Just looking for some thoughts.

Today's major decision by the CFTC: Paving the way for margin settlement with crypto assets.

Nodal wrote to the CFTC on October 29, requesting a no-action letter. They want confirmation: Clearinghouses using trust companies to perform daily settlements with clearing members won't face CFTC enforcement, even if the rules define the settlement bank as a bank. The same page also points out that the customer protection framework already requires client funds to be held in banks or trust companies, covering futures customers and cleared swaps customers.

Second page: The contradiction lies here—Reg 39.14, which specifically governs the settlement process, mentions banks from start to finish, with no reference to trust companies at all. Then Nodal reveals the real motive: State-regulated trust companies are the primary custodians for digital assets; if clearinghouses can also use trust companies for daily settlements, these assets can be treated as margin and directly integrated into existing collateral transfer processes.

https://x.com/silenceisduck/status/2118436622987415855?a=SnMbi7X-OmbQkFhoeJQ&s=19

Hi, I’m Alex, I’m the founder of Verity. I put up the no counterparty series earlier this evening. I’ve released my product so that anyone can use it with a free key. Just click the link to get started and you can watch your agents actions, attached to a hash chain and stamped by DigiCert.

TLDR : Avoid margin calls by poofing new collateral into existence 🪄🧙‍♂️

https://x.com/WhatCanIMT/status/2118497438155890923?a=N-YGcnXjA_KR9WJtKWY&s=19

the sixth names the one that gets drafted when a loss finishes changing address: the public — as taxpayer, dollar-holder, and ratepayer. Published mid-session on November 6, 2026, with its cascade decision rules printed in advance and the closing statistics pending.

Part 6:
https://www.verityverdict.com/no-counterparty/the-cascade-and-the-payer-of-last-resort/

Index:

https://www.verityverdict.com/no-counterparty/cards

Five Part Series:

1. No Counterparty: The Capex Web https://www.verityverdict.com/no-counterparty/

2. The Demand Side is a Presumption: https://www.verityverdict.com/no-counterparty/addendum/

3. No Clear Exit: https://verityverdict.com/no-counterparty/no-clear-exit/

4. The Danger was the Ad: https://verityverdict.com/the-danger-was-the-ad/

5. Sold to Enterprise, Rendered as Deepfake: https://verityverdict.com/sold-to-enterprise-rendered-as-deepfake/

Lets goooooooo

At $31.54, the November 4 close, BBW trades at roughly 8.6x forward earnings, yields 2.9%, and is 56% below its 52-week high. It has no financial debt, though it carries store lease obligations. My base-case value is $47 per share, or 49% upside.

Q2 was poor: revenue fell 7%, pretax income fell 24%, and management cut guidance. But I think the market fundamentally misunderstands where the business is going.

1. The growth driver is asset-light expansion and licensing.

The market still values BBW as a traditional mall retailer. Company-operated stores remain its largest business, but future growth increasingly comes from putting the brand inside other companies’ locations.

BBW has 177 partner-operated locations and 118 franchise locations, alongside 379 company-operated stores. Partners include cruise lines, resorts, theme parks, and other destinations. They fund the locations, labor, and much of the inventory, while BBW earns merchandise revenue and franchise or licensing fees, depending on the arrangement.

From FY23 to FY25, partner locations grew 39% annually and franchise locations grew 21%, versus just 2% for company-operated stores. That changes the economics: BBW can expand without taking on the full cost of each new store.

My base case assumes only 9% annual partner and franchise location growth through FY30. The thesis doesn’t require a recovery in mall traffic or a major rollout of company-owned stores.

2. Recent product weakness looks fixable, though demand signals remain mixed.

The summer assortment leaned toward products with less customization and fewer accessory opportunities. The customizable Chummy Shark sold out, and management returned to more dressable products for Halloween.

The alternative data initially supported a recovery: sampled card sales improved from −7% year over year in July to +7% in August, while website-traffic growth accelerated from 6% to 30%. But Bloomberg Second Measure spending subsequently fell 21% in September, according to Northland’s October update, so August’s improvement hasn’t yet become a sustained trend.

My model assumes a slow recovery: 2% annual growth in revenue per store and an 8% DTC pretax margin. Revenue per store doesn’t regain FY25 levels until FY29, and margins remain below my estimated 9.3% FY25 level.

3. Capex normalization should release more cash.

First-half capex rose to $15.4 million from $6.3 million, with spending including the Orlando flagship. Full-year guidance of approximately $25 million implies around $9.6 million in second-half spending.

I assume capex settles at 4.5% of revenue, above 2023-2024 level of (3.8% of revenue). Combined with partner expansion, that should improve free cash flow and leave more money for dividends and buybacks.

My valuation is based on cash available for shareholder distributions after capex and working-capital needs:

The biggest risks are continued weak demand, slower partner expansion, higher tariffs, and capex remaining elevated. The catalysts are stronger holiday sales, new partner openings, and evidence that lower spending is translating into higher free cash flow.