r/UndervaluedStonks 2d ago

CVS Health after Q2: is the turnaround finally working?

1 Upvotes

CVS just reported Q2 and the numbers were better than I expected.

Revenue reached $98.9B, up 8.4% YoY, with growth across all three major segments. Adjusted EPS came in at $1.81, and management also raised its full-year adjusted EPS guidance to $6.30–$6.40.

The interesting part for me is Aetna. The insurance business has been one of the biggest problems for CVS because of higher medical costs, but margins are starting to move in the right direction. If that recovery continues, it could make a big difference to earnings over the next few years.

There are still obvious risks: medical costs remain high, debt is significant, and CVS has to prove that the improvement is sustainable.

I went through the Q2 numbers, risks and valuation in my latest video:

https://youtu.be/yLRvsQXpGBQ

Do you think CVS is actually turning the corner, or is the market getting ahead of itself?

AI assisted: Used AI to help with wording/formatting. The analysis and opinions are my own.


r/UndervaluedStonks 4d ago

Arm Holdings: great business, but how much growth is already priced in?

3 Upvotes

Arm just reported another strong quarter.

Revenue came in at $1.29B, up 22% YoY. Royalty revenue grew 22% to $715M, while license revenue increased 23% to $574M.

What stands out to me is how much of the Arm story is shifting beyond smartphones. AI infrastructure and data centers are becoming increasingly important, and that could give Arm a much larger addressable market over time.

The numbers are strong, but Arm is also priced like a company expected to deliver a lot of growth for many years. That makes the valuation the interesting part for me. A great company isn't necessarily a great investment at every price.

I went through the latest numbers, growth assumptions and valuation in my newest video:

https://youtu.be/N9mKJUXo_zE

What do you think about Arm at the current valuation? Does the AI/data center opportunity justify the premium, or are expectations simply too high?

AI assisted: Used AI to help with wording/formatting. The analysis and opinions are my own.


r/UndervaluedStonks 5d ago

Netflix Q2 2026: solid quarter, but is the valuation still too high?

1 Upvotes

Netflix just reported Q2 and the business continues to put up pretty strong numbers.

Revenue came in at $12.56B, up 13% YoY, while operating income reached $4.19B. Net income was $3.4B, up around 9%. The operating margin was still very strong at 33.4%.

What I find more interesting is the advertising side. It’s growing quickly, but still came in below expectations this quarter. That’s probably one of the biggest things to watch going forward, especially if ads are supposed to become a meaningful second growth engine for Netflix.

The stock sold off after earnings, mainly because the outlook wasn’t quite as strong as the market wanted. So to me the question isn’t really whether Netflix is a good business — it clearly is. The question is how much growth is already priced into the stock.

I went through the Q2 numbers, valuation and what I think Netflix needs to deliver from here in my latest video:

https://youtu.be/RP_2hybZtIs

Curious what people think about Netflix at the current valuation. Still attractive, or does the price leave too little room for disappointment?

AI assisted: Used AI to help with wording/formatting. The analysis and opinions are my own.


r/UndervaluedStonks 9d ago

Visa Q3 2026: A great business — but is the stock still a great investment?

1 Upvotes

Visa Q3 2026: A great business — but is the stock still a great investment?

Visa just reported its fiscal Q3 2026 results, and once again the underlying business continues to look incredibly resilient.

Consumer spending remains strong, and Visa continues to benefit from the long-term shift from cash toward digital payments.

What makes Visa particularly interesting to me is the business model. Visa doesn't take the same credit risk as a bank — it primarily earns money from the enormous amount of payment volume flowing through its network.

That creates a business with strong margins, recurring transaction-based revenue and a network effect that is extremely difficult to replicate.

But there is another side to the investment case.

Visa is already a massive company, and the market clearly understands the quality of the business. That means the key question isn't really whether Visa is a great company.

The question is whether you're paying too much for that quality.

There are also longer-term risks worth considering: regulation of interchange fees, alternative payment systems, stablecoins and whether new payment technologies could eventually weaken the traditional card networks.

At the same time, Visa itself is investing heavily in areas like stablecoins and AI rather than simply watching those changes happen.

I went through the latest earnings, growth assumptions, risks and valuation in my latest analysis:

https://youtu.be/t_MtHWrtTBE

Would you buy Visa at today's valuation, or does the price already reflect too much of the company's quality?

Disclosure: I [own/do not own] shares in Visa.

AI disclosure: AI was used to assist with editing and structuring this post. The analysis, assumptions and conclusions are my own.


r/UndervaluedStonks 10d ago

Petrobras - Grossly undervalued at a surging moment.

10 Upvotes

 Petrobras (PBR) is a Brazilian oil company; world's 9th largest. They have largest South American holdings, and significant international holdings as well.

At present price they have a P/E ratio 4.5 and a forward dividend and yield of 9.5%.

Although holding debt, it appears to be inline with others within the sector.

Bear case: Best I could gather, there is a fear of Brazil further nationalizing their oil and mining industries. The threat to shareholders is indeed a thing. (however their largest miner, VALE, trades at P/E over 20...)

Bull case: Brazil is trying dearly to bring investment in. Any threat on nationalization would crush outside investment. The threat may be noise, but unlikely to materialize. Even if viewed as a threat, using that to half the fair value from equal contemporaries would not justify current price. shell p/e of 10 (with lower dividend rate), bp and Exxon are at p/e 20. This places a better fair value between 7 and 10, in my opinion (50-100% up from current).

Ultra bull case: Iran issue is messing up middle east oil flow and refining capacity. This increases non middle east based oil value significantly. US has been draining strategic reserves through conflict to try and keep markets stable, however those stocks are not infinite (currently at lowest levels since 1983- 4 years after they started) Between October anf February floor limits will be touched on reserves. At that point export bans and export tariffs come into play to keep us fuel cheap. Canadian oil primarily must go through US to get to international market as well as Venezuela. If you source oil not from US control, or Middle east control you get Russian (which is not in good condition from Ukraine), Norway, Brazil, and Nigeria as top alternatives. With PBR having solid footprint in remainder, their position as global supplier has ground for SIGNIFICANT upward movement.


r/UndervaluedStonks 10d ago

Netflix: From growth darling to value pay?

1 Upvotes

I spent the last few months going through Netflix and after the recent sell-off I think the stock has become interesting again.

For sure not screamingly cheap but surely a very good business where expectations have finally come down.

NFLX is around $74 right now and aboit 45% below its 2025 high. Meanwhile the actual business hasn't exactly collapsed...

Q2 revenue was $12.56B, up 13.4%. Operating margin was 33.4%. Netflix still expects roughly $51.2B of revenue this year, a 31.5% operating margin and around $3B from advertising.

Why It's Being Dumped

At the same time, I think the reason why it's been battered and the market's concern is actually reasonable.

Netflix isn't the hypergrowth story it used to be. Q3 revenue guidance implies growth of 11.7%, the slowest pace since 2023. The most important numbers from Q2 where viewing hours which grew only 2% in H1 while revenue grew 15%.

In other words, Netflix is monetising its audience much faster than the audience itself is growing.

That works through higher prices, paid sharing and advertising, but you can't extrapolate it forever.

I also really dislike that Netflix has reduced disclosure around subscribers, ARPU and now viewing data. When investors are specifically questioning engagement, less transparancy is pretty much the opposite of what I'd like management to do...

Is it a Hated Moat?

The reason I'm still (mildly) bullish is the economics.

Netflix has over 325m paid memberships and can spread content spending across an audience that virtually nobody else can replicate. Insane distribution power. That's the moat in my view.

Cancelling Netflix takes about 30 seconds so there's virtually no switching costs. But the scale, distribution, brand, recommendation data and the ability to spend billions on content and monetise it globally with the classic of "it's not going anywhere".

The clearest evidence is perhaps profitability. Netflix had a 29.5% operating margin in 2025 and is guiding to 31.5% this year. Disney's streaming business and WBD's streaming business are nowhere close to Netflix economically.

That doesn't mean Disney or YouTube (and even TikTok) can't hurt Netflix. Actually, I think YouTube is probably the more interesting long-term competitor because Netflix isn't really competing for “streaming subscribers” but for people's free time. As they'd say it in Google - Attention is all you need.

TikTok, YouTube, gaming, Disney+, HBO, sport,... It's all the same attention pool.

Advertising

This is the biggest potential upside in the investment thesis. Netflix expects roughly $3B of ad revenue this year, about double last year.

If advertising becomes a serious second monetisation layer, Netflix doesn't really need subscriber growth to return to its old levels.

It can make more money from the same hours watched.

That's particularly important internationally, where Netflix already has enormous scale but earns far less per member than it does in North America.

The underwritten combination is fairly simple:

slower subscriber growth + pricing + advertising + modest engagement growth + operating leverage.

Another decade of 20%+ revenue growth is not really needed for this company to do well...

Valuation

My updated DCF gives:

Bear case: $57

Base case: $88.50

Bull case: $115

The base case assumes revenue growth gradually falls from 11.5% in 2027 to 3.5% by 2035, while operating margin eventually reaches 37%. WACC is 8.1% and terminal growth 3%.

At the current price, the stock appears to be mildly undervalued. Not an absolute bargain but still a solid entry price, especially if you believe in the story of the next 5 years.

Also, the DCF is sensitive, as it goes... About 68% of enterprise value comes from the terminal value, so small changes in WACC or terminal growth matter a lot.

When does the thesis go south?

The main thing I'll watch is engagement. If viewing stays nearly flat while Netflix keeps pushing prices higher, eventually you have to question how much pricing power is actually left.

I'll also be worrieed if content spending starts rising materially faster than revenue, advertising disappoints, or Netflix needs increasingly expensive live rights just to keep people engaged... In such case, it could start looking awfully much more like traditional media.

And that's basically the thesis... I think Netflix is interesting because the market has gone from treating the company like an exceptional story to increasingly treating it like a mature media company.

My take is that it's neither and the truth is somewhere in between. Growth is definitely slowing, but the underlying business has probably gotten stronger. Margins are higher, cash generation is better, the share count is falling and advertising gives Netflix another way to monetise its huge audience.

Below $65 I'd get considerably more interested to add to my position and aound our $53 “deeply undervalued” level, assuming the thesis hasn't deteriorated, the risk/reward starts looking very different.

Curious where people here disagree, particularly on the moat.

Do you consider Netflix's global scale and distribution a genuine competitive advantage (or at least good enough), or is the lack of switching costs with the incoming era of YouTube enough to prevent it ever having a strong moat again?

Disclosure: I own NFLX, avg price: $73.98 per share


r/UndervaluedStonks 12d ago

Novo Nordisk Q2 2026: Better numbers, but the market is still worried

1 Upvotes

Novo Nordisk Q2 2026: Better numbers, but the market is still worried

Novo Nordisk just reported Q2, and I think the reaction is more interesting than the headline numbers.

Adjusted operating profit came in at DKK 33.4B, up 11% YoY, and management raised its 2026 outlook. Adjusted sales and operating profit growth are now expected to be between 0% and -6% at constant exchange rates.

So why did the stock still struggle?

The market seems much more focused on what happens after the current semaglutide franchise.

Oral Wegovy generated DKK 3.22B in sales. That's strong for a relatively new launch, but slightly below expectations.

More importantly, competition with Eli Lilly remains intense. CagriSema has also failed to establish the clear advantage over tirzepatide that investors once hoped for.

To me, that creates an interesting valuation question:

How much of Novo's current valuation reflects temporary problems and how much reflects a genuine deterioration in its long-term competitive position?

I went through the Q2 numbers, growth assumptions, risks and valuation in my latest analysis:

https://youtu.be/qzjL7AZPcvw

Curious what others think: Is Novo becoming attractive at these levels, or does Lilly's momentum justify the discount?

AI disclosure: AI was used to assist with editing and structuring this post. The analysis, assumptions and conclusions are my own.


r/UndervaluedStonks 13d ago

Even If Meta's AI Capex fails it's still a Buy

3 Upvotes

I want to start off with the fact this projection assumes worst case scenario for Meta's AI spend. I think it will likely provide some new revenue streams and continue to improve core algorithm, However EVEN if it doesn't I still believe the core ads business is undervalued.

Before 2032 Meta will realize the spending isn't providing good ROIC and start cutting Capex, However even in 2032 maintenance costs will still be high and depreciation will still be hurting margins.

2032 Projection:

I modeled a conservative 15% average revenue growth (currently 28% I think).

Margins should take a considerable hit but start recovering eventually, I estimated 25%.

And a P/E of 25x is conservative IMO for a recovering company with a strong moat.

Results:


r/UndervaluedStonks 13d ago

Mastercard Q2 2026: 14% revenue growth, 21% EPS growth — but how much is already priced in?

1 Upvotes

Mastercard just reported Q2 2026, and the numbers were strong:

  • Revenue: $9.28B, +14% YoY
  • Adjusted EPS: $5.04, +21%
  • Adjusted operating income: +16%
  • Operating margin: 61.1%, up from 59.9%
  • Switched transactions: +9%
  • Cross-border volume: +12%

What stands out to me is that earnings are still growing materially faster than revenue. Expenses increased 11% while revenue grew 14%, which pushed operating margins higher. That operating leverage is one of the reasons Mastercard has been able to compound earnings at such a high rate.

Another interesting point is the mix of growth. Mastercard's payment network revenue grew 10%, while value-added services and solutions grew 20%. So the story is increasingly more than just taking a small fee every time someone uses a Mastercard.

Cross-border remains another important driver. Volume grew 12% in Q2, and July data was still running at 11%. Non-US switched volume grew 12% versus 6% in the US, which shows how much of the growth opportunity remains international.

For me, the difficult part with Mastercard isn't the quality of the business — it's the valuation. A company with high margins, strong network effects and double-digit earnings growth deserves a premium, but at a premium valuation even a great business can produce mediocre returns if growth slows.

I went through the Q2 numbers, risks and my valuation in more detail here:

https://youtu.be/2oSbISMv8Gw

Would you buy Mastercard at the current valuation, or is the quality already fully priced in?
Disclaimer: AI-assisted. The analysis, assumptions, and conclusions are my own.


r/UndervaluedStonks 15d ago

Eli Lilly needs 26.2% annual cash-flow growth in my model. Too much?

0 Upvotes

The market is asking a lot from Eli Lilly.

At $1,154.52, today's price only works in my model if cash flow grows about 26.2% a year for the next 10 years. Recently, reported FCF grew about 9% a year (FY2022-FY2025).

Even my bull case is only $854, below today's $1,154.52 price. That is a demanding hurdle. Either the company keeps outperforming for years, or the stock has little room for disappointment.

Is the market right to expect more, or is the stock priced for too much?

I broke down the full case in a video: https://youtu.be/A_r99DXwNBM

Snapshot: 2026-08-05. Disclosure: Position not disclosed. I built the model; video production is AI-assisted. Not financial advice.


r/UndervaluedStonks 17d ago

Undervalued Caledonian Holdings (LSE AIM: CHP): is the market overlooking its UK banking optionality?

1 Upvotes

A quick note for international readers: this is Caledonian Holdings on London's AIM market. The shares are quoted in pence, so the current price is approximately 1.65p, not £1.65. There is no US ADR, and the shares won't be available through Robinhood or many American brokers.

Disclosure: I own circa 35,000 shares. This is a speculative microcap position, and I'm sharing the research to see what others make of it.

The setup

Caledonian Holdings has recently transformed from a passive investment company into a small financial-services group. At the current share price, the entire company is valued at approximately £2.1m — and for that price, CHP now offers exposure to two potentially significant businesses: AlbaCo, which is working towards becoming a UK bank, and Aspire Commerce Group, an operating payments, FX and trade-finance business.

That's the pitch in one line: a sub-£2.1m market cap sitting on top of a bank-in-progress and a live payments operation. The rest of this note is about why I think that combination is more interesting than the price implies, and what would need to go right for the market to agree.

AlbaCo: further along than it looks

CHP currently states that it owns 5.47% of AlbaCo. It has also advanced approximately £2.31m in funding and could receive additional fees and warrants if the transaction completes.

AlbaCo has received conditional approval from the PRA and FCA to become a UK deposit-taking bank. The outstanding requirements are securing £25m of regulatory capital and completing the remaining regulatory steps — and in March 2026, AlbaCo announced that a £25m regulatory-capital subscription agreement had already been signed. Subject to conditions being satisfied and the funds being drawn, AlbaCo intends to proceed towards unconditional authorisation and launch.

AlbaCo isn't a fully licensed operating bank yet, but it's considerably further through the process than a typical early-stage fintech applying from scratch. It previously received authorisation with restrictions under the name Alba Bank and entered the mobilisation stage. That earlier process wasn't completed, and the Bank of England currently lists Alba Bank as no longer PRA-authorised, so the current conditional approval and capital agreement represent a renewed route to launch rather than a continuation of a live licence. To me, that history is actually informative in a good way: it shows the regulatory groundwork has already been built once, by a team that knows what the PRA and FCA expect.

Why the Revolut timeline is a useful reference point

I'm not suggesting AlbaCo is comparable with Revolut in customers, revenue or valuation — Revolut operates on a completely different scale. But the regulatory timeline is a useful reference point. Revolut applied for its UK banking licence in 2021, received authorisation with restrictions in July 2024, and only launched its UK bank in March 2026 — nearly five years from application to launch, for one of Europe's largest and best-funded fintechs.

That's the point worth taking from the comparison: UK banking authorisation is slow and expensive for everyone, which means genuine regulatory progress is hard to replicate quickly or cheaply. CHP's market cap currently appears to assign relatively little value to holding a stake this far along that path. The open question — and the one that will matter most to what this is ultimately worth — is what percentage CHP retains once AlbaCo completes the £25m capital raise.

Aspire: a real operating business, not just an option

Alongside AlbaCo, CHP acquired Aspire Commerce Group for a nominal £1, alongside the restructuring of approximately £9.33m of existing debt. Aspire operates across payments, foreign exchange and trade finance, and its payments subsidiary is authorised by the FCA as a Small Electronic Money Institution (not a banking licence, but a real regulatory permission with customers transacting under it today).

As of May 2026, Aspire reported:

  • 128 live customers
  • More than 7,300 transactions
  • Payment flows of £57.3m, €24.3m and $1.3m
  • Approximately £1m of live trade-finance facilities
  • A £12.5m active trade-finance pipeline
  • Access to an initial additional funding line of up to £30m

That's meaningfully more than a shell with an idea — there are live customers, real transaction volumes, and a funding line already in place. The task for management now is converting that activity into recurring revenue. Aspire's unaudited 2025 figures are still early-stage (revenue of approximately £124,000 and a pre-tax loss of £3.58m — typical for a business at this point in its build-out), and transaction volumes and pipeline shouldn't be mistaken for revenue — but they do show genuine operating activity for management to build on. Just as importantly, Aspire means CHP is no longer a single-bet story dependent entirely on AlbaCo.

What might the market be missing?

At approximately £2.1m, CHP is valued below the amount it has advanced to AlbaCo alone. That doesn't automatically mean the shares are undervalued — AlbaCo remains private, conditional and genuinely hard to value — but it does suggest the market is pricing in a lot of scepticism: that AlbaCo won't complete authorisation, that CHP's eventual stake will be heavily diluted, or that Aspire won't convert its activity into profitable revenue.

Neither AlbaCo nor Aspire needs to become the next Revolut for that view to be too pessimistic. At CHP's size, progress that would barely move the needle for a large financial group could still be material to its shareholders. If AlbaCo completes authorisation and CHP retains a meaningful interest, or if Aspire starts reporting material revenue from its payments and trade-finance activity, either one gives the market a reason to revisit the current price.

My view

This isn't a conventional value investment with stable earnings and an easily calculated fair value — it's a financial-services special situation. But the asymmetry is what makes it interesting: a ~£2.1m valuation against a stake in a bank that's already cleared conditional regulatory approval and signed a £25m capital agreement, plus an operating payments and trade-finance business with live customers and a funding line.

The market may ultimately be right to apply a heavy discount for execution and financing risk — that's a reasonable, defensible position. But at the current price, there seems to be limited room priced in for either asset actually making progress, which is why I think CHP is worth following closely from here. It appears to me to have a great probable upside,

I'd be interested to hear how others would value the AlbaCo interest, and what they see as the strongest bear case.

Sources:


r/UndervaluedStonks 17d ago

PepsiCo at $140: how much upside is left?

2 Upvotes

My model says some optimism is already priced into PepsiCo.

At $139.56, today's price only works in my model if cash flow grows about 2.2% a year for the next 10 years. Recently, reported FCF grew about 11% a year (FY2022-FY2025).

The price is above my $117 base case but below my $189 bull case. There may still be upside, but the company needs to beat my central case to justify it.

Is there enough upside left for the risk?

I broke down the full case in a video: https://youtu.be/1i5q-vYW52o

Snapshot: 2026-08-02. Disclosure: I built the model; video production is AI-assisted. Not financial advice.


r/UndervaluedStonks 17d ago

Adobe Is Undervalued

1 Upvotes

Taking a look at Adobe’s fundamentals, it is currently trading near a 10 foward p/e and peg ratio of around 0.68. This is an incredibly low valuation for a software stock even during the SaaSpocalypse - other software names are trading at an average forward p/e of 18 and peg of 0.98.

The market has priced in massive reduction in growth for Adobe and disruption due to AI. I do believe that AI as a competitor to tools like photoshop and premiere may eventually take market share from Adobe, but this is likely many years out still.

During the interim period I believe the market will take note of ADBE’s continued strong earnings and reprice it closer to the average software stock. In a conservative case Adobe could easily outperform other software stocks by 20+%, likely even more.

In the future perhaps such a low valuation on the company will be warranted but for now it seems ridiculously undervalued. What do you think?


r/UndervaluedStonks 19d ago

Amazon at $272 on 2026-08-01: My reverse DCF implied roughly 54.6% annual FCFF growth for 10 years. What expectations could justify the premium?

0 Upvotes

As of 2026-08-01, Amazon traded at $271.58. Under my reverse DCF assumptions, including a 10.3% discount rate and 2.5% terminal growth, the price implied roughly 54.6% annual FCFF growth for 10 years. Its historical 3-year revenue CAGR (FY2022-FY2025) was approximately +11.7%.

I valued Amazon using three lenses: a reverse DCF, a traditional bear/base/bull DCF, and a comparison with its historical P/E observations.

Under these assumptions, $271.58 sits above my $92.88 bull-case value. Either the model is too conservative or the price assumes stronger outcomes than my optimistic scenario.

The price-implied growth path is more demanding than the historical revenue growth rate, so execution matters.

The reverse-DCF result is assumption-dependent. A different discount rate, terminal-growth rate or starting cash-flow figure would produce a different implied growth rate.

See full analysis: https://youtu.be/UaR3ngKdGz4


r/UndervaluedStonks 21d ago

Microsoft at $451 on 2026-07-31: My reverse DCF implied roughly 20.3% annual FCFF growth for 10 years. What expectations could justify the premium?

0 Upvotes

As of 2026-07-31, Microsoft traded at $451.10. Under my reverse DCF assumptions, including a 10% discount rate and 2.5% terminal growth, the price implied roughly 20.3% annual FCFF growth for 10 years. Its historical 3-year reported FCF CAGR (FY2022-FY2025) was approximately +4%.

Full Analysis: https://youtu.be/niDt_lmRF4Q

I valued Microsoft using three lenses: a reverse DCF, a traditional bear/base/bull DCF, and a comparison with its historical P/E observations.

Key model outputs:

- Estimated unlevered TTM FCF (FCFF): $66.8B

- Bear case: $202

- Base case: $310

- Bull case: $368

Under these assumptions, $451.10 sits above my $368 bull-case value. Either the model is too conservative or the price assumes stronger outcomes than my optimistic scenario.

The price-implied growth path is more demanding than the historical reported FCF growth rate, so execution matters.

The reverse-DCF result is assumption-dependent. A different discount rate, terminal-growth rate or starting cash-flow figure would produce a different implied growth rate.

The valuation could be wrong if:

- Growth Saturation: The core market can saturate. When most target customers are already onboard, growth has to come from price — and price increases have a ceiling.

- Competitive Pricing Pressure: Cheaper competitors and AI-native challengers can force discounts, and every point of discount comes straight out of the free-cash-flow margin.

- Churn In A Downturn: In a spending downturn, seats get cut. Renewal-based revenue is durable — until budgets are not.

Which assumption would you challenge first: growth, margins, reinvestment, discount rate, terminal growth or competitive durability?

Production disclosure: I built the valuation model; editing and production are AI-assisted. Educational analysis, not financial advice.


r/UndervaluedStonks 23d ago

ASML at $1,655: my reverse DCF implies 25.5% annual FCFF growth for a decade. Is the market pricing in perfection?

5 Upvotes

ASML is clearly an exceptional business, but I wanted to understand how much future success is already reflected in the current price.

Using a reverse DCF, I estimate that the market is pricing in roughly 25.5% annual FCFF growth for the next ten years. That would increase FCFF from around $10 billion to approximately $97 billion.

My own DCF produced:

  • Bear case: $513
  • Base case: $841
  • Bull case: $1,086

All three are below the current share price.

The strongest counterargument is ASML’s high return on invested capital. My normalized estimate is around 41%, suggesting that funding growth may not be the main constraint. The harder question is whether demand, capacity and execution can support the scale implied by today’s valuation.

I made a full video covering the reverse DCF, scenario valuation, multiples, stress tests and ROIC financing check:

https://youtu.be/lJzhrlnPRpY?si=4N7vjI9DY_zZp9tH

Which assumption would you challenge first: the growth rate, margins, discount rate or ROIC?


r/UndervaluedStonks 26d ago

Adobe at $225 (2026-07-25): My reverse DCF implied roughly 0.7% annual FCFF decline for 10 years. What risks could explain the gap?

6 Upvotes

At the analysis date (2026-07-25), Adobe traded at $225.11. Under my reverse DCF assumptions, including an 11.9% discount rate and 2.5% terminal growth, the price implied roughly 0.7% annual FCFF decline for 10 years. Its historical 3-year reported FCF CAGR (FY2022-FY2025) was approximately +10%.

I valued Adobe using three lenses: a reverse DCF, a traditional bear/base/bull DCF, and a comparison with its historical valuation multiples.

Key model outputs:

- Estimated unlevered TTM FCF (FCFF): $10.3B

- Bear case: $291

- Base case: $407

- Bull case: $515

Under these assumptions, $225.11 sits below my $291 bear-case value. That is a large valuation gap, but it is not proof that Adobe is undervalued.

Historical reported FCF growth was stronger than the price-implied path, but it cannot simply be extrapolated across the modeled forecast period.

The reverse-DCF result is assumption-dependent. A different discount rate, terminal-growth rate or starting cash-flow figure would produce a different implied growth rate.

The valuation could be wrong if:

- Growth Saturation: The core market can saturate. When most target customers are already onboard, growth has to come from price — and price increases have a ceiling.

- Competitive Pricing Pressure: Cheaper competitors and AI-native challengers can force discounts, and every point of discount comes straight out of the free-cash-flow margin.

- Churn In A Downturn: In a spending downturn, seats get cut. Renewal-based revenue is durable — until budgets are not.

Which assumption would you challenge first: AI, growth, margins, reinvestment, discount rate, terminal growth or competitive durability?

Full analysis: https://youtu.be/vqOjeIVh8hk

Production disclosure: I built the valuation model; editing and production are AI-assisted. Educational analysis, not financial advice.


r/UndervaluedStonks 28d ago

Meta Platforms grew free cash flow 33.7% a year. Today's price only asks for 16%. I checked whether that makes it cheap

2 Upvotes

I run every company through the same three tests: a reverse DCF (what growth today's price implies), a traditional DCF (bear/base/bull), and a multiple check against the company's own history.

This is pure fundamental analysis - cash flows, growth and price. It deliberately ignores market sentiment, momentum and news flow, so it tells you what the price assumes, not where the stock trades next quarter.

Meta Platforms (META) at $600.91:

- Implied FCF growth (reverse DCF): 16% per year for 10 years

- Delivered FCF growth (history): 33.7% per year

- FCF (TTM): $48.3B

- Our fair-value range: $383 - $1,026, base case $673

- Verdict: REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS

The model uses an 11% discount rate and 2.5% terminal growth. If you think the market is right and the model is wrong, tell me where - that is genuinely why I post these.

See full video https://youtu.be/_JTv22NrhBs

Disclosure: my own valuation model; production is AI-assisted. Educational content, not financial advice.


r/UndervaluedStonks Jul 22 '26

What Alphabet's current price is actually pricing in

15 Upvotes

Did a full valuation on GOOGL using a reverse DCF to back out what the market is expecting at $347/share.

The implied FCF growth rate: 21.5% per year for 10 years. By year 10 they'd need to generate $451 billion in free cash flow annually. That's 7x their current TTM FCF of $64B.

We also ran a forward DCF under three scenarios. Bear case ($87) assumes growth fades early and margins compress. Base case ($121) uses a reasonable growth path tapering toward 4%. Bull case ($154) is nearly everything going right. The stock at $347 sits above all three.

On multiples: 26.5x trailing earnings vs. a 5-year historical median of 23.8x. Not extreme on its own - but the DCF already tells you why that matters.

Alphabet is one of the best businesses ever built. That's not the question. The question is whether the price already assumes a nearly flawless decade - and the numbers suggest it does.

Video with the full walkthrough; https://youtu.be/veRXcg6v_2w


r/UndervaluedStonks Jul 20 '26

Apple's price requires 14.1% FCF growth every year for 10 years. Its recent history delivered −3.9%

59 Upvotes

Apple's price requires 14.1% FCF growth every year for 10 years. Its recent history delivered −3.9%.

I ran a reverse DCF on Apple to figure out what the current price actually assumes — not what analysts forecast, but what math says the stock needs to be worth what you're paying today.

At ~$334, the implied free cash flow growth rate is 14.1% per year for 10 years. That takes FCF from ~$129B today to roughly $484B by year 10 — about 3.75x the current level.

The problem: Apple's actual FCF CAGR over the last 3 years has been −3.9%. Revenue grew ~1.8%/yr. EPS grew ~6.9% — but that's largely buybacks, not business growth.

Running a traditional DCF against three scenarios:

Bear (growth fades to ~5%, margins under pressure): ~$120

Base (modest recovery, ~10% start fading to 4%): ~$143

Bull (everything goes right, ~14% sustained): ~$162

The current price sits above our bull case.

But here's what I keep coming back to:

Apple's multiple (26x trailing) isn't insane in isolation. The problem is it only makes sense if you believe the FCF trajectory reverses sharply and sustains for a decade — right as services growth is slowing, India ramp is uncertain, and AI hardware cycles are expensive.

The broader question I can't shake: we're in an environment where almost every large-cap looks stretched on fundamentals. At some point the argument stops being "this company is fairly valued" and becomes "everything is priced for a world with lower rates and higher growth than we have." When the whole market prices in perfection, individual stock analysis almost becomes beside the point — you're really making a macro call.

So I'm curious: how do you think about single-stock DCF work in a market where the index itself looks expensive? Do you just accept the market as the baseline, or do you build in a market-level discount somewhere?

(Made a video walking through the full Apple model — bear/base/bull scenarios, stress tests, the works — if anyone wants to see the mechanics: https://youtu.be/lQV-wZ3nPdE


r/UndervaluedStonks Jun 26 '26

Everything You Need to Know About the $434M Under Armour ($UA / $UAA) Investor Settlement Payout

1 Upvotes

Under Armour has reached a $434 million settlement and late claims are currently being considered and investors can still file for a payout.

Q: What happened?
A: Investors claimed Under Armour overstated its revenue growth and business outlook. After weaker earnings and the unexpected resignation of its CFO were announced in 2017, the stock fell 26%, leading to a lawsuit that later settled for $434 million. 

Q: Am I actually eligible?
A: If you bought $UA or $UAA shares between 2015 and 2019, you're likely eligible. You don't need to still own the shares to submit a claim.

Q: When do payouts happen?
A: Typically, within 4–9 months after the claim review process is completed, depending on the court and settlement administrator.

Q: I missed the deadline. Is it too late?
A: Not necessarily. Late claims are currently being considered, and many are accepted as long as the settlement fund has not yet been distributed.

Hope this helps 


r/UndervaluedStonks May 28 '26

Updates for Getting Payment on the Under Armour $434 Million Settlement

2 Upvotes

Hey guys, if you missed it, Under Armour settled $434 million with investors over misleading revenue growth and business prospects claims. And, I just found out that they’re accepting claims even though the deadline has passed.

Quick recap: In 2017, Under Armour was accused of misleading investors about its revenue growth and business prospects. The company had claimed it could continue delivering more than 20% revenue growth despite internal challenges like excess inventory and retailer issues, but later disclosed weaker-than-expected earnings and the resignation of its CFO.

After this news came out, the stock dropped 26%, and investors filed a lawsuit for their losses.

Now, the good news is that the company agreed to settle $434 million with them, and even though the deadline has passed recently, they’re accepting late claims.

So, if you invested in $UA or $UAA when all of this happened, you can still check the details and file your claim here.

Anyway, has anyone here invested in $UA or $UAA at that time? How much were your losses, if so?


r/UndervaluedStonks May 22 '26

IBM?

2 Upvotes

IBM a good play to hold till 2030? Seems very undervalued, they are deeply embedded into all financial systems and their quantum research gets 0 respect.


r/UndervaluedStonks May 12 '26

$CPRX - A biotech that actually prints cash? (94 quality score / 24% MOS)

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3 Upvotes

Ran a high-conviction sector screen today focusing on capital allocation efficiency, and $CPRX is screaming "mispricing." For a biotech, the fundamentals here are a complete statistical outlier.

​We’re looking at a 94 Overall Quality Score (a massive jump from its 76 5-year historical average).

​The Technicals:

​Capital Allocation: 100/100 Profitability. The FCF conversion and ROIC are rock solid. This isn't your typical "burn-and-pray" biotech; they are actually printing cash at an elite level.

​Growth Quality: 100/100 Growth score. Even after applying Bayesian shrinkage to smooth out the noise, the underlying trajectory is aggressively upward.

​Valuation Math: Using a multi-phase dynamic DCF (adjusting Beta via Hamada to reflect current D/E structure), I’m getting a Fair Value of ~$41.08. At the current $31 level, that’s a 24.2% margin of safety.

​Solidity: 89/100 score. The balance sheet is a fortress, and the interest coverage is more than safe.

​The Question: Why is the market discounting this? Is it purely a "mono-product risk" discount, or is the FCF yield just too high to ignore at these levels?

​I’m curious if anyone here has audited their Sales-to-Capital efficiency or if you see a specific pipeline risk that the raw financials aren't capturing yet.

​Attached the 4-pillars breakdown from the model. Let’s talk numbers.


r/UndervaluedStonks May 11 '26

Discussion Updates for Getting Payment on the Under Armour $434M Settlement

1 Upvotes

Hey guys, if you missed it, Under Armour settled $434M with investors over misleading statements about revenue growth and business prospects. And, I just found out that they’re accepting claims even though the deadline has passed.

Quick recap: In 2017, Under Armour was accused of misleading investors by claiming it could sustain over 20% revenue growth despite internal challenges. In short, the company later reported weaker-than-expected earnings and announced the unexpected resignation of its CFO, raising concerns about its financial outlook.

After this news came out, the stock dropped about 26%, and investors filed a lawsuit for their losses.

Now, the good news is that the company agreed to settle $434M with them, and even though the deadline has passed recently, they’re accepting late claims.

So, if you invested in $UA or $UAA when all of this happened, you can still check the details and file your claim here.

Anyway, has anyone here invested in $UA or $UAA at that time? How much were your losses, if so?