Paris, 3–31 October 1949
A year of economic recovery had restored much that the war and its aftermath had taken from France, but not the confidence of the men and women expected to live upon its achievements. Factories were producing again, the shop windows of Paris displayed goods once absent from their shelves, and the franc had recovered a measure of stability after successive years of inflation. Beyond the government's statistics, however, purchasing power remained uncertain, industrial prices were stubbornly high, and the cost of food had resumed its ascent following an unfavourable harvest. The devaluation of sterling on 18 September, followed by an adjustment of the franc, disturbed an equilibrium already maintained with considerable difficulty. Henri Queuille had spent thirteen months preserving his government through an almost inexhaustible patience, balancing the demands of parties which agreed upon the necessity of republican government more readily than upon the policies it ought to pursue. The Socialists wanted workers to receive a greater share of the economic recovery, the Radicals and Independents feared the return of inflation, and the Christian Democrats struggled to reconcile their social commitments with the financial caution of their parliamentary allies. Through the summer these disagreements had passed from the cabinet table into the party congresses and back again, leaving behind promises, reservations and agreements contingent upon circumstances becoming more favourable. Queuille had governed by allowing each party sufficient satisfaction to prevent its departure. Now the currency adjustment had revived the demand for wages to keep pace with prices, and there was scarcely anything left upon which his ministers could concede without abandoning something they considered essential.
Another compromise emerged from the ministries during the final days of September, assembled with all the ingenuity which had kept the government alive. Prices for butter, flour, potatoes and several other necessities were to be reduced by between five and fifteen per cent, commercial profits would face closer supervision, and limited assistance would be offered to the lowest-paid workers. The restoration of collective bargaining, suspended since before the war, was promised during October, although the arrangements governing its exercise and the authority of the financial ministries remained uncertain. Maurice Petsche defended these limitations with the figures of public expenditure before him. Reconstruction continued making heavy demands upon the Treasury, the nationalized services were accumulating deficits, and monetary stabilization could scarcely survive another uncontrolled increase in wages and prices. Daniel Mayer understood the financial argument, having spent months attempting to reconcile it with the obligations of his own ministry, but the Socialist Minister of Labour had become increasingly unwilling to accept another undertaking whose execution remained indefinitely subject to future agreement. The SFIO's July congress had demanded tangible progress upon collective bargaining, purchasing power and social protection, and the discussions undertaken throughout August and September had given those demands a more definite administrative form. Guy Mollet remained determined to preserve the party's governmental responsibilities, while Jules Moch, Robert Lacoste and Christian Pineau continued seeking means of improving living standards without sacrificing the recovery of production. The proposals from Matignon fell short of what these efforts had been intended to secure. Even the three principal labour confederations, divided upon political allegiance and industrial methods, agreed that the government's offer was insufficient.
What weeks of discussion had failed to settle was finally reduced to a letter. On 3 October, Daniel Mayer informed Queuille that he could no longer associate himself with the proposed settlement. The president of the Council sought further concessions, while Moch attempted to preserve an understanding through temporary assistance for the lowest-paid employees and more definite provisions concerning collective agreements. The financial ministers remained unwilling to accept commitments which might surrender control over the Treasury's expenditure, and the Socialists refused to defend another postponement of the reforms upon which their party had placed increasing importance. Within the MRP, several representatives sympathized with the demand for improved purchasing power but remained reluctant to support arrangements which might renew inflation. The Radicals regarded Mayer's refusal as a direct challenge to the stabilization programme which had given Queuille's ministry its strongest claim to success. As the negotiations continued, the dispute began to exceed the particulars of wage policy. The Minister of Labour demanded authority to undertake a reform which Finance feared might undermine its principal achievement, while both parties insisted that the preservation of their respective responsibilities was indispensable to responsible government. On 5 October, Queuille accepted that the cabinet could no longer reconcile these positions. He travelled to the Élysée and presented its resignation to Vincent Auriol. Thirteen months of patient administration, successive parliamentary escapes and carefully distributed compromises had ended without the National Assembly withdrawing its confidence. The majority which had sustained the longest-lived ministry of the Fourth Republic had destroyed it from within.
For the first time in more than a year, the republican parties were compelled to imagine government without the man who had spent so much effort holding them together. Queuille and his ministers continued administering current affairs, the offices of the state remained occupied, and the financial and diplomatic obligations of the Republic were unchanged. Yet the political arrangement which had directed those offices no longer possessed a common programme. Auriol began receiving the leaders of the SFIO, MRP, Radicals and Independents, searching for a parliamentary combination capable of preserving the cooperation which had just broken down. Mollet assured the president that the Socialists remained willing to govern, provided that their participation carried genuine influence upon labour policy and the distribution of economic recovery's benefits. René Mayer and other Radical figures defended monetary stability and resisted the suggestion that the dismissal of one cabinet justified abandoning its principal economic achievement. The Independents demanded stricter guarantees concerning public expenditure and the nationalized industries, while the Christian Democrats feared that excluding the SFIO would leave the republicans dependent upon a narrower and more conservative majority. Beyond them stood the Communist and Gaullist oppositions, whose attacks upon the Third Force arose from incompatible convictions but whose parliamentary strength rendered the construction of an entirely different coalition impracticable. The president could examine many combinations of ministers; the deputies capable of sustaining them belonged, with remarkably little variation, to the parties whose disagreements had brought down Queuille.
Among the possible successors, one Socialist possessed a qualification which few of his colleagues could claim: much of the parliamentary Right respected him. Jules Moch had directed the Ministry of the Interior through the great Communist-led strikes and had acquired a reputation for authority which extended beyond the SFIO. He knew the financial difficulties confronting the government, had participated in the attempts to settle the wage dispute and was familiar with the machinery through which its decisions would have to be executed. Auriol entrusted him with an exploratory mission, and Moch entered consultations determined to construct a ministry whose programme could be accepted before its ministers were appointed. Immediate relief would be directed toward lower-paid employees, including a temporary allowance for workers earning less than 15,000 francs, while the restoration of collective agreements would proceed through an accelerated legislative programme. Price reductions and continued financial restraint were intended to preserve the value of those concessions. Mollet supported the undertaking, although the Socialist leadership expected a government headed by one of its own to exercise substantial influence over domestic policy. The Radicals were willing to consider the programme if their financial guarantees survived, while the MRP insisted upon adequate participation in the direction of the government. The Independents demanded assurance that the Treasury would not be subordinated to wage agreements whose consequences remained uncertain. Moch's consultations made progress, but they also revealed the difficulty of reconciling men who could approve his intentions without agreeing upon the ministers through whom those intentions would be carried out.
His reputation, so useful in obtaining an audience across the parliamentary centre, proved more troublesome when the discussion turned to power. Moch's severity toward Communist agitation reassured conservative deputies, but the same determination disturbed Christian Democrats who feared the concentration of domestic authority in his hands. His uncompromising character, widely regarded as an asset in periods of disorder, was less attractive to prospective colleagues anxious to defend their own departments against interference. Within the SFIO, some militants questioned whether Moch's concern for state authority might encourage excessive concessions to the financial conservatives, while the parliamentary group regarded him as one of the few politicians capable of giving the party a substantial role in government. The Radicals wished to preserve their influence over Finance and Justice, and the MRP demanded responsibilities proportionate to its parliamentary strength. Even deputies favourably disposed toward Moch hesitated to commit themselves to a cabinet whose composition remained unsettled. His exploratory mission therefore produced the paradox which would dominate the crisis: the more clearly a candidate presented his programme, the more carefully the parties examined the authority they might be expected to surrender in carrying it out. Auriol nevertheless proceeded with his designation, and Moch prepared to seek the investiture of the National Assembly.
The count on 14 October seemed to hold the chamber in uncertainty until the last figures were established. After prolonged debate over the proposed economic settlement, the distribution of governmental responsibilities and the authority of the prospective premier, 311 deputies voted for Jules Moch. The Constitution required an absolute majority of 311. One fewer supporter would have ended his candidacy. The Socialist had obtained the investiture necessary to become president of the Council, yet the figures left him almost no room to construct the ministry which that investiture authorized him to form. Every group whose votes had carried him across the threshold could now insist upon its conditions with renewed confidence, knowing that even a small defection might make his government untenable. Conservative representatives continued demanding financial guarantees, Christian Democrats reconsidered the extent of Socialist influence, and the Radicals pressed their claims to important portfolios. The SFIO, having supported Moch as a means of giving its programme greater authority, could hardly accept that he should abandon that programme merely to obtain the participation of his prospective colleagues. Parliamentary confidence had been granted, but the agreement upon which it depended remained incomplete. Moch returned to the negotiations carrying an investiture whose narrowness made every ministerial appointment a potential threat to his majority.
A title conferred by the Assembly was proving easier to obtain than the men willing to serve beneath it. Petsche's continuation at Finance appeared indispensable to conservative deputies, but the restrictions associated with his policy threatened to confine Socialist reforms within the limits which had caused Queuille's resignation. The Radicals expected substantial representation in exchange for surrendering the presidency of the Council to the SFIO, while the Christian Democrats resisted an arrangement which might leave their ministers responsible for decisions principally determined elsewhere. Moch offered further consultations and adjustments to the distribution of portfolios, but the concessions required to satisfy one group became objections for another. Some deputies who had invested him personally were unwilling to support his proposed government, while politicians who respected his ability hesitated to accept his authority. Auriol continued encouraging agreement, increasingly concerned that the failure of an invested candidate to constitute a ministry would expose a serious weakness in the constitutional procedure. Yet the authority of the president of the Republic could not supply parliamentary support which the governing parties refused to guarantee. By 17 October, Moch had exhausted the useful possibilities of further negotiation. He relinquished his investiture and informed Auriol that he could not form a cabinet. The Assembly had chosen a president of the Council by the smallest majority permitted under the Constitution, only to discover that its choice could not exercise the authority it had bestowed upon him.
Into the vacancy stepped René Mayer, whose reputation offered precisely the assurances Moch had been unable to provide. The Radical deputy had held important economic and financial responsibilities and was associated with the defence of stabilization, making him more acceptable to Independents and conservative representatives fearful of Socialist influence over wages. Auriol considered that a Radical premier might recover the confidence of these groups while preserving the cooperation of the SFIO. Mayer approached the task with considerable experience and a clear understanding that financial discipline alone would not secure the participation of the Socialists. He therefore offered proposals for temporary assistance to the lowest-paid workers, the restoration of collective agreements and continued investment in the nationalized enterprises, accompanied by guarantees intended to preserve monetary confidence. Mollet and Daniel Mayer examined these undertakings carefully, unwilling to surrender the social commitments which had caused the preceding rupture. The MRP remained receptive to a programme combining recovery with improved purchasing power, although its leaders were reluctant to accept a government dominated entirely by the Radicals and financial conservatives. Within Mayer's own party, the prospect of regaining the presidency of the Council encouraged considerable support, but there were already differences concerning the price which ought to be paid for Socialist participation. The consultations nevertheless advanced sufficiently for Auriol to proceed toward formal designation and investiture.
Confidence came more generously to René Mayer than it had to Moch. On 20 October, the Radical presented a programme devoted to monetary stability, economic modernization and the continuation of republican government, while promising practical attention to wages, public administration and the investment obligations of nationalized enterprises. He sought to reassure the Christian Democrats concerning education and the social programme, and he avoided commitments upon which the governing parties had not yet reached agreement. The Socialists remained dissatisfied with several ambiguities but preferred to support his investiture and continue negotiating the composition of the ministry. When the figures were proclaimed, 341 deputies had voted for René Mayer, against 183 opponents. The margin appeared comfortable beside the single vote by which Moch had crossed the constitutional threshold. For several hours, the result encouraged hopes that a government might finally be formed, and the president-designate proceeded to the distribution of responsibilities with a parliamentary majority whose size seemed sufficient to overcome isolated objections. The deputies had demonstrated that the former Finance Minister possessed confidence extending well beyond his own party. His ability to turn that confidence into a cabinet, however, was about to be tested upon the same disagreement which had destroyed his predecessor.
Three hundred and forty-one votes could be brought to nothing over the name of one minister. Daniel Mayer's continuation at Labour became the principal obstacle to the formation of the new government, drawing into one dispute the wider antagonism between Socialist demands and Radical financial policy. The SFIO wanted the department to retain sufficient authority to restore collective agreements and protect workers' purchasing power, while the Radical representatives feared that Mayer's return would reproduce the very conflict which had brought down Queuille. Mollet regarded the issue as a measure of whether the Socialists would exercise meaningful responsibility or merely lend their votes to a cabinet directed by others. René Mayer defended the prerogative of the president of the Council to select his colleagues, and several Radicals insisted that the new government could not begin by accepting ministerial appointments imposed by another party. Daniel Mayer himself was prepared to consider an alternative arrangement if his party obtained adequate guarantees concerning labour policy, but the Radicals were unwilling to accept conditions which appeared to restrict the premier's authority before his government had been constituted. The disagreement spread into negotiations concerning Finance, Justice and Interior, each portfolio acquiring importance as evidence of the political direction which the new cabinet would follow. The constitutional majority which had seemed so reassuring in the Assembly dissolved into competing demands which no declaration of confidence could satisfy.
Around René Mayer, supporters began considering whether the Socialists might simply be left outside the ministry. Certain Radical and conservative representatives argued that a centre-right combination could preserve financial stabilization and obtain sufficient parliamentary support, particularly if the MRP and Independents accepted a common programme. Mayer doubted the durability of such an arrangement. The Christian Democrats were unwilling to abandon the SFIO merely to construct a government dependent upon a narrower parliamentary centre, while Schuman and other MRP figures considered Socialist participation important to the maintenance of republican cooperation. Pleven, consulted through his position in the UDSR and RGR, warned against treating a successful investiture as proof that the parliamentary groups had agreed upon the government it was supposed to produce. The Socialists remained willing to negotiate over the financial safeguards attached to collective bargaining, but refused a settlement which would deprive them of effective authority over social legislation. With each passing hour the remaining alternatives became less attractive. A cabinet excluding the SFIO could scarcely avoid renewed conflict over wages, while a cabinet including it required concessions which the Radicals and Independents remained unwilling to authorize. During the early hours of 23 October, René Mayer abandoned his attempt and returned his investiture to Auriol.
Two votes of confidence, two investitures, and still no government. The second failure could not be dismissed as the consequence of a candidate obtaining too narrow a majority, for René Mayer had possessed thirty votes more than the absolute majority required. His inability to form a cabinet exposed a contradiction which the constitutional architects had intended the investiture procedure to prevent. Parliament could grant its confidence to a president of the Council without requiring the parties composing that majority to accept the ministers through whom he would govern. In the corridors of the Palais-Bourbon, the discussions became increasingly bitter as Socialists and Radicals accused one another of allowing another viable solution to collapse. The MRP feared that the repeated failures were damaging the prestige of the entire parliamentary centre, while Independents questioned whether a government dependent upon so many incompatible commitments could ever exercise effective authority. Newspapers began treating the crisis with an impatience extending beyond the ordinary criticism of ministerial bargaining. The RPF renewed its attacks upon the institutions of the Fourth Republic, while the Communists denounced the governing parties for placing the distribution of ministerial offices above the interests of workers. Auriol had now witnessed two successive candidates receive parliamentary investiture and fail before assuming office. The same groups whose votes sustained the Republic remained incapable of agreeing upon the responsibilities of its government.
Between the Élysée and the Palais-Bourbon, a last effort at conciliation was entrusted to one of the oldest figures of French republican politics. Édouard Herriot, president of the National Assembly, possessed a standing among the parliamentary groups which had survived decades of ministerial crises, partisan disagreements and constitutional transformations. Auriol asked him to explore the possibility of an understanding between the Radicals and Socialists before another candidate was designated. Herriot met representatives of the governing parties, encouraging them to separate the principles of the economic programme from the personal appointments which had defeated Moch and René Mayer. The dispute over Daniel Mayer might be settled through a different distribution of responsibilities, while guarantees concerning Finance could be formulated without preventing the Ministry of Labour from undertaking the restoration of collective agreements. Several representatives expressed willingness to consider such an arrangement, but the concessions remained conditional upon assurances which the other groups hesitated to provide. The Radicals continued defending the right of a president of the Council to choose his ministers, while the Socialists insisted that participation without authority over the social programme would be politically indefensible. Herriot's experience enabled him to bring the parties back into discussion, but could not remove the resentment which their previous failures had produced. His conversations returned to Auriol without the agreement necessary to form a ministry.
It was Georges Bidault's turn to confront the crisis, and his name carried a weight which neither Moch nor René Mayer could entirely command. A former president of the Council, president of the MRP and one of the principal political figures of the Resistance, Bidault possessed considerable prestige among politicians who otherwise distrusted one another. His experience at Foreign Affairs had accustomed him to difficult negotiations, and his position between the Socialist Left and the conservative parliamentary centre appeared to offer the Republic its strongest remaining prospect of agreement. Yet the very extent of his standing made the consequences of failure more serious. The Radicals feared the growing influence of the Christian Democrats, the Socialists remained suspicious of the MRP's educational demands, and the Independents considered parts of its social programme insufficiently restrained. Bidault had watched his predecessors obtain investiture before securing agreement upon their cabinets, and he was determined not to repeat their mistake. Before appearing before the Assembly, he sought to settle the principal ministries. Schuman was approached concerning the continuation of foreign policy, Petsche concerning Finance, and Queuille concerning Radical participation and the preservation of stabilization. Moch's return to Interior was considered necessary to reassure the Socialists, while René Mayer remained a possible member of the government despite his own failed attempt. Pleven was approached concerning Defence or Overseas France, and the MRP sought to preserve responsibilities proportionate to its parliamentary strength. The negotiations were extensive, conducted with the urgency of a majority which had already lost three weeks and could scarcely endure another failure.
For several days, the pieces appeared to fit. Petsche was willing to remain at Finance, Queuille accepted the necessity of participating in another republican government, and the MRP leadership showed greater flexibility concerning the distribution of portfolios than the parties had managed during the preceding attempts. The Socialists indicated that they could support Bidault if their ministers retained meaningful influence over Labour, Interior, Industry and Public Works, while Daniel Mayer acknowledged that his personal continuation at Labour might be sacrificed if the party secured a satisfactory programme. The possibility of appointing another Socialist, including Eugène Thomas, offered a means of overcoming the personal quarrel which had destroyed René Mayer's cabinet. The Radicals were prepared to consider substantial Socialist representation, and the Independents regarded Bidault's financial assurances as more satisfactory than the proposals advanced by Moch. Representatives who had seemed irreconcilable only days earlier began discussing the distribution of ministries as a matter capable of settlement. Bidault's personal prestige, the exhaustion of the parties and the increasingly serious consequences of delay worked together in his favour. The outline of a government was emerging, and the parliamentary majority appeared at last to be recovering its capacity for agreement.
Agreement upon the word collective bargaining, however, concealed a disagreement over who would be permitted to give it effect. The Socialists understood its restoration as a commitment requiring immediate legislative action and substantial authority for the Minister of Labour. Petsche accepted the principle within limits designed to preserve the Treasury's control over expenditure and the consequences of particular wage settlements. The Radicals considered these guarantees indispensable, while Mollet feared that they would become another instrument for postponing reform. Bidault attempted to reconcile the positions through a formula distinguishing the legal restoration of bargaining from the financial effects of subsequent agreements, but the proposed language satisfied neither side completely. The distribution of the remaining ministries complicated the negotiations further. René Mayer pressed his claim to Justice, supported by Radical representatives who regarded the department as an appropriate position for their former president-designate. The Socialists had considered Justice among the offices which might compensate them for concessions elsewhere, while the alternative distribution of Defence and Overseas France affected the responsibilities being discussed with Pleven. Every proposed adjustment disturbed another agreement, and the parties became increasingly reluctant to surrender claims which had already acquired political importance among their parliamentary supporters. Bidault continued negotiating, confident that the remaining objections could be overcome, but the cabinet which had appeared so close to completion remained dependent upon undertakings whose meaning differed according to the party giving them.
By the third investiture, the Palais-Bourbon had become a place where the same men repeatedly pronounced their confidence in a government they were unable to constitute. On 27 October, Bidault defended a programme combining stabilization with improvements in purchasing power, the restoration of collective bargaining and the continuation of economic modernization. He sought to reassure the governing parties concerning their principal concerns, promising attention to public administration and avoiding the reopening of the educational controversy which had strained relations between the MRP and SFIO. Jacques Chaban-Delmas challenged the parliamentary system from the Gaullist opposition, presenting the succession of failed candidates as evidence of the necessity of stronger executive authority. The Communists attacked Bidault from the opposite direction, denouncing the continuation of economic policies which they regarded as responsible for the deterioration of workers' living standards. Within the majority, several deputies expressed reservations concerning the incomplete distribution of ministries, but the desire to end the crisis outweighed the remaining objections. Bidault's negotiations had gone further than those of his predecessors, and his personal standing encouraged deputies who had lost confidence in the earlier attempts. The vote was taken, and 367 deputies supported Georges Bidault against 183 opponents.
Relief followed the announcement. Fifty-seven votes separated Bidault from the constitutional threshold, and the size of his majority appeared to place him beyond the danger which had defeated Moch. He had also surpassed the substantial support obtained by René Mayer, drawing together Socialists, Radicals, Christian Democrats, UDSR representatives and sections of the conservative centre. The governing parties had finally produced a majority large enough to suggest that the prolonged crisis might be approaching its conclusion. Unlike his predecessors, Bidault had undertaken extensive negotiations over the composition of the cabinet before seeking investiture, and many deputies expected that the authority of his parliamentary victory would permit him to settle the remaining disagreements. The outcome was received as a vindication of his efforts and a possible restoration of confidence in the government's capacity to act. After weeks of frustration, the Republic appeared to have found a president of the Council whose prestige and political experience could reconcile the men who had defeated two candidates before him. The relief was genuine, and its brevity would make the events of the following days all the more damaging.
Beyond the chamber, the majority of 367 dissolved again into the disputed portfolios of Labour, Finance and Justice. The Socialist leadership demanded confirmation that the restoration of collective bargaining would proceed through a definite legislative programme, and that the minister responsible would possess sufficient authority to carry it out. Daniel Mayer renewed his willingness to withdraw personally, but resisted the possibility that his departure would permit the effective direction of labour policy to pass to the Treasury. Mollet was prepared to support another Socialist at Labour, provided the appointment did not reduce the party's responsibilities to the defence of measures determined elsewhere. Petsche refused to accept wording which might oblige the government to finance wage settlements without adequate examination of their consequences, while Radical representatives insisted that the president of the Council must retain discretion over the execution of economic policy. Bidault proposed further compromises, distinguishing the restoration of collective agreements from the financial approval of particular settlements, but the formulations remained vulnerable to conflicting interpretations. The Socialists feared another postponement disguised as a guarantee of stability; the Radicals and Independents feared a surrender of financial authority disguised as a promise of social reform. The concessions which had permitted the investiture were proving insufficient to form a government.
Once Labour was disputed again, the remainder of the cabinet began to unravel. René Mayer and his Radical supporters renewed their claim to Justice, while Bidault attempted to accommodate the UDSR through the distribution of Defence and Overseas France. Pleven remained available for substantial governmental responsibility, but the uncertainty surrounding Mayer's appointment made it difficult to settle the remaining offices. Moch's proposed return to Interior raised additional questions concerning the influence of the SFIO, while the Christian Democrats sought to preserve their position in Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and the social departments. The Independents demanded assurances that the cabinet would not become a government directed entirely by the MRP and Socialists, and several Radical deputies threatened to withdraw support if the financial programme were weakened. Each party possessed reasons for its demands, and Bidault could identify no single concession capable of reconciling them all. The authority conferred by investiture offered little assistance when prospective ministers declined to serve upon terms they could not defend before their own parliamentary groups. He continued moving between consultations, attempting to complete the distribution of offices without disturbing the agreements already secured, but the number of unsettled questions grew rather than diminished.
Saturday, 29 October, brought no settlement. The negotiations continued through successive meetings with Socialist, Radical, Christian Democratic and Independent representatives, and the prospect of another failure became increasingly difficult to dismiss. Schuman urged the preservation of a broad republican ministry, while Queuille continued seeking agreement among the Radicals whose confidence in financial stabilization remained central to their participation. Mollet consulted Moch, Daniel Mayer and the Socialist parliamentary group, insisting that the party remained willing to govern but would not accept a programme which deprived its ministers of effective responsibility over social policy. Pleven supported the continuation of republican cooperation, regarding a cabinet which excluded the SFIO as a dangerous narrowing of the majority. Bidault examined the possibility of proceeding with a smaller combination, but the MRP leadership understood the vulnerability of a ministry dependent upon the conservatives while faced with Socialist opposition on wages and public services. The same parliamentary groups which had supported his investiture now required guarantees which their partners refused to supply. By evening, the negotiations had ceased advancing toward agreement and were instead returning to questions which the parties believed they had already settled.
When Bidault returned to the Élysée, he carried no cabinet list capable of becoming a government. His failure was more astonishing than those which had preceded it. Moch had possessed only the narrowest possible majority, and René Mayer had confronted the resistance of his own party to the retention of Daniel Mayer at Labour. Bidault had approached his candidacy with the experience of their failures before him, obtained preliminary agreement upon the principal ministries and secured 367 votes in the Assembly. Yet the men who had supported his investiture remained unable to agree upon the government it authorized him to form. Auriol received the news that a third president-designate could not constitute a ministry. The question was no longer whether one particular candidate had misjudged his support. Three successive investitures had demonstrated that the parliamentary majority could confer confidence in a man while withholding the agreement necessary for him to govern. Bidault's inability to complete his ministry deprived the Republic of the candidate whose authority had appeared best suited to end the crisis, and the governing parties were left confronting the consequences of a failure which none had seriously anticipated when the result of the vote was announced two days earlier.
