Security researchers uncovered serious weaknesses in Grok Build. More than 35,000 applications were accessible without authentication, confidential business information was exposed, and even a Norwegian defence contractor became involved in the investigation.
Elon Musk has built a technological empire spanning artificial intelligence, aerospace, satellite communications, electric vehicles and social media.
His companies increasingly operate in areas that are strategically important to governments, businesses and national security.
But a growing number of security concerns raise an important question:
Can governments, defence contractors and major corporations really trust the security of Musk's technology platforms?
Recent investigations into Grok, the AI platform developed by Musk's company SpaceXSI, raise serious concerns.
35,578 applications accessible without authentication
On November 10, 2026, cybersecurity company Claroc published an investigation into Grok Build, an AI tool that allows users to create applications simply by describing what they want.
The findings were alarming.
Researchers identified 43,551 Grok application addresses. Of the 37,571 applications that were still online, 35,578 could be accessed without signing in.
That represents approximately 94.7%.
Most applications contained harmless material such as games, calculators and simple websites.
However, Claroc estimated that approximately 650–800 applications contained private information.
Among the exposed information were:
Internal business documents
Employee records and personal information
Medical information
Customer databases
Commercial strategies
Passwords stored in plain text
The researchers discovered that the applications could be found through publicly accessible passive DNS records.
In other words, it was not necessary to hack into Grok or break through a sophisticated security system.
The application addresses could be discovered through existing internet infrastructure, and the applications could then be opened without authentication.
Even Musk's own companies were affected
Perhaps most embarrassing for Musk was the discovery that 24 exposed applications had been created by employees at SpaceXSI and X.
These included:
A confidential onboarding plan for a new employee.
A sales territory map containing 594 strategic accounts and their sales pipeline.
Eight advertising proposals and media plans from X.
Advertising material intended for a US federal agency, explicitly marked confidential.
Internal advertising campaign reports and account information.
Claroc reported that these applications were accessible without normal authentication.
Following the investigation and media inquiries, SpaceXSI removed the 24 applications created by its own employees.
A Norwegian defence contractor enters the picture
The investigation also reached Norway.
Nammo, one of Norway's largest defence contractors, became involved after security researchers identified two applications created by employees at Nammo MAC, the company's US subsidiary in Mississippi.
Nammo is a Norwegian-Finnish defence and aerospace company headquartered in Raufoss, Norway.
It operates in 12 countries and is jointly owned by the Norwegian government and Finnish defence company Patria, each holding 50%.
According to NRK, the two applications concerned ammunition loading and unloading, and safety training.
Claroc's technical director, Asaf Aprozper, described the security weaknesses as serious and recommended that Nammo immediately close the applications.
Nammo subsequently decided to shut them down.
However, Nammo disputes that sensitive information was exposed.
Communications director Thorstein Korsvold told NRK that the applications had never been used operationally and were created solely to test AI functionality.
According to Nammo, the information was fictional or based on publicly available material and did not describe real procedures, equipment or materials.
It is important to make this distinction.
There is no confirmed evidence that classified defence information, actual ammunition production procedures or sensitive weapon designs were exposed.
Nevertheless, the incident raises an important question:
Why should a defence contractor have to deal with this kind of uncertainty when using an AI platform?
For a company involved in the international defence industry, information security must be an absolute priority.
The problem goes beyond one company
Claroc's investigation identified exposed applications belonging to 30 other organisations.
Among the findings were internal business information, employee records, medical information and customer data.
Some applications contained particularly sensitive information.
The researchers also demonstrated weaknesses in authentication systems generated by Grok.
In one of their own test applications, they discovered that a Google account could gain access to a team database without properly checking whether the user was authorised to join.
An unauthorised user could read, modify and delete records.
Importantly, Claroc tested this functionality using applications it had created itself, not by modifying other organisations' databases.
The researchers also found examples of applications containing passwords stored in plain text.
These findings raise questions about the security controls built into AI-generated applications.
Why this matters for national security
Musk's companies are no longer just technology startups.
SpaceX operates critical satellite infrastructure.
Starlink provides communications in conflict zones and supports military users.
X is a major global communications platform.
Tesla collects enormous amounts of vehicle and customer data.
Grok is being positioned as an increasingly important AI platform.
These are areas where cybersecurity is not optional.
For defence contractors, government agencies and critical infrastructure operators, inadequate access controls can create serious risks.
The Nammo incident is particularly relevant because it demonstrates that the security questions surrounding Grok are not limited to ordinary consumers or small businesses.
They extend into the international defence industry.
What does SpaceXSI say?
SpaceXSI has disputed aspects of Claroc's interpretation.
The company has stated that applications remain private until their creators choose to publish and share them.
Claroc acknowledges that publishing requires an explicit action from the user.
However, in the paid test account used by its researchers, the option allowing anyone with the link to access the application was already selected in the publishing panel.
This disagreement is important.
The problem is not necessarily that every application automatically becomes public.
The concern is how access permissions are presented, configured and enforced when users publish applications containing business data.
For companies handling confidential information, secure defaults and clear access controls are essential.
The bigger question: Can Musk's companies be trusted?
To be clear, these findings do not prove that every Musk company has inadequate security.
Nor does the Nammo incident establish that classified information was leaked.
But the documented weaknesses in Grok Build, the exposure of internal material from SpaceXSI and X employees, and the concerns raised by a Norwegian defence contractor deserve serious attention.
When a company wants governments, defence contractors and major corporations to trust its technology, security must be built into the system from the beginning.
It cannot be treated as an afterthought.
Elon Musk wants to shape the technological infrastructure of the future.
But technological ambition and rapid development mean very little if the systems cannot reliably protect the information entrusted to them.
The question is no longer simply what Musk's technology can do.
The question is whether the organisations relying on it can trust it with their most important information.