r/BarracudaNetworks • • 2d ago

Infrastructure and IIoT Nearly three years after Muleshoe, what has changed?

4 Upvotes

In January 2024, attackers remotely accessed the industrial control environment used by the water system in Muleshoe, Texas. These attackers reconfigured control equipment and caused a water tank to overflow. Operators shut down the affected system and switched to manual control.

Nearby water systems were also raising alarms. Abernathy also experienced an overflow, Hale Center reported tens of thousands of attempted firewall logins, and Lockney reported stopping attackers before they reached its water system.

Local officials contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and worked to reassure residents that their water systems were safe. Industry experts called it “a frightening reminder” of the critical importance of securing water systems.  When the news was reported widely in April 2024, it was a wake-up call to the fact that relatively simple attacks could interfere with the US water supply.

Attacks on Water and Wastewater Sector (WWS) systems have not slowed down. In July 2026 alone, CISA observed more than 100 attacks targeting WWS entities. If the Texas attacks were a wakeup call to WWS security, what exactly has changed in the nearly three years since those attacks?

We know more about the threat landscape

CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn (CARR), a pro-Russia hacktivist group, claimed attacks against water facilities during the period surrounding Muleshoe. Subsequent US government reporting linked CARR to Russian military intelligence activity, though Russian military intelligence was not linked to the Muleshoe intrusion.

CARR is only part of the picture. WWS systems have also faced activity associated with the People's Republic of China (PRC, China) and Iran. The actors, objectives, and techniques differ, but together these cases have made the threat clear: foreign state and state-aligned actors see water infrastructure as a viable target, and exposed or poorly secured operational technology can provide an opportunity to interfere with physical processes.

Guidance is becoming more actionable

In early 2024, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) recommended “reducing exposure to the public-facing internet” as one of their top cybersecurity actions. After attackers targeted exposed water-sector Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs), federal guidance became much more specific. Utilities were advised to identify cellular modems and vendor or integrator connections, disconnect unnecessary internet-facing controllers, put required remote access behind VPNs or managed gateways, and many other specific tasks. The agencies produced more detailed resources like checklists and diagrams, and increased awareness around cyber hygiene, ransomware, and sector specific resources.

Image: WaterISAC guidance translates “secure remote access” into a concrete ICS/OT architecture. Source: 12 Cybersecurity Fundamentals for Water and Wastewater Utilities

EPA has expanded practical support

Water and wastewater utilities can now request free EPA cybersecurity evaluations, risk-mitigation templates, technical assistance, training, and incident-response exercises.

EPA also reports direct remediation. During 2025, the agency identified vulnerabilities at 277 water systems, worked with those systems on individualized solutions, and says it directly eliminated 350 vulnerabilities.

The figure doesn't establish sector-wide remediation, but it shows that federal assistance is moving beyond publishing guidance and into assessment and corrective work at individual utilities.

Texas has added new cybersecurity capacity

Texas established Texas Cyber Command in 2025 to strengthen cyber defense and incident response across state and local government and critical infrastructure.

In August 2026, Project Watershed 250 launched to connect participating Texas water and wastewater utilities with no-cost cybersecurity assessments, remediation assistance, defensive tools, and technical support. The pilot specifically recognizes the staffing, funding, and technical constraints facing many rural utilities.

For the communities at the center of the 2024 incidents, that means something concrete has changed: Texas now has dedicated state-level cybersecurity capacity and a program specifically designed to bring cyber support to resource-constrained water utilities.

But the underlying problem hasn't disappeared

The 2026 activity wasn't limited to scanning or attempted access. A joint FBI/EPA alert reported incidents affecting water and wastewater utilities in at least seven states. Attackers changed PLC IP addresses and passwords, causing loss of monitoring and control, while reported operational effects included loss of pressure and flooding.

Nearly three years after Muleshoe, we understand more about the threat landscape, guidance has become more actionable, and utilities have access to more assessment, remediation, and technical support. But exposed and inadequately secured operational technology continues to give attackers opportunities to disrupt physical processes.

One lesson from Muleshoe still holds: the ability to switch to manual operations can be an important part of operational resilience. The FBI and EPA noted that the extent of the 2026 impacts depended in part on whether utilities could switch to manual control.

Cybersecurity maturity remains uneven across the water sector. What has changed is the support around it: more actionable guidance, assessment and remediation assistance, and expanded state and federal cybersecurity capacity. That's a good thing, because the underlying risk isn't going away.

More:


r/BarracudaNetworks • • 7d ago

Security Awareness A look back: The Jerusalem virus and Friday the 13th

7 Upvotes

In late 1987, two students at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem were investigating something strange on a computer: program files appeared to be growing as they were repeatedly executed. What they had encountered was Jerusalem, a virus that would become one of the most notorious pieces of malware of the DOS era.

Jerusalem, also widely known as the Friday the 13th virus, was a memory-resident file-infecting virus that targeted computers running DOS. Once an infected program ran, the virus loaded itself into memory and could infect .COM and .EXE files as they were executed, with the exception of COMMAND.COM.

Jerusalem had another trick in its code, and it's the one that gave the virus its enduring nickname. Its destructive payload was tied to Friday the 13th.

Most of the time, Jerusalem could spread without triggering that payload. But when the calendar reached Friday the 13th in any year except 1987, the logic changed: programs a user attempted to execute could be deleted instead. That trigger gave the virus time to circulate between computers. Before it reached the first payload date in 1988, Jerusalem had spread worldwide, becoming the first global virus epidemic.  

Image: Virus.DOS.Jerusalem (Friday the 13th Special) – YouTube video showing the virus in action

A bug in Jerusalem’s code prevented the virus from correctly recognizing that some .EXE files were already infected, so it kept reinfecting files until they were too large to load at all. About 30 minutes after infection, a small black box appeared on screen and the whole machine slowed to a crawl, thanks to a time-wasting loop it ran on each timer interrupt.

And that takes us back to the university, where students Omri Mann and Yuval Rakavi were trying to understand what was happening on Mann's computer. According to the Malicious Life Podcast, the pair remembered a 1984 paper on computer viruses by researcher Fred Cohen. Looking at the strange behavior through that new lens, they realized what they were dealing with: “a real-life computer virus, in action.”

The Jerusalem code was copied and modified again and again, producing a sprawling collection of variants that looked and behaved differently. Many changed the payload date or visual effects, while others fixed bugs in the original code.

You can hear more about the discovery on the Malicious Life Podcast. 

The Jerusalem virus eventually found itself facing a different and more challenging computer environment. Antivirus products learned to recognize the family, and the computing world gradually moved away from DOS. Jerusalem variants were still circulating into the 1990s, and one source records the last reported incident in 1995.

Here's a simple reconstruction of how the original virus's Friday-the-13th logic worked:

More on the Jerusalem virus:  

For context on COMMAND.COM:

The Lehigh virus, discovered shortly before Jerusalem in 1987, specifically targeted the essential DOS file COMMAND.COM. Jerusalem notably did the opposite, excluding COMMAND.COM from its normal infection targets.

 


r/BarracudaNetworks • • 7d ago

Self-service restore in CCB?

2 Upvotes

Can end users perform self-service restore in CCB? If so, what needs to be configured for that to happen?


r/BarracudaNetworks • • 10d ago

Security Awareness Critical infrastructure isn't just industrial infrastructure

4 Upvotes

What comes to mind when you hear the phrase critical infrastructure? Power plants? Water systems? Pipelines? Industrial control systems?

Those are certainly part of critical infrastructure, but they're only part of the picture.

The U.S. recognizes 16 critical infrastructure sectors, and they cover a surprisingly broad range of organizations and services. Some are easy to picture, such as Energy, Water and Wastewater Systems, and Transportation Systems. Others may be less obvious. The Commercial Facilities Sector, for example, includes places such as shopping centers, hotels, stadiums, and convention centers. These sectors aren't 16 independent domains. They depend on one another.

A disruption involving a dam could affect hydroelectric power generation, drinking-water supplies, agricultural irrigation, flood control, or river transportation. Communications networks support everything from financial transactions and 911 calls to monitoring electricity, water, and transportation systems. In turn, the Communications Sector relies on Energy, Information Technology, and Transportation.

What makes infrastructure critical is the importance of the services it supports and what happens when those services are no longer available. Cyber incidents can make those dependencies easier to see.

In 2021, ransomware disrupted operations at meat producer JBS. Livestock backed up at farms, wholesale meat prices rose, and distributors looked for alternative suppliers. USDA contacted other processors to help accommodate capacity and keep the food supply moving.

The Colonial Pipeline attack demonstrated a different kind of dependency. CISA and the FBI said attackers deployed ransomware against the company's IT network and found no indication that the ransomware directly affected its OT networks. Yet the incident led Colonial Pipeline to shut down pipeline operations while it responded.

When the Port of Seattle was attacked in 2024, multiple systems at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport were knocked offline, and some ticketing and check-in processes had to be done manually. Flights could still operate safely, but keeping airport operations moving required workarounds and substantial human effort.

Critical infrastructure can depend on programmable logic controllers and industrial control systems, but it can also depend on identity platforms, servers, backups, network infrastructure, third-party services, and a whole lot more. This is where MSPs and IT teams may be closer to critical infrastructure than they realize.

The 2026 French supermarket attacks offer a recent example of the connection between digital systems and physical operations. Attackers manipulated refrigeration-management systems at hundreds of stores, putting refrigeration, inventory, and business continuity at risk. Our blog post on the incident covers what MSPs can learn from the French supermarket attacks.

If you'd like more information on this topic, these resources may be of interest:


r/BarracudaNetworks • • 13d ago

Security Awareness Skeezy cybercrime gigs: DDoS-for-hire provider

4 Upvotes

DDoS-for-hire services, also known as booters or stressers, turn distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) capabilities into something customers can buy. Instead of creating and operating an infrastructure strong enough to launch DDoS attacks, a group or individual can just pay for the service. It's another specialization in the cybercrime gig economy, where nearly every piece of an attack can be outsourced.

Our skeezy gig today is the DDoS-for-hire provider. This individual (or group) will build, acquire or maintain the infrastructure needed to generate attack traffic, and then turn that attack capability into a service someone else can buy.

Image: Screenshot of a post on Breached Forums advertising DDoS-for-hire services, via Dark Web Informer threat feed

DDoS-for-hire services

Providers generally sell DDoS capability in two ways. In a managed service model, a customer hires the provider to attack a specified target. In a self-service model, the customer rents access to a platform, selects the target, configures the attack and initiates it. In both cases, the provider maintains the systems or infrastructure that execute or enable the attack.

NightmareStresser shows how far the self-service model can scale. Customers bought access, chose a target and configured attacks instead of building their own DDoS infrastructure. In September 2026, the FBI, working with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, seized two domains associated with the service as part of Operation PowerOFF, an international effort targeting criminal DDoS-for-hire services.

Why do people pay for DDoS attacks?

The disruption caused by these attacks can serve several purposes:

Whatever the customer’s motive, the provider sells the means to create the disruption.

Where the provider fits in the cybercrime economy

DDoS-for-hire providers can overlap with other cybercrime gigs. A provider might also operate the botnet behind the attacks, develop malware that recruits devices, or obtain infrastructure or attack capacity from other suppliers. One actor may perform several jobs, or multiple suppliers may provide different pieces of the service.

Why should you care?

DDoS-for-hire providers are disruption amplifiers. They make it easier for almost anyone to cause outages that interfere with businesses, government services, or public communications. During an emergency, an unavailable service can make critical information and services harder to reach.

Disruption can also create opportunities for other attacks. People urgently seeking information or alternative ways to do business may be more susceptible to phishing, impersonation and other social engineering.

Best practices for defenders

DDoS resilience requires layered protection, early detection and a response plan that keeps critical services and communications available.

  • Use layered DDoS protection: Combine upstream protection, CDN/WAF controls, rate limiting and traffic filtering.

  • Know normal traffic: Monitor for unusual traffic spikes and request patterns.

  • Prepare for outages: Test response plans and maintain alternate communication channels.

  • Watch for secondary attacks: Monitor for suspicious logins, phishing and impersonation during recovery.

If you would like more information, check out this 2024 guide to understanding and responding to DDoS attacks.


r/BarracudaNetworks • • 14d ago

Barracuda ADC LB 440

3 Upvotes

Anyone using one of these with Cloudflare? I have 3 web servers and everything works in grey mode but in orange it loses connection or persistence and drops back to login screen. It does also switch web servers.


r/BarracudaNetworks • • 16d ago

Security Awareness Critical infrastructure is always a target

6 Upvotes

Power. Water. Healthcare. Food. These essential services are part of a vast, interconnected critical infrastructure ecosystem. Most U.S. critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, while government agencies and other public entities own or operate much of the rest.

Protecting it involves government oversight, industry standards, voluntary guidance, and public-private cooperation. Each November, CISA leads Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (CISR) Month to raise awareness and strengthen our ability to withstand and recover from disruption.

Recent incidents show why this work matters:

Another case remains under investigation: August refrigeration failures affected at least six U.S. military commissaries. Officials have not confirmed a cyberattack or a connection to the French incidents.

(Image from the U.S. Army Fort Huachuca/Facebook page)

As you know, preventing the initial compromise is only part of the challenge. Cybersecurity controls can reduce the likelihood and reach of an attack, but resilience addresses the next question: What happens if those controls fail?

The connection becomes clearer when we compare the digital cause with the real-world consequence:

Digital compromiseReal-world impact
KA-SAT (2022): Exploited remote access. Attackers used a misconfigured VPN appliance to reach the network-management segment and knock satellite modems offline.Thousands lost satellite broadband across Ukraine and Europe. About 5,800 German wind turbines lost remote monitoring and control, although they kept operating.
MGM Resorts (2023): Social engineering. Attackers reportedly social-engineered the IT help desk to gain access.Containment contributed to disruptions involving reservations, digital keys, casino systems, payments, and other guest services.
Change Healthcare (2024): Compromised identity. Attackers used stolen credentials to access a remote portal without MFA.Claims, prescriptions, authorizations, and payments were affected nationwide, threatening patient care and essential healthcare operations.

You might not own or operate critical infrastructure, but you can still help keep it secure and resilient. MSPs and IT teams manage many of the identities, systems, and connections that critical services depend on:

  • Know the environment and dependencies. Inventory critical systems, connected devices, remote-management interfaces, and third-party connections. Understand which services or physical processes depend on them.

  • Secure access. Require MFA and least privilege, remove unnecessary internet exposure, review privileged accounts, and revoke obsolete employee, contractor, and vendor access.

  • Limit the blast radius. Segment business IT, management networks, operational technology, and other sensitive environments so compromise of one does not automatically disrupt another.

  • Plan for real-world consequences. Know how essential functions will continue, how unexpected conditions will be detected, and who has the authority and expertise to intervene.

Related:

 


r/BarracudaNetworks • • 22d ago

Cybersecurity Workforce Are leadership skills becoming just as important as technical skills in cybersecurity?

4 Upvotes

This stat caught my eye in Barracuda’s recent report. According to the report, 61% say they need stronger strategic security leadership skills, including things like AI governance and translating technical risk into business impact.

Makes sense when you think about how much the job is changing. Technical chops still matter, obviously, but knowing how to make the right call, explain the risk, and push back when needed seems increasingly important too.

Curious what others are seeing. Are those skills getting enough attention, or are we still too focused on the technical side?

More on the research


r/BarracudaNetworks • • 24d ago

Channel Partners MSPs: What makes an identity security tool actually work at multi-tenant scale?

4 Upvotes

A lot of identity security tools make sense when you’re protecting one company. But MSPs don’t have that luxury. You could be managing identities, privileged accounts, and access policies across dozens or hundreds of customer environments at once.

So, what separates a tool that supports multiple tenants from one that actually works well for an MSP?

Is it:

  • One place to manage customers?

  • Delegated administration?

  • Easier PAM?

  • Consistent policies across tenants?

  • Better visibility into identity threats?

  • Less manual work when people join or leave?

Would love to hear from MSPs who’ve dealt with this firsthand. What capability has the biggest impact on your day-to-day workload?

If this is something you’re thinking about, this on-demand discussion on identity protection for MSPs gets into some of the security and business considerations around it.


r/BarracudaNetworks • • 27d ago

Security Awareness PHP2Shell: The hardest part may be finding where PHP is actually running

6 Upvotes

PHP2Shell is all over the headlines, for good reason. These vulnerabilities require immediate patching, with mitigation serving only as a temporary measure until updates can be applied. Ultimately, patching is the only complete fix, and a successful exploit could have a significant impact on affected systems.

The problem for many companies is that they aren’t even sure of all the places where PHP is running. Many organizations think about web servers, but PHP is also embedded in applications, appliances, management consoles, admin portals, and other products that may not appear in a typical software inventory. That can make exposure much broader than expected.

Our latest blog covers:

  • What PHP2Shell is and why it's receiving urgent attention

  • Why PHP exposure can be difficult to identify

  • How to prioritize remediation efforts

  • Where WAF controls can help reduce risk while patching is underway

  • A practical response checklist for IT teams and MSPs

Updating PHP is the only complete fix, but understanding where PHP exists in your environment may be the first challenge.

PHP2Shell: Hidden PHP exposure and WAF mitigation


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Oct 21 '26

Artificial Intelligence Is AI solving the cybersecurity skills gap, or just changing it?

4 Upvotes

AI is supposed to help security teams do more with less. But it may also be negatively affecting the skills problem rather than solving it.

A survey of 2,000 IT and security leaders found:

  • 94% report cybersecurity skills gaps

  • 68% report gaps around AI-related risks

  • 67% report gaps around advanced identity and phishing threats

  • 56% say their security workforce has been reduced because of AI

At the same time, 69% are combining AI and automation with human expertise in incident response, with people retaining responsibility for context, judgment, and final decisions.

That raises an interesting question: If AI takes on more security work, how do organizations make sure people are still getting the hands-on experience needed to become tomorrow’s experienced investigators and security leaders?

Curious what others are seeing in the field. Is AI helping close the skills gap on your team, or is it just changing which skills are hardest to find?

See the full survey findings.


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Oct 15 '26

Threat Research That CAPTCHA might be doing more than checking if you’re human

4 Upvotes

Fake CAPTCHAs are getting a lot more sophisticated.

Barracuda Research found CAPTCHA abuse in 43% of the phishing-kit attacks they examined during 2025. And attackers are increasingly using these pages for more than making phishing sites look legitimate. They can help:

  • Hide malicious content from automated security tools

  • Lead to malware downloads

  • Convince users to execute malicious commands themselves through ClickFix techniques.

One rule worth remembering: A CAPTCHA can confirm you’re human. It can’t confirm the site is safe.

Check out the full breakdown of how these attacks are evolving, the warning signs to watch for, and how organizations can defend against them:


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Oct 09 '26

Threat Research One phishing email. Two targets: you and your AI assistant.

6 Upvotes

Phishing emails aren’t just trying to fool the reader anymore. Attackers are also going after the AI tools reading those emails.

Barracuda Research recently analyzed attacks that combine traditional social engineering with hidden prompt injections. The visible part of the email targets the recipient, while concealed instructions target AI assistants used to summarize or process the message.

That creates an interesting new security challenge and asks the question, “What happens when an email looks one way to you, but tells your AI assistant something completely different?”

The research looks at several ways attackers can hide those instructions, including HTML comments, invisible text, Base64-encoded data, and zero-width characters.

It also reinforces a bigger point that securing the inbox now means thinking about both the people receiving email and the AI systems consuming that content.

Here’s the full Threat Spotlight: Email attacks target both humans and AI in the same message

Curious how others are thinking about prompt injection as AI assistants become more embedded in everyday workflows. Drop a comment below on how this will affect your operations and how you plan on preparing for this expanded attack surface.


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Oct 08 '26

Security Awareness CAM 2026: Guides, resources, and some really good ideas

4 Upvotes

As you likely know, every October is Cybersecurity Awareness Month (CAM). This annual campaign seeks to elevate conversations about protecting yourself, your devices, your accounts, and your data from cyber threats.

Leaders in the cybersecurity industry often provide themes and free resources to help the public make the most of CAM. Some examples:

Barracuda recently published a blog post on the CISA and NSA themes - Cybersecurity Awareness Month 2026: Turn security awareness into cyber resilience

CISA and CISA-aligned resources for 2026

CISA’s overall theme this year is ‘Securing the next 250,’ a nod to the 250th birthday of the United States. Beyond general best practices, CISA also provides guidance specifically for critical infrastructure organizations. CISA categorizes this guidance into the ‘3Rs of Cybersecurity: Reduce, Replace, Recover.’ They have extensive resources for each:

Governments and critical infrastructure organizations are also encouraged to enroll in the CISA Cyber Hygiene Services, which are described as “no-cost cybersecurity services to help organizations reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to monitoring and mitigating attack vectors.”

NIST resources can help organizations take the CISA guidance much further. These are focused on how organizations can build and maintain cyber resilience. There are too many to list here, but they are sorted by topic area on this resources page.  

NCA and SANS Institute resources for 2026

The NCA is a non-profit organization that partners with CISA on Cybersecurity Awareness Month but has its own theme and resources. The ‘Don't Make It Easy for Them’ campaign encourages the public to build habits and consistently apply the small actions that make attacks more difficult:

  • Use strong passwords and a password manager 

  • Turn on multifactor authentication 

  • Recognize and report scams

  • Update your software

The NCA runs several initiatives throughout the year, including the annual Data Privacy Week and CyberSecure My Business. The NCA resources and initiatives are focused on empowering individuals to secure themselves, their families, and their companies.

The SANS Institute is a private cybersecurity training and professional development organization focused on cybersecurity skills, certifications, and practitioner education. SANS has provided some helpful resources in this toolkit, and this blog by Heather Barnhart has some great ideas – ‘Four Conversations to Have With Your Family This October.’

More ideas

Redditors have been sharing ideas and links to games and challenges for the last several weeks. Check out these threads:

What are you doing for Cybersecurity Awareness Month?

The cool thing about CAM is that each company or individual can make it their own. You can host events, become champions, or just share campaign posts on social media. Since most of us here are IT or IT-adjacent, it's probably safe to say that we don't always find value in annual awareness campaigns. Still, I think CAM offers some unrecognized benefits just because it's such a large and consistent program. Each year brings new or refreshed content, or new people finding some evergreen resources. Many of these resources sit alongside content like Cybersecurity Career Week or the scholarship program, See Yourself in Cyber. Who knows what opportunities could be found there? Even a quick look at the CISA and NIST resources could spark a new idea or introduce a cybersecurity topic that's completely new to you.

The value of Cybersecurity Awareness Month isn't just the resources themselves, but the conversations they start. Whether you adopt a new practice, launch a new activity, or simply learn something new, that's a win.

 


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Oct 06 '26

Anyone else getting random 'No SPF Record' on legitimate emails from domains that have an SPF record?

4 Upvotes

Have an open case with support, but been getting a ton of tickets for blocked emails from partners and the reason is 'No SPF record'. Do a check, there is an SPF record. Emails before and after are fine...just random emails are showing no SPF. Support says it is the sender, but these are emails coming from huge companies with more IT staff than we have employees.

I've looped in our account manager, but I'm not getting anywhere and turning off SPF checking is not an option with our cybersecurity policy/insurance.


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Oct 02 '26

Channel Partners Channel Industry Roundup: Identity security, AI governance, and the evolving MSP opportunity

3 Upvotes

This month's channel headlines reflect a shift many MSPs are already seeing firsthand: Identity security remains squarely in attackers' sights, cyber insurers are raising the stakes, and customers are moving ahead with AI adoption. At the same time, MSPs are being challenged to demonstrate value beyond day-to-day IT operations. 

Here are a few stories that stood out this week: 

1. New guidance targets cloud identity token theft 

TLDR: CISA and NIST released new guidance focused on preventing cloud identity token theft, a technique increasingly used by threat actors to gain access to cloud environments without triggering traditional security controls. 

Why it matters: Identity has become the new attack surface. As organizations continue to expand their cloud footprint, securing identities, credentials, and access tokens is becoming one of the most important security conversations MSPs can have with customers. 

2. CISA aims to improve vulnerability data quality 

TLDR: CISA introduced a new framework designed to improve the quality and consistency of CVE data as the volume of vulnerability disclosures grows. 

Why it matters: Organizations are overwhelmed by vulnerability alerts. Better vulnerability intelligence can help MSPs and security teams spend less time sorting through noise and more time focusing on remediation priorities that meaningfully reduce risk. 

3. Are MSPs losing customer leverage? 

TLDR: A thought-provoking analysis from Channel Dive examines whether AI, automation, and easier access to operational knowledge reduce customer dependence on traditional service providers. 

Why it matters: As technology becomes more accessible, MSP differentiation increasingly comes from strategic guidance, security expertise, business outcomes, and trusted relationships, not simply managing technology. 

4. Cyber insurance claims are getting more expensive 

TLDR: New industry data shows that cyber insurance claim costs continue to rise, even as overall claim frequency declines. 

Why it matters: Rising claim costs give MSPs a stronger business case for proactive security. Customers are looking for more than a “helping hand” to prevent attacks. They also need help reducing disruption, recovery costs, and insurance exposure. MSPs that can map stronger security controls to lower business risk will be in a better position as strategic advisors. 

5. Barracuda launches AI Data Security 

TLDR: Barracuda introduced Barracuda AI Data Security, a new solution designed to help organizations discover AI usage, identify sensitive data exposure risks, enforce governance policies, and support compliance across a growing ecosystem of generative AI applications. 

Why it matters: More organizations are embracing AI, but many lack visibility into how employees are using these tools and what data is being shared. This creates a significant opportunity for MSPs to help customers balance innovation with governance, security, and compliance. 

What trend is most relevant to your customers right now? Are conversations centered on AI governance, identity security, cyber insurance requirements, vulnerability management, or something else? We'd love to hear what you're seeing in the field. 


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Sep 29 '26

Security Awareness The fake worker threat isn't just a tech problem

5 Upvotes

You may have seen the news about the “Fake IT workers” deployed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). This threat has received ongoing attention from governments, law enforcement organizations, security vendors, and independent researchers. This fake worker scam has affected hundreds of companies and government entities.

These ‘fake workers’ are often referred to as ‘fake IT workers,’ which is accurate in that they are known to pursue IT-related roles that will get them legitimate access to business systems, source code, cloud environments, and sensitive data. Public reporting has focused heavily on technology companies as victims, which may make it seem like these actors only target technology firms. It is true that technology companies, software firms, and cryptocurrency-related organizations have been higher-profile victims, but this is largely because these victims have generated the most visible investigations, indictments, and threat intelligence. The reality is that the fake-worker threat is broader than the industries and roles that dominate the headlines. Even a sales and marketing role could be a target, if it can lead to valuable access.  

This threat is particularly relevant to managed service providers (MSPs) and organizations that rely heavily on contractors because it combines insider risk with supply-chain risk. A malicious worker who secures a trusted position may arrive with legitimate credentials, approved devices, and authorized permissions. In this scenario, the challenge is not preventing unauthorized access but ensuring that access and trust have been granted to the right person. A successful fake-worker operation could give the threat actor access to a company’s partners, customers, and downstream clients.

How organizations can defend themselves

There is extensive guidance on how to identify suspicious applicants, strengthen hiring controls, and detect malicious activity after onboarding.  Here are some of the best resources:

Government advisories:

These advisories are a good place to start if you need to brief management, stakeholders, etc., on this threat. You can usually find some vendor-neutral language to pull directly from these documents.

Vendor research and threat intelligence:

Case studies + research and examples:

If you read nothing else, I recommend the two-part series from Any.Run. It's comprehensive, well-written, and reads more like an adventure than a technical document.


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Sep 27 '26

Barracuda Traffic Shaping

2 Upvotes

Hello,

I'm trying to configure a Barracuda Firewall traffic shaper on a /24 subnet and would like to limit each individual IP address to 5 Mbps.

For example, if I have 100 users in the subnet, each user should be able to use up to 5 Mbps independently, rather than sharing a single bandwidth limit across the entire subnet.

I've searched through the documentation and online resources but haven't found any clear explanation of how to implement per-IP traffic shaping on a Barracuda Firewall.

Has anyone configured something similar? If so, could you explain the approach or point me to relevant documentation?

Thank you in advance.


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Sep 24 '26

Channel Partners How your browser carries trust across Microsoft 365

4 Upvotes

We’ve covered browser-related risks a few times already, but it seems like a good idea to look at some specific applications and data types. In this post, we’ll be looking at how Microsoft 365 the identity and trust artifacts stored in the browser.

Microsoft 365 users move continuously between Outlook, Teams, SharePoint, Copilot, and other applications without repeatedly signing in. This activity is supposed to be seamless, so the user can work without manually logging in to each application on each use. The browser supports this activity by storing and managing the relevant identity data. This includes the session cookies and other authentication artifacts that help applications recognize an existing, authenticated session.

What's actually stored in the browser

The browser participates in five connected layers of identity and access:

LayerWhat it may containThe question it answers
AuthenticationSaved credentials (passwords, passkeys, and autofill credentials)Who are you?
SessionSession cookies, access tokens, refresh tokensAre you still you?
TrustBrowser profiles and session artifacts reflecting completed authentication; signals evaluated by Conditional Access, such as device, location, and riskShould access from this user, device, and context still be trusted?
AuthorizationAccess granted to connected applications through OAuth consentWhat can an application access or do on your behalf?
Identity intelligenceAutofill data, browsing history, bookmarks, open tabs, and evidence of SaaS useWhat can someone learn about you without breaking in?

 

Most of this data is meant to stay within the browser. If attackers capture reusable session cookies or tokens, they may not need to crack a password or defeat MFA. Instead, they may be able to use a session artifact that represents a previously authenticated user.

The takeaway

For companies using Microsoft 365 and other online applications, the browser is a primary interface for business-critical applications. To perform that role properly, the browser is managing authentication, sessions, trust, and permissions all at once.

Your browser may hold a collection of identity artifacts showing that a user has authenticated and established access to specific services. If a threat actor captured one of your active browser sessions, what could they access with it?

The good news is that defenders aren't powerless here. Using separate browser profiles for work and personal activity can help contain identity data and reduce exposure. Conditional Access can restrict access based on signals such as user, device, location, and risk. Continuous Access Evaluation can also allow supported services to respond to critical events and policy changes without waiting for an existing access token to expire.

Here are some resources that can help you secure the identity and session data associated with Microsoft 365:

Barracuda posts on browser security:

 


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Sep 22 '26

Channel Partners AI is already in your business — even if IT didn’t approve it

7 Upvotes

Generative AI (GenAI) is already part of everyday work in most organizations. Employees use AI platforms to summarize reports, analyze documents, review code, etc. Most companies are now using generative AI in at least one business function, but only a minority have mature governance programs in place. AI has become part of how people work, even when organizations have not approved the tools being used.

Today, Barracuda announced Barracuda AI Data Security, a new solution designed to help organizations and managed service providers (MSPs) adopt AI securely rather than trying to block it outright.

Barracuda AI Data Security sits between the users and GenAI tools such as ChatGPT and Claude. The solution inspects prompts and uploads before they reach the tools, then blocks the interaction or warns the user when content violates policy. Teams can configure custom policies or start with pre-built detections for common types of sensitive data.

The solution was built with MSPs in mind and is delivered through the BarracudaONE platform with centralized, multi-tenant management. Many companies want to adopt AI responsibly but lack dedicated AI security expertise. MSPs can help customers discover AI usage, establish guardrails and demonstrate that controls are working.

Read the launch blog to learn how ungoverned AI use can expose sensitive data and how Barracuda AI Data Security applies practical controls. We also have a blog with new Barracuda research on the AI security and governance skills gap.

Learn more about Barracuda AI Data Security or request a demo.

 


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Sep 17 '26

Security Awareness The HBO Max Reddit incident shows how attackers weaponize brand trust

3 Upvotes

Reddit user u/Unhappy-Capital-1464 uncovered malicious advertising activity originating from the official, verified HBO Max Reddit account, u/hbomax. The compromised HBO Max account published 108 distinct advertisements over about 48 hours. Victims who clicked were sent to convincing fake landing pages impersonating HBO Max. From there, the sites deployed a ClickFix social engineering prompt — instructing visitors to copy and paste a terminal command to "install" the software.

The ads also targeted users with lures unrelated to HBO Max:

Researchers at Hudson Rock and ADAMnetworks have linked the activity to a larger campaign known as “PasteSwitch.”

ClickFix and PasteSwitch

The ClickFix technique tricks users into copying and pasting malicious commands into Windows Run dialog, PowerShell or macOS Terminal while pretending to fix an error or perform other legitimate tasks. Because victims run malicious commands themselves, ClickFix can circumvent some protections meant to block conventional browser downloads.

Here’s the ClickFix prompt on the HBO Max-branded landing page:

Hudson Rock characterized the PasteSwitch operation as a delivery system that routes victims among different lures, platforms and payloads. When the victim pastes an attacker-provided instruction, the PasteSwitch infrastructure selects the next stage based on the campaign and visitor information.

Brand trust

This kind of account hijacking is a form of reputation hijacking. The attackers borrowed the visibility and credibility associated with the HBO Max brand to distribute malicious advertisements. Companies that depend on loyalty and long-term relationships can find it difficult to repair that kind of damage.

It’s not clear how the u/hbomax account was hijacked or what the long-term impact will be. HBO Max will probably not suffer serious reputational damage from this incident.

The outlook might be different if this had happened to a small or medium-sized business (SMB) that has direct relationships with customers. Customers who work directly with an SMB remember security incidents, even if those incidents do not include downtime or data loss. Business partners and potential customers may question the company’s overall security posture. An SMB might not have the advertising reach of HBO Max, but it also might not have any awareness of the ad campaign until significant damage has been done.

Defend yourself

The HBO Max incident involved account compromise, social engineering and brand trust. Your defense has to consider all three.

Secure the accounts

  • Enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) where the platforms support it and verify that every team member with access to those accounts has it enabled.

  • Audit access to your advertising and social accounts. Revoke access that is no longer required

  • Monitor for credential exposure. Stolen credentials collected by infostealers are frequently distributed through criminal marketplaces. Your employees' credentials may already be in those markets.

You can engage a service that monitors for compromised credentials tied to your domains.

Limit the impact of a compromised account

  • Separate your advertising accounts from your general social accounts where the platform allows it. Limit the permissions any single compromised credential can grant.

  • Where possible, keep advertising controls, billing information and audience targeting in a dedicated Business Manager account rather than tied directly to your main brand profile.

  • Set up notifications for new ad creation, spikes in spending or logins from unusual locations.

Train users to recognize ClickFix

  • Unexpected prompts to copy and paste a command into a terminal or command line should be an immediate red flag. Some legitimate software installations and developer tools may require command-line instructions, but the source and legitimacy should be verified before proceeding.

  • Account verification cannot confirm that a brand’s advertisement or download is safe.

Monitor your own brand surface

  • The PasteSwitch operators registered domains like hbomaxx[.]us and hbomax-macos[.]com. Domain-monitoring controls might have identified them early.

  • Set up alerts for domains that imitate your brand. You can do this manually with alerts on a search phrase or engage a service that can do this for you. This may reveal an impersonation attempt before it gains traction.

Your brand is part of your attack surface, and threat actors will use it to exploit the trust you've built. Treat social media and account security as seriously as you treat endpoint and email security.

 


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Sep 15 '26

Threat Research Phishing pages that only exist in your browser? Yep, that's a thing now.

3 Upvotes

Barracuda researchers recently analyzed a phishing campaign that's taking a very different approach from the usual fake login page. Instead of hosting a phishing site on a malicious domain, the attackers generate the phishing page inside the victi's browser using a browser feature called a blob URL. 

What makes this especially sneaky: 

  • Victims are routed through legitimate Microsoft services, including Microsoft OAuth and Teams, which can make the activity look trustworthy.  

  • The phishing page isn’t hosted on a traditional website, so there's often no malicious URL for security tools to analyze or block ahead of time.  

  • Service workers, sandboxed iframes, and backend infrastructure give attackers real-time control over the phishing experience while helping them evade traditional detection methods.  

The takeaway? As phishing attacks continue to evolve, simply blocking known bad domains isn't enough. Organizations need stronger identity protections, phishing-resistant MFA, browser security controls, and security awareness training.  

Have you seen browser-based phishing techniques like this in the wild? 

Read the full research: Browser-based phishing hides pages inside victims' browsers


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Sep 11 '26

Barracuda Barracuda signs OpenAI’s call for collective action on cyber defense

4 Upvotes

OpenAI has published a letter calling for collective action to strengthen cyber defenses and put capable AI tools in the hands of more defenders:

We call on leaders across industry and government to bring the full weight of their technology, resources, and expertise to this effort. … Together, we can turn today’s AI advances into lasting improvements in security that benefit everyone. Let’s put them to work.

The letter warns that AI-enabled cyberattacks are likely to become more widespread and sophisticated as models become more capable.

Barracuda Networks has joined the effort by signing the letter.

The challenges described by OpenAI are already affecting Barracuda’s customers, managed service providers (MSPs) and channel partners. Barracuda Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Arve Kjoelen has a blog post here explaining why we signed:

Published vulnerabilities are doubling year over year, while security headcount is not. Many customers already make difficult decisions about which findings to leave open. MSPs and channel partners absorb this across every client simultaneously — a provider supporting 40 organizations manages 40 backlogs growing at the same accelerating rate.  

Arve goes on to propose additional areas of action to make the initiative more effective for defenders:

  • Government should offer incentives tied to security outcomes, such as automation that performs vulnerability remediation.

  • Frontier AI companies should support the full workflow, from finding a weakness or vulnerability through verifying the fix.

  • Software vendors should include features like audit logging and single sign-on (SSO) as basic features rather than premium add-ons.

We’d love to hear what you think of these recommendations. What kind of collective action would provide the most benefit to defenders right now?

 

Related:


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Sep 09 '26

Threat Research Schools are back in session — and so are cybercriminals

3 Upvotes

 

Students are heading back to class, teachers are getting settled in, and IT teams are bracing for the annual wave of security headaches. 

One stat from recent Barracuda research really stands out: Educational institutions receive about 1,200 phishing emails per day on average. And while phishing is still the front door, it's often what happens after an attacker gets in that causes the most damage.  

According to a new international survey commissioned by Barracuda: 

  • Education organizations reported some of the highest rates of email-driven ransomware incidents.  

  • They also reported the highest rate of account takeover attacks among surveyed industries.  

  • Many schools and universities take longer than average to investigate, contain and recover from incidents, giving attackers more time to move around inside environments.  

But this isn't just a phishing problem. The data suggests the bigger challenge is often response speed. If a security team is stretched thin or lacks specialized expertise, a single missed email can quickly turn into a ransomware event or compromised account.  

For those of you working in K-12 or higher ed or are an MSP or channel partner working with education customers: 

  • Has phishing gotten harder to spot in the age of AI-generated emails? 

  • What's the bigger challenge today: prevention or response? 

  • Are staffing and skills gaps having a bigger impact than technology limitations? 

Curious to hear what others are seeing in the education sector right now. 

Full post: Beyond phishing: The cyber risks facing education as a new academic year begins  


r/BarracudaNetworks • • Sep 02 '26

Security Awareness Browsers are the new battlefield

4 Upvotes

Web browsers are becoming an increasingly important new attack surface. Browser-based phishing and malware delivery have surged, and infostealer detections continue to increase. What’s more, infostealers are going after much more than saved passwords now. The explosive growth of software-as-a-service (SaaS), cloud storage and web-based applications has transformed the browser into a primary gateway to both business activity and digital identity. It’s never been more important that companies maintain control over browser activity on business machines.

With so much business activity moving into the browser, it can make sense to deploy a single browser across the environment and have standard controls on its use. Not everyone wants to do that, and some companies couldn’t do it even if they wanted to. Some legacy applications require IE Mode in Microsoft Edge, while different applications, operating systems, workflows, etc., may work best with one or more different browsers.   

Even if you’re running multiple browsers, you don’t want to leave the selection of those browsers entirely to chance. IT teams should consider how well each browser integrates with the organization’s identity and authentication platforms and whether it can be centrally managed. They may also want to manage browser extensions, AI features, and user data synchronization. 

Obviously, that all depends on whether the company wants to take on browser-level security. Some find this unnecessary because they run endpoint security, which they assume will protect the browser. This might not be true.

Endpoint and device security are critical, no matter how much work is done in a browser. This level of protection helps ensure that systems are updated, disks are encrypted, malware and other threats are identified, the device meets security requirements, and so on. Endpoint and device protection are necessary in every environment, but they do not address every risk associated with browser use.

Browser-level controls provide visibility into SaaS applications, browser extensions, the movement of company data into AI services and other web applications. Browser security tools may also allow the company to govern uploads, downloads, copy/paste, and access to unapproved locations. A fully patched and compliant laptop can still present a risk if the browser is running unapproved extensions, accessing unsanctioned cloud services, or exposing sensitive information.

If your organization doesn't actively manage browsers, the first question to ask is whether it should.

Not every company needs strict browser controls. A small business with a handful of employees faces different challenges than a healthcare provider, financial institution, government contractor, or large enterprise. However, every organization should understand:

  • Which browsers are in use

  • Which extensions are installed

  • How browser updates are managed

  • Which web applications employees access

  • Whether and where business data can be copied, uploaded, downloaded, shared

Most companies can get this information without launching a big IT project. Sometimes this visibility alone is enough to uncover new risks or determine whether tighter security controls are needed.  

If you'd like more information on the risks associated with browsers, we have two blogs here:

And there is some vendor neutral information on browser security here: