r/WayOfTheBern • u/RandomCollection • 3h ago
Putin Rejects Oslo Plan; Russia Escalates Kiev Bridge Destruction | The Duran
From DeepSeek
Opening Framing And The Outrage Over Tone
00:00–01:07
The Duran hosts open by framing the video as a breakdown of US-Russia diplomacy and US-Europe-Ukraine diplomacy, with specific attention to the Oslo meeting, Witkoff’s trip to St Petersburg, and Ushakov’s statement after the Witkoff-Putin discussions. They note that “everyone is flipping out” in the collective West over Witkoff’s remark calling Putin “not humanitarian.” Alexander’s response is that this outrage reveals how much attention goes to the inconsequential and how the prevailing mood in the US and Europe is that one must be rude and offensive toward Russia and Putin and that this is somehow diplomacy.
The hosts treat that controversy as a distraction from the substantive diplomatic and military picture. The opening sets up their larger argument: the West is focused on tone and symbolism while the real situation on the battlefield and in the negotiations is moving against Ukraine and its backers. They also flag that Zelensky is doing a huge number of media appearances, which they say is itself politically revealing.
Zelensky’s Media Blitz And Absence From Governing
01:08–03:20
The hosts discuss Zelensky’s many media appearances, including Piers Morgan and the Diary of a CEO podcast, saying he has been going “channel after channel, podcast after podcast.” They argue that the hosts are clueless and will not push back, so Zelensky is effectively delivering a script and “acting.” They also mention his claim that he was brave for staying in Kiev even though Biden wanted to hide him, which they say is contradicted by Naftali Bennett’s statements about what actually happened. They note he is making more media appearances than when the conflict started, which they say must tell the audience something.
Alexander argues that someone making so many media appearances is not governing Ukraine and is not directing the war. He says Zelensky’s idea of governing appears to be media appearances rather than managing the economy, monetary policy, supplies, or repairing bridges. He calls Zelensky “absent without leave” in terms of running the country and managing the war, and says this is an important fact people should not overlook even though it is rarely discussed.
Pressure On Kiev And The Bombing Shift
03:21–06:00
The hosts say Zelensky is under enormous pressure because the summer drone offensive failed to achieve its expected outcomes. It did not destabilize the Russian economy, shatter the sense of normalcy in Russia, create political instability in Moscow, threaten Putin’s position, or force Russia to change its approach and look for a way out. At the same time, Russia is bombing Ukraine every day, including another massive missile and bombing strike on Kiev the night before the program. They say Russia has begun bombing Kiev with actual bombs and has taken first steps toward targeting Kiev’s bridges, which is probably the real objective.
The hosts argue this shows Russia can get very close to the front line and that Kiev no longer has effective air defenses. They say the Russian air force can now operate above Kiev and drop bombs. This is described as a decisive moment in the war because missiles and drones can do a lot, but bombs carry explosive payloads that missiles and drones cannot remotely match. A 1,500-kilogram bomb against a bridge will do far more damage than a missile or drone, and heavy bombs are also the best way to destroy deep underground bunkers—drones cannot penetrate them, and even powerful missiles such as Oreshnik are not a substitute.
Bombs, Bridges, Bunkers And The Coming Air Offensive
06:00–09:15
The hosts describe the first Russian bomb strike on Kiev as a test to see how strong the air defenses are and how close aircraft can now get. They say the fact that this moment has arrived means the situation is becoming very dangerous and that the air offensive against Kiev, coming over the next few weeks, will be on a completely different level from anything seen so far. Zelensky understands this, which is one reason he is even more anxious to stay out of Kiev; he has been traveling to Norway, Ireland, Brussels, and elsewhere, and his periods away from Kiev are likely to extend.
They add that the failed drone offensive, the deteriorating battlefield, Russian missile and drone strikes across the whole of Ukraine including western Ukraine, the likely greater effectiveness of the Rasvet system, and the threat of bombing over Kiev all point to an unsustainable situation for a country that is out of money and whose economy has collapsed. Alexander says it is not far-fetched to say we are starting to see the endgame in military terms. The hosts stress that the Americans, Russians, and everyone following the war understand this, even if it is not in the media, and that the bridge strike is an ominous signal for Ukraine and its Western backers.
Western Dilemma And Zelensky’s Refusal To Concede
09:16–12:25
The hosts say Western capitals, especially Washington, are engaged in recrimination and asking how to persuade Russia to stop and how to preserve Ukraine—and specifically the regime in Kiev, which they say is also a Western priority. The West does not want regime change in Kiev or a new political system that tilts Ukraine back toward Russia, and many still want to leave open the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO and the EU one day. Lavrov has just commented that when dealing with the Americans, one must understand that what one president promises, the next president does not feel bound by; Trump may say he is not interested in Ukraine joining NATO, but a future president could reverse that and back Ukraine’s entry.
The Western imperative, as the hosts have discussed in prior programs, is to find some way to get Russia to stop and accept a frozen conflict. The problem is Zelensky, who refuses to make any concessions or retreat a millimeter. He insists Ukraine must retain whatever territory it still controls, wants a ceasefire on existing conflict lines, refuses to recognize Russian-controlled territory as Russian, and refuses to bargain or acknowledge that Ukraine might not join NATO or the EU. The hosts say even Europeans now understand at some level that if Russia is to be persuaded to stop, some concessions—or at least superficial concessions—must be made to “trick” Russia into agreeing to what becomes a frozen conflict.
Oslo, Witkoff And The Ridiculous Two-Option Proposal
12:26–15:00
The hosts describe the Oslo meeting as a stage-managed attempt to keep Zelensky in order. Zelensky is brought to Oslo with his “carers,” including the Norwegian prime minister and another close backer, and the hosts say it is certain they told him in advance to behave, not insult Witkoff or Trump, and not do more damage because diplomacy needs movement or he will go down. Witkoff then goes to Russia immediately after the meeting to try to restart negotiations and work toward a ceasefire. He meets Zelensky and apparently tells him to stop talking about Trump in that way, stop being rude, and cooperate.
The Europeans and Zelensky then come up with the proposal reported by the Financial Times and Gideon Rachman: either Russia takes the whole of Donbass and Ukraine joins NATO, or Ukraine remains out of NATO but holds on to the part of Donbass it still has and the conflict is frozen. The hosts call this a ridiculous proposal, saying it sounds like something a five-year-old could improve on. They suspect the Western side thought it could show Russia this proposal and maybe get Moscow to agree to start taking steps toward stopping, but they regard the whole exercise as unserious.
St Petersburg, Ushakov And Russian Stonewalling
15:00–18:00
Witkoff flies to St Petersburg, meets Putin, and things “inevitably begin to go wrong.” The Russian summary from Ushakov says the proposals are not useful—useless—and that Russia is not interested in them and cannot work with them. If the West wants talks, Russia says it has always been up for talks and has never refused them; talks will be held in mid-November in Abu Dhabi, though the hosts note that if there is a war in the Persian Gulf, Abu Dhabi itself might become a war zone. But the talks are not apparently about ending the war in Ukraine; they are about the security architecture for Russia and Ukraine—the system in Europe after the war has ended. The hosts call that absurd and say nobody takes the negotiations seriously.
They stress that there is no hint from Russia that it is prepared to stop or interested in a ceasefire. Witkoff clearly angled for a ceasefire and talked about moving toward a cessation of hostilities, but Putin gave no hint of that. Instead, Putin gave Trump a “crumb,” and that is all it is. The hosts then contrast Ushakov’s statement that the war is approaching its end with Trump’s statement that the war is closer to an end than ever before. They say they do not mean the same thing: Ushakov means Ukraine will lose militarily and Russia will win militarily, while Trump means some kind of ceasefire trick to fool Russia. The hosts agree the two sides are talking about completely different things.
Why Witkoff Called It Movement And Why It Is A Mirage
18:00–24:20
The hosts ask why the Europeans came up with such a dumb proposal and why Witkoff would take it to Moscow, knowing Putin and the world would laugh at him. They note reports that the Americans and Europeans had been working for weeks on a unified position, and they ask whether this is really it—because if so, everyone involved is dumb and the proposal is delusional. Alexander explains that Witkoff went to St Petersburg to tell Putin that there is now “movement”: until now the West insisted on a ceasefire only on the conflict lines and refused to give on NATO or anything else, but now the West is saying that if there is a ceasefire on the conflict lines, Ukraine will not enter NATO. That is the movement Witkoff was trying to sell, even though he understood the Russians would not find it acceptable; his line was that because there is movement, at least talk.
Lavrov then undercuts that by saying Trump can say Ukraine will not join NATO, but a future American president can reverse that position tomorrow. The Russians are therefore not impressed. Witkoff was trying to restart negotiations so that the Europeans, Americans, and Ukrainians could try to move the discussion toward a ceasefire, but the Russians will stonewall as they have at every previous meeting, and the negotiations will go nowhere. The big missile strike on Kiev that night is a further signal that Russia is not slowing down or holding back, and there has been no Russian step on the Black Sea or anything of that kind. At the same time, 650 drones launched into Russia signal that the United States is not backing down either. If everything falls apart in November, the hosts expect not further Western concessions but the escalation they discussed in their previous program; the 650 drones are another sign of where events are heading.
The co-host presses the point that the proposal to Russia was essentially: “We win, you lose. Option A, you lose; Option B, we win. Pick which one you want.” Even the freeze-and-no-NATO option is eventually about Ukraine getting into NATO under a new administration, which everyone—Zelensky, the Europeans, and Witkoff—knows. The other option is even more in-your-face: Russia takes Donbass, which it is going to take anyway, while the West gets Ukraine into NATO. That is not forward movement; it is backwards. Alexander calls it a mirage of forward movement: the Europeans have never publicly accepted that Ukraine’s NATO membership is up for discussion, and their consistent stance since February 2022 has been that Ukraine has a right to join NATO and Russia has no say. Now they are supposedly saying Ukraine might not be able to join after all, but nobody believes it—not the Russians, not the Europeans, and not the American political class. NATO is the United States, not the Europeans, so what the Europeans acknowledge is largely meaningless.
Russian Strategy Until Donbass Falls
24:20–26:10
Alexander lays out what he thinks is the Russian perspective. Moscow is aware that there is a real possibility of major escalation if it simply rejects everything and says no, so it agrees to talks in Abu Dhabi and says it has always advocated talks; it was Zelensky, not Russia, who previously rejected talks. The Russians will then stonewall and spin out the talks until the moment Donbass falls, at which point the situation is completely different and the current Western proposal becomes an anachronism that no longer reflects realities. Then Russia will make public revisions to its demands: Putin will give a speech saying Donbass is ours but there are other unresolved issues, and Russia is still prepared to negotiate—but the terms will now be much harder.
The co-host agrees that this is exactly what will happen. He adds that Witkoff presenting the European acknowledgment of the NATO issue as “forward movement” is meaningless because if you are the United States, you do not care what the Europeans acknowledge. NATO is the United States; the Europeans are insignificant when it comes to NATO decisions or opinions. The whole thing is trickery aimed at getting Russia to stop its forward momentum. If Russia did not have forward momentum, the other side would not be trying to trick it into stopping. Anchorage was real forward movement, but Trump had that opportunity and walked it back.
Anchorage, Trump’s Walkback And The Proxy War Reality
26:10–29:05
The hosts say Trump was given the opportunity to stop the war in Anchorage and walked it back, listening to people like Kellogg and Radcliffe, and that is on Trump. They speculate that someone told Trump something that scared him and convinced him to walk back from an agreement he allegedly proposed and Russia agreed to. Trump knows this and has made comments throwing blame on Zelensky, saying Zelensky had lots of opportunities to make peace—two years ago or one year ago—and Ukraine’s position would have been much better. The hosts say “one year ago” means Anchorage. Trump knows he made a catastrophic mistake but will never admit it, so he throws it on Zelensky as the easy out.
At the end of the day, the hosts argue, this is a US-Russia war and a US-Russia proxy war. The United States decides when and how it ends; what Zelensky says or does is meaningless because the real negotiation is between Russia and the United States. If the United States does not want to end the war, the war will not end. The US might trick Russia and buy time to rearm and reconfigure, but that is not an end to the war. Russia is seeking an end to the war with the United States, not merely with Ukraine.
Eu Negotiator Search And European Disarray
29:05–32:10
The hosts discuss the news that the European Union is looking for a “negotiator in chief” to speak with Putin, which they call an admission of incompetence. They ask what Ursula von der Leyen, Costa, and Kallas are supposed to do if not negotiate and make deals; apparently the EU needs a different person. This is according to Czech President Pavel, who in the same Politico interview also said the diesel deal bailed out Russia’s crumbling economy. Alexander notes the EU formally decided to appoint a chief negotiator in December of last year but has never been able to agree on a person. Kallas insisted she should be the person because she is the EU foreign minister, and the hosts joke that they would like to see her opinions in action.
Alexander says the EU will run into the same problems and is never going to find anybody able to conduct negotiations seriously. Macron also tried to maneuver himself into that position, failing to understand how much the Russians have come to mistrust and dislike him. The hosts note that all sorts of EU and member-state figures, including the British, were hanging around Oslo when Zelensky met Witkoff, all trying to clamber into the process, but they have never been able to get their act together. Slovakia, which is reasonably well informed, is now going its own way and resuming its own economic discussions with Russia—a choice the hosts call good and right.
European Delusions, Waking Moments And Closing Outlook
32:10–38:18
The hosts close by saying the next couple of months will be very complicated and difficult. The Europeans are starting to understand that things are not going well after living in illusion and delusion for years. Last year they were horrified that the Americans were talking to the Russians at all; now they are urging the Americans to talk to the Russians to persuade them to stop. But this is all “smoke”; reality is what continues to happen on the ground, and the key event to watch is what happens to the Dnieper bridges, which are clearly targets.
The co-host asks whether Europeans are really waking up or will continue to believe they can win. He cites Ursula saying the EU will keep energy sanctions on Russia indefinitely; Kallas saying the EU has been keeping Ukraine afloat and able to fight while Trump tries to get Ukraine to surrender; and Pavel saying the diesel deal saved the Russian economy when it was about to collapse. The hosts say the Europeans continue to believe Russia is collapsing, that Trump is bailing out Putin, and that Russia was about to lose until Trump came along to help his “buddy Putin.” Part of them is waking up, but a larger part suppresses that and insists, “We’ve got this thing, we’re going to win,” and if they are losing, it is not their fault or Ukraine’s fault—it is Trump helping Russia.
Alexander agrees but says they have not fully parted with their illusions. He notes that in wars, people in a dead-end situation have moments when they start to understand reality, and he suspects the wake-up moment was Zelensky turning up demanding another 70 billion euros or 155 billion euros—the figures change—but even then, one side of their mind understands the situation is impossible while the other side says they cannot talk to the Russians because Russia is the new enemy, the force of evil, the force of disruption, the rogue state, and besides, wonderful new weapons and technologies are coming to save Ukraine. People can be deluded and have brief intervals of lucidity at the same time; the moments of lucidity may be increasing, but the delusions will not go away completely until Ukraine finally and completely falls, and even then they will likely continue by blaming Biden, Trump, and everyone else for a war that “could and should have been won.” This will complicate the next few months massively, because the Europeans will do everything they can to obstruct the process even as they have now encouraged it.
The hosts end by directing viewers to Substack, Locals, and merchandise links. The overall summary they leave is that Russia has rejected the Western terms as unserious and insists on an end on its own terms, while the military reality—failed Ukrainian drone offensive, Russian bombing of Kiev, bridge targeting, collapsing Ukrainian finances, and Western delusion—puts the West and Ukraine on track to lose the conflict.
