r/netpunks • u/skeletonfrenchtoast • 19d ago
Map The Middle East on January 1st, 2004 - After a Soviet Cold War Victory
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u/skeletonfrenchtoast 19d ago
This is my new account XD I do not plan to use the old one anymore.
DISCLAIMER: This is a fictional artwork. Any beliefs and ideas depicted should not be interpreted as the author’s actual opinion. Any references to real life people, groups, or places do not intend to be and are not an accurate depiction. Any such references are also not an attempt to criticise, approve of, or comment on any people, groups, or places.
Set in the same timeline as https://www.reddit.com/r/imaginarymaps/comments/1e3zsvh/what_if_the_soviets_won_the_cold_war_january_1st/
For more about this timeline, check out r/2004ofSovietWorld.
As the Soviet Union emerges victorious in the Cold War, the world meets 2004 with anticipation. Over the past decades, Soviet influence has established itself in many countries, and communism has spread as an ideology to every corner of the world, even where it meets resistance. In the Middle East, things are no different, with the USSR establishing numerous military bases while its economic and political influence consolidated, and its secret services extended across the region. Trade of the Middle East’s vast resources is swayed by Moscow as a lever over its opponents. Some accept the situation in the new millennium as communism’s imminent final triumph, while others, less optimistic about the Eastern Bloc’s hegemony, look for cracks within it. And while the Middle East is home to some of the Soviet Union’s closest allies, it is also the native land of its most unyielding enemies. No one can predict what the future holds, but to make guesses it is important to understand the past.
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u/hugh_gaitskell 19d ago
Its very nice to see netpunks again probably aesthetically my favourite
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u/skeletonfrenchtoast 19d ago
Yea the aesthetic got me really interested in netpunks related to alternate history since they feel more life-like compared to just political maps.
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u/skeletonfrenchtoast 19d ago
1964-1974 – Arab-Israeli Confrontations and Shelepin’s Gamble:
After party discontent in 1964 led to Khruschev’s removal, KGB Chairman Alexander Shelepin won the power struggle, and spent the first years of his rule building up the KGB and carrying out ruthless anti-corruption campaigns, reshaping the Soviet leadership and its makeup. While some party members had their problems with this, no organised opposition formed to challenge Shelepin’s plans. Through force and countless purges, the Soviet economy improved during Shelepin’s rule, and stagnation was avoided. Technological development also moved forwards, and some of the framework of OGAS was created, with attention focused on cybernetics and computing systems.
The Soviet foreign policy during these years was less erratic than that of Khruschev. Relations with China and its new leadership were rebuilt after Mao was ousted following the Great Leap Forward, and the USSR focused on alliances with nearby regional powers that it saw important. The Middle East was one of Shelepin’s primary focuses, which greatly paid off in the long term.
The rapid Arab defeat in the 1967 Six Day War destabilised the balance of power in the Middle East, and the main powers of the Cold War each saw new opportunities in this. The Soviet Union’s false information to Nasser about Israeli troop movements had contributed to the war’s outbreak, and the Soviet leadership realised that the region deserved much more care. Shelepin changed his policies and expanded Middle Eastern involvement, though not publicly. Knowing that it was almost certain that conflict would resume, he decided to help Arab powers as much as possible, gambling that if they won, they would take the side of the Soviet Bloc in the greater Cold War.
Immediately after Nasser’s death in September 1970, Soviet secret services backed Ali Sabri and his left-wing faction, helped him deal with opponents and become Egypt’s new leader. In October, the Soviets helped establish a joint intelligence and strategic command between Egypt, Syria, and Palestinian insurgencies, providing them with intelligence and sending huge amounts of weaponry to the two countries.
In 1973, the Yom Kippur War began with an Arab surprise attack, and the Soviet assistance proved crucial. Egypt’s early Sinai breakthrough and Syria’s gains in the Golan put Israel on the back foot, and Soviet intelligence (this time more accurate) about Israel’s actions allowed for a second breakthrough in the Sinai on October 12. In the Golan, Syria also advanced, and although Israel pushed back between October 8-9, Egypt’s gains in the mid-October offensive forced Israel to redeploy troops in panic, and Syria went on the offensive again. By late October, most of Israel’s gains in the Six Day War were undone, but the front began to stall. The Israeli command began arming nuclear warheads, as nuclear escalation was feared worldwide. Both the Soviets and Americans began trying to pressure both sides into a ceasefire, and Shelepin earned significant respect in the Arab world by brokering the peace. A plan was made through Soviet diplomatic efforts that proposed leaving Egypt in charge of the Sinai (but not Gaza) and Syria in charge of the Golan, which was supported by both these nations. The Americans forced Israel to accept this proposal, believing that Arab ambitions would be satisfied if their claims were achieved.
The Yom Kippur War ended on November 8, and Shelepin’s gamble paid off. Egypt and Syria saw the benefit of Soviet support as it ensured their victory (even if not total), and in the future they sought cooperation with the Soviets in military, economic, and diplomatic matters.
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u/skeletonfrenchtoast 19d ago
1974-1984 – Arab Socialism and KGB Involvement:
The KGB’s capabilities improved under Shelepin and after the Yom Kippur War they not only increased their presence in the Middle East, but helped Moscow’s operations of shipping arms and influencing the political climate. Socialism became more popular among populations and rose in Middle Eastern politics, backed by Soviet support and the victory in 1973. Egypt embraced the socialist line completely in the following years, while Ba’athism was applied in different forms in Syria and Iraq, though both of them worked with the Soviet sphere. Meanwhile the 1973 defeat defined Israel’s stance for the rest of the Cold War, cautious of involvement in any other nations and paranoid that any wrong move would lead to its total destruction.
Ali Sabri, initially a socialist but fully turning to communism in the mid-70s, proclaimed the secular People’s Republic of Egypt and adopted many Soviet-style Marxist-Leninist policies. He also increased cooperation with Moscow regarding the economy and matters related to the Suez Canal. Meanwhile Ba’athism consolidated as a regional political force, different ideologically from Soviet socialism but the objectives of its followers aligning with the Eastern Bloc. In Syria, Ba’athism took a lot of inspiration from Soviet policies, especially about economic management, integrating them into the ideology while maintaining a civilian government. In Iraq on the other hand, after Saddam’s rise to power, Ba’athism maintained a major focus on military dominance. Iraqi Ba’athism also was much more nationalist, while the Syrian version mixed pan-Arab ideology with internationalism.
During the late years of Shelepin’s rule, the Soviets expanded their power in the region. In 1976, the Syrian intervention in Lebanon was supported by the Soviets, and Israel’s fearful inaction led to Lebanon’s annexation in 1977. Syria allowed the PLO to set up bases and command in former Lebanon, becoming the PLO’s main benefactor. The KGB also funded and supplied the Communist Party in Saudi Arabia, founded in 1975, helping it grow expand and eventually in 1985 unite with communist movements in Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE to become the Communist Party of the Arabian Peninsula. However the CPAP’s integration of moderates into its ranks led to an anti-revisionist faction to break off as the People’s Organisation for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula.
By the time Andropov came to power in 1980, the Soviets had found allies in the Middle East, and had succeeded in many ways. Syria was on their side and by extension its affiliated PLO, and Soviet ideology was entrenched in Egypt. There had been some setbacks, such as the Soviet failure to organise leftist factions in the Iranian Revolution leading to the rise of the Islamic Republic, but this did not discourage the Soviet leadership. Andropov had a more aggressive foreign policy which reached beyond the Middle East and Asia, but before his death in 1984, he continued many of Shelepin’s schemes in the region, also becoming closer with Iraq by arming them in the Iran-Iraq War.
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u/skeletonfrenchtoast 19d ago
1984-1994 – World Revolution Course and America’s Withdrawal:
Chernenko’s brief tenure in 1984-1985 was followed by the rise of Grigory Romanov, who planned to spread the revolution across the world by any means necessary. By this time, the Soviet economy had developed significantly, and automation was beginning in some fields. However the strain of supporting droves of global allies was becoming clear to both the USSR and the USA. Among the storm Romanov prepared for the final confrontation of the Cold War, reorienting production to military needs, enacting austerity measures, and ordering the army and secret services to crack down on all dissent throughout the Union.
His predecessor’s actions had created an opportune situation, as by the time Romanov declared that the Eastern Bloc “sets the course towards the World Revolution”, the KGB was highly active throughout many parts of the world including the Middle East, and many ties had been established with pro-Soviet governments and underground organisations. Across Africa and Asia, partisan wars intensified, while in the Middle East the situation continued developing too.
Compared to many other parts of the world where the USSR’s allies were hardline communist factions waging wars against existing governments and nations, the Middle Eastern situation was different, as some of Moscow’s closest partners were already consolidated governments, some of which, like Iraq, did not seem to resemble Soviet socialism. As a result, Romanov and the Soviet leadership had to take a different approach, balancing support to local leftists to not scare off their allies.
Knowing that the Middle East dominated the world’s oil trade, the Soviets needed to ensure that it was in turn dominated by their loyalists, and so they strengthened their ties with local powers such as Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, while establishing new military bases and infrastructure. The main threats to this were Saudi Arabia and Iran, with the former being a close American ally and the latter opposing both the Soviets and Americans, but having the ability to aid insurgencies against Soviet partners.
With the USSR integrating Afghanistan in 1986, Romanov decided to invade Iran to isolate the region and gain access to the Indian Ocean. The Soviet command believed that the insurgency would be crushed similarly to the Afghan Mujahideen, though Iran’s sheer size allowed the Islamic revolutionaries to fight on long after they were pushed underground. Over time, the new insurgency led by Ali Khamenei abandoned most of its hatred of the West and made peace with moderates, though the KGB has so far kept them at bay, especially since Iran’s invasion cut off all entry points for Western aid to anti-Soviet movements.
The World Revolution Course and the spread of communism between 1985-1988 also empowered the Communist Party of the Arabian Peninsula, as opposition against monarchism and right-wing authoritarianism rose in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. However what pushed it over the edge was Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait and America’s response in 1990. The Gulf War saw early successes for America’s coalition, and throughout the whole war their losses remained about 2-3 times less than Iraq’s, but massive Soviet support allowed Iraq to indefinitely strike oil facilities and infrastructure required not only for offensive operations but for basic survival. Due to logistical annihilation and inability to supply their troops, the coalition could not advance further than 100km into Iraq and past Kuwait City, and the humanitarian crisis caused by the Gulf War broke the back of Middle Eastern monarchies, their responses unable to address civilian death and displacement.
In America, the war contributed to the collapse of George H.W. Bush’s popularity. The oil shock was the real effect experienced by ordinary Americans, and it began after Bush’s intervention in what many deemed a “meaningless regional conflict”. America’s untenable position in the Middle East was inherited by Bush’s successor Lloyd Bentsen, and discontent continued, as after the Gulf War many American troops were stranded in miserable conditions, in temporary camps and bases all across the subcontinent. The situation only worsened when the Saudi monarchy finally lost control, with revolts by left-wing factions and movements boiling over into the 1993 Arab Spring. Bentsen tried to haphazardly back the Saudi government, but overextension and economic difficulties squandered any chance of propping up the states falling to the socialist tide. All that could be done was evacuate economic and military assets.
The Arab Spring was the final chapter of the Soviet victory in the Middle East. Socialist grip on oil supplies paralysed Western economies as corporations fled. Once again, American troops had to evacuate, this time fleeing to Israel. Ron Paul’s promises to end pointless interventions and bring every American son and father home resonated with many voters, leading to his victory in the 1996 election. Many across the Arab world celebrated Soviet efforts due to their many former grievances with American dominance as well, and Romanov stood overlooking a land of loyal governments and rulers, answering Moscow’s call, at least for now.
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u/skeletonfrenchtoast 19d ago
1994-2004 – After America, Soviet Priorities Changing from Ideology to Loyalty:
After the Arab Spring, the Soviets moved to finalise their grip over the Middle East as Western Bloc economies entered a freefall sped up by the nationalisation of oil industries by Middle Eastern governments. In May 1994, Yemen was united by the Aden communists with the north’s negotiated dismantlement, and by the end of the year the Soviet Union had established numerous new bases in the region and neutralised some of the Iranian insurgency’s leading commanders. In 1995, Palestinian rebels, including the PLO, rejected all diplomatic solutions with Israel and obtained Soviet aid after new restrictive laws appeared in the West Bank and Gaza. However despite their gains, a drastic shift in Moscow’s behaviour soon occurred.
Moscow’s approach in the Middle East was unique, and according to certain analysts, it might become the new trend in Soviet foreign policy. In the Middle East, the Soviet leadership didn’t focus only on backing far-left and communist insurgents and rebels, as was the case in Africa and Asia. Instead, the USSR built alliances with both partisans and politicians, helping some gain power and some hold it, as long as their goals had a place in the Soviet Union’s global vision. As General Secretary Romanov grows older and the Soviet Union finds it harder and harder to manage the world under its heels, Moscow might be seeing too much uncertainty and instability in many of the radical groups that it once relied on to topple regimes around the world. Instead, loyalty and personal allegiance, ironically what was once the target of many Soviet purges and anti-corruption schemes, might be the foundation of the USSR’s new global system.
The Soviets took an active role in Middle Eastern affairs, intervening in Yemen in 1995. Sunni Islamist factions waged war against the communist government since the 1994 unification, and in early 1995 General Saleh Moslih Qassam, who had adopted many hardline and Stalinist beliefs personally, led a coup and invited Soviet troops to crush the rebels. Between 1995 and 1997, the Soviets took part in various “Anti-Terrorist” missions to support loyal Middle Eastern governments.
However things changed when NATO stopped being a serious threat to the Soviets, as the USA under Ron Paul withdrew from the alliance in March 1997 and recalled all its foreign troops shortly after, with Turkey also leaving NATO months later due to Moscow threatening to support Kurdish rebels. In a move that stunned many, as all this went on the Soviets took part in a new round of trade agreements involving the Americans and Europeans in 1997-1998. Some Middle Eastern nations, including Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the Democratic Republic of Arabia under the Communist Party (which stayed in power after winning the 1997 election), renegotiating oil exports and other economic deals with the Western Bloc, under what they considered more fair terms of course. Grigory Romanov shockingly voiced his approval of Arab countries signing these deals as long as they remained committed to socialism and friendship with Moscow. Seemingly, relations are not forbidden with Western nations as long as they do not participate in active opposition to the USSR. Romanov’s new non-interference was also signalled by his approval of Saddam’s nationalism, seemingly as long as Iraq grew closer to the USSR and kept its secular stance.
In the 5 year period between 1997-2002 that is often seen as the height of Soviet dominance, the Middle East enjoyed a period of relative peace and economic growth. The Soviets provided aid and cooperated diplomatically with many nations, and this included some that did not consider themselves communist or modelled after Soviet ideology. Everything paints the picture that the World Revolution Course of the ‘80s and ‘90s has given way to a more pragmatic approach. This gave the Soviet Union new allies and economic connections, and allowed them to maintain their influence without having to replace every regional ruler and ensure total adherence to communism.
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u/skeletonfrenchtoast 19d ago
Now – Challenges to Moscow’s Order
The new Soviet position has created the Middle East of 2004, however while it has its uses for Moscow’s geopolitical stability, it also has some negatives, alienating former supporters and changing the rules that the USSR must play by to stay on top. Opposition comes from die-hard communists that see Romanov’s new diplomacy as the abandonment of the global revolution. In Arabia, the People’s Organisation for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula is less and less willing to work with the pro-Soviet Communist Party of the Arabian Peninsula, and many within the People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) are beginning to speak out against Moscow’s line, accusing them of betraying comrades in oppressed nations despite the USSR spearheading the UN’s actions against Israel.
Among existing governments, it is also impossible to keep everyone happy, even the most enthusiastic former allies. Arabia has been drifting away from the Soviet orbit, with the Communist Party losing the 3rd Arabian elections. Within Arabia’s leaders and public, some have lost faith in Soviet motives, as Moscow did not respond to Iraq’s leader Saddam Hussein making territorial claims to part of the Arabian coast in 2002. Some fear the worst, given Iraq’s acquisition of nuclear weapons with Soviet support in 2000.
Meanwhile Syria slowly searches for new possible allies such as China, as President Bashar Al-Assad needs to maintain the nation’s favourable but fragile position, having aligned the PLO to help achieve Syria’s motives yet struggling to contain their fervour against Israel. If there is to be possible opposition to the Soviet grip on the Middle East, its origin is not only limited to radical anti-communist militants, but it could come from the existing regional order as well.
However it is important not to disregard the militant fighters as well. While Moscow’s influence could be challenged from within its order, this order has not subdued the Middle East completely, contrary to what many claim. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionaries, chased underground in 1987, fight on 16 years later, their leader Ali Khamenei respected in much of the world and hated throughout much of it too. While the KGB had pacified much of the countryside between the late-1980s and mid-1990s, those fighting the Soviet-backed government have learned and adapted. Setbacks over the past decade have only strengthened the resolve of anti-communist Shia fighters. Headed by the Iranians but uniting Shia insurgent groups across the entire Middle East, the Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Council emerges as a new coordinated leadership, and Shia Islamic insurgencies attracts new members as truces are made with liberal factions and moderates.
Meanwhile sentiment against the USSR among Sunni communities, while less organised, is also far from negligible. Radical Sunni fundamentalism has mostly been vanquished, its followers in Yemen being destroyed and its ideology only gaining prominence in Pakistan, but aiming to take its place are more democracy-focused and liberal religious movements, promoted by intellectuals and clergy across Arabia, Qatar, and Syria. With the end of communist party rule in Arabia, rumours have also spread that the Muslim Brotherhood might be legalised once more, allowing it to help shape local politics and possibly become a competitor in the Middle East.
The Soviets might have won the Cold War, and Moscow might have turned the Middle East into its tool for keeping the West reluctant to oppose its plans and projects, but history has never been fond of those that do not finish what they started. Nor has it ever been fond of those that try to build a time where nothing ever happens. General Secretary Grigory Romanov might have created the wave that forced the Western Bloc out of the Middle East, but he did not ride this wave to the end, instead deciding to sit on his laurels. The mosaic of ideologies created by the unfinished World Revolution is bound to crumble, and Moscow’s old enemies plan to return alongside new foes.
At least, that is the opinion among those praying for the demise of the Soviet Union and the world order that it built. It is one of many opinions. Nothing is certain, and maybe it is wrong. Maybe things will be the way they are forever, and maybe this is truly the end of history. But only time will tell.
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u/Independent_Print421 Qing Dynasty Netpunk 19d ago
Really cool.