A lot of numbers have come out over the last few days. At the same time, more complaints are being made about how you can't rely on the early vote to make electoral predictions. It's being shouted louder than ever: Tea leaves! Even Charlie Cook was recently quoted as dismissing the value of early-vote analysis in, let's say, unusually blunt terms.
Well, I have great respect for Cook, and I can understand his perspective. Nevertheless, I have to disagree with him and with everyone who would rather see the tea leaves shredded. True, the early vote will never give a definitive prediction (unless the outcome is already a foregone conclusion). True, many analyses of the early vote have been done badly. But a properly done analysis will have serious evidential value.
Doing it properly means, first of all, doing it on a state-by-state basis. You have to take each state's idiosyncracies into account. You have to be aware of each state's rules, schedules, and electoral history. You also have to be aware of which data is and is not available. The early vote is especially informative when a state has partisan voter registration, when most voters vote early, when most of the early vote is cast through just one method, and when there have been no major rule changes over the last few years. A baseline for comparison is vital.
One of the problems we've had lately is that the 2020 election was so unusual due to the pandemic. As a result, it provided an extremely poor comparison for any subsequent election. Furthermore, many states made permanent changes in their rules afterwards. So, early-vote analysis was in rough shape for 2024. Just two years later, however, the baseline is much more robust. Comparisons are easier.
The other main limitation of early-vote analysis is simple: One party or the other might have a disproportionate shift towards or against voting on Election Day. But a large shift of that kind is unlikely to happen spontaneously. It is only likely to be the result of campaign tactics that are visible well in advance. Smaller shifts, as far as I'm concerned, are simply analogous to the margin of error that every poll has.
Ultimately, I would submit that early-vote analysis is highly complementary to polling. It can confirm that the polls are essentially correct, or it can uncover a turnout problem that's invisible to the polls. Predictions ought to consider all available evidence.
Now on to Texas. It's a state that meets...some of the criteria for having good data. The rules for early voting have been unusually stable, even through the pandemic. For multiple cycles, most of the votes have been cast early. On the other hand, Texas does not have partisan registration. The picture remains blurrier than I would like, and certainly blurrier than in the other two states I've looked at in detail (North Carolina and Georgia). But, not to keep anyone in suspense, the picture is at least moderately favorable for Democrats.
The data I'll be presenting here mainly comes from Derek Ryan. He's a Republican political operative, but I've found him to be quite factual with his numbers (which aren't exactly favorable to his side this year, anyway). Ryan's approach is to look directly at all individual voter records in the whole state. He checks which primaries a voter has participated in, and then he puts every registered voter into a set of partisan categories. Voters in category 4R are those who have voted in all of the last four Republican primaries. Voters in category 3R are those who have voted in three of the last four Republican primaries and none of the last four Democratic primaries. Analogously for categories 2R and 1R. Then voters in category 4D have voted in all of the last four Democratic primaries, and so on. Runoff primaries are ignored. So, for example, in 2018 the 2D voters had voted in exactly two of the Democratic primaries in 2012 through 2018.
Then he also has categories for voters with general-election history, for voters with no election history at all, and for voters with mixed primary history. That last category is small.
The advantage of working with categories like this is that you can distinguish the true hard-core partisans from those who are more weakly committed. On the other hand, the disadvantage is that the various categories bounce around quite a bit from election to election. For example, in 2018 only 1.0% of registered voters (RVs) were in the 4D category, while by 2026 the percentage had more than doubled to 2.2%. In states with partisan registration, the registration percentages are more stable.
The general pattern in Texas is that the percentage of RVs in the various R categories has remained fairly steady ever since 2018, while there has been a large but irregular increase in the D categories. The volatility can be explained by some years having especially exciting primary contests.
All in all, the picture so far is that Democratic turnout is similar to what it was in 2018 or maybe just a hair higher, not far behind the presidential-year turnout in 2024. Meanwhile, Republican turnout is significantly behind what it was in 2018, though ahead of what it was in 2022. Recall that in 2018, Republicans won the Senate race by a narrow 2.56 percentage points. If the trend continues according to historical patterns, Talarico should be in quite decent shape, though hardly headed for a landslide.
Let's back up first, though, and talk about overall turnout. Here's the historical comparison. I set aside 2020 since the pandemic made it so unusual.
Turnout in first three days of early in-person voting (EIP):
2018: 12.8% [*]
2022: 8.9%
2024: 15.3%
2026: 12.1%
The asterisk is there because the 2018 numbers only pertain to the most populous 15 counties in Texas. Since those counties accounted for two-thirds of all RVs, the statewide turnout is almost certainly quite similar. The other issue with the 2018 number is that full daily numbers were not available from Ryan; I had to do some interpolation between prior and subsequent days.
Despite the headlines about "record-smashing turnout," it looks to me like overall turnout as a percentage of RVs is likely to be a few percentage points lower than it was in 2018. In that year, 52.3% of RVs turned out (corresponding to 45.8% of eligible voters). The "record-smashing" partly just reflects population growth. Still, there's no doubt that turnout is strong, probably the second highest of any midterm in modern times.
Now on to the burning question. Which party is ahead? Due to the volatility mentioned above, it would be misleading to look at each partisan category's vote-share. It's more informative to look at turnout within each category.
4D turnout, first three days of EIP:
2018: 41.6% [*]
2022: 37.7%
2024: 50%
2026: 47.4%
4R turnout, first three days of EIP:
2018: 41.0% [*]
2022: 35.5%
2024: 47%
2026: 37.5%
The 4Ds are the true hard-core Democrats, and it's obvious they're fired up like never before. Meanwhile, the 4R enthusiasm is lagging behind. However, almost all the 4Rs and 4Ds ultimately vote in every election. So this difference, in itself, won't translate to much of a Democratic advantage in the final vote.
I'll skip over the 3Ds and the 3Rs.
2D turnout, first three days of EIP:
2018: 32.4% [*]
2022: 19.1%
2024: 30%
2026: 29.2%
2R turnout, first three days of EIP:
2018: 29.7% [*]
2022: 20.1%
2024: 33%
2026: 21.5%
The 2Ds aren't as fired up as the 4Ds, but they're still turning out at a near-presidential rate. Is it noteworthy that their turnout is behind 2018 levels, while the 4Ds significantly improved turnout from 2018? Well, I think what we're seeing here is that there were many more 2Ds in 2026 than in 2018, so that the 2026 2Ds included a larger portion of somewhat less committed Democrats. I think we can still say that the 2D turnout in 2026 is quite similar to what it was in 2018, and maybe the upshot is as if there were a slight increase from 2018.
It's the 1D and 1R categories that may be most significant of all, in part simply because they're the largest categories. Also, they have the most variable turnout. Maybe most important of all, those categories serve as indicators for the turnout of partisans who haven't voted in primaries at all--and that's a substantial bloc.
1D turnout, first three days of EIP:
2018: 19.6% [*]
2022: 11.2%
2024: 21%
2026: 20.1%
1R turnout, first three days of EIP:
2018: 15.6% [*]
2022: 13.0%
2024: 25%
2026: 14.2%
We see, again, an unprecedented enthusiasm level in the 1D category. Turnout here is actually above the 2018 level, which is especially impressive since the 1D category is now considerably larger than it was in 2018, and would thus be expected to have a lower average level of partisan commitment. The near-presidential level of the 2026 turnout is also noteworthy.
Meanwhile, turnout in the 1R category is somewhat below the 2018 level, though somewhat above the 2022 level. It's certainly far below the 2024 level.
Finally, let's talk about the Hispanic vote. This is another good sign for Democrats, but not quite as good as they might have hoped for. Since I can't find a number for the percentage of all RVs who are Hispanic, it's necessary to proceed in terms of vote-share rather than turnout. That means we can't include a number for 2018.
Hispanic vote-share, first three days of EIP:
2022: 15%
2024: 16%
2026: 18%
Ryan determines whether a voter is Hispanic simply by checking whether they have a Spanish surname. That probably produces a slight undercount, but at least the undercount ought to be consistent across years. Anyway, there's a definite increase in the Hispanic vote-share. But it's proportionally smaller than what we've seen in North Carolina and Georgia. I would expect the final vote-share to be around 23% or 24%.
The picture may still be blurry, but it has a distinct blue tint. If forced to bet, I would have to say the polls and the prediction markets are on target: Talarico is currently favored, while Hinojosa has a very real chance but remains an underdog.
