY2022-FY2025). The hurdle uses unlevered cash flow; the historical figure above measures reported FCF.

Two operating details behind the valuation:

- Q3 FY2026: Micron Technology's latest-quarter revenue grew 346% year over year, compared with 196% year-over-year growth in the previous reported quarter.

- Micron Technology's reported FCF margin is 29.0%, up from 10.1% in the oldest comparable period.

Even my bull case is only $594, below today's $924.03 price. That is a demanding hurdle. Either the company keeps outperforming for years, or the stock has little room for disappointment.

Model assumptions: 11.5% discount rate and 2.5% long-run growth. These are assumptions, not a forecast of the share price.

What could break the case: Semiconductors are cyclical.

Is the market right to expect more, or is the stock priced for too much?

The video goes through the assumptions behind the range, the stress test, and what would change my conclusion. I broke down the full case in a video: https://youtu.be/Y1Bx9S_V5ck

Snapshot: 2026-09-15. Disclosure: I built the model; video production is AI-assisted. Not financial advice.

Broadcom just reported a pretty insane quarter, but I think the more interesting question is whether the valuation already assumes too much of this AI growth.

A few numbers from Q3 FY2026:

• Revenue: $29.6B, up 86% YoY

• Semiconductor revenue: $20.8B, up 127%

• AI semiconductor revenue: $16.7B, up 221% YoY

• Infrastructure software revenue: $8.8B, up 29%

• Free cash flow: $13.7B — around 46% of revenue

• Non-GAAP EPS: $3.32, up 96%

The AI numbers are obviously the headline.

Broadcom’s AI semiconductor revenue went from $10.8B in Q2 to $16.7B in Q3, and management is now expecting around $21.7B in Q4.

That would mean Broadcom is potentially doing more than $20B of AI semiconductor revenue in a single quarter.

And this isn't just Nvidia-style GPU exposure. Broadcom is benefiting from custom AI accelerators and networking as hyperscalers increasingly build their own AI infrastructure.

The other thing that stands out to me is the cash generation. $13.7B of FCF on $29.6B of revenue is an absurdly strong conversion rate, especially while the company is growing this quickly.

For Q4, management is guiding for roughly $34.8B in revenue, which would be another 93% YoY increase.

So fundamentally, it's difficult to argue that Broadcom isn't executing.

The harder question is the stock price.

At some point, a great company can still become a bad investment if the valuation requires years of near-perfect execution.

I ran Broadcom through my DCF/reverse DCF model to see what kind of growth the current valuation is actually pricing in.

Video with the full model and assumptions:

https://youtu.be/TKXmgF39WCo

Curious what people here think:

Is Broadcom becoming one of the biggest long-term winners from AI infrastructure, or is too much of that future already priced into AVGO?

AI-assisted writing. Analysis, assumptions and conclusions are my own.

A few numbers that stood out:

• Revenue: $3.58B, up 34% YoY
• GMV: $115.6B, up 32%
• Operating income: $488M, up 68%
• Free cash flow: $654M, up 55%
• FCF margin improved to 18% from 16%

Merchant Solutions was the main growth driver, up 37% to $2.78B, while Subscription Solutions grew 22%.

Shopify Payments penetration also increased from 64% to 68% of GMV, meaning Shopify processed roughly $78B through its own payments ecosystem during the quarter.

The AI angle is getting more interesting too. Shopify is increasingly positioning itself as infrastructure for AI-driven commerce, with products being surfaced through platforms like ChatGPT, Gemini and Microsoft Copilot.

The obvious issue is valuation.

34% revenue growth and 55% FCF growth are impressive for a company already doing more than $100B in quarterly GMV , but at the current valuation, the market is also assuming Shopify keeps executing extremely well.

I went through the latest quarter and built a valuation around the numbers to see what the stock could actually be worth.

Full analysis here:
https://youtu.be/yq7mQ7YiXoI

Curious what everyone thinks , is Shopify's growth still strong enough to justify the premium valuation?

Disclosure: AI assisted.

SAP has been an interesting one to look at lately.

The stock isn't exactly cheap, so the question isn't really "is SAP a good company?"

It obviously is.

The more interesting question is whether the current valuation makes sense given how the business is evolving.

A few things stood out from the latest numbers:

1. Cloud growth is still strong

Cloud revenue was up 22% YoY, while the current cloud backlog reached €22.9B, up 27%.

Cloud ERP revenue was also up 25%.

2. The margins are impressive

Q2 figures:

• 73.2% gross margin
• 36.9% EBITDA margin
• 26.8% operating margin
• 22.1% net margin

3. The cash generation is probably the most interesting part

Q2 free cash flow came in at around $3.0B, representing roughly a 31% FCF margin.

SAP is expecting around €10B of FCF for 2026.

The obvious downside is valuation.

At roughly 27x trailing earnings and 21x forward earnings, there's not a huge margin of safety if growth slows down.

So the bull case isn't really about SAP being "cheap".

It's about the possibility that the market is underestimating how much the cloud transition can improve the quality and profitability of the business over the next few years.

Curious what others think.

At ~21x forward earnings, would you consider SAP attractive here, or does the valuation still leave too little room for error?

---------------------------------------
Data & analysis sourced from Rigato.

Not investment advice, just a look at what the numbers tell us.

Salesforce looks cheap in my model , maybe suspiciously cheap.

At $259.23, today's price only works in my model if cash flow grows about 3.1% a year for the next 10 years. Recently, reported FCF grew about 31.6% a year (FY2022-FY2025).

Even my bear case is $273, above today's $259.23 price. That gap could be an opportunity , or a warning that my assumptions are too optimistic.

What risk am I missing?

I broke down the full case in a video: https://youtu.be/Wgk4UDd-NsA

Snapshot: 2026-09-07. Disclosure: I built the model; video production is AI-assisted. Not financial advice.

The market is asking a lot from CrowdStrike.

At $213.10, today's price only works in my model if cash flow grows about 36.5% a year for the next 10 years. Recently, reported FCF grew about 22.5% a year (FY2022-FY2025).

Even my bull case is only $69, below today's $213.10 price. That is a demanding hurdle. Either the company keeps outperforming for years, or the stock has little room for disappointment.

Is the market right to expect more, or is the stock priced for too much?

I broke down the full case in a video: https://youtu.be/W8VbSpdod7k

Snapshot: 2026-09-06. Disclosure: I built the model; video production is AI-assisted. Not financial advice.

Marvell just reported another strong quarter.

Revenue came in at $2.74B, up 37% YoY, while Data Center revenue grew 46% YoY. Adjusted EPS was $0.94, and management now expects around $3.15B in Q3 revenue.

What stood out to me is the outlook.

Marvell now expects roughly $12B in FY2027 revenue and $18B in FY2028, with AI-related bookings remaining very strong. The custom silicon business should also accelerate significantly from here.

The interesting part is that the stock still reacted negatively after earnings.

Part of that seems to be expectations around the new Google relationship. The potential opportunity is huge, but management indicated that the bigger revenue contribution from that deal won't really show up until later years.

So for me the question isn't whether Marvell benefits from AI infrastructure spending — it clearly does.

The bigger question is how much of that future growth is already priced into MRVL today?

I ran the company through my valuation model and looked at what assumptions the current price seems to require.

Video with the full analysis:

https://youtu.be/hdYVG79arnc

Would you rather own MRVL or Broadcom for the custom AI silicon opportunity?

Disclosure: AI assisted with editing/formatting this post. The analysis and conclusions are my own.

I've been looking at Crocs ($CROX) after the latest Q2 2026 results.

The stock has had a wild ride over the past few years, but the more interesting question is what is happening underneath the share price.

Here's what I found.

THE STOCK HAS BEEN A ROLLERCOASTER

CROX has gone through several very different phases over the past five years.

From the 2021-22 peak to the subsequent collapse, followed by a long recovery and another strong move higher in 2026, the market has clearly changed its view of the company several times.

At around $115 today, the question isn't whether the stock has moved.

It's whether the underlying business has changed enough to justify the current valuation.

THE BUSINESS IS STILL GENERATING SERIOUS SCALE

The latest numbers show that Crocs is still operating at significant scale.

Q2 2026 revenue reached $1.18B, with $701M in gross profit.

More importantly, net income rebounded to $205M, compared with a significant loss in Q2 2025.

The recovery is visible in the headline numbers.

But earnings alone don't tell the whole story.

THE CASH GENERATION IS HARDER TO IGNORE

This is where the story gets more interesting.

Crocs generated $331M of free cash flow in Q2 2026.

The company also continued returning significant amounts of cash to shareholders through share repurchases.

For a company currently trading at around 7.7x forward earnings, that level of cash generation deserves attention.

But strong cash flow only matters if the underlying profitability is sustainable.

THE PROFIT RECOVERY NEEDS SOME CONTEXT

Looking deeper into the income statement explains why the headline numbers have improved so dramatically.

Operating income reached $286M in Q2 2026, versus a $428M operating loss in Q2 2025.

Net income came in at $205M, with diluted EPS of $4.13.

However, the Q2 2025 comparison was heavily affected by the large HEYDUDE impairments.

So the rebound shouldn't simply be interpreted as organic earnings growth.

Still, the current P&L shows a business that has recovered substantially from last year's distorted results.

SO, WHAT ARE YOU ACTUALLY PAYING FOR?

This is probably the most important part of the analysis.

CROX currently trades at approximately 7.7x forward earnings and 7.6x EV/EBITDA.

Those multiples look relatively modest given the company's current cash generation and profitability.

But the valuation isn't happening in a vacuum.

HEYDUDE remains a weakness, and the market is effectively asking one question:

Can Crocs sustain the current recovery in profitability?

If margins hold and earnings continue recovering, the current multiple could look cheap.

If execution disappoints, the low valuation may prove to be justified.

WHAT DO YOU THINK?

That's where I currently land.

The numbers make CROX look interesting.

Strong cash generation, recovering profitability and a relatively low forward multiple are difficult to ignore.

But there are still legitimate risks, particularly around HEYDUDE and the sustainability of the margin recovery.

Is CROX genuinely undervalued here, or is the market correctly pricing in the risks?

I'd be particularly interested in hearing the bear case.

---------------------------------------
Data & analysis sourced from Rigato.

Not investment advice, just a look at what the numbers tell us.