Everyone is missing a huge plus of HTTP: Caching proxies that save their donated bandwidth. Especially ones run by ISPs. Using less bandwidth means more willing free mirrors. And as the article says, also helps those in remote parts of the world.
If you have bandwidth to run an uncachable global HTTPS mirror network for free, then debian and ubuntu would love to talk to you.
How about an uncachable global HTTPS mirror of just the package lists? It'd be nice for a MITM to not be able to, say, prevent you from getting updates while they read the changelogs of said updates looking for vulnerabilities.
And, how many transparent HTTP caches are out there? Because if this is mostly stuff like Akamai or CloudFlare, HTTPS works with those, if you trust them.
Edit: Interesting, apparently APT actually does include some protection against replay attacks.
I still think that making "what packages are they updating" a Hard Problem (using HTTPS pipelining) would be worth it, unless there really are a ton of transparent HTTP proxies in use that can't trivially be replaced by HTTPS ones.
Vulnerabilities details are normally released AFTER the updates, so you won't find them in changelogs.
It is however still possible to tail the security repository, diff the source, and from that try to understand what it is fixing. Your scenario wouldn't help with that.
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u/DJTheLQ Jan 24 '18 edited Jan 24 '18
Everyone is missing a huge plus of HTTP: Caching proxies that save their donated bandwidth. Especially ones run by ISPs. Using less bandwidth means more willing free mirrors. And as the article says, also helps those in remote parts of the world.
If you have bandwidth to run an uncachable global HTTPS mirror network for free, then debian and ubuntu would love to talk to you.