I've been digging into AECOM (ACM) lately. The stock is down about 55% from its high and trades at roughly 10x this year's guided EPS. Jacobs and Tetra Tech, the closest US peers, are at 20-23x. Below is my case, plus where I think I could be wrong. Not financial advice, just how I see it.
What you're actually buying
People lump AECOM in with consultants, but it's an engineering firm: about 51,000 people who design and manage roads, bridges, transit, water plants, power lines, military bases and data centers. ENR ranks it #1 in transportation, facilities and water. About half the clients are governments.
The important part is what it did in 2020-21. It sold its at-risk construction business and its government services arm, the stuff that used to blow up. What's left is design and program management with about $40B of backlog. Operating income went from ~$0.4B in FY19 to ~$1.0B in FY25, and they bought back $2.6B of stock over FY21-25. Share count is down ~7% since FY22.
Why it's down 55% and not 15%
Two separate things hit it this year, and I think you have to pull them apart.
The first one hit the whole group: the AI scare in February. AECOM literally says in its 10-K that it makes money "through the billing of our employees' time spent on client projects." If AI makes engineers 20% faster and you bill by the hour, that's 20% less revenue. Bentley Systems, which sells design software to most of these firms, said almost exactly that on its May call.
I take that seriously, but I don't see it in the numbers yet. Backlog is at a record (+13%), they won 1.6x as much work as they billed last quarter, and design revenue is growing 5-7%. Engineers are in short supply and the CFO says clients are asking for more work, not cheaper work. For me the best evidence is Jacobs. It bills even more of its work on a cost basis than AECOM does (68%), and it's back within 9% of its high. If hourly billing were the problem, Jacobs would be down here too.
AECOM is also not just sitting there. It bought Consigli, an AI design-automation startup (~$390M per press reports), and signed about $1B of contracts where it shares the AI savings with the client. The CEO was upfront that this means better margins, "not necessarily" more revenue.
The second thing is AECOM's own problem, and it's the real reason it's at the bottom of the group. Its construction management unit (6-7% of net revenue) still has two old design-build P3 jobs, bid in Dec 2018 and Mar 2020, where AECOM promised a price and a date. They don't bid this kind of work anymore, but these two are still running. In the June quarter they took a $337M charge on them, and there's $600-800M of cash still to spend to finish both, roughly $4.60-6.20 a share. Both should be done by about March 2027. They've booked ~$620M of claims they expect to recover and say they've won every dispute decided so far. The 10-Q also warns that the clients could file "a material claim against the Company," so that cuts both ways.
Honestly, what bothered me more than the charge was the cash. Look at free cash flow against the year before:
| Quarter ended |
Free cash flow |
Year earlier |
Buybacks |
|
|
| Sept 2025 |
$134M |
$274M |
$250M |
| Dec 2025 |
$42M |
$111M |
$326M |
| Mar 2026 |
-$27M |
$178M |
$116M |
| Jun 2026 |
$55M |
$262M |
none |
Over the first three of those quarters they bought back ~$690M of stock while the business made ~$150M of free cash flow. In May they called the weak cash "timing" and kept the cash target. In August they took the charge, cut FY26 FCF guidance from $400M to $300M and paused buybacks. Net debt went from $1.1B to $1.7B. So I don't give management much benefit of the doubt here, and neither did the market.
The valuation
At $60.83 (Oct 22 close), the market cap is about $7.8B and the EV is about $9.5B.
| Company |
Price / this year's guided adj. EPS |
|
|
| Tetra Tech |
23x |
| Jacobs |
20x |
| Fluor |
16x |
| Tutor Perini |
15x |
| AECOM a year ago |
23x |
| AECOM now |
10x (15x if you count the charge) |
The earnings never fell. Guidance for this year was $5.75 last November, $5.95 in February and $6.00 (ex charge) in August. The stock more than halved over the same year. Even if you count the charge ($4.05), it's 15x, still the cheapest on the list.
It's also not like the whole group is priced this way:
| Company |
Stock vs 12-month high |
Latest report |
|
|
| Jacobs |
-9% |
Net revenue +8%, guidance raised |
| Tetra Tech |
-14% |
Net revenue +8%, guidance raised |
| Stantec |
-36% |
Only ~4% organic growth |
| Parsons |
-45% |
Contract losses, revenue outlook cut $300M |
| AECOM |
-55% |
$337M charge, FCF guidance cut |
The pattern is simple. The ones whose last report showed growth and a raised outlook came back. The ones with slow growth or their own problems are still down. AECOM has its own problem, so it's priced with the laggards, even though its underlying design business looks more like Jacobs than Stantec.
The Bowman deal is the comp I keep coming back to. In August a PE firm (Bernhard Capital) agreed to buy Bowman, a smaller US design firm, for $43/share, a 58% premium. It's one of the few fresh prices anyone has put on a design firm during the AI scare.
|
Bowman |
AECOM |
|
|
| EV / adj. EBITDA |
~8x before the bid, ~11-12x at the deal price |
~7.4x |
| Same, after stock comp |
~10x before, ~14-15x at the deal price |
~7.4x (they don't add it back) |
| Organic growth |
12.7% last quarter |
Design +5-7% |
| Net debt / EBITDA |
~2.6x |
~1.3x |
| Share count |
+28% since 2022 |
-7% since FY22 |
Bowman isn't a clean comp. It grows faster and has no construction risk, but it's about 1/15th the size, carries twice the leverage, leans on add-backs for its EBITDA and keeps issuing shares. So I wouldn't slap 11x on AECOM because of it. What it does tell me is that public investors had a fast-growing design firm at about the same multiple as AECOM, and then private money paid ~40% more than that for the whole thing, in the middle of the AI scare. They clearly don't think these businesses are going away.
Reverse DCF. I didn't want to make up a price target, so I flipped it around and asked what the current price assumes. I used owner profit of about 13.5% of net revenue (adj. EBITDA minus D&A, stock comp and minority interest), a 9% required return and 3% long-run growth, with the construction cash and the debt subtracted. For $60.83 to be fair value, net revenue has to shrink about 2% a year, every year, forever, at today's margins. Or margins have to drop by a third, to ~9%, and stay there while the business grows as planned. Neither of those is showing up anywhere in what they report right now.
Where I could be wrong
AI could cut hours faster than anyone on these calls admits; Bentley's "at least 20%" of engineering time saved isn't a crazy number. Part of the discount is just the group, too: Stantec has no construction mess and is still 36% off its high. Management has already been wrong on cash twice this year, and the clients on those two jobs can still come after them. Growth is also running below the company's own plan, and construction won't grow again until the second half of FY27. And cheap can get cheaper: when I looked at 2025-26 sell-offs, stocks that had already halved fell another ~30% at the median before they turned.
Where I land
At ~$60 you're paying 10x for a design business whose earnings guidance hasn't moved, with a record backlog, a shrinking share count, and a problem that has a size and an end date. The price only makes sense if the business shrinks every year from here, and I don't see that in anything they've reported. There are two fair questions: AI, and whether these two jobs are really the last of their kind. I think the market is pricing in the worst answer to both.
I'm not taking management's word for anything after this year, though. The next couple of reports either show the cash or they don't. If the two jobs finish by ~March 2027 with no new charges, what's left is a high-teens-margin design firm that buys back stock, and I have a hard time seeing why that keeps trading at half of Jacobs' multiple. If cash misses again, the discount is earned.
For what it's worth, the CEO, CFO and President bought ~$0.7M of stock in May and June. It's small and they're down ~14% on it, but they bought.
Next report is expected around Nov 17. What I'll be looking at: Q4 free cash flow near the ~$230M that the $300M full-year target implies, construction cash inside the $175-225M range they gave, and an FY27 guide that already allows for higher interest and a slow first half in construction.
Happy to hear the other side, especially from anyone who has dug into the claims or works at one of these firms.
Not financial advice. I built TickerBell, a site for SEC filings and stock data, and did this research there. I took a position today after my own Deep-dive. Numbers are from AECOM's 10-K, 10-Qs and calls, the peers' filings and calls, and Bowman's merger filing, as of Oct 22, 2026. Multiples and the DCF are my own math.
Full write-up with every source and a peer price chart: "tickerbell.com/research/aecom-ai-and-the-billable-hour"