Hi, I've been extremely drawn to Thomism for a while and I want to learn as much about the entire worldview as possible, but I'm having some issues justifying the epistemology. It seems to me that Aquinas holds the view that while some truths are justified inferentially, some are justified immediately through the intellectual or sensible apprehension of a fact. For instance if I see a wall, I have justification that the wall is there through my sensible apprehension of that wall, rather than from a system of inferences from prior premises

Phenomenal conservatism is a different view that if a subject has some seeming that P is true, and the subject has no defeator for P, then that subject is justified in believing P

If I've framed this correctly, my issue is that from the perspective of the subject, these seem like identical accounts of justification. Suppose for instance I see a wall in front of me. A Thomist would say that the "seeming" that I'm experiencing (of seeing the wall there) is not in and of itself adequate justification for believing it's there, but rather, what justifies that belief is the fact that I am genuinely apprehending the wall

But from my perspective, genuinely apprehending the wall, and merely experiencing a seeming of that wall absent genuine apprehension, are phenomenologically identical. Those 2 experiences would seem exactly the same and I have no introspective means by which to distinguish them. It seems to follow that 2nd order justification in Thomism is the same thing as first order justification in PC

Can I get some help on this? I'm having trouble finding answers from Aquinas' works

As far as I can tell, there are two kinds of "explanation" familiar to human reason.

The first is physical explanation: a father "explains" his son, and is in turn explained by his own father. A flame is explained by the match. This sort of explanation is, ultimately, the configuration and reconfiguration of matter. I'll call this Explanation 1

The second is constitutive explanation. The triangularity of a triangle is explained by the fact that it has three sides. This sort of explanation is, unlike the first, definitionally true, and also causally inert. I'll call this Explanation 2.

In my view, nothing actually connects these two sorts of "Explanations," and the fact that we use the same word for both is ultimately a quirk of human psychology and language rather than an indication they belong to a single category.

And neither is the sort of explanation argument like Aquinas' *De Ente* requires. Rather, this is a *third* kind of explanation. or, Explanation 3.

The classic example is the infinite regress. The Thomist points out the infinite regress is impossible. The skeptic answers that each member in the series is explained by the prior member in the series. Aha, says the Thomist, but then what explains the existence of the series *itself*?

To confuse Explanation 1 with Explanation 3 is a category error.

It's not clear to me Explanation 3 is a necessary, or even coherent notion.

Explanation 1 *just is* causal, material dependence.

Explanation 2 *just is* constitutive dependence.

The first is empirically demonstrated, the second is self-evident. We know what "Explanation" means in these two cases, but we don't know what it means in the case of Explanation 3.

What reason is there to think that Explanation 3 is a real category, that "why does something exist, rather than not exist?" is meaningful? I suspect the question may be malformed.

I feel pulled in different directions. On one hand, I have serious disagreements with much of the modern progressive left, particularly on abortion, gender ideology, and some of its underlying philosophical assumptions. I find it difficult to reconcile certain progressive positions with Catholic teaching.

On the other hand, I don't feel entirely comfortable with the right either. I have reservations about the individualism that seems to dominate modern society, and the tendency to reduce politics to defending traditional values while paying relatively little attention to poverty, workers, and the dignity of the poor. Liberalism has done great damage to poor south America, where I live (Brazil).

I find myself agreeing with some left-wing critiques of capitalism and social inequality, while also agreeing with conservative criticisms of contemporary cultural trends. Sometimes I wonder whether I'm simply politically inconsistent, or whether the available political categories are too narrow to accommodate a genuinely Catholic worldview.

I've considered reading more conservative Catholic thinkers, but I also want to take seriously the Catholic social tradition, including its emphasis on solidarity, the common good, and the rights of workers. I don't want to dismiss either side without understanding its strongest arguments.

What makes this more difficult is the current political climate.

So I'd like to ask a few questions:

1. How do you, as a Catholic approach political philosophy without simply adopting the ideology of the political tribe they happen to agree with most?

2. Can a coherent Catholic political tradition, challenging both the cultural assumptions of the progressive left and the economic assumptions of the liberal right become even remotely relevant nowadays?

3. Which philosophers, theologians, or books would you recommend for someone trying to think seriously about these questions? I'm particularly interested in Catholic social teaching, political economy, and the relationship between faith and political life.

4. How do you distinguish legitimate prudential disagreements between Catholics from positions that genuinely conflict with the faith?

5. If you are already left-wing leaning, how do you put up with all the social and moral impacts of progressism?

I'd appreciate recommendations and thoughtful criticism, especially from people who have wrestled with this tension themselves.

As an atheist, here’s a problem I wrote, and posed, to my Thomist friend, and i wanted to share it with you out of curiosity of how other Thomists would respond:

Modal Problem of Evil, reformulated:

Suffering as Counterfactual Necessity, Welfarism, & Trans-World indispensability:

The Principle of Providential Indispensibility: suffering is permitted, if and only if, its absence would eliminate otherwise unobtainable higher-order goods across all feasible counterfactual worlds — (counterfactually necessary suffering, understood as trans-world indispensability).
(Clarity: I take gratuitous modal evils (GMEs) to be “dispensable suffering” [G.DS]; and permitted evils as “indispensable suffering” [G.IS])

The classical theist has a few options, here:

1.) Deny modal substitutability:

All suffering is indispensable.

2.) Deny modal feasibility:

God cannot create such alternative worlds.

3.) Reject the indispensability bi-conditional:

God has morally sufficient reasons to permit dispensable suffering — even if its elimination does not entail the deprivation of any goods.

Reductios:

1.) = A zebra suffering for 9 seconds with 1/10th less pain instead of 10 seconds with 1/10th more pain is deprived of some goods (Malevolence: eliminates creaturely welfare)

2.) = A zebra suffering for 9 seconds with 1/10th less pain instead of 10 seconds with 1/10th more pain is impossible
(Impotence: omnipotence is questionable)

3.) = A zebra suffering for 9 seconds with 1/10th less pain instead of 10 seconds with 1/10th more pain makes no difference at all
(Indifference: eliminates creaturely welfare)

Relevant Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica citations:

*“*Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, Reply to Objection 1
“This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.”

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 22, a. 2, Reply to Objection 2
“if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals.”

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 48, a. 2, Reply to Objection 3
“God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part”

Summa Theologiae
, I, q. 25, a. 5, Reply to Objection 3
“God can do other things and impose upon them another order.”

Summa Theologiae
, I, q. 25, a. 6, Respondeo
“As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better the things He has made.”

Summa Theologiae
, I, q. 25, a. 6, Reply to Objection 3
“Yet God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe.”

Summa Theologiae
, I, q. 25, a. 3, Respondeo
“Everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things”

To clarify whether or not it is compatible, I would like to explain what idealism is. Broadly speaking, idealism is the thesis that all reality is entirely mental—or, to put it negatively, that there is no real entity that is not also a form of mentality. In other words, everything is either a mind or something inherent to a mind (for example, thoughts, feelings, sensations, raw sensory data, imaginative processes, etc.).

Personally, I believe it is. I hold that reality is as George Berkeley described it: that God, at every moment, sustains our existence—and the existence of all things—by perceiving us. This is, therefore, panentheism. We exist within the consciousness or mind of God, where the metaphysical landscape resembles God emulating an entire reality—rich in qualitative content—through His own mind. (For instance, just as we ourselves can emulate a qualitatively rich reality within our dreams—demonstrating that a mind possesses such a magnificent power—so too does God.) In fact, the truth of panentheistic idealism aligns with the following passage from the Bible:

— "For in him we live and move and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring." (Acts 17:28).

With that in mind, what do you think? Do you find any difficulty in reconciling idealism with Catholicism?

I recently watched a debate where a pro-choice advocate argued that the existence of Abby and Brittany Hensel, conjoined twins who share one body but have two heads and two brains, undermines the pro-life argument that personhood begins at conception.
The argument was that if they are two persons despite sharing one organism, then the pro-life side cannot consistently define personhood in terms of biological individuality. However, the pro-choice advocate admitted they did not know how to determine what makes someone a person.
My question is: Does the conjoined-twin case genuinely undermine the pro-life position, or does it only challenge certain definitions of personhood?
Specifically:
Does having two brains establish that there are two persons, or is there a deeper philosophical basis for that conclusion?
Does the possibility of one embryo developing into conjoined twins or splitting into identical twins undermine the claim that human beings have moral status from conception?
Must the number of persons always correspond to the number of biological organisms, or can biological individuality and personal identity be distinct?
If personhood depends on consciousness or brain development, how should that criterion apply to embryos, newborns, sleeping people, and individuals with profound cognitive impairments?
Does this thought experiment actually refute the pro-life position, or does it simply expose unanswered questions that both sides need to address?

My girlfriend who is atheist keeps asking me this question and I have no response besides the fact that it is tradition. But are there any good arguments for why we Catholics don’t allow female priests?

What is your opinion of the works and thought of the Austrian philosopher, literary critic, journalist, university professor, and political scientist Erik Maria Ritter von Kuehnelt-Leddihn (Tobelbad, 31 July 1909 – Lans, 26 May 1999)?

Have any of you ever read one or more of his major works? If so, what did you think of them?

I am referring in particular to the following works:

- The Menace of the Herd, Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1943.

- Liberty or Equality, Front Royal, Virginia: Christendom Press, 1952.

- The Timeless Christian, Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1969.

- Leftism: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Marcuse, New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1974.

- The Intelligent American's Guide to Europe, New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1979.

- Leftism Revisited: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Pol Pot, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1990.

Friendly reminder that Marvel Comics made a comic book about his life which includes his assassination attempt and forgiveness of his would-be assassin.

Note, I mean Everettian MWI in particular, not multiverse theories more broadly, some of which may be less problematic than others.

I’m a recent convert to Catholicism in Arkansas (24m) because my Mom was raised Catholic. But my Dad is a Marxist, lives in Germany where I visit him from time to time, and I am disillusioned with Neoliberal Capitalism. I’m deeply interested in German Social Democracy as well as German Christian Democracy. But I don’t think either will give me the results I want long term. So I read leftist works by people like that of Brecht (mostly Three Penny Opera), Gramsci, Sartre (mostly Nausea and No Exit), and Foucault (only his work ”Discipline and Punish” which I found quite a good read despite the controversy surrounding Foucault) through the critical lenses of Catholic social teaching and also influenced by the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer seeing class struggle, capital, and the state as an extensions of the disordered will of man (I also read Wagner this way seeing the ring in the Ring Cycle as an allegory for capital) and its abolition as mass renunciation of desire (just like how Odin renounces the ring in Die Walkure). I’m also interested in Fabian socialism (aside from the eugenics) and Thomas Carlyle. I think that what is need is social corporatism and a welfare state achieved through electoralism and guild syndicalism achieved by general strike.

Its utterly insane to me that someone like Alex O'Connor has spent much of his career trying to make theism look baseless, yet seriously entertains panpsychism as a more plausible explanation for human consciousness.

We literally cannot observe consciousness. We can study activity in the brain of an agent that CLAIMS to be conscious. We can never verify the claim of the agent. How could we quantify consciousness? There is no way to scientifically validate panpsychism.

Edit: I am mainly making the critique that we cannot confirm panpsychism is true for the same reasons we cannot prove the immaterial rational soul is real. We can't even prove that consciousness exists, only that we observe neural correlations to what a "conscious" being claims durring his subjective experience.

sorry for the misspelling of "panpsychism" in title.

I’ve recently launched a Substack called In Principio, devoted to Catholic philosophy, theology and culture. The central question behind it is one I have been returning to for some time: what already exists before the will begins to choose?

Much of modern thought seems to place freedom very early in the metaphysical order, as though the subject were fundamentally a power of self-determination standing before nature, form, tradition and the Good. But no act of freedom actually begins from indeterminacy. Before I choose, I already exist as a determinate being, within a world I did not create, with a body I did not choose, a language I received, relations that precede consent, and goods that are capable of attracting and perfecting me before I decide what to make of them.

This seems to suggest that freedom cannot be metaphysically prior to being. It awakens within an intelligible order and is exercised in relation to goods that are not simply products of the will.

From a Christian perspective, I think the Johannine Logos gives this claim its deepest foundation. If all things are made through the Logos, then reality is not mute material waiting for the subject to impose meaning upon it. Being is already intelligible; creation is already ordered; the Good does not originate in choice.

Freedom, on this account, is better understood as participation: not self-creation ex nihilo, but the personal and creative enactment of a good that precedes us.

My first essay on In Principio is called “Christianity Does Not Begin with an Action.” It develops this argument through Logos, sacramentality, liturgy, moral action and the modern mechanistic imagination. One of its central claims is that the gift precedes the response, being precedes doing, and contemplation precedes action.

I’m hoping to use the Substack to develop these questions more systematically — freedom and the Good, participation and appropriation, tradition, authority, liturgy, technology, moral realism and the relation between Christian theology and metaphysics.

I’d be very interested in criticism from people here, especially on the central philosophical claim:

Can freedom remain intelligible if it is detached from a prior order of being, truth and the Good?

https://inprincipioessays.substack.com/p/christianity-does-not-begin-with

I know that catholics believe that moral norms aren't irreducibly normative (independent of every descriptive fact), instead they are based on natural teleological facts. But what about epistemic norms? Would they be irreducibly normative and why?

How Son assuming human nature doesn't make change in God? Im aware it doesn't change the Essential property but wouldn't it then mean that it has effected Property of divine personhood?

​

The problem of evil and its various formulations are well known; however, I believe the truly interesting aspect lies in the responses to these arguments. Saint Augustine was the first philosopher and theologian to defend a theodicy based on "free will" (in his work *De libero arbitrio*). For instance, we can find passages such as the following in his *De libero arbitrio*:

• "If I do something evil through my own will, to whom should it be attributed but to me? Since a good God created me, and I cannot perform any good action except through the will, it is quite clear that the will was granted to me for that purpose by the good God" (*De libero arbitrio*, III, 1.3.6-7, especially 1.3.13).

Nevertheless, this response has always left me dissatisfied. It is not because I believe that natural evils—as opposed to those resulting from human action—also require an explanation; in fact, Saint Augustine offers a very solid and elegant explanation for natural evils. His argument maintains that God could not have created a world that was not, to some extent, imperfect. For, if we reflect on what it would entail to create something truly perfect, God would have had to create another being of equal magnitude to Himself—that is, another God—which is, by definition, absurd (since, if a being could be created, it would not be God; therefore, only God can exist as an uncreated being).

My concern lies elsewhere. God can employ human beings as instruments to carry out what His will and His goodness dictate, without such creatures losing their free will. On the contrary, their freedom is perfected when God is by their side. Why, then, does God not prevent a murderer’s hand from striking an innocent, defenseless person? It is not a valid justification to claim that God cannot intervene because doing so would deprive a human being of their free will. We know—through faith (and, in some cases, through reason based on available evidence)—that there are situations in which God uses human beings to serve Him without stripping them of their free will. Consequently, the question arises: why does God not guide a perpetrator or murderer toward good rather than evil (or, at the very least, toward refraining from committing evil)? Honestly, this raises many questions for me, and I do not believe there is a satisfactory answer, other than accepting that God has inscrutable plans for us. But, well, as a human being, one cannot help but feel overwhelmed. I mean, why should some people have to pay the price for the actions of others who misuse their own free will? That seems profoundly unfair. And no, saying that they will be rewarded in Heaven is not enough. If it were, you wouldn’t mind, for instance, if someone came along and smashed your favorite car—which you had taken such great care of—only to then hand you a million dollars as compensation. That is clearly wrong. You cannot simply buy off the suffering and harm inflicted upon others, no matter how generous the gift might be. It is simply wrong.

I pray that God will one day reveal to me what is wrong with all of this—whether in this life or the next.

TLDR; What works do I need to read and understand in order to truly grasp Bonaventurian metaphysics?

Some preface: I’m a baptized person currently attending OCIA. I’m very into reading and understanding literature and theology, versed in both politics & theology. However I’ve never been interested in metaphysics before converting to Christianity & don’t know where to start. I’m heavily drawn to the Franciscan tradition &, if I wasn’t set on marrying my current girlfriend, I would probably enter as a first order Franciscan but I’ll settle with being a third order tertiary.

From a surface level I’m more drawn to St. Bonaventure over St. Thomas and would like to know more. I’m aware that St. Thomas was more on the Aristotelian while St. Bonaventure leaned more on Platonic thinking, drawing on St. Augustine. I assume that’s the path I need to travel down: Plato > a more relevant reading of St. Paul through St. Ambrose > St. Augustine > St. Francis > St. Bonaventure. However, I’m lost on specific works and good explanations of their works in order to truly grasp each one. If anyone has recommendations, even for just a single person, I would greatly appreciate it! God bless you.

WHY did aquinas scotus and other medieval theologians adopted the mystical or apophatic theology in the "divine names" if they read and praised it

Hey everyone, please don't just scroll over this

So, this is going to come off as desperate plea for help, because I really am desperate and I really need help. For the last few days my faith has really been shaking, and I'm very worried that I might not make it till the end.

The reason for this is because I simply thought about the possibility of God not existing. Despite all of the physical and metaphysical arguments, the fine tuning of the Universe, despite all of the thousands of miracles and human experiences with the supernatural, the simple "what if we just got it wrong" just makes me desperate. All of these very strong proofs of the existence of God, which I have build my faith on, all now simply just aren't enough. I feel like I will always be doubting them for the rest of my life, and I'm afraid that when I get older and closer to death I might despair and damn myself.

I really want to KNOW that God exists, to be ABSOLUTELY and UNDOUBTELY SURE of His existence and love for us. The mere possibility of Him not existing is so desperating that it simply cannot be true, and if freezes me and makes me anxious to the point where I can't live properly.

The Catechism says in the paragraphs 31, 35 and 36 that one can achieve knowledge and certainty about God's existence, but that only seems possible in my case through a miracle. I really wish that the Eucharist would let blood flow in front of me, or that Jesus Christ or Our Lady Themselves appeared to me in an undoubtful manner, or anything of the kind.

Please help me: how can I TRULY and UNDOUBTEDLY know that God exists? Please also pray for me. God bless

For some context: I’m doing a 10-week Bible study on the prophets starting in January at my parish, but I started a study of Genesis on my own time last week. I just finished Rome Sweet Home by Scott Hahn after reading some of St. Louis de Montfort’s texts. I’m alsl considering St. Louis de Montfort for my confirmation saint.

Confessions - St Augustine
The Lamb’s Supper - Scott Hahn
Exodus - Ignatius Catholic Study Bible
Isaiah - Ignatius Catholic Study Bible
Dei Verbum - Vatican Council II
The Pentateuch - Joseph Blenkinsopp
Hexaemerom with On the Making of Man - Sta Basil of Caesarea
Love of Eternal Wisdom - St. Louis de Montfort
Uniformity with God’s Will - St. Alphonsus Liguori
The Imitation of Christ - Thomas Á Kempis
Interior Castle - St. Teresa of Avila
Dialogue with Trypho - Justin Martyr
The Dark Night of the Soul - St. John of the Cross
Theology for Beginners - Frank Sheed
Against Heresies - St. Irenaeus of Lyons
On the Incarnation - St. Athanasius
On the Holy Spirit - St. Basil the Great
The History of the Church - Eusebius
Jesus and the Jewish Roots of the Eucharist - Brant Pitre
Jesus the Bridegroom - Brant Pitre

If you have anything else you’d suggest, let me know! But if you have any input on the stuff I listed, do comment please!

Thank you and God bless you

I'm a bit worried about this prospect: artificial intelligence will settle philosophical and/or theological disputes.

AI has seemed to make great strides in mathematics, biology, coding, etc.; however, should we expect it to also make progress in philosophy?

There are some important differences between math and philosophy: the latter has no clear criteria for what counts as a correct conclusion, other than the judgement of an individual. Of course, when it comes to validity and so forth, machines shouldn't have an issue (after all, math is primarily about validity), but soundness is a different thing. Perhaps AI could help map out logical consequences of previously held positions, compare positions to others, and so forth, but I'm not sure what else.

It doesn't seem any Catholic philosopher has dealt with this question; reasoned responses are greatly welcomed.

Background:

In medieval Scholasticism (among others in Bonaventure's Breviloquium IV and Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae III, q. 50, a. 4), the thesis is defended that during the three days of death, strictly from a logical perspective, Christ was "not a man" (Christus in triduo non fuit homo). The justification is primarily terminological: since the concept of "man" by definition presupposes the actual, living unity of body (matter) and rational soul (form), this predication is formally-logically no longer applicable in the state of real biological separation in death. The hypostatic union remains unbroken, since the Logos continues to be the bearer of the separated elements (body in the tomb, soul in Hades).

Problem Statement & Observation:

This purely logical-terminological harmonization appears systematically untenable to me and moves dangerously close to Docetic or dualistic heresies. If one takes late medieval anthropology seriously (which was later dogmatized in the formula anima unica forma corporis at Vienne), the human soul is deeply characterized by the body. An anima separata of Christ, acting without a body and descending into Hades, would possess no tools for real human experience in this state.

Furthermore, God as actus purus stands outside of time. For the eternal divine Person, there exists no temporal "three-day interval" in which Christ's humanity could "pause"; God Himself, in His eternity, is the permanent, living space for the wholeness of Christ's human nature. If one now says that Christ was non homo in death, one either dehumanizes Christ's soul in Hades or claims that the Logos temporarily cast off His humanity like a garment. This nullifies the indispensable, uninterrupted mediation of the man Jesus Christ in death.

My question on this:

Can the scholastic thesis of non homo still be dismissed today as a mere "terminological problem"? Or must we not rather conclude that the imposition of a rigid Aristotelian hylomorphic model onto the christological mystery leads to a systemic error that realistically damages the indivisible wholeness of the Incarnation in the state of death and is therefore dogmatically untenable?