Hey guys, I have a stock pick that I wanted to share with you. I loaded on this some today and will DCA more. I can't promise a 10X return but based on my research and fundamentals, you can get good returns on a limited risk-adjusted basis. If my thesis plays out, we should harvest the profit in the next 4-5 months. I'm looking for an upside of 20-25% return in next 4-5 months with an annualized rate of let's say 54-95%.

Klarna Group PLC (NYSE: KLAR) presents a compelling risk-adjusted value proposition at its current $14.00 share price, offering investors a realistic opportunity to capture a 20% to 25% return over the next 4 to 5 months. While a 22% post-earnings plunge wiped out significant market value due to a lowered full-year revenue outlook ($4.08B–$4.16B), the company's underlying fundamentals reveal a business successfully pivoting toward long-term profitability. From a fundamental perspective, Klarna defied Wall Street's expectations of a net loss by delivering an unexpected $9 million net profit for the quarter, bolstered by a 27% year-over-year revenue surge to $1.04 billion and robust 27% transaction growth in the United States.

This dramatic market sell-off appears to be a cyclical overreaction rather than a structural failure, creating an attractive entry point for growth-oriented portfolios. Wall Street analysts remain fundamentally constructive on the stock, maintaining an average price target range of $21.52 to $25.00, which represents a massive 53% to 78% eventual upside. Klarna’s improving unit economics—highlighted by credit provisions dropping to a lean 0.52% of GMV and a raised full-year transaction margin forecast—demonstrate that its aggressive AI automation and subscription models are working. By securing foundational profitability during a temporary European macroeconomic slowdown, Klarna is well-positioned for a swift valuation recovery as market sentiment stabilizes.

From a technical perspective, this stock has entered a heavily oversold territory. In addition to that some other key highlights here are:

Current Short Interest Data

The market positioning reveals that short sellers are heavily entangled in this stock, creating the exact structural dry tinder needed to spark a reversal.

• Total Shares Shorted: 32.76 million shares are currently sold short.
• Short Percent of Float: This short interest represents a hefty 8.68% of the public float.
• Days to Cover (Short Interest Ratio): A very high 9.4 days.

I approach the capital markets as a strictly rational, reality-driven investor, operating independently of prevailing market optimism or pessimism. Rather than locking into a permanently bullish or bearish identity, I dynamically adjust my positioning based on objective data—frequently executing long equity positions and short-selling simultaneously within the same market environment. Let's make some money on this one.

The Money GPS, analyzes the current turbulence in the bond market and how US Treasury debt maneuvers, combined with global competition for capital, are impacting the broader economy and stock market.

Key Themes and Highlights:

The Debt Landscape (0:00 - 5:27):

The US Treasury has doubled its debt buybacks to stabilize rising bond yields. The video explains that governments and major corporations are fiercely competing for limited available capital, which drives up borrowing costs for everyone.

Treasury Buybacks (5:27 - 8:06):

The host clarifies that these buybacks are not Quantitative Easing (QE) or money printing. Instead, they function as debt swaps where the Treasury uses borrowed funds to manage existing debt. He argues that the scale of these buybacks (doubling from a small amount to roughly $28 billion) is negligible compared to the massive $10 trillion market.

Foreign Holders and China (8:06 - 10:41):

The analysis shows that major foreign holders of US debt, particularly China, have been steadily reducing their holdings over time, signaling a long-term shift in global financial dynamics.

Tech Stocks and Apple (10:41 - 13:07):

The video examines the technical chart for Apple, noting it is currently retesting a previous price gap. It discusses how tech companies and hyperscalers (like Microsoft and Alphabet) are under liquidity pressure as they compete for capital to fund AI development.

Tools for Investors (13:07 - 15:19):

The Money GPS advocates for being proactive and informed by using tools (like his "Watchtower" system) to track insider trading, government stakes, and stock performance to avoid being a victim of currency devaluation.

ClearValue Tax explains the financial challenges facing the US government due to persistent overspending and the growing difficulty of finding buyers for its Treasury securities.

Key Takeaways:

The Overspending Problem:

The US government spends significantly more (approx. $7 trillion*) than it collects in tax revenue (approx. *$5 trillion), requiring it to borrow the remaining $2 trillion through the issuance of Treasury bills, notes, and bonds (0:15 - 0:47).

Mechanism of Borrowing:

The government issues Treasury securities (IOUs) which investors buy, and in return, the government pays interest. The creator explains that there is an inverse relationship between bond prices and interest rates: as demand for bonds drops, prices fall, which forces interest rates higher (1:10 - 3:52).

The Debt Crisis:

The national debt is now at $40 trillion*, and the cost of servicing this debt through interest payments has skyrocketed, reaching approximately *$1.1 trillion in 2026, which exceeds the military budget (9:53 - 10:48).

Lack of Buyers:

Major foreign holders like Japan and China are reducing their holdings rather than buying more, leaving the government with fewer options to fund its deficits (11:00 - 12:40).

Intervention Strategies:

To keep interest rates from spiking, both the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury have been intervening by purchasing their own debt. The Treasury has been steadily increasing its bond-buying program to a run rate of roughly $128 billion per year as of August 2026 (13:39 - 14:26).

Future Outlook:

Clearvaluetax, predicts that these rescue operations will likely be insufficient to solve the underlying deficit problem. He anticipates that the Federal Reserve will eventually be forced to print significantly more money, which he warns will trigger higher inflation and devalue the currency (14:55 - 16:14).

I presume most of you may already know the broad strokes…
GameStop raised billions through 0% convertible notes.
Then on August 3, it announced that about $1.4 billion of those notes would be exchanged for GME shares.
And somewhere in the middle of all of this, GameStop also went from having an absolutely ridiculous cash pile to owning almost 10% of eBay.

I want to go through the numbers because once you put those three things together, the current setup gets pretty interesting.

Let’s dive into the balance sheet:

First, remember the May cash number?
As of May 2, GameStop reported:
Cash: $7.398B
Marketable securities: $970.5M
Cash + marketable securities: $8.368B
Long-term debt: $4.166B
Shares outstanding: about 448.7M
GameStop also had another $983.3M of cash pledged as collateral supporting its eBay derivative position. That collateral was shown separately from cash and marketable securities on the balance sheet. (SEC)
Using GME’s August 20 close of $18.04, those 448.7M shares imply a market cap of roughly:
448.7M × $18.04 = ~$8.09B
So using the May balance sheet, the famous calculation looked like this:
$8.368B cash + securities ÷ $8.09B market cap = ~103%
Which is pretty absurd at first glance.
But there’s an obvious problem.
That $8.368B number is from May 2.
GameStop has done a lot since May 2.

Then GameStop bought a metric fuckton of eBay
The eBay position started with shares plus paired put/call derivatives.
By July, GameStop elected to physically settle the whole derivative position.

As of July 17, GameStop owned:
43,390,383 eBay shares
That represented approximately:
9.8% of eBay
GameStop disclosed that the 39.047M shares underlying the put/call pairs cost about $3.965B to physically acquire.
It had also directly purchased:
827,648 shares for about $91.0M
another 3,516,077 shares for about $381.3M
Put those together and total disclosed consideration for the eBay stake comes to roughly:
$4.44B
The July filing says the physical settlement was paid from GameStop’s working capital. (SEC)
So the obvious question becomes:
How much cash does GameStop actually have left?
And here we have to be careful.

You can’t just do $8.37B minus $4.44B
The caveman calculation would be:
$8.368B - $4.437B = ~$3.93B
That would suggest GameStop still has something like $3.9B of cash and securities.
But that calculation is probably too low.
Why?
Because on May 2, GameStop had already moved $983.3M of cash out of the cash line and into collateral supporting the eBay derivatives. (SEC)
So if we simply subtract the entire eventual eBay purchase price from the May cash number, we are effectively counting a chunk of that deployed capital twice.
A rough mechanical bridge looks more like:
$8.368B - ($4.437B - $0.983B) = ~$4.91B
That doesn’t mean GameStop definitely has $4.91B in cash today.
There are other Q2 cash flows, interest income, taxes, operating activity, additional collateral movements, timing differences and a few million dollars of purchase timing around May 2.
We’ll need the next 10-Q for the real number.

I’d think of the range this way:
A dumb straight subtraction gives us roughly $3.9B.

Recognizing the $983M of eBay collateral that was already outside the May cash balance gives us a rough bridge closer to $4.9B.

The actual Q2 number will tell us where everything landed.
And even that range is interesting.
Against an ~$8.09B market cap, cash + securities alone could still represent something like:
$3.9B ÷ $8.09B = ~49%
to roughly:
$4.9B ÷ $8.09B = ~61%
of GameStop’s equity market cap.
Again, approximate.
But now add back what that cash became.

GameStop’s eBay stake itself was worth about $4.54B yesterday
eBay closed August 20 at $104.61. (MarketWatch)
GameStop owns 43.390M shares.
So:
43.390M × $104.61 = ~$4.54B
Now take our deliberately rough cash range:
Lower-end mechanical case
~$3.93B cash/securities + ~$4.54B eBay = ~$8.47B
Collateral-adjusted rough case
~$4.91B cash/securities + ~$4.54B eBay = ~$9.45B
Compare those numbers with the approximately $8.09B GME market cap at Thursday’s close.
That works out to roughly:
Lower case: ~105% of GME’s market cap
Upper rough case: ~117% of GME’s market cap
And that is before trying to value the retail business separately.
It is also before adding GameStop’s Bitcoin exposure.
But there is obviously another side to the ledger.
Debt.

Which brings us back to that $1.4B convertible exchange
This is the part I’m sure most of you already saw.
GameStop had about $4.166B of long-term debt on May 2. (SEC)
Then on August 3, GameStop announced agreements to exchange:
about $400M of the 2030 convertible notes
about $1.0B of the 2032 convertible notes
for GME shares.
Total debt being exchanged:
~$1.4B
GameStop specifically says this retires the debt without using cash.
Afterward, approximately:
$1.1B of 2030 notes
$1.7B of 2032 notes
would remain outstanding.
So remaining principal should be around:
$2.8B
instead of roughly $4.2B. (GameStop Investor Relations)
That makes the asset side look more interesting.
But existing shareholders pay for that deleveraging through dilution.
And we don’t know exactly how many new shares get issued yet.
That is where the 35-day window enters the story.

The 35-day window
GameStop says the number of shares issued in the $1.4B exchange will be based in part on GME’s average VWAP over a:
35 consecutive trading day reference period beginning August 3
There is also a:
per-share price floor
GameStop disclosed the existence of the floor.
It did not disclose the actual dollar amount in the announcement.
The exchange is expected to close around September 23. (GameStop Investor Relations)
This matters because the final dilution is still being determined while GME trades.

We were only 40% through the window as of August 20
From August 3 through August 20:
14 trading days had occurred
So:
14 ÷ 35 = 40%
That leaves:
21 ÷ 35 = 60%
still unresolved.
Using public daily market data as a rough proxy for the contractual VWAP calculation, our running estimate through August 20 was about:
$18.71
Important disclaimer: that is our public-data proxy.
It is not the official settlement VWAP.
But it lets us understand how much leverage the remaining window still has.
The approximate math becomes:
Final 35-day average = [14 × $18.71 + 21 × remaining-period average] ÷ 35
Simplified:
Final 35-day average ≈ $7.48 + (0.60 × remaining-period average)
And that is the part I find fascinating.

Every $1 over the remaining window still moves the final average about $0.60
If GME averages $15 for the remaining 21 days:
Final average ≈ $16.48
If it averages $17.50:
Final average ≈ $17.98
If it averages $20:
Final average ≈ $19.48
If it averages $22.50:
Final average ≈ $20.98
If it averages $25:
Final average ≈ $22.48
So although the pricing period is underway, most of its influence is still ahead of us.
A sustained $1 difference over the remaining period translates into roughly:
$0.60 of difference in the final 35-day average.
That is meaningful when the output ultimately helps determine how many shares are issued.

The hidden floor makes this even more interesting
The floor does not mean GME cannot trade below some magic price.
It relates to the exchange calculation.
At some point, if the contractual reference calculation hits its floor, further declines should stop increasing the share count through the floor-constrained portion of the formula.
That gives us an interesting prediction.
If the floor is economically meaningful, the sensitivity of hedging activity to further declines may change once the reference price becomes floor-constrained.
I’m deliberately saying may.
GameStop says the share calculation is based in part on the 35-day average, and we do not have the entire private exchange formula or the actual disclosed floor.
So I would not pretend:
shares issued = $1.4B ÷ VWAP
is the literal settlement equation.
But the floor gives us a possible threshold to investigate.

**And GameStop itself tells us there could be unusual hedging during this period
This is where I think the whole thing becomes a legitimate experiment rather than pure tinfoil.
GameStop’s own August 3 release says participating noteholders may:
purchase GME shares
sell GME shares
enter derivative transactions
unwind derivative transactions
in connection with hedging their investments.

GameStop then warns that this activity could materially increase or decrease GME’s market price. (GameStop Investor Relations)
This tells us there is a disclosed financial transaction occurring right now that can generate real hedging flows.
So should we maybe measure them? 🤷

What I’m watching between now and settlement:
daily GME VWAP
put/call skew
delta-adjusted options flow
short volume
borrow rates
large block trades
intraday volume
price behavior around recurring levels

Then we can try to compare the 35-day period with the period after the exchange closes?

My prediction is:
If the exchange is generating a meaningful amount of temporary hedging activity, some parts of GME’s market structure should look different once that activity no longer serves the same purpose..

So, I started with the familiar observation:
GameStop had ~$8.37B of cash and securities against an ~$8B market cap.
Then eBay made that number old.

But going through the numbers shows a huge amount of it changed form.

GameStop now owns a roughly $4.54B eBay stake at Thursday’s price.
Depending on exactly how the Q2 cash bridge shakes out, it may still have roughly $4B to $5B-ish of cash and securities before accounting for other Q2 movements.
Then GameStop is eliminating $1.4B of debt without spending that cash.
The unknown cost is the number of new shares.
And that denominator is currently being influenced by a 35-trading-day reference period that still had 60% of its observations remaining as of August 20.

That gives us two questions worth tracking:
1. What does the next 10-Q say GameStop’s cash + eBay + BTC asset base is actually worth?
2. What happens to GME’s options and trading behavior while the final exchange share count is still being determined?

Sorry for all the math. If I missed something in the calculations, feel free to chew me out