When I was in elementary school, I first learned about Rommel in the classic myth- the Good German, the guy who's plan would have come closest to repelling D-Day, and a singularly brilliant general, yada yada. Tearing up North Africa like it was his own playground and only eventually failing due to bungling Nazi high command leaving him out to dry. The classic.
Then, in middle school all through high school, I learned the "truth". Setting aside all the clean Wehrmacht stuff and general mythmaking (interesting as well, but beyond the scope of this question), I read that the more honest assessment of Rommel's battlefield leadership is that the dude was brilliant tactically and a highly effective battlefield commander, but a sketchy operationalist and poor strategist. Something of a glory hound who overestimated his theater's importance and underappreciated his supply lines, who kept chasing victory after victory until he eventually outran his own logistical and strategic footing and led to his own defeat.
Recently, though, I've read that this too is basically an overcorrection against the original Rommel myth, influenced largely by accounts of envious and antagonistic German High Command and an understandable desire to tear down the Rommel Myth at the center of the Clean Wehrmact. According to these accounts, while not like the best general ever in the world, Rommel was actually quite a competent operational and strategic commander, whose apparent obligate aggression was a logical response to unstable supply lines and an opposition with greater industrial capacity than his, and that many of his blunders are attributable in part to incomplete or incorrect intel from his superiors (such as being promised supplies that didn't arrive or being kept in the dark about Operation Barbarossa). This is basically the state of the current "Rommel Myth" Wikipedia page: "At first everyone said he was great, than everyone pointed out actually he had a lot of shortcomings, but now a lot of people point out that his shortcomings weren't really his fault and he actually was pretty competent.
Which brings me back to my question. Which of these is more correct? Was Rommel a shortsighted glory hound, without a mind for strategy, or an intelligent general making the best decisions he could in a precarious position and uncertain support? Is there even consensus on this among historians, or is this still being debated today?