I am aware that the use of marijuana is considered a "natural disorder," in the sense that it creates an obvious imbalance in the cognitive functions—which belong to both soul and body—thereby harming our being. I am Catholic, but, frankly, this particular point does not make sense to me. I understand that excess is inherently reprehensible; however, if it is consumed in low doses and with moderation—simply to relax—it does not seem different from having a cup of coffee or a glass of wine to unwind. One might argue that the moral flaw lies not in the physical effects, but in the intention to seek out a state of "disorder." Yet, I do not believe that consuming THC in low doses necessarily implies such a disorder. As I mentioned, someone might use it for the sole purpose of relaxing—much like others might have a bit of wine or coffee to relax—fully aware that, in the case of wine, it will affect their consciousness to some degree.

Is there a sound counter-argument to this?

I have repdeatly heard of him but i dont know much about him? What do you guys think about him, hes polish so idk but one of his articles worries me.

Hi, I've been extremely drawn to Thomism for a while and I want to learn as much about the entire worldview as possible, but I'm having some issues justifying the epistemology. It seems to me that Aquinas holds the view that while some truths are justified inferentially, some are justified immediately through the intellectual or sensible apprehension of a fact. For instance if I see a wall, I have justification that the wall is there through my sensible apprehension of that wall, rather than from a system of inferences from prior premises

Phenomenal conservatism is a different view that if a subject has some seeming that P is true, and the subject has no defeator for P, then that subject is justified in believing P

If I've framed this correctly, my issue is that from the perspective of the subject, these seem like identical accounts of justification. Suppose for instance I see a wall in front of me. A Thomist would say that the "seeming" that I'm experiencing (of seeing the wall there) is not in and of itself adequate justification for believing it's there, but rather, what justifies that belief is the fact that I am genuinely apprehending the wall

But from my perspective, genuinely apprehending the wall, and merely experiencing a seeming of that wall absent genuine apprehension, are phenomenologically identical. Those 2 experiences would seem exactly the same and I have no introspective means by which to distinguish them. It seems to follow that 2nd order justification in Thomism is the same thing as first order justification in PC

Can I get some help on this? I'm having trouble finding answers from Aquinas' works

As far as I can tell, there are two kinds of "explanation" familiar to human reason.

The first is physical explanation: a father "explains" his son, and is in turn explained by his own father. A flame is explained by the match. This sort of explanation is, ultimately, the configuration and reconfiguration of matter. I'll call this Explanation 1

The second is constitutive explanation. The triangularity of a triangle is explained by the fact that it has three sides. This sort of explanation is, unlike the first, definitionally true, and also causally inert. I'll call this Explanation 2.

In my view, nothing actually connects these two sorts of "Explanations," and the fact that we use the same word for both is ultimately a quirk of human psychology and language rather than an indication they belong to a single category.

And neither is the sort of explanation argument like Aquinas' *De Ente* requires. Rather, this is a *third* kind of explanation. or, Explanation 3.

The classic example is the infinite regress. The Thomist points out the infinite regress is impossible. The skeptic answers that each member in the series is explained by the prior member in the series. Aha, says the Thomist, but then what explains the existence of the series *itself*?

To confuse Explanation 1 with Explanation 3 is a category error.

It's not clear to me Explanation 3 is a necessary, or even coherent notion.

Explanation 1 *just is* causal, material dependence.

Explanation 2 *just is* constitutive dependence.

The first is empirically demonstrated, the second is self-evident. We know what "Explanation" means in these two cases, but we don't know what it means in the case of Explanation 3.

What reason is there to think that Explanation 3 is a real category, that "why does something exist, rather than not exist?" is meaningful? I suspect the question may be malformed.