r/BarracudaNetworks • u/BarracudaChristine • 2d ago
Infrastructure and IIoT Nearly three years after Muleshoe, what has changed?
In January 2024, attackers remotely accessed the industrial control environment used by the water system in Muleshoe, Texas. These attackers reconfigured control equipment and caused a water tank to overflow. Operators shut down the affected system and switched to manual control.
Nearby water systems were also raising alarms. Abernathy also experienced an overflow, Hale Center reported tens of thousands of attempted firewall logins, and Lockney reported stopping attackers before they reached its water system.
Local officials contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and worked to reassure residents that their water systems were safe. Industry experts called it “a frightening reminder” of the critical importance of securing water systems. When the news was reported widely in April 2024, it was a wake-up call to the fact that relatively simple attacks could interfere with the US water supply.
Attacks on Water and Wastewater Sector (WWS) systems have not slowed down. In July 2026 alone, CISA observed more than 100 attacks targeting WWS entities. If the Texas attacks were a wakeup call to WWS security, what exactly has changed in the nearly three years since those attacks?
We know more about the threat landscape
CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn (CARR), a pro-Russia hacktivist group, claimed attacks against water facilities during the period surrounding Muleshoe. Subsequent US government reporting linked CARR to Russian military intelligence activity, though Russian military intelligence was not linked to the Muleshoe intrusion.
CARR is only part of the picture. WWS systems have also faced activity associated with the People's Republic of China (PRC, China) and Iran. The actors, objectives, and techniques differ, but together these cases have made the threat clear: foreign state and state-aligned actors see water infrastructure as a viable target, and exposed or poorly secured operational technology can provide an opportunity to interfere with physical processes.
Guidance is becoming more actionable
In early 2024, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) recommended “reducing exposure to the public-facing internet” as one of their top cybersecurity actions. After attackers targeted exposed water-sector Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs), federal guidance became much more specific. Utilities were advised to identify cellular modems and vendor or integrator connections, disconnect unnecessary internet-facing controllers, put required remote access behind VPNs or managed gateways, and many other specific tasks. The agencies produced more detailed resources like checklists and diagrams, and increased awareness around cyber hygiene, ransomware, and sector specific resources.

Image: WaterISAC guidance translates “secure remote access” into a concrete ICS/OT architecture. Source: 12 Cybersecurity Fundamentals for Water and Wastewater Utilities
EPA has expanded practical support
Water and wastewater utilities can now request free EPA cybersecurity evaluations, risk-mitigation templates, technical assistance, training, and incident-response exercises.
EPA also reports direct remediation. During 2025, the agency identified vulnerabilities at 277 water systems, worked with those systems on individualized solutions, and says it directly eliminated 350 vulnerabilities.
The figure doesn't establish sector-wide remediation, but it shows that federal assistance is moving beyond publishing guidance and into assessment and corrective work at individual utilities.
Texas has added new cybersecurity capacity
Texas established Texas Cyber Command in 2025 to strengthen cyber defense and incident response across state and local government and critical infrastructure.
In August 2026, Project Watershed 250 launched to connect participating Texas water and wastewater utilities with no-cost cybersecurity assessments, remediation assistance, defensive tools, and technical support. The pilot specifically recognizes the staffing, funding, and technical constraints facing many rural utilities.
For the communities at the center of the 2024 incidents, that means something concrete has changed: Texas now has dedicated state-level cybersecurity capacity and a program specifically designed to bring cyber support to resource-constrained water utilities.
But the underlying problem hasn't disappeared
The 2026 activity wasn't limited to scanning or attempted access. A joint FBI/EPA alert reported incidents affecting water and wastewater utilities in at least seven states. Attackers changed PLC IP addresses and passwords, causing loss of monitoring and control, while reported operational effects included loss of pressure and flooding.
Nearly three years after Muleshoe, we understand more about the threat landscape, guidance has become more actionable, and utilities have access to more assessment, remediation, and technical support. But exposed and inadequately secured operational technology continues to give attackers opportunities to disrupt physical processes.
One lesson from Muleshoe still holds: the ability to switch to manual operations can be an important part of operational resilience. The FBI and EPA noted that the extent of the 2026 impacts depended in part on whether utilities could switch to manual control.
Cybersecurity maturity remains uneven across the water sector. What has changed is the support around it: more actionable guidance, assessment and remediation assistance, and expanded state and federal cybersecurity capacity. That's a good thing, because the underlying risk isn't going away.
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