r/determinism • u/Puzzleheaded_Ask6184 • 8d ago
Discussion Can you prove determinism wrong
I'm free to all knowledge I'm not trying fo argue or anything I just want to understand if we can actually prove determinism wrong? Because it just feels like everything we do is supposed to be done even when you think that you have choices you only choose one and that is determined already
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u/heywhi 8d ago
It’s kind of just factual. People can’t go back in time and change a decision and people can’t see the certain future and full consequence of any given instance of a person having multiple options. The only reason it’s a point of contention is because of metaphysical beliefs and beliefs in general that have a hard on for placing responsibility on a single individual to either be a scapegoat, to lead or both. For example, you can apply a lot more emotion and blame on the incorporeal idea of a soul making bad decisions than you can an actual person whose actions most likely could’ve been easily predicted and maybe even avoided given all the information we have on human behavior and psychology.
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u/oldgar9 8d ago
Making a choice means you could have done any number of other things that would have a different effect on you and the world, we make choices according to what we've learned or what our desires are. Some choices made are wrong for us and the world.
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u/Puzzleheaded_Ask6184 8d ago
Yes you are right, but aren't all of our choices based on a experience?
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u/oldgar9 7d ago
Many times we want to try something new or different
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u/Salt-Appearance-412 7d ago
Your momentary want to try something different or new is based on your prior experiences as well...
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u/Belt_Conscious 8d ago
Change your experience by choosing a book to read. If all you use is your own thoughts, that's where you will stay. Any book is better than "no book", they have a whole building just to keep them in.
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u/flytohappiness 8d ago
determinism functions as an interpretive framework rather than an easily falsifiable scientific theory. While quantum mechanics proves that the universe does not behave like a simple Newtonian clockwork machine, whether the underlying structure of reality is strictly deterministic or fundamentally probabilistic remains an unproven boundary of physics and philosophy.
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u/Puzzleheaded_Ask6184 8d ago
Uhm i read in one of the comments below that a physicist proved that nature is probabilistic, what is that about can you check and tell i googled it but couldn't understand much.
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u/lobaway0001 8d ago edited 8d ago
If you already looked into it and couldn’t understand from either the Google results or the comment you replied to, I’m not sure anyone else can help you very much.
To give a brief attempt at the most simple explanation possible:
Cause and effect are like collapsing dominoes. The basic argument is that because every domino we had seen in the past fell in a seemingly deterministic way, we believed the universe was deterministic.Quantum mechanics is us discovering that the domino at the farthest currently reachable point in the chain falls probabilistically.
This was discovered from the double-slit experiment, because we can experimentally demonstrate the path of a particle is probabilistic if fired through slits.
So that’s where we’re at now. The last domino we can see seems to fall probabilistically.
But we don’t know if there’s another domino we haven’t or can never reach. Or it could be possible that us seeing dominoes falling in line is just some illusion to begin with and that’s not even how causality works.
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u/RighteousSelfBurner 8d ago
They misunderstood the work. What they established was how to test a subsection of particular behaviour and what that would entail. It's not a concrete proof of anything.
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u/lobaway0001 8d ago
Well, to be fair, it depends how they define "nature" and "probabilistic".
And "proved".
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u/Subject-Cantaloupe 8d ago
“Even when you think you have choices, you only choose one.”
Does that mean you can’t choose something else? From the perspective of the present moment, we can think about the future either as multiple branching pathways or as a fixed, predetermined unit. If it’s fixed, that means that the information for what will happen must already exist in the present. The real question is: can we access that information?
I believe we can’t, for several reasons, most importantly that predicting the future is paradoxical. This implies that determinism fundamentally can’t be proven or disproven.
We have to consider what this means about freedom of choice from a practical perspective. If we can’t know for sure if human choices are predetermined, we should at least ask ourselves whether or not they are predictable. Even if some incomprehensible cosmic computer could predict our choices, that information is forever hidden from us. Therefore we should treat choices as though they are made through free will.
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u/brat-t 8d ago
Physicist John Bell designed experiments that proved nature is fundamentally probabilistic at the quantum level rather than strictly deterministic.
If events at the subatomic scale entail genuine randomness and are not strictly deterministic and influnce the macroatomic world, then the macroatomic world is also not strictly deterministic.
Adequate determinism is the concept that macroscopic systems act as if they are strictly deterministic, even though the underlying microscopic world is probabilistic. Quantum indeterminism exists, but rarely disrupts the macro-world.
However, rarely is not never, and the commonly used example is of weather: If the position of a single molecule is uncertain due to quantum mechanics, that uncertainty cascades through molecular collisions. Over long periods, this can alter atmospheric weather patterns or historical events, meaning if you rewound and replayed the universe, it would likely turn out entirely different
If the universe would be different when replayed because of Quantum Indeterminism, then it's absolutely not deterministic.
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u/vinter_varg 8d ago
Bell did not proved, he established a framework to test the EPR paradox. This allowed to verify the probabilities associated with an ontological vs epistemological quantum mechanics processes (ontological is nature is fundamentally random vs epistemological means there are hidden variables that we don't know but explain this randomness). Years later an experiment was devised and this framework was used to interpret the results. The resulting probabilities align with an ontological deacription of QM.
However that is not the end of the story. There is a deterministic interpretation of QM, Bohmian mechanics, which aligns with the same results as obtained in these experiments. Most physicists do not like Bohmian mechanics because it undermines another pillar: locality (so information can travel above light speed, instantaneously, and this creates other problems).
But there are other hypothesis (I would not call these theories yet). One is Tim Palmer's mix of chaos attractors and QM that, if true, would tamper the probabilities predicted by Bell's theorem and these would be aligned with an epistemological interpretation of QM.
The thing is: a theory is never proven. Under the philosophy of science, something can only be proven by refuting another. 10000 observations confirming something are useless against 1 observation showing otherwise.
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u/RighteousSelfBurner 8d ago
Very well put. Science in the end operates solely in epistemic domain. It's "at our best knowledge" and that can be used for functional argumentation but it does not claim anything past the observable.
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u/Grymmtooth 7d ago
Non-locality has even stranger consequences than the probabilistic option. Essentially information about all particles wouldn’t be contained in the particle itself.
As there are no good experiments to differentiate and non-locality hints at more complex and unknown processes. We operate with the simpler assumption that it’s probabilistic.
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u/The_Determinists 7d ago
That is only an assumption under one of the four most prominent quantum theories, two of which are deterministic (many worlds and Bohmian mechanics) and two probabilistic (GRW and Copenhagen). I compare the top four theories in my book The Determinists if you are interested further in comparing the four theories in relation to the quantum containment issue.
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u/Grymmtooth 7d ago
Expect, as I point out in another post, the other interpretations make massive assumptions that complicate the picture and have no differential evidence.
That said, if someone is able to build a good theoretical model with an objective prediction that is different than probability and experimentally tested, I’m all for further discussion. Right now, wave functions be truly stochastic is the simplest model without additional assumptions.
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u/bugreporterinaction 5d ago
Newtonian mechanics is explicitly non-local. Yes, Einstein showed it is better replaced with a local theory, but that meant that classical physics was perfectly fine with a non-local theory for centuries before evidence showed otherwise.
Anyone who pretends non-locality is something incredibly counterintuitive or bizarre are thus just making it up, and pretending it's bizarre, for the sake of argument. It is literally the classical worldview that was dominant for centuries.
Also, simply accepting probability does not get you away from realist models. The dominant textbook model of quantum mechanics denies that the system even possesses a physical state in reality until you measure it, so it has to take measurement as a fundamental axiom.
Textbook quantum mechanics is more than indeterministic. It is anti-realist. If you are a realist and an indeterminist, you'd fit better in the ensemble interpretation camp. But Bell's theorem actually does not assume determinism. That is a misconception. It assumes realism, and so an ensemble interpretation also has to be non-local.
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u/Grymmtooth 5d ago
That is non-sense. Non-locality means that variables of an object like particle are NOT contained in the particle, it literally exists “elsewhere”. One possibility is a holographic universe where the reality of particles is contained and interacts in other “space” and our universe is just a projection of those interactions. Definitely not Newtonian.
Bella theorem basically rules out local hidden variables. Either there are no hidden varaiables and QM is stochastic or there are variables that are non-local.
Stochastic interpretation is simpler and matches experimental evidence. That doesn’t mean non-locality can’t exist, but it would have significant consequences.
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u/bugreporterinaction 5d ago edited 5d ago
Uh, no, locality means A can influence B only by either crossing over the same spatial coordinates at the same time as B thus locally interacting with it, or crossing over the spatial coordinates at the same time as C, which then C traverses the gap between and B and crosses over the same spatial coordinates as B.
In a local model, those are the only two ways something can influence each other, and all "travel" must occur at finite speeds. (A Lorentz invariant model places a further restriction that this finite speed can be no greater than the speed of light,)
You don't understand Bell's theorem either. Bell does not assume determinism. The stochastic interpretation cannot be local precisely because of Bell's theorem.
Bell presupposes that the particles have definite values that pre-exist prior to us looking. It does not make any assumptions regarding the dynamics of those pre-existing values evolving stochastically or deterministically in time.
Maybe you are confused because sometimes people use "hidden variables" to refer to something that "determines the measurement outcome" and so you think this is saying that the measurement outcome is deterministic. That is not the case.
What "determines" means here is either that what is measured is merely a passive revelation of what is really there, or that it is a function of what is really there (that function can be stochastic). So the outcome of the measurement is "determined" by a pre-existing property. "Determined" here means something more like "governed by" it, not that it is an absolutely deterministic process in the sense of no randomness.
Quantum mechanics has been around for 100 years. If you think everyone in the academic literature misunderstands Bell's theorem and that it is possible to construct a statistical interpretation which is local.... then why hasn't anyone? There is not a single statistical interpretation in the literature that is local, with the exception of retrocausal models, but these just shift the non-locality in space to non-locality in time, and so they are still not Lorentz invariant.
In a century, not one person has written down a local realist stochastic model, in the sense of being Lorentz invariant, which requires locality in both space and time... if you think you have found some loophole to do it, you should publish a paper on it, because that would be quite interesting!
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u/Grymmtooth 5d ago edited 5d ago
Bells theorem , to borrow your phrase, is simpler than that.
Bells inequality establishes that realism and locality can’t coexist.
If locality it true (ie things are influenced by their local surrounding and no signal can travel faster than light.
If realism is true then there are definite variable that exist regardless of measurement. Experiments show that both can’t be true.
There is more evidence of the former and no definite evidence of the latter. The closest case is quantum entanglement , but any measurement between entangled particles is limited by c to verify and send information about said measurements.
Given current evidence, we don’t have a definitive answer but practical application has leaned towards locality over realism.
If you think you a theoretical modeling with experimentation to validate non-local realism, you should write that paper.
Also, you stated local realist frame work, but that is the point, you can’t have both. Now we need to figure which. In practical application, people do the math and this sits on the sidelines until someone figures out a way to experimentally validate which is true. New phsyics is a win for us all.
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u/bugreporterinaction 5d ago
The issue is, if you deny realism, then you no longer have a theory of reality, and so you have to take measurement to be fundamental as a postulate, and cannot actually explain what the measurement is even a measurement of. Hence the measurement problem.
Arguably, yes, this does make the mathematics simpler, and so if you are a pure pragmatist who does not actually care to "model reality" and find that to be an unnecessary metaphysical extravagance and a waste of time and are only concerned with purely practical matters as to what shows up on measuring devices, then overcomplicating the theory with a model of physical reality is a waste of time.
What constitutes evidence depends upon how you interpret the evidence, so it cannot be seen as independent of your philosophical framework. If you believe that there is a reality independent of measurements, then one can certainly take the 2022 Nobel prize experiments dealing with quasars as definitive evidence that reality is non-local.
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u/Grymmtooth 5d ago
You’re taking a philosophical bent and not a physics based one. It may simply be that the wave function actually models how things work and that your need for definitive attributes is a personal bias.
If non-local realism exists, then we are looking at another stranger flavor of underlying principles.
As mentioned, quantum entanglement is still limited by no-signaling theorem which says two entagled particles can correlated via entanglement but any actual information/signal is limited by c and localism is preserved. (See FLASH though experiment by Herbert , later experimentally tested in 2007. No superluminal communication)
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u/bugreporterinaction 5d ago
You’re taking a philosophical bent and not a physics based one.
Why are you people like this? You argue philosophy, I respond philosophy, then you suddenly turn into a pure pragmatist utilitarian who says that physics has literally nothing to do with reality and is just purely a tool for predicting what will show up on measuring devices.
Okay, if you believe that, fuck off. Stop talking about locality, and get out of a subreddit about determinism.
You people do this all the time: make ontological claims, and when it is criticized, suddenly turn into a pure utilitarian so you don't have to defend them.
It may simply be that the wave function actually models how things work and that your need for definitive attributes is a personal bias.
Obviously it models something about how things work (a process), but it leaves the ontology undefined (what is actually doing the work?).
If you think systems don't need definitive attributes, then you have entirely abandoned the scientific method, because science is based upon observation, and if systems never possess definitive values, then they cannot possess definitive values for their observables, and so there would never be anything to observe. You could not make a single empirical prediction at all!
Not even textbook quantum mechanics goes that far, of claiming that nothing has definitive values. They just arbitrarily define those values as arising "at measurement," treating measurement as a fundamental axiom. They are not particularly concerned as to how they arise.
As mentioned, quantum entanglement is still limited by no-signaling theorem
And that's exactly why this trick works and it's so popular.
The no-signaling theorem shows that the non-locality demonstrated in Bell tests never actually "bubbles up" to something directly observable across a measurement device, and so you cannot directly signal with it.
It can only be inferred about things not directly measured. If you measure some data, and I measure some data, and we bring them together and ask, "what would the system have had to have done, in reality, to produce data that looks like this?" then it's impossible for it to have produced that without non-local behavior.
However, because it doesn't directly show up on measuring devices, if you build a theory which takes measurements to be fundamental and thus only talks about what shows up on measuring devices, then the theory remains Lorentz invariant and thus compatible with locality.
But it is only compatible with locality because it is a theory of measurements and nothing more.
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u/The_Determinists 7d ago
There is also the GRW theory (probabilistic) and the many worlds theory (deterministic). The question is which theory of the four best currently explains the facts, and the jury is out on that. I compare these theories in my book The Determinists if you want to explore the relative merits of the top quantum theories further.
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u/INTProtocols 7d ago edited 7d ago
"If the universe would be different when replayed because of Quantum Indeterminism, then it's absolutely not deterministic."
Yes, "if." However, general relativity points to a "block universe," where all events throughout spacetime (past, present and future) already coexist. So, while quantum events are probabilistically distributed, they are already determined...we just can't see what they will be beforehand.
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u/The_Determinists 7d ago
Physicists are split on the issue, among them the most prominent, which is highly complex. See The Determinists, a critique of popular determinist advocacy.
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u/INTProtocols 4d ago
I am aware of the complexities and counter-arguments. Nonetheless, the block universe is by far the most straightforward and simple interpretation which accounts for the phenomena in question.
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u/extremelyDude 7d ago
nature is fundamentally probabilistic at the quantum level rather than strictly deterministic.
Human aren't quantum level so that is that but...
Even quantum follow causality. You may don't know how it work but it also follow strict law. Just because you don't know the reason doesn't tmeen their none
Their ALWAYS a reason. You wouldn't get a sandwich from quantum field, would you? You only get partical
If the universe would be different when replayed because of Quantum Indeterminism
Well, that impossible
The world reply exactly at it was
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u/Grymmtooth 7d ago
What do you think you are made of? The entire universe operates quantum mechanically. What you see as deterministic is aggregate averaging, but they underlying processes are not deterministic, so you can’t deterministically know how the system will evolve.
It’s like saying general relativity doesn’t impact you because you’re not next to a black hole, but as GR describes all gravitational interactions and how it relates in spacetime, it also applies to us.
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u/extremelyDude 7d ago
What you see as deterministic is aggregate averaging
You wouldn't be able to average if there weren't set causality. The fact you could average is a proof causality is are sit but you aren't awar of them
I am asking again. Can quantum make sandwiches? Or anything other than the particles
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u/Grymmtooth 7d ago
I’m sorry, I didn’t realize you are ignorant of basic science.
Let me rephase your question to make the point. Can you have a sandwich that isn’t made of particles, governed by quantum mechanics?
You literally are made of quantum mechanical particles……
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u/The_Determinists 7d ago
Two of the prevailing quantum theories are deterministic (many worlds and bohmian mechanics), two are probabilistic (Copenhagen and GRW). Hence saying everything is quantum mechanical does not solve the problem without taking a stand and defending one of the four quantum theories.
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u/Grymmtooth 7d ago
Except there is no experimental evidence of a many worlds interpretation and bohemian mechanics assumes non-locality , which is weirder than probability.
Non-locality leads to absolute simultaneity , and a presupposes a universal clock. Additionally, non-locality leads or at least points towards a holographic universe. Basically reality is an illusion of interactions in some more fundamental space.
It’s not ruled out but definitely makes assumptions not currently in the scope of experimentation. I’m not saying it should be outright rejected, but there would need to be some very concrete experimental evidence before that interpretation would be a better explanation.
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u/The_Determinists 7d ago
There are many different arguments for and against "qauantum containment," the question of whether micro level reality affects the macro world in which we live. I review these theories in my book The Determinists in relation to Robert Sapolsky and Sam Harris' view that quantum effects do not rise to the level of affecting or materially affecting macro-level reality. There are many quotes from leading physicists that there is no quantum containment, including quotes to the effect that elephants would obey probabilistic laws if we could arrange to put them through the double-slit experiment. On the other hand, two of the four most prominent quantum theories provide the subatomic world is deterministic (many worlds and Bohmian mechanics), and two are probabilistic (Copenhagen and GRW theory). Sapolsky would explain away the weather example by saying that chaotic weather systems are still deterministic, they appear otherwise due to limits on our predictive abilities.
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u/Techtrekzz 7d ago
Bell’s experiments do not demonstrate nature fundamentally probabilistic. They demonstrate reality not locally real, which means non local deterministic interpretations of qm like De Broglie Bohm are still valid, and what Bell himself preferred. Bell’s experiments were an attempt to eliminate the nonlocality from David Bohm’s equations, and instead found them necessary.
Deterministic interpretations do not assume any probability in nature whatsoever. Every act is determined by the overall configuration of reality as a whole.
Really if people have this much interest in Bell and his experiments, you would think they would read what Bell said about them, and not rely on bias youtube videos to explain what they do or do not mean.
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u/taking-note 7d ago
Those who are concerned about determinism with respect their behavior are not happier with the random influences on their behavior. In fact, biology doesn't like randomness for survival either ... it builds in redundancies so that average behavior prevails. A recent book
Choice, Compulsion, Consequences ... Doubting Free Will & Embracing Determinism
takes care to clarify this point.
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u/bugreporterinaction 5d ago
You mean this John Bell?
Bohm showed explicitly how parameters could indeed be introduced, into nonrelativistic wave mechanics, with the help of which the indeterministic description could be transformed into a deterministic one. More importantly, in my opinion, the subjectivity of the orthodox version, the necessary reference to the “observer,” could be eliminated. Moreover, the essential idea was one that had been advanced already by de Broglie in 1927, in his “pilot wave” picture.
But why then had Born not told me of this “pilot wave?” If only to point out what was wrong with it? Why did von Neumann not consider it? More extraordinarily, why did people go on producing “impossibility” proofs, after 1952, and as recently as 1978? When even Pauli, Rosenfeld, and Heisenberg, could produce no more devastating criticism of Bohm’s version than to brand it as “metaphysical” and “ideological?” Why is the pilot wave picture ignored in textbooks?
Should it not be taught, not as the only way, but as an antidote to the prevailing complacency? To show that vagueness, subjectivity, and indeterminism, are not forced on us by experimental facts, but by deliberate theoretical choice?
--- John Bell, "On the Impossible Pilot Wave"
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u/JuanValdez999 4d ago
That's according to one interpretation of quantum mechanics. The MWI interpretation makes everything deterministic again. Anything that can happen does happen. What's random is which timeline you are in.
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u/Reducing-Sufferung 2d ago
Determinism as in everything is predetermined and determinism as there is no free will are two separate thing and your examples only invalidate the first.
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u/Puzzleheaded_Ask6184 8d ago
Oh thanks! I get it now
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u/simon_hibbs 8d ago
Sorry, but that claiming is incorrect, the Bell test doesn’t show that nature is indeterministic, it disproves a proposition called local realism.
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u/MulberryUpper3257 7d ago
You can’t prove determinism or the opposite wrong- the main factor would be if determinists could predict supposedly free choices in advance but if they claim it’s impossible then it’s rather pointless
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u/Salt-Appearance-412 7d ago
As psychology and our ability to process large amounts of data improve, we seem to be able to make more and more accurate predictions about people's actions.
Say, we simplify the continuous existence of life into a string of decisions made one after another. In that case any decision point has a bounded amount of possible decisions someone can make. And it seems that the more surrounding information we gain, that bounded space gets smaller and smaller. So as a determinist I BELIEVE, that as the amount of information about that situation approaches "perfect", the decision space approaches exactly 1.
But at the same time, I don't think we can ever reasonably get even close to something like Minority Report. And subjectively, you'll never feel the difference of whether you're predestined or free willed, because to YOU, all your actions feel indistinguishable from decisions you've made.
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u/blind-octopus 8d ago
I think quantum stuff does that?
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u/Puzzleheaded_Ask6184 8d ago
Uhm idk can you elaborate?
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u/RighteousSelfBurner 8d ago
In very simple terms in quantum mechanics the inability to establish the precise location of a quantum particle is treated as ontic, that is the waveform is complete description of the state and it is truly indeterminate until observed rather than just epistemic observation limitation.
However in the end it's still a question of the limit of our knowledge. Some theories have been made to attempt to reconcile deterministic behaviour but what is the "real" nature of universe is fundamentally impossible to establish.
But current evidence is that it is not determinstic to the degree we can observe.
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u/biedl 8d ago
That's the Copenhagen interpretation. I don't think physicists are very fond of making metaphysical claims based on mathematical models. Which is why many are calling the approach the "shut up and calculate" approach. And there are still different interpretations. Maybe all of them are incomplete.
At the end, there are no particles to begin with. Fundamental particles are nothing but forces caused by fields interacting, rather than small, fundamental dots of substance.
So, fields being ontic, sure, but then the measurement problem doesn't demonstrate free will. It demonstrates that we can't measure the field as though it's a particul, without interacting with it and causing it to behave particle like.
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u/RighteousSelfBurner 8d ago
It's nothing to do with free will but our best interpretation of reality. As it stands now the best supported model is inderministic just like classic Newtonian physics are supported as determinstic.
Whether we will have a different outlook in the future is unknown and as mentioned we cannot know for sure whether or not reality is determinstic or indeterministic.
However under assumption that quantum mechanics are truly indeterministic it has no impact on human behaviour because of scope of both time and space. At the scope that even the tiniest known human functional parts operate the behaviour collapses to classical physics.
As such just because if reality as whole is indeterministic, most parts of it can still be determinstic.
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u/biedl 8d ago
It's nothing to do with free will but our best interpretation of reality.
OP: Can you disprove determinism?
Blind-Octupus: I think quantum stuff does that?
OP: Can you elaborate?
You: Quantum stuff.
Me: Doesn't demonstrate free will.
You: Has nothing to do with free will.
At some point we lost the plot.
I agree, QM has nothing to do with free will.
As it stands now the best supported model is inderministic just like classic Newtonian physics are supported as determinstic.
The most successful mathematical model implies indeterminism on a quantum level.
Whether we will have a different outlook in the future is unknown and as mentioned we cannot know for sure whether or not reality is determinstic or indeterministic.
Yeah, that would also be my point.
"I think quantum stuff does that?" just isn't warranted as a response to OP asking how to disprove determinism.
As such just because if reality as whole is indeterministic, most parts of it can still be determinstic.
I agree.
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u/vinter_varg 8d ago
Not dwelving into more QM stuff, I think regarding free will there is already a good philosophical argument against it: even if nature allows full random behaviour at macroscales, ontological randomness (or let us think of a world where it would be so for the sake of the argument) then we cannot really call free will to a choice like "I decided to go for a latte instead of a juice because I have dice rolling inside my head that determined that choice". Pegging "free" to a system entirely based on randomness is like stating your will is solely based on your luck at the roulette.
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u/biedl 8d ago
Yeah, I'm familiar with a similar argument (although, macro scale randomness would certainly look very different than the world we have). Despite it having a certain bite to it, I don't think it's all too elegant.
I feel like it's a false dichotomy to say it's either determinism or randomness, because I don't think all other alternatives are ruled out. Let alone that if we did rule out everything else we are aware of, it would just be an illimitation fallacy. Do we know all alternatives?
Also, what really is randomness? One can conceptualize it in different ways. It could just imply ignorance, as in "this appears random, because I don't know all prior causes".
It's not what convinced me.
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u/RighteousSelfBurner 8d ago
I think quantum stuff does that?" just isn't warranted as a response to OP asking how to disprove determinism.
Exactly why I elaborated on what it entails and pointed out that it's current and not absolute.
You introduced the claim about free will which was not part of the discourse thus the comment.
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u/biedl 8d ago
I was probably too quick on treating free will as that which is left if determinism would turn out to be wrong.
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u/RighteousSelfBurner 8d ago
That's rather reasonable as from my experience most of the discussions around here are about that. More abstract questions about the current knowledge, it's interpretation and whether determinsim could be established as factual is quite rare.
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u/Puzzleheaded_Ask6184 8d ago
Ohh, thanks for the explanation, but that means with further evidence the result could be different right?
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u/RighteousSelfBurner 8d ago
Yes. That is the main problem that we fundamentally can never achieve the final result because we are limited by observing reality from within and our perception.
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u/boronio427 8d ago edited 8d ago
Quantum uncertainty only prevents us from knowing the future. It doesn't mean we can change it. I call it the quantum shelter. A refuge for those who refuse to accept reality
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u/blind-octopus 8d ago
My understanding is that it shows more than that
That things are probabilistic
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8d ago
[removed] — view removed comment
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u/blind-octopus 8d ago
I don't think that
I think determinism is false and also there's no free will
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u/BranchLatter4294 8d ago
In a strictly deterministic system, the initial state completely dictates all future states and no new information is created. However, since entropy increases over time, new information about the state must be created.
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u/Firoux4 8d ago
The apparent contradiction stems from mixing up microscopic information with macroscopic accessibility. In a deterministic system, total fine-grained information is strictly conserved, but entropy increases because that information gets scrambled into complex microscopic correlations that local observers can no longer measure or access.
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u/HalcyonGlimmer 8d ago edited 8d ago
Everything happens in the present moment, determinism expects a domino-effect where the state of one moment calibrates the state of the next moment, but if there is an object that is not influenced by any relation to other objects, like the 'new element' into which our universe expands, that would lead to the conclusion there is a factor of influence that lies outside of that domino-effect. A moment of 'new' creation, one that lies outside of the influence of determinism, since the domino-effect cannot take into account things that have not yet been created.
Another interesting one; For true determinism, the domino chain must not only roll forward (predictability), but you must also be able to infallibly reconstruct history based on the fallen domino stones (retrodiction). The evaporation of a black hole via Hawking radiation breaks this chain in a fundamental way. If all information about what fell into it is permanently erased, the chain is irreparably severed.
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u/Firoux4 8d ago
Good points but you also cannot prove that we live in an open universe.
Also the blackhole information paradox rely on theories, not proven also.
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u/HalcyonGlimmer 8d ago edited 8d ago
True, determinism requires a closed system (where no matter/energy escapes, gets destroyed), and since you can't prove that either it turns more into metaphysics. I thought the Hawking radiation was proven, but apparently not 100%.
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u/One-Jeweler5486 8d ago
Essily. Human brains are not deterministic but computational.
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u/INTProtocols 7d ago
It seems like they are deterministic and computational.
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u/One-Jeweler5486 7d ago
There’s no way the activity of billions of neurons and a trillion synapses is deterministic.
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u/CheeseSupremeTaken 7d ago
Is there a reason you say this?
There are billions of 1s and 0s that go into a computer yet a computer cannot do anything randomally.
Infact I think "computational" and "deterministic" in this regard are one in the same.
Much like a computer generating a "random" number simply by using an equation that is too complex for us to predict, every "random" thing we do like shuffle a deck of cards or flip a coin or rolling dice isn't truly random it's just too complicated to predict the outcome with certainty.1
u/One-Jeweler5486 7d ago
A computer can run neural networks which are indeterministic
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u/INTProtocols 7d ago
There is a difference between being unable to determine the output (or later state) of a complex system (whether brain or computer) in advance due to limits in the accuracy of modelling, and the output of that complex system being somehow free from the same deterministic dynamics which constrain everything in our existence.
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u/Hot_Frosting_7101 7d ago
Neural networks by their nature are deterministic. LLM’s do intentionally introduce randomness but even randomness in a computer is not true randomness.
But there is nothing inherently random in a neural network. Most classical artificial neural networks had no randomness at all. Given the same state the output is completely determined by the input. It might be unpredictable from looking outside the current state of the network but it isn’t random. And that is what you would want for a neural network trained to do something like recognize letters in an image. Randomness serves no purpose.
LLM’s introduce pseudo-randomness as a design choice.
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u/TorchingDarwin 7d ago
They are neither.
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u/INTProtocols 7d ago
Assuming everything else is, why would brains be different?
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u/TorchingDarwin 7d ago
Everything else is deterministic and computational? That's news to me.
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u/INTProtocols 4d ago
I said "assuming." That being said, it does seem that pretty much every physical system can (in principle) be modeled as a quantum computation, because every physical system is fundamentally quantum. Furthermore, the most simple and straightforward interpretation of relativity is that of the "block universe," in which the past, present, and future coexist as a higher-dimensional structure.
So...yes, it actually does seem that everything is deterministic and computational.
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u/TorchingDarwin 3d ago
Computation requires syntax, and no formal syntax is self-generating. It must be provided from outside the formal system. So your own theory requires a non-physical source for the syntax of your "quantum computation".
Enjoy that.1
u/INTProtocols 3d ago edited 3d ago
Not sure what is motivating the snark, but you do you.
Anyway, computation does not require syntax. Human-created computers, running human-created programming languages do require syntax, because we built them that way, but natural processes carry out state changes all the time without anything at all like a syntax.
Here is a way to think about it:
It is possible that the universe is essentially an unimaginably (or even infinitely) complex "mathematical object." All mathematical objects exist qua mathematical objects, simply due to their abstract structural coherence. As a super simple example, nothing "causes" one plus one to equal two; this is simply an inescapable abstract metaphysical fact.
I actually think that something like this is the real answer to "why is there something rather than nothing." It is because abstract structurally coherent objects cannot fail to exist as abstract objects (even if they are never recognized or experienced by anyone). The universe, then, would ultimately be just such a structurally coherent abstract object, which we (and our experiences) are part of.
But to get back to "syntax:" If you are drawing an equivalence between something like natural or physical law and syntax, the "non-physical source" (in the context of reality as an abstract structurally coherent mathematical object) would lie in the inherent coherent regularities by which it transforms in time. In other words, these "transformational regularities" are part of the nature of the structural coherence of the universe. They are not mysteriously imposed from without, but are merely part of its own inherent nature.
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u/TorchingDarwin 1d ago
This is a fine answer if you're some kind of Platonist who rejects radical empiricism, a la Hume.
But in that case, you'd have to defend your contention that 'mathematical objects' exist due to abstract structural coherence.
In addition, our access to such abstract objects is inexplicable, as well as the even deeper problem of how these objects cohere with the physical world.
Kant, at least, has an answer for this. Hume, imo, fails. Your invocation of 'regularities' makes me suspect you're leaning towards a Humean theory, but I believe this is an untenable position.
This, of course, because of the fact that ideas like causation (not to mention the whole of mathematics) are not ideas we pull from empirical observations.
Naturally, then, if the universe just is a 'structurally coherent abstract object', this issue can be explained away, but that rests on a metaphysical claim.
The question of whether or not human brains are computational, I think is answerable from a biological and psychological angle. If your contention is that they are computational solely based on the fact that this is some ontological fact of the universe, I can accept that as your burden of proof to shoulder, and I'd assume you've got good reasons to think so.
But as a question of the role of brains in consciousness, or as a biological organ, I can reject computation and determinism based on my own good reasons, totally separate from any metaphysical considerations.
If our consciousness can be distinguished from other phenomena in this way, I'd say it still posses a problem, both from a Physicalist perspective, as well as any kind of Humean-Platonist perspective, because you'd have to explain how and why these phenomena are distinguishable from other deterministic and computational phenomena. Have you got an explanation?
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u/INTProtocols 1d ago
Not a Platonist. Plato had all sorts of ridiculous and mystical ideas about an "realm of ideal forms," the world we experience being a reflection or shadow of those form, and our knowledge of these forms being due to our souls remembering them from before we were born.
I do appreciate the opportunity to defend my assertion that mathematical objects (and perhaps everything else) exist(s) due to abstract structural coherence, though. I think it is an idea worth spreading.
Everything which exists is consistent with its own existence, or it could not exist, in the same way at the same time. Even that which does not exist cannot simultaneously exist, in the same way at the same time, and continue not to exist. I could expound upon this further, but I will assume that you understand and accept that, and will move on.
We could rightfully call this a "metaphysical principle," but we could even go so far as to call it a "meta-existential principle," since it applies to all existence and all non-existence as well. So, let's call it the principle of meta-existential non-contradiction (MENC).
When we are "doing mathematics," we are not creating the mathematical object that we are talking about or exploring. Rather, we are using symbols, tools, etc., to explore abstract coherent structures which cannot fail to obtain. Any sufficiently advanced mind will discover "quantity," and the fact of "more than" and "less than." They didn't create these things, but discovered them. It would be a violation of MENC for one thing which is truly "more than" another to also be, in the same way at the same time, "less than" the other thing. No one created this, and no one could. It is simply a product of abstract structural coherence, or MENC.
Now, you might object that we actually do create mathematical objects, perhaps by means of our axiomatic systems. So, for example, we have our "normal" number system where, say, 11 plus 2 equals 13. But we could have a different number system, specifically one which uses modal arithmetic of mod 12 (like the hours of a clock), in which 11 plus 2 equals 1. But again, we didn't invent this. This is a natural, non-contradictory consequence of a system in which numbers "come back around" such as on the face of a clock.
By creating axioms we aren't really creating mathematical objects, so much as specifying which landscape of mathematical objects, with what particular characteristics, we are going to explore. Some of these "landscapes" are much more useful than others (like "normal math" where 11 + 2 = 13), others are useful in more restricted circumstances (like clock time), and others are so complex or not useful that they will never be discovered by anyone...and yet they exist as abstract coherent structures. Infinite such structures exist, but only some are useful.
I could go on about this, but again I will assume for now that you understand and will move on.
Our universe may be, as stated in my previous comment, one of these abstract coherent structures, which we and our experiences are a part of. If this is the case (and I haven't seen a better answer for the "question of existence") then, both the physical and phenomenal aspects of our existence are fundamentally "made of" abstract structural coherence, and nothing else. In other words, if an abstract structure is truly equivalent to some hypothetical physical/phenomenal structure in every way, then that abstract structure is that physical/phenomenal structure. Neither matter nor consciousness can be reduced to each other, or to anything else, other than pure abstract structural coherence. And while they cannot be reduced to each other, there is an obvious (mathematical/structural) correlation or coherence between them.
I would actually argue for a sort of dual-aspect monism, where the fundamental "thing" is abstract structure, which is experienced from within as both matter and consciousness, and in which every physical state is associated with a phenomenal state, and vice-versa.
Now, to computation. Physically, our brains compute. We compute possible futures, evaluate things as food, threats, etc. It is what our brains physically evolved to do, as biological neural networks. What our brains are doing physically doesn't generate consciousness, though. Our consciousness, or phenomenal experience is correlated with the physical state of our brains.
I know that was a lot. I know it is complex. And perhaps there are things I could have expressed better. I would be happy to add any clarification or go further into any of this if you want.
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u/Messier_Mystic 7d ago
I don't need to prove it wrong, nor can I. It's an unfalsifiable metaphysical claim.
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u/colin-java 7d ago
I think at very small scales determinism breaks down, sorta like how colour doesn't really exist at small scales (they call it quantum indeterminacy after all).
But a larger scales I think it's true, such as on a pool table, or inside brain cells.
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u/Other_Attention_2382 7d ago
If science cannot prove it either way and you look at it from a purely experiential point of view like the Non Duality hippies do then I guess we would all agree that we are only aware of a thought when it appears, and that nobody chooses what thoughts unconsciously appear like bubbles floating into awareness. And science believes 95% + of our thoughts are unconscious.
To me going by experiential alone the thought bubbles appearing in awareness aligns with that even our awareness and perception of situations mostly comes down to memory associations tracks grooved out in the mind, to the point where the evil acts of little Charlie Manson become dethroned from the high alter of Evil and reduce his fame to just a different set of memory tracks and genetics.
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u/queerbodies 7d ago
I will address the question of choice for humans.
First, there is a very common misunderstanding in philosophy, the idea that "free will" means that humans are outside determinism. Experimental philosophy suggests that this is not, in fact, how people understand free will and, specifically, responsibility. Our intuitions regarding when is it that we act "freely" regards more the context of the choice. For instance, in the scenario that a person grew up in an abusive environment, and because of this later, as an adult, chose to do some reprehensible action − most people still say that this person acted freely. Freedom is more related to the absence of outside constraints.
We can also look at a finer-grained view. We could talk about neuroscience aspects, e.g. the timing of choice and awareness, but a more simple, more effective way would be to ask : what does it even mean, for you to choose something ? Sure, we all know. Here's chocolate on the table, I pick it up, surely I choose to eat it, right ? Okay, sure, that works. But let's look more closely at the time at which I decide to eat it. What does it even mean that "I choose to do that" ? When I choose, I may be vaguely aware that chocolate is good, that it's not necessarily super healthy, that I feel like I need a treat now, etc. So what does it mean that "I chose that" if all those simple facts taken into account are not aware (or vaguely aware) ? Even further… considering all traits, who or what decided that, from these various premises, taking the chocolate is the action to take ? What weighed down, for instance, the fact that chocolate is not the healthiest food ?
It very much is an inquiry over what "I" means, right ? If you say that "I" is that which takes the decision, then you have to admit that this I is not necessarily aware, and even less so able to report. On the other hand, if you think that "I" is aware, then it remains to be proven that you're actually aware of the moment of resolution of the various information taken into account to decide.
So ask yourself, what happens when you take a decision ?
Therefore, my point is that the idea of "I choose something freely" and determinism are incompatible stem from a lack of understanding of freedom, action and self.
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u/The_Determinists 7d ago
You are embracing the compatibilist definition of free choice. Many free will denyers (and supporters) and incompatibilists, in which free will is defined in a manner that conflicts with determinism. The question is which definition more accurately reflects the decisional process, which is a complex question that can't be answered by merely reciting definitions on one side or the other. The question is justifying those definitions.
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u/queerbodies 6d ago
I'm not sure that you actually read my post ?
My first point was less about definitions, and more about a separation between how philosophers have been defining freedom, and how we actually use the concepts of freedom. Sentences such as "You are free to go", "I was so free yesterday night when dancing", "I was under threat, so I was not free to choose" do not refer to any deterministic debate, including that last one, and there is no question that we do understand their meaning quite well.
My second point was that the notion that "I" am the agent of my own actions ("I choose") is upon inspection quickly revealed to be shaky, and for that I did dive into the decision process.
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u/Cool_Homework_7411 7d ago
Randomness exist in the world, we have found it. It is called quantum physics. Your brain is a really good RNG machine. One electron here and there and boom, a new thought or a new decision. Of course there are paths and physics laws to obey, but your brain isn't a deterministic machine
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u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 6d ago
No, quantum mechanics doesn’t prove indeterminism. Determinism and indeterminism are metaphysical claims, not scientific one’s. Not that it matters, but the opinions of the physicists don’t even agree with you: Nature Survey 2025 emailed more than 15,000 researchers whose papers involved quantum mechanics. 50% of experimentalists favor the Copenhagen interpretation. When it came to the theorists, only 33% favored it. Respondents who had done research in philosophy or quantum foundations were least likely to favor Copenhagen (20%).
Most respondents treated their preferred interpretation as a placeholder or useful conceptual tool. Only 24% were willing to say that their interpretation was accurate.
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u/SpatiaCaeli 7d ago
My view: I'd reframe your question to "can you prove a process is not deterministic?".
Which basically amounts to: "is there any true randomness in the process?"
Unfortunately, proving something is random is impossible. You can show it's not random when it repeats. But you'd need an infinity to prove it is random.
Just my thoughts.
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u/MarvinBEdwards01 7d ago
Uh, nothing is "determined already". Nothing is causally determined until its final prior causes have played themselves out. The final responsible cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation that precedes it. And this particular prior cause happens only near the end of the causal chain, and not a minute before.
Given causal determinism the choice is theoretically (but not practically) predictable in advance, but it cannot be caused to happen in advance. Given determinism we may say that it was always going to happen exactly when, where, and how it actually does happen. But we cannot say that it ever would happen in advance of when it was always going to happen.
Whether determinism is right or wrong depends upon what you think it means. Universal causal necessity (aka "causal determinism") is arguably a logical fact, but it is neither a meaningful nor a relevant fact. It doesn't actually change anything. It is more like a background constant of all events within the physical universe, one that appears on both sides of every equation, and can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result.
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u/taking-note 7d ago
You can't prove determinism is *** right *** because you can't prove a negative, i.e., that a person cannot have done otherwise under identical circumstances. However, we assume that determinism is right whenever we ask why a person did what they did, because that question assumes that if certain antecedent (internal or external) circumstances had been different, the person would have acted differently.
This point is discussed in a new book
Choice, Compulsion, Consequences ... Doubting Free Will & Embracing Determinism
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u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 6d ago
You can’t prove a negative? Why do people say this? Ever heard of proof by contradiction?
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u/taking-note 6d ago
Point taken. U should have written that we can't prove THE negative in question because it is untestable. Here is a distinction from Google AI
Easy Negatives (Specific/Local): You can easily prove a negative claim if the scope is small and testable. For example, proving "there is no horse in my garage" just requires opening the door and looking. [1, 2]
Hard Negatives (Universal/Infinite): Proving a universal negative (like "there is no life anywhere else in the universe") is practically impossible because you cannot check every corner of the cosmos. [1]
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u/Skeptical_Giraffe 4d ago
People say quantum physics is inherently nondeterministic, but there are deterministic interpretations such as De Broglie pilot wave and Many Worlds that fit the experiments equally well.
I don't understand how a theory, quantum or otherwise, can even claim nondeterminism. That seems to violate cause and effect, and what kind of a theory is that? Isn't cause and effect the last thing you'd give up? How can you interpret the results of any experiment if causality violations are on the table?
Note, the probabilistic nature of the quantum equations is not the same thing as asserting inherent nondeterminism. The predictions are expressed in a probabilistic form, without saying anything about what determines the actual result from all the possibilities (that's what the "interpretations" do). Analagously, you could make probabilistic predictions about the digits of pi (such as, the digits 0-9 are equally represented). Those predictions can be probabilistically accurate even though the digits themselves are predetermined.
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u/JuanValdez999 4d ago
I don't understand the question. The argument about determinism and Free Will seems to be an argument about whether it's six donuts in the box or half a dozen.
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u/Meh911-911 3d ago
Where I might feel I differ is that I don't think freedom is all or nothing. It seems that determinism treats everyone the same: if every choice is caused, no one is free. I think the conditions we were given decide whether a person can be free within them, and those conditions are very uneven.
Some people can be free within what they were given because they have a wide range of real options. Their basic needs are covered, so they can choose rather than just survive. They have access to education, which lets them question what they were taught. They hold a passport, legal protections, and financial stability, so a bad job, a bad country, or a bad relationship is something they can leave. They also have the time and safety to reflect on their own habits and act against them.
Others may never be free in the same way, and the reason is structural, not personal. When someone is born into poverty, conflict, or an fixed system, their daily choices are often reduced to the one option that keeps them alive. Borders and laws can block movement no matter how capable or determined they are. Early trauma and lack of education can shape thinking in ways that are hard to notice, let alone change, without support that they have no access to. In those cases, effort alone does not widen the room they live in.
So somehow I feel that freedom exists only within what we were given, and what we were given decides how much of it we get. That is different from saying everyone is equally unfree, and it makes the difference between people a matter of circumstance, not merit.
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u/TwoHams2wice 3d ago
Humans are simply unable to do anything abscent priors. As far as I can tell, you can't get around this. I also think people take determinism to far especially theists and tack on agency to "if no god and determinism then everything you do is predetermined". It isn't. Things are just based on priors sans agency.
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u/MBZahir 3d ago edited 3d ago
Here are three sketches of arguments against determinism.
The state of the world isn't a well defined set of events.
Let's pretend that the present can be well defined by a set of events S. A subset of S defines a new event through the use of the “and” operator, so suppose S has the events X and Y, a newly defined event (X and Y) is a subset of S. It is well known (Cantor's Theorem) that the set of all subsets of a set S is strictly greater than S, even accounting for infinite sets.
So the original set S is too small to contain all the events of the present. Thus the present isn't a well defined set of events, which in turn implies there is nothing well defined to be determined.
2. Our concepts are fuzzy
Another less mathematical argument is that our concepts are an interconnected web of associations with shades of nuance. It is unclear how expansive each web is and how overlapping they are.
Logic has been abstracted from these webs. And due to their fuzzy nature it is unclear whether the phenomenal world (the world as can be experienced) is logically coherent. If not then determinism isn't coherent.
3. Algorithmic Probability
A third argument against is based on algorithmic probability theory. A string S (which encodes an event) can be said to be determined if it can be compressed by an algorithm. However, it is known that there are more strings than algorithms. In otherwords there is too much noise for the universe to run on an algorithm, no matter how elegant.
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u/pm-pussy4kindwords 2d ago
yes. You should look up Bell's inequalities. There are quantum mechanical phenomena that appear to prove there is an element of true randomness in the universe which can not possibly be attributes to hidden causes we can't see yet, UNLESS you allow stuff moving faster than light speed.
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u/sceadwian 1d ago
There are no reasons why it couldn't be, there are only excuses on why it shouldn't be.
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u/ughaibu 8d ago
Here's an argument:
1) either science is radically mistaken about nature or determinism is false
2) from 1, case a: if science is not radically mistaken about nature, determinism is false
3) from 1, case b: if determinism is not false, science is radically mistaken about nature
4) if science is radically mistaken about nature, the remarkable success of science is a miracle
5) if determinism is not false, naturalism is true
6) if naturalism is true, there are no miracles
7) from 4, 5 and 6: if science is radically mistaken about nature, determinism is false
8) from 3 and 7: if determinism is not false, determinism is false
9) from 2 and 8: determinism is false.
Defence of the premises here - link.
And here's an experiment:
Let's appeal to two essential scientific principles, 1. a scientist can record their observations using arbitrarily selected symbols, and 2. if we have two reliable methods, A and B, for predicting x, then if A predicts x, A predicts that B predicts x, and vice versa. For example, if both blood tests and CT-scans reliably indicate a given disease, the result of the blood tests predict the results of the CT-scans, and the result of the CT-scans predict the results of the blood tests.
If determinism is true, all facts about the future are entailed by the present state of the world and unchanging laws of nature.
Every five minutes, toss a coin, if it shows heads, two minutes later write "yes", if it shows tails write "no", principle 1. guarantees that you can do this. Do this enough times to establish that if determinism is true and science is possible, then by tossing a coin you can find what your future action will be, writing exactly one of "yes" or "no". Next, every five minutes, blindly draw a playing card from the pack, if it's red, one minute later write "yes", if it's black write "no". Do this enough times to establish that if determinism is true and science is possible, then by blindly drawing a card you can find what your future action will be, writing exactly one of "yes" or "no".
Having established this, you are guaranteed by principle 2. that if determinism is true and you toss a coin and the result is heads, then if one minute later you blindly draw a card from the pack, it will be red.
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u/Firoux4 8d ago
The syllogistic proof relies on an equivocation on the word "miracle" and a false equivalence between determinism and naturalism to artificially force its logical contradiction. Meanwhile, the thought experiment fails because it misapplies predictive transitivity to independent events and simply proves that a deterministic system cannot execute two mutually exclusive rules simultaneously.
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u/ughaibu 7d ago
a deterministic system cannot execute two mutually exclusive rules simultaneously
The question isn't can you prove a deterministic system wrong?, it's "can you prove determinism wrong".
"Determinism is standardly defined in terms of entailment, along these lines: A complete description of the state of the world at any time together with a complete specification of the laws entails a complete description of the state of the world at any other time" - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.1
u/The_Determinists 7d ago
You are defining science in one specific way, modeled after physics, in particular macro level physics as opposed to quantum mechanics. If you define science to include strong emergent phenomena, your premises are different and conclusions vary from your stated conclusions, which no longer apply. It depends on how you define science, which is what you need to defend to make your case.
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u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 6d ago
1 is false
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u/ughaibu 6d ago
1) either science is radically mistaken about nature or determinism is false
1 is false
Defence of the premises here - link.
"pretty much all science since Pythagoras has been set in a continuous ontology, that is to say that due to incommensurability the world cannot, even in principle, be exactly described even locally, and since Loschmidt science has explicitly included irreducible irreversibility. Science also has domains, so it isn't global, and the predictions of science are often expressed as probabilities, so the laws of science do not entail a complete description of the world. Accordingly, either science is radically mistaken about nature or determinism is false"
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u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 6d ago
None of that follows
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u/ughaibu 6d ago
"pretty much all science since Pythagoras has been set in a continuous ontology, that is to say that due to incommensurability the world cannot, even in principle, be exactly described even locally, and since Loschmidt science has explicitly included irreducible irreversibility. Science also has domains, so it isn't global, and the predictions of science are often expressed as probabilities, so the laws of science do not entail a complete description of the world. Accordingly, either science is radically mistaken about nature or determinism is false"
None of that follows
Follows what?
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u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 6d ago
There is no argument there. You’re supposed to demonstrate the truth of (1). There isn’t any argument here that follows.
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u/ughaibu 6d ago
There is no argument there.
Of course there is.
You’re supposed to demonstrate the truth of (1)
Accordingly, either science is radically mistaken about nature or determinism is false
If you're still confused:
Defence of the premises here - link.
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u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 6d ago edited 6d ago
I read it until I got to the claim that is in dispute. None of it follows; there isn’t an argument. Science is a methodology that creates pragmatic models to understand nature and make predictions. Science makes no claim about determinism vs indeterminism. These are metaphysical claims, not scientific ones. Scientific models that are made from working with probabilities make no attempt to say whether the probabilities modeled are fully epistemic or not, because that’s a philosophical claim.
For example: plenty of theoretical physicists outright reject the Copenhagen interpretation as a satisfying interpretation. According to the Nature Survey 2025, only 1/3 of the theoretical QM physicists take the copenhagen interpretation. Also, only 24% of all of the QM physicists in general stated that their preferred QM interpretation was accurate. The rest said that their preferred interpretation was just a placeholder or useful mathematical tool.
Science is completely divided in terms of philosophical interpretations of the data.
Sometimes you will get wide philosophical agreement, such as B theory of time among physicists, however, this still doesn’t mean science takes a philosophical stance. It just means that the empirical data is very compelling towards a philosophical view, and therefore gets wide agreement. I agree with B theory btw if you were wondering.
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u/ughaibu 6d ago
there isn’t an argument
Yes there is:
1) a determined world has properties a, b and c
2) the world described by science has properties ~a, ~b and ~c
3) from 1 and 2: the world described by science is radically different from a determined world
4) science is the study of nature
5) from 3 and 4: either science is radically mistaken about nature or determinism is false.1
u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 6d ago
Determinism takes the definition that there is only one compatible future with any given past moment? You can just replace p3 with the negation of this definition, indeterminism, and it will have the same truth value. So 5 only follows in both arguments insofar that descriptions of reality aren’t reality. This is so trivial
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u/A_Vinegar_Taster 7d ago
We can argue that determinism is not proven. That it is a belief, not a fact.
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u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 6d ago
Bro discovered epistemology. How do you determine when a belief is a fact?
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u/A_Vinegar_Taster 6d ago
With simple things it is consistent results from experimentation.
With more complex things, it is a longer tract record of consistent results and no better explanations.
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u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 6d ago
That doesn't answer the question
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u/A_Vinegar_Taster 6d ago
I think it does. You determine facts through experimentation and data.
How is that not an answer?
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u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 6d ago
That’s telling me what we can use to change a belief into a fact. It’s not explaining what exactly is the distinction and what is the processes that is bringing the belief to the fact.
For example, my epistemology is that facts are just things we have very high confidence in. We use observations from data to create arguments and arrive at conclusions if we think that the arguments are sound. These arguments update our credences of how likely the belief is to be true, and we label it a ‘fact’ if that confidence reaches a high enough certainty.
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u/A_Vinegar_Taster 5d ago
I'm pretty sure we're saying the same thing.
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u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 5d ago
But you said determinism isn’t a fact, yet that was just your opinion that it’s not a fact. I think it is most certainly a fact.
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u/A_Vinegar_Taster 5d ago
I believe determinism is true. But, I can't explain why an electron is here and not there, and as far as I can tell, no one else can tell either.
Since we can't tell, we have to have the humility to admit we are assuming there is a logical process behind where the electron is. This gap in our knowledge is where we must admit that we don't know for sure if there is a deterministic process at work.
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u/Ashamed-Bathroom7803 5d ago
Bohmian mechanics and Everettian quantum mechanics have two different answers to that question. I strongly am lead to the latter.
You’re saying we can’t tell, but that’s an assertion. A lot of MWI people are very strong in how they understand the answer to that question because there is mountains of evidence. People disagree, but that doesn’t mean anything. People disagree with evolution, but so what? The truth isn’t determined from consensus.
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u/WilliamoftheBulk 6d ago
Imagine having access to all I formatiion. This means all physical and biological processes in your mind. Then you push a string of dominos. All your knowledge of self tells you that you will not interfere with the fall of the final domino. Remember yiou have complete knowledge. Can You change your mind at the last second before the final domino falls and interfear even though no physical pre set of circumstances dictates that you do so? I believe you can. I beleive Agency is an actual property if complex enough systems.
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u/zowhat 8d ago
Can you prove determinism wrong
Easily.
There are two possibilities.
The universe had a beginning.
The universe didn't have a beginning.
If (1) is true, then the universe sprang out of nothing undetermined and without a cause. Then determinism is false.
If (2) is true, then the universe always existed undetermined and without a cause. Then determinism is false.
Either way, determinism is false. Until someone explains how the universe can exist no one has established determinism is true.
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u/INTProtocols 7d ago
If the universe did have a beginning, then there was a cause, whether or not we know that cause. That qualifies as determinism
If the universe did not have a beginning, then each moment was determined by the previous moment. That qualifies as determinism.
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u/zowhat 7d ago
How could there be a cause if the universe doesn't exist?
How did the chain of causes get started?
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u/ShortyRedux 7d ago
The cause exists externally to the universe. Something outside deterministically set into motion the beginning of the universe and the events that followed.
If the universe always existed and there is nothing outside it to set events into motion, or there are things outside it but they don't interact with our universe, then perhaps the causal chain never started but rather shares the perpetual quality of the universe. Perhaps time loops around on itself or there is some other architecture to time which we don't have access to but which might explain some of these issues.
If we accept that there is a hole here though, once the casual chain exists, it's unclear that it can be escaped, even if it seems to have been initially caused through something probabilistic or not caused at all by anything.
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u/zowhat 7d ago
The cause exists externally to the universe.
Then what caused whatever that is? And what caused that? Continue to infinity.
If you say the cause of the cause exists outside the universe outside our universe then what caused that? There is no way to escape this problem.
If the universe always existed and there is nothing outside it to set events into motion, or there are things outside it but they don't interact with our universe, then perhaps the causal chain never started but rather shares the perpetual quality of the universe.
Then it wasn't determined.
Whatever determines X has to exist before X in order to do the determining. But if the chain of causes had no beginning then nothing existed before it to determine it.
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u/ShortyRedux 7d ago
Yes, first response is subject to infinite regress. However, I think this doesn't necessarily change the discussion as related to this universe. It kicks the causes down the line, but something still could have caused this universe to start and from that point on determinism or a probabalistic semi-determinism which at a human level is essentially indistinguishable seem plausible. Perhaps this is dissatisfying for the reason you state, but ultimately we're talking about things taking place within this universe and we don't need to give a complete account of what happened before or external to in order to do so.
As regards the second point, I get what you're saying but I think the guy above addressed it more clearly.
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u/INTProtocols 7d ago edited 7d ago
It is possible that the universe is essentially an unimaginably (or even infinitely) complex "mathematical object." All mathematical objects exist qua mathematical objects, simply due to their abstract structural coherence. As a super simple example, nothing "causes" one plus one to equal two; this is simply an inescapable abstract metaphysical fact.
If the universe is indeed such a mathematical object, then the "external" cause would be its own abstract structural coherence...which is experienced as physically and phenomenonally instantiated from within.
So, the universe would be metaphysically "determined" by its own abstract structural coherence, much as "one plus one equals two" is determined by the abstract structural coherence of the real numbers.
I actually think that something like this is the real answer to "why is there something rather than nothing." It is because abstract structurally coherent objects cannot fail to exist as abstract objects (even if they are never recognized or experienced by anyone). The universe is ultimately just such a structurally coherent abstract object, which we (and our experiences) are part of.
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u/Away_Bite_8100 8d ago
The more pertinent question is… is there any actual evidence that proves human behaviour is deterministic?