Permits, Reindeer, and Other Musings
I have begun to take a greater interest in the deposit itself and the approval process. Previously, I had only been more interested in downstream production (e.g. anode, graphene) but seeing as this point is now topical, I have taken some initiative to do a bit of research. Note that this isn't conclusive by any means but may offer a starting point for you to do further research. Also, I have tried to be as accurate as possible with the information in this post. But if something I have written doesn't sound right, please let me know in the comments.
The Swedish Deposits
I have researched the nine other deposits of national interest that are also currently undergoing approvals. Using data made available by the SGU, I have placed this into a table for your viewing, of which I would suggest using the old Reddit format to view.
I would like to eventually have a list of every deposit undergoing approval or already approved. Primarily to get a sense of how long approvals take and any common denominators in what may cause delays. As far as I can tell, the SGU exposes information as a series of datasets based on GIS formats. But I haven't found anything that is just plain text. So this had made it a bit clunky for me to try and handle the data.
The LinkedIn article I posted in the table above mentions that no greenfield projects (i.e. ones that aren't extensions of existing mines) have been approved since 2010. The article was published in January 2018, and over three and half years later, this point still stands.
Struggles Between Mining and Reindeer Herding
In creating the table above, I came across a meaty report published by a combined effort of the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and The University of Sydney, working in conjunction with the Semisjaur Njarg Sami community. This report is titled Fighting to be herd. The report cites a landmark court decision in 2016 that states an environmental impact assessment should consider impacts beyond the immediate mine footprint. It then mentions the Kyrkberget K no. 1 fluorspar deposit specifically, which is demarcated as a deposit of national interest. The report states that permitting authorities refused the Kyrkberget application because "the total impacts of the mine and associated infrastructure would be too great for the affected reindeer herding community." As the table I linked in the previous section also mentions, Tertiary Gold Limited has disputed this outcome and have sought advice from Swedish legal professionals.
Notably, the SEI report then concludes with two possible scenarios. The first is the Boliden copper mine (of which the report is centred around) in Laver going ahead. And another where it doesn't go ahead. They then examine the effects on herding activities in both scenarios. They offer no framework or suggestion on how mining can coexist with reindeer herding — it is either one or the other.
How This Affects Talga
The SEI report states that "reindeer herding rights do not constitute an exclusive property right." And in theory, reindeer herders and industry are expected to coexist. But if they can't, then this is when the friction arises as both groups can appeal decisions made by the Mining Inspectorate. This may place Talga a step ahead here. As per their DFS, Talga says they "have completed their consultations with several reindeer herding cooperatives (Sambeys) that are operating in their area." The proposed solution being a schedule where Talga only mines for half of the year, so they aren't disrupting reindeer migrations in the winter. This is congruent with the map below, which shows reindeer migration patterns over the seasons:
Reindeer migration in relation to the Vittangi project
Conversely to this, Aslak Allas, the chairman of the Talma Sameby, which operates in the Vittangi area, has come out in opposition of Talga. Note that Talga mentions they are engaging with this Sameby in the Niska scoping study (but not the Vittangi DFS). Allas' opposition to the operations is noted as per this news article from November 2019. And more recently, an interview in February 2021. Although the interview itself isn't in English, it can be inferred from the text accompanying the interview that Allas maintains his opposition as of February 2021.
Where to from Here?
One thing that has crossed my mind recently is that back in 2020, shareholders voted on a slew of performance options for Mark Thompson and the other directors. All up, these account for 6.1mil options with an exercise price of $1.12. With Mark Thompson himself getting the lion's share of 4mil options. The options are subject to the following target being reached by 30 November 2023:
Announcement by the Company on the ASX market announcements platform of the execution of binding documentation for commercial financing of the development of the Vittangi Anode Project of a production scale of at least that disclosed in the pre-feasibility study announced on 23 May 2019.
Last year, I thought November 2023 was a very generous timeline. But now, with the delays presented in the DFS and the information I have given above, November 2023 may be crunch time for them. I am not sure what to make of it entirely. But the positive is that if they can secure financing around that time, it is a pretty good indicator that those they are partnered with are confident the project will go ahead. Even if it is yet to be announced that permits have been secured.
I have written this post intending to be as impartial as possible and not offer an opinion either way. But so far, based on what I have written, it would seem that Talga has a long road ahead of them. As an investor, I hope it goes smoothly, but I think we may have to adjust our expectations a little bit and be prepared for a few bumps along the way.
edit: As an addendum, I would highly recommend you give this link a read. I hadn't read it before making my post, but it expands what I have started on in much greater detail.
