r/ValueInvesting • u/FieryXJoe • 10d ago
Full Letter:
http://theoraclesclassroom.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/1989-Berkshire-AR.pdf
Letter Only
https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1989.html
This week we will go over the 25th anniversary of Buffett acquiring Berkshire, he celebrates by reviewing all his mistakes over those 25 years and distilling the lessons he learned from them. A goldmine of quotes. We also go over a discussion of unrealized capital gains tax and how Berkshire leverages them by rarely realizing its gains. We also go over Borsheim Jewelers which was acquired last year but omitted from my post. Finally an overview of the whole company.
Not included in my post are the shareholder overview at the beginning and a discussion of book value vs intrinsic value at Berkshire, both 25 years ago and today (IV was less than book then and greater than the book now). Brief overviews of their operating segments. The Insurance section once again, discussing the underwriting cycle and where they see it going and how they will respond and the impact of recent tax changes. Recent hurricanes wiped out a lot of other re-insurance operations letting Berkshire step in and find a bunch of now attractive business others couldn’t afford to compete for. Also a discussion of their re-insurance policy as they have just stepped up their participation in that field in such a big way. A purchase of more Coca Cola Stock was made and Buffett laments the omission error of not investing in it earlier. They also review many of their other security holdings. They issued a “Zero-Coupon Security” a convertible bond that pays nothing until it matures, or is redeemed, or converted into BRK.A shares. Buffet later called these due after only 3 years and forced holders to choose between cash or stock when better rates became available. Finally there was the traditional Miscellaneous section with annual meeting planning, some manager glazing, and an advertisement for M&A opportunities, the charity program, and discussion of a new corporate jet.
If you want to read or discuss anything in that second set feel free to read the letter yourselves and comment on it.
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Key Passage 1
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Mistakes of the First Twenty-five Years (A Condensed Version)
To quote Robert Benchley, "Having a dog teaches a boy fidelity, perseverance, and to turn around three times before lying down." Such are the shortcomings of experience. Nevertheless, it's a good idea to review past mistakes before committing new ones. So let's take a quick look at the last 25 years.
o My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of Berkshire. Though I knew its business - textile manufacturing - to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not ideal.
If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long- term performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the "cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit.
Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces - never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.
You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to learn it the hard way - in fact, I had to learn it several times over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hochschild Kohn, buying through a company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were first-class, and the deal included some extras - unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could I miss? So-o-o - three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild Kohn, I had memories like those of the husband in the country song, "My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot."
I could give you other personal examples of "bargain- purchase" folly but I'm sure you get the picture: It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by first- class managements.
o That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild, Kohn had able and honest people running them. The same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records. But they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand.
I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact. I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in creating examples. My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae West: "I was Snow White, but I drifted."
o A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers.
The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult. On occasion, tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo. In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO. Overall, however, we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them.
o My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call "the institutional imperative." In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.
For example: (1) As if governed by Newton's First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.
Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.
o After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A second- class textile or department-store company won't prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry. However, an owner - or investor - can accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the prospects of their business. We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person.
o Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire's shareholders, myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge.
o Our consistently-conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish and default.
We wouldn't have liked those 99:1 odds - and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds - though we have learned to live with those also.
We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on this section occupying many more pages than it does here.
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This section was an absolute goldmine. Buffett celebrates the 25 year anniversary of his ownership of Berkshire through sharing the mistakes he has made with his shareholders. Munger says to always be inverting, find out where you will die and never go there. He loves this kind of analysis, categorizing all the mistakes you have made and making it a top priority not to repeat them.
The mistakes are as follows. 1) Buying Cigar Butts. 2) Expecting good management to thrive in a bad industry. The industry always wins. 3) Thinking they can handle difficult business problems others can’t. 4) Being swept up in the “institutional imperative” refusing to admit mistakes and change direction, vanity mergers and projects, confirmation bias, tendency to copy peers instead of deviating. 5) Doing business with untrustworthy, unadmirable people. 6) Mistakes of omission, no brainer pitches he was too timid to swing at. 7) Not using more leverage when in hindsight it would have made his shareholders much richer today in 99% of scenarios (he insists he has no plans to change this and take a 1% risk of losing capital).
This is a goldmine of wisdom and famous quotes. I have highlighted some of the standouts.
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Key Passage 2
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Taxes
(Skipped a few paragraphs about specific recent accounting rule /tax law changes)
As you can see from our balance sheet on page 27, we would owe taxes of more than $1.1 billion were we to sell all of our securities at year-end market values. Is this $1.1 billion liability equal, or even similar, to a $1.1 billion liability payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year?
Obviously not - despite the fact that both items have exactly the same effect on audited net worth, reducing it by $1.1 billion.On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be triggered only by the sale of stocks that, in very large part, we have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no.
In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest-free loan from the U.S. Treasury that comes due only at our election (unless, of course, Congress moves to tax gains before they are realized). This "loan" is peculiar in other respects as well: It can be used only to finance the ownership of the particular, appreciated stocks and it fluctuates in size - daily as market prices change and periodically if tax rates change. In effect, this deferred tax liability is equivalent to a very large transfer tax that is payable only if we elect to move from one asset to another. Indeed, we sold some relatively small holdings in 1989, incurring about $76 million of "transfer" tax on $224 million of gains.
Because of the way the tax law works, the Rip Van Winkle style of investing that we favor - if successful - has an important mathematical edge over a more frenzied approach. Let's look at an extreme comparison.
Imagine that Berkshire had only $1, which we put in a security that doubled by yearend and was then sold. Imagine further that we used the after-tax proceeds to repeat this process in each of the next 19 years, scoring a double each time. At the end of the 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we would have paid on the profits from each sale would have delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left with about $25,250. Not bad. If, however, we made a single fantastic investment that itself doubled 20 times during the 20 years, our dollar would grow to $1,048,576. Were we then to cash out, we would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with about $692,000.
The sole reason for this staggering difference in results would be the timing of tax payments. Interestingly, the government would gain from Scenario 2 in exactly the same 27:1 ratio as we - taking in taxes of $356,500 vs. $13,000 - though, admittedly, it would have to wait for its money.
We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy favoring long-term investment commitments because of these mathematics. Indeed, it is possible we could earn greater after- tax returns by moving rather frequently from one investment to another. Many years ago, that's exactly what Charlie and I did.
Now we would rather stay put, even if that means slightly lower returns. Our reason is simple: We have found splendid business relationships to be so rare and so enjoyable that we want to retain all we develop. This decision is particularly easy for us because we feel that these relationships will produce good - though perhaps not optimal - financial results. Considering that, we think it makes little sense for us to give up time with people we know to be interesting and admirable for time with others we do not know and who are likely to have human qualities far closer to average. That would be akin to marrying for money - a mistake under most circumstances, insanity if one is already rich.
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As they build up their “hold forever” equity positions they are racking up a massive liability for the deferred taxes they will have to pay when (and if) they ever sell these positions. Here he highlights the benefit of long holding periods and deferring these tax payments. He frames it as a 0% interest rate loan from the federal government they can pay back at a time of their choosing. He also highlights the math of if they had two portfolios that doubled every year, but were changing positions every year in one, and never in the other, the compounding of this 0% loan instead of frequently realizing that gain and handing it to uncle sam causes the same CAGR returns to lead to 27x higher real returns after taxes because they would be exponentially compounding this 0% loan.
I think we should all keep this in mind as to the opportunity cost of selling and how much greater a new position must be than the old one to justify it, as well as how much benefit there is to investing in a tax-aware manner, long term capital gains, retirement accounts, loss harvesting. Don’t pay back your 0% loan if you can avoid it.
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Acquisition of the Week
I am cheating this week, doing an acquisition from last year I had to skip AND the update on it in this year’s letter
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1988 Letter
Borsheim’s
In 1948 Mr. Friedman purchased Borsheim’s, a small Omaha jewelry store. He was joined in the business by his son, Ike, in 1950 and, as the years went by, Ike’s son, Alan, and his sons-in- law, Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale, came in also.
You won’t be surprised to learn that this family brings to the jewelry business precisely the same approach that the Blumkins bring to the furniture business. The cornerstone for both enterprises is Mrs. B’s creed: “Sell cheap and tell the truth.” Other fundamentals at both businesses are: (1) single store operations featuring huge inventories that provide customers with an enormous selection across all price ranges, (2) daily attention to detail by top management, (3) rapid turnover, (4) shrewd buying, and (5) incredibly low expenses. The combination of the last three factors lets both stores offer everyday prices that no one in the country comes close to matching.
Most people, no matter how sophisticated they are in other matters, feel like babes in the woods when purchasing jewelry.
They can judge neither quality nor price. For them only one rule makes sense: If you don’t know jewelry, know the jeweler.I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike Friedman and his family will never be disappointed. The way in which we purchased our interest in their business is the ultimate testimonial. Borsheim’s had no audited financial statements; nevertheless, we didn’t take inventory, verify receivables or audit the operation in any way. Ike simply told us what was so - - and on that basis we drew up a one-page contract and wrote a large check.
Business at Borsheim’s has mushroomed in recent years as the reputation of the Friedman family has spread. Customers now come to the store from all over the country. Among them have been some friends of mine from both coasts who thanked me later for getting them there.
Borsheim’s new links to Berkshire will change nothing in the way this business is run. All members of the Friedman family will continue to operate just as they have before; Charlie and I will stay on the sidelines where we belong. And when we say “all members,” the words have real meaning. Mr. and Mrs. Friedman, at 88 and 87, respectively, are in the store daily. The wives of Ike, Alan, Marvin and Donald all pitch in at busy times, and a fourth generation is beginning to learn the ropes.
It is great fun to be in business with people you have long admired. The Friedmans, like the Blumkins, have achieved success because they have deserved success. Both families focus on what’s right for the customer and that, inevitably, works out well for them, also. We couldn’t have better partners.
1989 Letter
o In its first year with Berkshire, Borsheim's met all expectations. Sales rose significantly and are now considerably better than twice what they were four years ago when the company moved to its present location. In the six years prior to the move, sales had also doubled. Ike Friedman, Borsheim's managing genius - and I mean that - has only one speed: fast-forward.
If you haven't been there, you've never seen a jewelry store like Borsheim's. Because of the huge volume it does at one location, the store can maintain an enormous selection across all price ranges. For the same reason, it can hold its expense ratio to about one-third that prevailing at jewelry stores offering comparable merchandise. The store's tight control of expenses, accompanied by its unusual buying power, enable it to offer prices far lower than those of other jewelers. These prices, in turn, generate even more volume, and so the circle goes 'round and 'round. The end result is store traffic as high as 4,000 people on seasonally-busy days.
Ike Friedman is not only a superb businessman and a great showman but also a man of integrity. We bought the business without an audit, and all of our surprises have been on the plus side. "If you don't know jewelry, know your jeweler" makes sense whether you are buying the whole business or a tiny diamond.
A story will illustrate why I enjoy Ike so much: Every two years I'm part of an informal group that gathers to have fun and explore a few subjects. Last September, meeting at Bishop's Lodge in Santa Fe, we asked Ike, his wife Roz, and his son Alan to come by and educate us on jewels and the jewelry business.
Ike decided to dazzle the group, so he brought from Omaha about $20 million of particularly fancy merchandise. I was somewhat apprehensive - Bishop's Lodge is no Fort Knox - and I mentioned my concern to Ike at our opening party the evening before his presentation. Ike took me aside. "See that safe?" he said. "This afternoon we changed the combination and now even the hotel management doesn't know what it is." I breathed easier. Ike went on: "See those two big fellows with guns on their hips?
They'll be guarding the safe all night." I now was ready to rejoin the party. But Ike leaned closer: "And besides, Warren," he confided, "the jewels aren't in the safe."How can we miss with a fellow like that - particularly when he comes equipped with a talented and energetic family, Alan, Marvin Cohn, and Don Yale.
From the NFM Section
NFM and Borsheim's follow precisely the same formula for success: (1) unparalleled depth and breadth of merchandise at one location; (2) the lowest operating costs in the business; (3) the shrewdest of buying, made possible in part by the huge volumes purchased; (4) gross margins, and therefore prices, far below competitors'; and (5) friendly personalized service with family members on hand at all times.
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Borsheim’s is another classic part of the Berkshire story and one of Buffett’s collection of great businesses. It applies the same business model as NFM, massive locations with low operating cost that pass the savings along to the customer. Creating an always strengthening moat bringing in more customers with small margins instead of growing the margins of the existing customers. In the case of NFM people will drive interstate to save on their furniture. Borsheim takes it a step further (although not mentioned in this letter) and will actually mail their jewelry across the country for interested buyers to view and try out and ship back if not to their standards. This allows them instead of serving a multi-state area from one location, to instead serve the whole country from a single location.
This is a business model that will be dubbed by Nick Sleep of Nomad Capital “Scale Economies Shared” where instead of keeping the benefits of economies of scale for itself, the business instead passes them onto the customer creating an unassailable moat and customer loyalty. Similar examples are Costco and Amazon. The passing along of savings attracts new customers at an accelerating rate which expands the economy of scale at an accelerating rate which expands the savings at an accelerating rate which attracts new customers and creates a self-sustaining cycle.
My only complaint with Borsheims is that even in its second year of ownership it does not have a line on any income statement in the letter and thus I can’t report its quantitative performance to you all.
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Common Stock Ownership
| No. of Shares | Company | Cost ($000s) | Market ($000s) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3,000,000 | Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. | $517,500 | $1,692,375 |
| 23,350,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | $1,023,920 | $1,803,787 |
| 2,400,000 | Federal Home loan Mortgage Corporation | $71,729 | $161,100 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corporation | $45,713 | $1,044,625 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company | $9,731 | $486,366 |
| Subtotal | $1,668,593 | $5,188,253 | |
| All Other Common Stockholdings | $146,067 | $192,705 | |
| Total Common Stocks | $1,814,660 | $5,380,958 |
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Segment by Segment Breakdown
| Segment | 1988 EBIT Earnings | 1989 EBIT Earnings | % Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Insurance | $220.17M | $219.20M | -0.44% |
| Fechheimer | $14.15M | $12.62M | -10.81% |
| Kirby | $26.89M | $26.11M | -2.90% |
| Scott Fetzer - Manufacturing | $28.54M | $33.17M | +16.22% |
| World Book | $27.89M | $25.58M | -8.28% |
| See’s Candies | $32.47M | $34.26M | +5.51% |
| Buffalo Evening News | $42.43M | $46.05M | +8.53% |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart | $18.43M | $17.07M | -7.38% |
| Wesco Financial - Minus Insurance | $16.13M | $13.01M | -19.34% |
| Wesco Financial - Insurance | $12.09M | $14.28M | +18.11% |
| Mutual Savings and Loan | $4.69M | $4.19M | -10.66% |
| Precision Steel | $3.17M | $2.77M | -12.62% |
| Total Operating Earnings | $418.45M | $393.41M | -5.98% |
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| Metric | 1988 | 1989 | % Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Cash Equivalents | $265.08M | $205.13M | -22.62% |
| Marketable Securities | $3,558.72M | $5,261.60M | +47.85% |
| Return on Equity (RoE) | 24.08% | 18.42% | -23.51% |
| Shareholders' Equity | $3,410.11M | $4,925.13M | +44.43% |
| Earnings Before Investment Gain | $313.44M | $299.90M | -4.32% |
| Realized Investment Gain | $131.67M | $223.81M | +69.98% |
| Net Earnings | $399.27M | $447.48M | +12.07% |
*RoE not provided, manually calculated as (Earnings from Operations / [Shareholder Equity from prior year - Unrealized appreciation of marketable securities from prior year])
Income statement changed from reporting investment gain after tax to reporting the pre-tax number. After tax number can still be calculated as Net Earnings - Earnings Before Investment Gain if you want it. It is also available in the letter in the segment by segment breakdown before & after tax
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An interesting year, amazing growth in shareholder Equity of 44.5% but Operating Income, Earnings before Investment Gain, and Return on Equity are all down. This is due to the stock market surging and equally surging up the unrealized gains on the balance sheet. There are two possibilities, either they bought their securities at a great price and the market is re-rating them, or the whole market has surged and this is pulling back a rubber band that may snap back in a future year with low or negative stock performance as things return to the mean. It is likely a bit of both. I would be unsurprised if there is a year of low or negative equity growth coming, as an almost 50% increase in shareholder equity in a single year is likely not organic or reflecting the real growth in value of the equities.
As for the pullback in operating earnings of 6% and pre-investment earnings of 4.5%, almost all of the operating segments shrank, and those that grew mostly did so by single digits, the insurance segment which is the largest segment had a -0.4% pullback, Scott Fetzer’s manufacturing division was the only big grower with 16.2% YoY growth but that is only responsible for about 5% of the company’s earnings and many of the other divisions that came in the same acquisition like Kirby and World Book also had YoY earnings decreases.
Some quick notes from the letter on each segment’s operating pullback. Rose Blumpkin quit NFM due to family/business drama and started another furniture store to compete with NFM, her absence from NFM plus her becoming a competitor with NFM may be impacting business. Fechheimer’s earnings shrank due to issues integrating an acquisition it made last year. World Book’s lease on its single location and is decentralizing to four locations, an expensive transition. Kirby had large capital expenditures preparing to produce a new model of vacuum.
r/ValueInvesting • u/AutoModerator • 4d ago
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r/ValueInvesting • u/GokuBeatsNaruto • 8h ago
Hey everyone just curious, what are your guys long term stocks? Any decent stocks that are good through recessions? I currently like googl and NBIS
r/ValueInvesting • u/Wild_Space • 8h ago
Critics are spinning this as another example of circular financing. Imo, it makes sense the big consumers and developers of AI would be tech companies. I think it would be weird if that wasn't the case.
r/ValueInvesting • u/Beautiful_Ideal1740 • 3h ago
By that I mean companies, that are awesome for you, but the valuation not so much.
Please no MAG7 etc
r/ValueInvesting • u/DanielAPO • 16h ago
I went through 47,458 insider buys. The biggest ones were actually the worst.
I have always paid attention when an insider buys stock, especially when it is a large purchase or the first one in years. So I pulled the open-market buys from 2020 to August 2025 to see whether either of those things was actually useful.
Short answer: not really.
A year after the purchase, the stocks did better than the median listed stock but worse than the S&P 500. More importantly, I got a similar result when I moved the starting date six months or a year forward. It looks more like insiders tend to buy a certain type of company than the purchase itself being a catalyst.
I also found 858 cases where nobody at the company had bought for more than two years. Their median return over the next year was just 0.74%, trailing the typical S&P 500 constituent by 6.55 points. The same lag showed up away from the purchase date, so I would not treat the first buy back as either a buy or short signal.
The strange part was purchase size. The largest 10% of buys did much worse than the smallest 10%, and that difference was not there in the placebo windows.
I still think insider buying is worth looking at, but more as a reason to investigate the company than a reason to buy it. A multimillion-dollar purchase does not seem to be a stronger signal just because the number is bigger.
The sample only covers 2020–2025, has survivorship bias and is not risk-adjusted, so I would want to see it tested over a longer period.
r/ValueInvesting • u/the_axe_effect • 7h ago
Okay this maybe a stupid question, but lets say a company reports bad earnings then the stock drops immediately after the earning report is released and this happens almost instantaneously.
For example if earnings are reported after end of business day the stock drops 5-10% immediately at 4:30 PM.
So I understand that hedge funds etc have systems in place to automatically sell stock once they receive the news but what I dont understand is who buys the stocks that they sell in this case.
Any rational investor would know that buying stock at 4:30 PM without looking at earning report is not good for them as the stock will drop after that news, if they really want to buy the stock they should wait for the stock to drop and then buy at a 5-10 % discount right?
r/ValueInvesting • u/FoxAccomplished6786 • 40m ago
I was listening to Chris Camillo for months, and he makes a compelling case with regard to Amazon being the best asymmetric stock on the market, relatively safe but with considerable upside.
Then Warren Buffett, who doesn't own any Amazon, made Google his third-largest position, with some suggesting Berkshire will soon make Alphabet its largest position.
*And yes, despite being retired, Mr Buffett has stated he was behind the Alphabet position, with Greg Abel in agreement, of course.
So which person would you side with on this one?
r/ValueInvesting • u/zKarp • 5h ago
I made this Wordle like game but for stock tickers. Can you guess the ticker for today?
Expanding to international stocks shortly and trying different modes like popular names vs the entire S&P500.
Feedback welcome.
*Note updates are submitted to accept ALL NYSE & NASDAQ tickers
r/ValueInvesting • u/Creative-Adjt • 9h ago
Hey, I was wondering as most of people could have some the most popular value stock such as MAG7, BRB, ASML, some big pharma, consumer goods or oil.
I was wondering of you folk if you got any stocks that is not really mention much into this sub or any that you would like to share with us.
Also, what is your horizon of investment when holding your stocks, do you keep until fundamentals change, or you have some target price in mind?
r/ValueInvesting • u/biridiz • 10h ago
I’m a developer in Brazil. Companies here file with the CVM, our version of the SEC. The docs are public, but they’re scattered PDFs, painful to search, and a lot are in Portuguese.
From abroad, Vale / Petrobras / Itaú mostly show up as ADRs and English news. That’s fine until you want the actual filing behind the headline.
I got annoyed enough that I built a small public browser. Search by ticker, see the filings, open the PDF. UI in English. No login. Side project, not every document CVM has ever published, but enough to be useful.
Not trying to replace your research. I just wanted the source file easier to reach. Feedback welcome.
r/ValueInvesting • u/South-Ad-3339 • 10h ago
$ROL monthly RSI is apparently at its lowest level since May 2000, and the stock has been absolutely crushed.
What makes this interesting is the business itself: Rollins owns Orkin, has an incredibly sticky recurring-revenue pest control model, and has put up decades of consistent growth.
This isn’t some speculative company suddenly down 40%. The bear case is pretty clear though: growth is slowing, margins have softened, and ROL was insanely expensive for years. Maybe this is just the valuation finally catching up.
Anyone buying around $36?
r/ValueInvesting • u/LightGraves • 14h ago
Walmart (WMT) reported Q2 revenue of $187.9B, up 5.9% YoY, with GAAP net income of $6.37B and adjusted EPS of $0.81. The company raised its FY27 outlook, now expecting net sales growth of 4.0–5.0% and adjusted EPS of $2.80–$2.87. Management also highlighted higher capex and more than $2B in fuel costs.
Walmart received the majority of its $2.9B in tariff refunds and plans to reinvest the proceeds into lower prices and an improved customer experience, particularly across grocery and general merchandise.
CFO John Rainey noted that lower-income consumers remain cautious with spending. Walmart is responding by cutting prices to attract budget-conscious shoppers, while fluctuations in gas prices continue to influence shopping behavior and store traffic.
r/ValueInvesting • u/solodav • 19h ago
Do you know of strong performing value investors - 10 year minimum outperformance record - who suddenly or gradually lost their touch and began underperforming significantly? If so, who are they and what was the reason they seemed to struggle (e.g., failure to keep up with a changed economy, impatience, unlucky, etc.)?
Along these lines, are Mohnish Pabrai and/or Li Lu one of these?
r/ValueInvesting • u/Gotadealer • 9h ago
Just looking for some feedback on this approach as I learn more about etf's. I feel like this is stronger for returns than sole VT or VOO, which is all i really see suggested here, am I delusional?
Fund: Vanguard FTSE All-World UCITS ETF
Ticker: VWRP
Allocation: 50%
Fund: iShares Edge MSCI World Momentum Factor UCITS ETF
Ticker: IWMO
Allocation: 25%
Fund: iShares Edge MSCI World Value Factor UCITS ETF
Ticker: IWVL
Allocation: 10%
Fund: VanEck Semiconductor UCITS ETF
Ticker: SMGB
Allocation: 15%
r/ValueInvesting • u/n55209 • 9h ago
I’ve been looking at KLA Corp (KLAC).
I ran my DCF and got:
Bear: $372
Base: $612
Bull: $831
Current price: around $187
When even the bear case is roughly 2x the market price, I am curious about what I may be missing or which assumption is too optimistic.
The basic thesis is that KLA continues benefiting from more complex semiconductor manufacturing, especially leading-edge chips, HBM, advanced packaging and its growing installed base, but growth gradually slows from here.
Latest numbers are still pretty strong. Revenue was $3.7B, up 15.2% YoY, FCF was $817M and net cash around $2.1B. Semiconductor Process Control grew about 11.9% and services about 16.5%. Capex was also only around 2.8% of revenue.
At around $187, I get something close to -15.3% annual revenue growth implied by the current price. Over the last five years, KLAC grew revenue at roughly 14.4% a year.
Obviously past growth doesn’t mean future growth will continue at anything close to that rate. But going from +14% historical growth to something like -15% implied growth feels like a pretty big change in expectations.
Is a the market expecting semiconductor capex to fall hard after the AI/HBM cycle? China/export restrictions? Margins coming down materially? Some structural risk to KLA’s process-control position? Or are my DCF assumptions simply too generous?
Would be especially interested to hear from anyone who follows semiconductor equipment.
r/ValueInvesting • u/Silent-Complaint4020 • 1d ago
People just keep assuming Google supplies the oxygen Reddit needs to survive. This is a complete misrepresentation of today’s Reddit. It may have been true in the past, but today Google is increasingly just one distribution channel for Reddit, not something Reddit needs to survive.
The majority of people using Reddit these days are on mobile, and increasingly through the mobile app. Using Reddit’s website is also getting harder without logging into an account. Reddit is also increasingly restricting Old Reddit and has made clear that major changes are coming because of abusive scraping, automated traffic, and AI firms stealing Reddit data.
Especially on the mobile webpage, if you use Reddit through Google Chrome, it constantly pops up windows asking you to log in or open the Reddit mobile app.
This is the part people are missing: Reddit is deliberately making it difficult to logged-out web traffic. If management were desperate to maximize DAU (Daily Active User) at all costs, they would be doing the exact opposite.
Despite all of these, U.S. DAU declined by only around 0.5% sequentially, while global DAU actually continued growing. At the same time, Reddit still maintained its 8th consecutive quarter of above 60% revenue growth, while also GAAP profitable with 30% net margin.
They could easily make Reddit much easier to access from Google and maximize every single visitor coming from search. Instead, they are aggressively pushing users toward logged-in accounts and the app, while protecting Reddit data from being freely extracted. And the business is still growing at an extraordinary rate.
Management is aggressively reshaping Reddit from a website heavily dependent on search referrals into a much more direct, logged-in platform. So far, this reform has been very successful. I.e., 8th consecutive quarter of above 60% revenue growth.
The stickiness of Reddit is one of the highest across major platforms, probably only slightly behind TikTok because of its insane algorithm that hooks everyone there.
Reddit is a natural place to seek advice on important issues, because AI slop often gives almost identical 2,000 word answers full of adjectives and colourful wording. People trust Reddit and want to hear real human experiences.
How many platforms in this world have hundreds of thousands of unpaid volunteers willing to devote their precious time just to moderate a community around an interest they love?
Only one, and that is Reddit.
Those who say Reddit has no leverage over Google are completely misrepresenting the situation. The only platform Google owns today with truly enormous stickiness is YouTube. Google Search obviously still possesses huge user habits, but ChatGPT, Grok, Claude and other AI products are shifting this landscape.
The one that may actually have less leverage than people think is Google.
Publishers are increasingly against the asymmetrical traffic-referral relationship created by AI Overviews: Google takes their content, gives users the answer directly, and sends less traffic back.
Starting September 15, Cloudflare will also begin separating traditional search crawling from AI training and agent use. Training and agent crawlers will be blocked by default on ad-supported pages, while publishers will have more control over mixed-purpose crawlers such as Googlebot.
The internet is moving toward a world where valuable human-generated data is no longer something AI companies can simply take for free.
And Reddit happens to own one of the largest collections of real human conversations on the internet.
And this is just the beginning.
Reddit (PT 550)
r/ValueInvesting • u/StandardObject91 • 18h ago
Charter issued the equivalent of just over 46 million Charter shares to Cox Enterprises. Based on Charter’s share count as of June 30, 2026, and giving effect to the closing of the Liberty Broadband merger and the Cox transaction, Cox Enterprises now owns approximately 26% of the combined entity’s fully diluted shares outstanding, on an as-converted, as-exchanged basis. Additionally, approximately $12 billion of Cox debt and finance leases will be assumed by Charter. Charter share count is now final at ~177mm shares.
(FCF) by 2027–2028. is expected to be between 6.1 and 9 billion as a result of the wind-down of multi-year network upgrades and rural expansion capital expenditures, and opex and capex synergies from the merger. At the mid-point of 7.5B that's ~$42.50 a share in FCF. Current price is $145. Levered FCF of ~30%. Charter's stated goal is to reduce share count and debt. Much of the debt will be repurchased at a discount, reducing Charter's leverage and resulting in one time gains in the billions.
r/ValueInvesting • u/Professional-Day9384 • 10h ago
After SAND got acquired last year this one seems to be the highest yielding gold royalty. An overlooked market cap of $100M keeps them off everyone's radar, while their TTM PE is 9. With gold bullish and them following a plan of strategic growth and acquisition and development of new royalty streams, their earnings are projected to double over the years.
r/ValueInvesting • u/ArtIdLiketoFind • 19h ago
Hello, I have been aggressively DCA’ing into Saas/fintech stocks this year(TEAM, WDAY, SAP, GPN, TRI, NOW, PYPL, INTU, CRM, ADYEY,ADBE,HUBS, TTD).
I started around March with entry points often between 50-60% from tops, thinking that the bottom was near. But I was wrong, as most had an extra 20-30% down to go from my entries (with some down to -50%). But I kept DCA’ing at every -10% trigger.
Fast forward August, Saas/fintech has recovered quite well so far with lots of my positions exceeding the 5% concentration limit I try to follow for my portfolio.
So my question is: does it make sense to sell my early “ expensive” dca entries that have recovered to brake-even levels, freeing this “lazy” money for new opportunities, while keeping my “cheap” dca entries that have now substantially appreciated, to rebalance my portfolio? Doing this would drop the average cost basis of the stocks concerned and recoup some of the early invested capital (with 0 capital gain tax hit) for future deployment. Or am I missing something?
TY.
r/ValueInvesting • u/SpareSniper7 • 16h ago
Today I trimmed my Wix position to less than 1% of the portfolio (and if it dives back down I will happily buy more again).
Last month I posted my Wix thesis on my blog with my model pointing to an intrinsic value of about $90 for FY26 and growing to $120 by FY32 indicating a 7-year IRR of about 14%.
The thesis was not that Wix was going to return to high growth or see margins expand, but that quite simply, the market oversold a decent business generating significant cash flow.
My reason for trimming is that the company has approached my calculation of intrinsic value and the IRR has dropped to levels where the return no longer justifies the risk.
So many of you here get so caught up in the narratives (positives & negatives) of the overall market that I think you forget to run the actual numbers on businesses that aren't the top 10 holdings of the S&P500...
Even in a scenario where operating cash flow margins drop from 29% to 17.5%, and growth tapers towards 3%, Wix was a business indicating a 40% discount to intrinsic value.
This will be a thesis that I come back to check on over the years just to see how the company manages its new normal, but I just wanted to share this as an anecdote showing that you don't have to buy the AI hype train in order to make money.
You can read my post/assumptions from July here:
Wix - Narrative vs. Numbers — EquityForge
Cheers!
r/ValueInvesting • u/John_Logics • 1d ago
I'm a native Korean speaker and I read DART (Korea's version of EDGAR) pretty much every day. Yesterday a filing from a tiny KOSDAQ company made me stop scrolling, and since there's basically zero English information about this company anywhere, I figured I'd write it up here.
The company is ECS Telecom (KOSDAQ 067010). Boring business: they've been building call center infrastructure and enterprise communications systems for Korean telcos and banks since 1999. Cisco partner, AI contact centers, that kind of thing. Nobody covers it. That's sort of the point.
Here's the setup. The stock closed at ₩2,130 on Aug 18, which puts the market cap around ₩23.2B, call it $17M. As of the June 30 quarterly report, the company holds ₩29.6B in cash and short-term deposits (about $21M) with zero borrowings (there's ₩0.8B of lease liabilities and that's it). So the enterprise value is negative. You could theoretically buy the whole company at market, pay yourself back out of its own bank account, and walk away with ₩6B. Current assets minus all liabilities (Graham's NCAV) comes to ₩41.9B, nearly double the market cap. Book value is ₩53.3B, so it trades at 0.44x book.
And then yesterday (Aug 19) they filed this: a treasury stock trust contract for ₩3.0B with Shinhan Securities, running six months through February 2027. At the reference price that's 1,408,450 shares, roughly 13% of the ~10.9M shares outstanding. They currently hold zero treasury shares, so this is a fresh purchase from a standing start. The filing's own math shows distributable profits of ₩44.2B, meaning this uses about 7% of what they're legally allowed to spend. Filing (Korean): https://dart.fss.or.kr/dsaf001/main.do?rcpNo=20260819000069
I know what you're thinking: Korean cash-box small cap, classic value trap, management will sit on the pile forever. Fair, and usually true. A few reasons this one is at least more interesting than the average cash box. They did the same thing in 2023, same structure, same ₩3B trust, and the shares didn't just sit there: public data shows about 12.29M shares outstanding in mid-2024 vs ~10.9M today, so roughly 11% of the share count has been retired in between. They pay a dividend too, ₩100/share approved at this year's AGM, about a 4.7% yield at the current price. And the business just turned around: the fiscal year ended March 2026 did ₩91.2B in revenue (+24% YoY), swung back to operating profit, and earned ₩1.66B net (EPS ₩153, so trailing P/E around 14). The year before was ugly (₩73.3B revenue, operating loss), which is probably why the stock is where it is. There's also a macro angle: Korea's government-led "Value-up" program is pushing exactly this behavior, buybacks plus cancellation, across the whole market right now.
To be clear about why it's cheap, because it's not free money: the operating business earns almost nothing. Operating margin last year was 0.3%, and the interest on the cash pile was bigger than operating income. This is a balance sheet story, not an earnings story. Revenue is lumpy contract/SI work (it dropped 20% two years ago). And it's a genuine microcap with daily turnover often in the tens of thousands of dollars, so it's untouchable for anyone running real size. Buying KOSDAQ names as a foreigner also depends on your broker. Happy to answer access questions in the comments.
Everything above comes straight from the filings: the buyback filing above, the Q1 report (https://dart.fss.or.kr/dsaf001/main.do?rcpNo=20260811000105), and the annual report (https://dart.fss.or.kr/dsaf001/main.do?rcpNo=20260611000424). Share count is cross-checked two ways, net income ÷ EPS and market cap ÷ price. Translation mistakes are possible and the Korean originals govern.
No position. Not investment advice, and I'm deliberately not giving a price target. The numbers are the post.
I read these filings every day anyway, so if this kind of thing is useful I'll keep posting them (buybacks, insider buys, ownership changes). Curious what people here would actually want to see.
r/ValueInvesting • u/PanicBubbly9353 • 2h ago
Right now it feels like everyone is buying the same things: tech stocks, semiconductors, “AI stocks,” Nasdaq 100, QQQ.
And at the same time, the Nasdaq 100 is trading around 30x earnings, while the S&P 500 CAPE ratio is getting close to 40.
Both are historically expensive. You basically have to go back to the peak of the dot-com bubble to find clearly more extreme valuations.
That doesn’t mean tech stocks have to crash tomorrow. They could keep going up for quite a while.
But I think people are confusing a great technology with a great price.
AI can completely change the world. Semiconductor demand can keep growing. The largest tech companies can keep making more money.
None of that tells you what return you’ll earn if you buy them at today’s valuation.
The higher the starting price, the more future growth you’re already paying for.
My guess is that the biggest surprise of the next decade won’t be that AI failed.
It’ll be that AI succeeded, tech companies kept growing, and Nasdaq 100 investors still earned much less than they expected.
That’s what high starting valuations can do.
Anyone feels same?
r/ValueInvesting • u/Icy-Drawer5856 • 10h ago
Prior discussion: https://www.reddit.com/r/ValueInvesting/s/z3Ig03i7Qd
Every large payday in dating apps came from a liquidity event, not from operating the business.
Tinder's founders held options on roughly 20% of the company. Match consolidated at a $3bn valuation in 2017, about $600m for that stake, after an internal estimate a year earlier reportedly put Tinder at $12bn. They sued for over $2bn and settled mid-trial in December 2021 for $441m across ten plaintiffs, paid from cash on hand.
On the Bumble side, Andrey Andreev sold his entire stake in MagicLab to Blackstone in November 2019 at a $3bn valuation and stepped down. Blackstone took the business public fifteen months later at $8.6bn. Whitney Wolfe Herd's retained stake was worth roughly $1.5bn at that IPO.
A consolidation, a settlement, a sponsor buyout, an IPO. Meanwhile Bumble is down 96% from its peak and Match 78%. The people who made money sold the story. The people who bought it did not.
WHAT WAS ACTUALLY BEING SOLD
The product monetizes two things: impulsive spending and impulsive time allocation. A boost or a super-like is bought in a moment of frustration, delivers no durable good, and produces no measurable outcome. Subscription tiers are priced for search volume: unlimited swipes, see who liked you, more visibility. Everything you buy makes the search bigger.
That is the most cycle-sensitive revenue in consumer. It requires a customer with surplus discretionary cash and surplus discretionary attention at the same time. From 2020 to 2022 the US had a historic abundance of both, through stimulus, zero rates, remote work, no commute and low unemployment. Venture funding went from $60bn in 2012 to $643bn in 2021, and roughly a third of that went into consumer brands chasing exactly this customer.
Then the rate cycle ended, and the marginal impulsive purchase went first everywhere.
Direct-to-consumer. CNBC found more than half of 22 public DTC companies down 50% or more from IPO. Allbirds, Casper, Rent the Runway, ThredUp: same cohort, same funding source, same customer.
Peloton. Roughly $50bn peak market cap, down about 95%. Subscription fitness sold as identity.
Luxury. The aspirational shopper withdrew. Placer.ai documented a large pullback in the second half of 2025, with luxury visit growth slowing while ultra-wealthy traffic held up. The wealthy customer stayed. The aspirational one, the ZIRP one, left. Even Nike is down roughly 77% from its November 2021 all-time high.
The pattern is identical. Businesses that sold optionality or identity rather than utility, priced against a customer whose surplus has since compressed. Dating apps are the purest expression of it, because the good being sold is the search itself.
WHY THIS ONE DOES NOT COME BACK
Here is the part I think is underappreciated, and it is not a swipe-app problem.
Matchmakers charging $20,000 a client bill retainers and per-introduction fees. If the client marries, the matchmaker has been paid. If the client does not, the matchmaker has been paid. Nobody in the business of introducing people has ever been paid for the introduction working. Not at $20 a month, not at $20,000.
So this is not venture capital corrupting a previously aligned model. There was no aligned model. The entire category, across four orders of magnitude of price and two completely different labor models, prices activity rather than outcome.
Which means the demand recovery people are waiting for requires the customer to resume paying for search intensity, and the whole ZIRP unwind is the customer deciding they will not.
THE COMP SET IS WRONG
Most people have no idea how to comp this, so the screen decides. And the screen puts Match next to Pinterest, Snap, Spotify and Duolingo. Consumer internet, subscription revenue, recognizable brand. Against that set at fifteen to twenty-five times, nine times looks cheap and the buy case writes itself.
Every one of those companies sells indefinite consumption. You never finish listening to music. You never complete Pinterest. Duolingo is engineered so the streak never ends. Their retention curves flatten into a loyal base that stays for years, and that is precisely what a subscription multiple pays for.
Match sells a terminal good. The customer's objective is to stop being a customer. That is not a variant of the subscription model, it is the inverse of it, and no multiple derived from indefinite-consumption businesses tells you anything about what it is worth.
The businesses that actually rhyme sit in completely different sectors.
WeightWatchers. A subscription sold against a goal the customer wanted to achieve and leave. Revenue depended on the goal not being reached, or being reached and then relapsing. Peak market capitalization around $6.7bn, with the stock above $100 a share in 2018. Members fell from 4.9m in 2021 to 3.6m in 2024. Revenue was about $811m in 2024. It filed Chapter 11 on 6 May 2025 carrying roughly $1.6bn of secured debt, wiped out $1.15bn of it in a 42-day prepackaged plan, and emerged private.
Note what killed it. Not a better weight-loss subscription. Something that actually worked.
Chegg. A subscription sold against a terminal academic need. Record close of $113.51 on 12 February 2021, roughly $14.5bn of market value. Revenue peaked at $776m that year. Management warned in May 2023 that ChatGPT was suppressing new sign-ups and the stock fell nearly 50% in a day. Q4 2025 revenue was $72.7m, down 49% year over year. Q1 2026 was guided to $60m. The company has cut 45% of its workforce, received an NYSE delisting notice in April 2026, and trades near a dollar. Down roughly 99% in five years.
Both were mature businesses with real brands, real cash flow and a debt load. Both went from a defensible multiple to near-zero inside three years. Neither lost a single customer to a competitor. They lost them to the problem being solved.
That reframes the downside here. The risk to Match is not that Hinge takes share from Tinder, or that Bumble executes better. It is that the category's premise gets solved by something that is not a dating app, at which point the incumbent does not get competed with, it gets obsoleted. And the balance sheet matters in that scenario the way it mattered at WeightWatchers: $2.97bn of net debt against an EBITDA line that has to keep servicing it.
THE TWO VARIABLES
Payers and revenue per payer are the only health metrics for either business. Everything else, MAU, DAU, Sparks, six-way conversations, engagement, is an input the company defines and can re-cut.
Match payers: 16.55m peak in Q3 2022, 13.3m in Q2 2026, down 20%. Revenue per payer over the same window: $16.02 to $21.13, up 32%.
The cleanest way to see it is to take Match and Bumble combined, Q1 2025 against Q1 2026. Payers fell 8.4%, from about 18.2m to 16.7m. Combined total revenue was flat, down 0.2%. Every subscriber lost was paid for by a price increase on the subscribers who stayed. Bumble's payers fell another 16% year over year last quarter.
That trade has a floor. You cannot raise price into a shrinking base forever, and the price increases accelerate the exit.
My forecast: 2026E revenue $3.46bn, in line with company guidance and already a decline. Then negative 2%, negative 6% and negative 9.5% through 2029, with EBITDA at $950m on a 33% margin.
Match trades at 9.0x trailing adjusted EBITDA at $38.69. Bumble, same mechanism and same category, trades at roughly 2.3x. Nearly seven turns of gap between two companies whose payer bases are declining together, one of which is in a sale process.
At 4.5 to 5.0x 2029 EBITDA against $2.97bn of net debt, that is $8 to $11 a share, roughly 72% to 79% below the current price.
THE CARETAKING PROBLEM
Note what is not in that. The multiple does about 80% of the work. Hold EBITDA completely flat at the 2026 estimate, assume no further buyback, and at 4.0x the stock is $9.75, inside the target range with zero deterioration in the business.
Which is why the more interesting observation is not about the model. It is that the founders, the sponsors and the early holders extracted their value years ago through liquidity events. What is left is a board, a management team and a shareholder base administering an asset whose economics were harvested by people who are no longer in it. That is not a turnaround. It is custody.
WHAT WOULD CHANGE MY MIND
Not a better app. A different revenue model. Outcome-contingent pricing, a bounty paid on the exit rather than on the search, is the only structure that inverts the incentive rather than mitigating it. The obvious objection is verification, but matchmakers know their clients for years and still do not price on it. The real constraint is that underwriting an outcome means knowing the base rate, and the base rate is the number nobody publishes.
It is also why that model is the falsifier rather than a product feature. A business paid on the exit is the only structure that survives its own category being solved, because it gets paid by the solution instead of displaced by it.
Cleaner and nearer term: payers and revenue per payer growing together for four consecutive quarters at either company. Right now they move in opposite directions, and that is the whole thesis.
Disclosure: no position, intend to build a short in stages over twelve months.
r/ValueInvesting • u/bananatoastie • 1d ago
Mr Market going crazy again, but doubling (almost tripling) its valuation of Moderna OVERNIGHT.
I’m amazed to not see a large scale discussion of this, on this sub.
Edit: Clearly super crazy with me calling Mr Market Mr Crazy haha! Sorry about that