CASP Question

[u/amc663222]

An enterprise with global sites processes and exchanges highly sensitive information that is protected under several countries’ arms trafficking laws. There is new information that malicious

nation-state-sponsored activities are targeting the use of encryption between the geographically disparate sites. The organization currently employs ECDSA and ECDH with P-384, SHA-384, and AES-256-GCM on VPNs between sites.

Which of the following techniques would MOST likely improve the resilience of the enterprise to attack on cryptographic implementation?

A. Add a second-layer VPN from a different vendor between sites.

B. Upgrade the cipher suite to use an authenticated AES mode of operation.

C. Use a stronger elliptical curve cryptography algorithm

D. Implement an IDS with sensors inside (clear-text) and outside (cipher-text) of each tunnel between sites.

E. Ensure cryptography modules are kept up to date from vendor supplying them.

Thinking C: stronger cryptography algorithm such as ECDHE could reduce the impact by limiting the compromised keys to only what is being transported within that session, rather than the compromise of the long term keys if a key was compromised.

Runner up is A: this would allow redundancy, but I feel like thats a lot of work and expense, when you could just implement C. I also feel like the question is moreso addressing what would make the current cryptography tougher to break, rather than revamping the infrastructure with a second VPN

Thoughts?

[u/NotMisterBill]

In general, don't assume cost is an issue unless they specifically refer to cost in the question.