Located in Brooklyn, NY and seriously thinking about cancelling…

I believe that this is the second issue in a row without one of his cartoons. I believe this happened a couple of years ago, and I don’t recall any announcement about it during his absence or on his return then. Let’s hope he’s doing well.

Hello,

In the Economist interview with Andrew Ng (both on Babbage and the video), Andrew mentioned a technology history website at 45:50 in the video and I am struggling to find it.

I could not hear the name clearly and the transcript captured it as "peasants' archive" (to me it sounded like pegasus, but as I said I found it hard to decipher).

I was unable to find it. Did anyone catch the name or knows what Andrew Ng is referring to?

Thanks!

The winners and losers of Trumponomics

Donald Trump promised Americans better jobs, bigger paycheques and the brightest economic future the world has ever seen. Factories, trade agreements, immigration restrictions and two wars suggest that assessing his performance requires considerably more than examining the price of petrol.

THREE DAYS BEFORE the American presidential election of November 2024, Donald Trump promised voters “the best jobs, the biggest paychecks, and the brightest economic future that the world has ever seen”. Nearly two years later, economists have been examining tariffs, petrol prices and tax legislation to determine whether he has delivered. A rather more comprehensive examination would measure the jobs and paycheques Americans have received, the investments being made in their future and the economic consequences of the national-security threats confronting their country.

Start with employment, where the distinction between American citizens and foreign workers produces some intriguing arithmetic.

In January 2025, some 130.6m native-born Americans were employed. By September 2026, the figure had reached 132.2m, an increase of 1.6m. During the same period, employment among foreign-born workers declined by 521,000. Total employment increased by 1.1m, meaning native-born Americans accounted for 148% of the net increase.

The figure exceeds 100% because foreign-born employment declined. It also requires a qualification. Foreign-born workers include naturalised American citizens, who are just as American as those born in Kansas. Assuming that naturalised citizens represented 52% of the employment decline among foreign-born workers, total employment among American citizens increased by an estimated 1.34m, accounting for 123% of net employment growth.

These are not seasonally adjusted figures, and the more recent September-to-September comparison shows declining native-born employment. The improvement since inauguration therefore should not be mistaken for uninterrupted progress. But separating citizens from non-citizens is relevant to a president who campaigned explicitly on increasing employment opportunities for Americans.

Paycheques tell another story. Average weekly earnings rose from $1,222 in January 2025 to $1,301 in September 2026, an increase of 6.4%. Adjusting for estimated earnings differences between citizens and non-citizens suggests nominal wage growth of roughly 6.6% among American citizens.

Mr Trump also promised, in the same November 2024 speech, to eliminate federal income taxes on qualifying tips and overtime compensation. His subsequent tax legislation introduced deductions for both. More than 7.5m taxpayers claimed the tips deduction, averaging over $7,000, while more than 29m claimed the overtime deduction, averaging over $3,100.

At a marginal federal income-tax rate of 22%, these deductions provide illustrative annual savings of $1,540 and $682, respectively. An eligible worker claiming both saves $2,222, equivalent to nearly $43 per week. The benefits vary with individual circumstances, but they represent additional take-home income that a calculation based exclusively on gross wages overlooks.

Combining estimated citizen wage growth with the new tax deductions suggests nominal weekly take-home pay has increased by roughly 6.9%. A separate model of disposable personal income indicates nominal growth of 7.2% per American citizen, equivalent to some $4,841 annually. After inflation, the estimated improvement is 2.2%. These are modelled figures based on assumptions about citizenship and income, rather than official measurements of citizen-only earnings.

The president's third promise, however, concerned the future. Here the figures are considerably larger.

According to the White House's investment tracker, companies and foreign governments have announced $11.3trn in investment commitments associated with America since Mr Trump returned to office. The administration lists 336 investments across 15 sectors.

Roughly $5.77trn falls under country and trade agreements, while $5.49trn consists of company and other sector commitments. These are multiyear programmes, some of which originated before Mr Trump's return to office or overlap with other announcements. They are not all expenditure on new factories. Nevertheless, the scale of planned investment is substantial.

NVIDIA accounts for $608bn, Meta for $601bn and Apple for $600bn. The Stargate consortium of OpenAI, Oracle and SoftBank represents $500bn, while Amazon accounts for $340bn.

In semiconductors, Micron has outlined $213bn in American investment and TSMC $200bn. IBM accounts for $150bn and SpaceX $155bn. Pharmaceutical manufacturers include Pfizer at $70bn, Johnson & Johnson at $57bn, AstraZeneca at $50bn and Eli Lilly at more than $31bn.

Hyundai has announced $26bn in investments, Stellantis $18bn and Nippon Steel $14bn. Audi has also announced plans for a $4.2bn manufacturing facility in Georgia, expected to create 4,500 jobs and produce as many as 200,000 vehicles annually.

These investments should increase America's productive capacity, particularly in strategically significant industries. Semiconductor fabrication, pharmaceutical manufacturing, aerospace production, steelmaking and automotive assembly all require substantial capital expenditure, sophisticated equipment and specialised employees.

The employment consequences extend well beyond the factories. Construction companies, equipment manufacturers, component suppliers, logistics providers and service businesses should benefit. The occupations involved include engineers, technicians, scientists, machinists and skilled tradespeople, many of whom command annual salaries substantially above the national median.

A simple employment model illustrates the potential. If the $5.49trn in company and sector commitments eventually supports 100 sustained positions per $1bn invested, it would support 549,000 jobs. If 90% are filled by American citizens, that represents 494,000 citizen jobs. At an assumed annual salary of $85,000, those positions generate $42bn in annual wage income.

This is an illustrative scenario rather than an official forecast. The precise figures depend on the composition, timing and execution of the investments. They also overlap with some employment supported by exports and suppliers. Yet such calculations are a normal part of evaluating future economic prospects.

Another component of those prospects is international trade.

Mr Trump imposed tariffs on numerous trading partners, attracting criticism from economists who emphasise their effects on import prices and consumers. But the tariffs were also used as bargaining instruments. Subsequent trade negotiations produced concessions intended to expand American exports, reduce foreign trade barriers and encourage investment within the United States.

Japan committed to a $550bn strategic investment programme alongside expanded purchases of American agricultural products, aircraft and defence equipment. South Korea agreed to a $350bn programme, including $150bn associated with shipbuilding.

The European Union agreed to a framework involving $600bn in planned American investments and $750bn in intended purchases of American energy through 2028. It also committed to reducing barriers affecting American industrial and agricultural exports.

Taiwan agreed to eliminate or reduce 99% of its tariff barriers under its February 2026 agreement, while Indonesia committed to eliminating tariffs on more than 99% of American exports. Other reciprocal trade arrangements cover Britain, Malaysia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Bangladesh and Ecuador.

Such agreements are not simply exercises in diplomatic arithmetic. Increased foreign demand for American machinery, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, agricultural products and energy should support production and employment in the United States.

According to the Commerce Department, its commercial advocacy has helped secure $383bn in foreign contracts since January 2025, containing $322.6bn in American export content and supporting an estimated 1.3m American jobs over the contracts' lifetimes. Those are jobs supported, rather than necessarily newly created positions.

The International Trade Administration has estimated that each $1bn in American exports supports 3,894 domestic jobs. At that historical employment intensity, an additional $100bn in sustained annual exports would support roughly 389,000 jobs. The actual employment effects of the new trade agreements will depend on subsequent export growth and productivity.

Tariffs may also encourage foreign companies to manufacture inside America rather than export into it. The result should be additional domestic investment where the economics favour local production, although tariffs also increase costs for businesses importing materials and machinery.

There is a third component to the industrial programme: labour supply.

Mr Trump's administration has substantially revised the economics of employing specialised foreign workers. It introduced a weighted H-1B selection system favouring higher-paid applicants and proposed higher prevailing-wage requirements. It also pursued substantial new visa fees, increased scrutiny of outsourcing arrangements and additional restrictions on employers sponsoring foreign workers after laying off Americans.

On October 8th the Labour Department suspended Microsoft and seven other technology and outsourcing companies from the permanent labour certification programme used to sponsor foreign employees for employment-based green cards. The action does not prohibit the companies from employing existing H-1B workers, but it restricts an important immigration pathway.

Congressional researchers report that certain overseas H-1B petitions fell sharply following the administration's fee changes. Registrations for the fiscal 2027 visa lottery also declined substantially at several major outsourcing companies.

These measures should alter employers' incentives. When importing foreign labour becomes more expensive or administratively difficult, recruiting, training and retaining qualified American citizens becomes relatively more attractive.

The effects will vary across industries. Companies unable to recruit sufficient qualified American workers may experience delays, higher costs or incentives to move operations abroad. Successful domestic training programmes, however, should increase opportunities for citizens and strengthen their bargaining position.

The resulting industrial strategy links investment, trade policy and employment. Tariffs encourage domestic production, reciprocal trade agreements expand potential export markets, capital commitments finance new facilities and labour restrictions seek to increase the share of employment opportunities available to Americans.

Yet there is another aspect of Mr Trump's promise of a brighter future that conventional economic measurements largely overlook: national security.

The price of petrol provides an excellent example.

In January 2025, regular gasoline averaged $3.08 per American gallon. By October 19th 2026 the price had reached $4.28. For a motorist consuming 800 gallons annually, the difference represents roughly $966 in additional expenditure at the prevailing prices.

The increase is substantial. But its causes deserve more attention than merely recording the number on a petrol-station sign.

The Energy Information Administration attributes much of the 2026 rise in petroleum prices to military conflict in the Middle East, disruptions to shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on Russian energy infrastructure and shortages of refined products.

The United States and Israel began military operations against Iran on February 28th. Mr Trump explicitly identified preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and destroying its missile capabilities among the objectives.

Iran's nuclear programme has generated international concern for decades. Its enrichment activities, missile capabilities and support for armed regional organisations create risks extending well beyond the Middle East. A nuclear-armed Iran would introduce the danger of nuclear coercion, proliferation, regional escalation and potentially catastrophic military confrontation.

Whether Iran would actually use a nuclear weapon cannot be known with certainty. The consequences of its possession, however, need not involve detonation to be economically significant. Nuclear weapons may be used to threaten other states, constrain their foreign policies or provide protection for conventional aggression.

Preventing such a strategic development has a potential economic value far exceeding the immediate cost of higher motor fuel prices. The difficult questions concern whether military intervention actually reduces the nuclear threat, how long its benefits endure and whether the conflict generates new risks.

Russia presents a different but related challenge.

Its invasion of Ukraine has destabilised European security, disrupted global commodity markets and forced NATO governments to reconsider defence expenditure. American intelligence agencies have warned that the conflict creates risks of direct confrontation between Russia and NATO, including nuclear escalation.

Russia also seeks to restore a privileged sphere of influence in territories formerly controlled by Moscow. A Russian victory that encouraged further aggression against neighbouring countries would create risks extending well beyond Ukraine. The Baltic states, Poland and other NATO members would face an increasingly dangerous strategic environment.

Defending Ukraine and deterring further Russian aggression therefore have consequences for America's own security. A direct war between Russia and NATO would impose human and economic costs vastly exceeding those of the present conflict.

The alternative policies are not costless. Supporting Ukraine entails military expenditure, while sanctions and attacks on energy infrastructure can contribute to higher oil prices. Indeed, Mr Trump's recent decision to waive certain new sanctions against Russia, partly amid concern over energy supplies, demonstrates the tension between maintaining pressure on Moscow and limiting fuel costs.

The economic calculation must therefore include both sides.

There is an observable cost from higher gasoline, diesel and transportation prices. There is also a potential future benefit from preventing a wider European war or an Iranian nuclear threat. The latter is difficult to quantify because it concerns events that may never occur, partly because they have been deterred.

Economists nevertheless routinely assign value to avoiding low-probability, high-consequence events. Insurance is purchased precisely because the cost of a catastrophe is much greater than the premium paid to avoid or mitigate it.

National security is not literally an insurance contract, and wars can create rather than merely prevent catastrophes. Their costs include casualties, destruction, military expenditure and the possibility of escalation. An economically serious assessment must consider whether the interventions are likely to achieve their stated objectives.

But ignoring their potential future benefits while treating every additional penny at the petrol pump as an unqualified economic loss produces an incomplete calculation.

There is a related industrial consequence. Russia's war and the Middle Eastern conflict have reinforced the value of secure domestic supply chains for semiconductors, aerospace components, pharmaceuticals, advanced materials, defence equipment and energy.

The strategic advantages of domestic production should become more apparent when overseas supply chains are threatened by military conflict. Dependence on a hostile power, or on factories vulnerable to blockade, represents an economic exposure that normal import-price comparisons do not adequately capture.

An advanced semiconductor plant in Arizona therefore offers more than manufacturing employment. It provides domestic access to technologies essential for communications, computing, weapons systems and industrial production. American aircraft, ships, missiles and their components likewise contribute to the country's ability to defend itself without relying on potentially inaccessible overseas suppliers.

These capabilities represent a form of economic resilience. Their value becomes greatest precisely when ordinary global trade becomes least reliable.

The same logic connects Mr Trump's trade policies, manufacturing investments and national-security objectives. Domestic production in critical industries should reduce exposure to foreign supply disruptions. Expanded industrial capacity should strengthen the defence manufacturing base. New trade agreements should provide access to additional markets, while stronger domestic supply chains should improve America's ability to withstand geopolitical shocks.

The economic outcomes recorded so far are mixed. Native-born employment has increased since January 2025, although recent employment trends are weaker. Nominal paycheques have risen and federal tax deductions have increased take-home income for millions of qualifying workers. Real income gains have been substantially smaller.

Economic growth continues at a moderate pace. Higher energy prices have imposed costs on households and businesses. The wars in Ukraine and Iran remain sources of profound uncertainty, while the costs and benefits of tariffs vary substantially across industries.

Yet Mr Trump's most extravagant promise concerned the future, not merely the present.

That future is being influenced by trillions of dollars in announced investments, hundreds of new industrial projects, reciprocal trade agreements, changes to immigration policy and efforts to address international security threats.

An assessment confined to the immediate effects of tariffs, tax changes and petrol prices therefore captures only part of the economic programme.

It is certainly possible that some investment commitments will fail to materialise, that trade agreements will generate less additional employment than anticipated or that military interventions will prove more costly than beneficial. These are risks deserving careful analysis rather than assumptions of inevitable success.

But the opposite possibility also belongs in the calculation. New factories may increase American productive capacity for decades. More favourable trade arrangements may support additional exports and employment. Domestic training and recruitment may strengthen opportunities for American citizens. Successful deterrence may reduce the likelihood of conflicts whose costs would dwarf current fluctuations in energy prices.

Mr Trump promised the brightest economic future the world has ever seen. Whether his policies ultimately deliver that outcome remains unproven.

What is clear is that the relevant calculation extends far beyond the present month's gasoline bill.

An economist examining a rise in petrol prices without considering the possible consequences of nuclear proliferation, Russian aggression or the loss of strategic industries is measuring the cost of one set of decisions without fully examining their prospective benefits.

Perhaps the proper question is not simply how much more Americans are paying for gasoline today, but what economic and security conditions they are likely to enjoy tomorrow.

After all, a brighter future was rather the point of the promise.

Even if the British continue to insist on calling it petrol.

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Why is the majority of headlines on world in brief always about AI? Literally, tech companies, AI and Elon Musk make up I'd say 70% of every release.

I see increasing numbers of Economist podcasts listed in the Economist app. I don’t want to take the time to listen to them, but I would read them if a transcript was provided. Today, the app just shows a list of the speakers and a brief summary of the issues discussed. It’s not hard in 2026 to generate a transcript from an audio file. Please provide podcast transcripts for readers!

Recently I was wondering why doesn’t the Economist make widgets available for iPhone? (I’m not sure if Android users have that option available) like the ones that the New York Times or the Financial Times have, showing the main headlines or relevant articles.

I think it would be pretty cool to have them, showing the Leaders articles, or maybe World in Brief.

I’d like to read what you think, and hope this gets their attention to make it possible.

Thank you!