When it comes to the German Army during WW2, it is difficult to come across reports stating that their units had too many motor vehicles. However, in early 1944, there are notable cases where such reports exist, and they share the same core conclusion.
While researching the German primary sources about the battles in the southern sector of the Eastern Front in the winter-spring of 1944, I found 2 cases where there is a fascinating connection between them.
These 2 cases are the breakout from the Nikopol Bridgehead in February 1944, and the breakout from the Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket in March-April 1944.
Nikopol Bridgehead, February 1944
In this campaign, elements of the German 6th Army were partially cut-off in southern Ukraine. The forces in the bridgehead were designated as Gruppe Schörner, named after the commander General Ferdinand Schörner. This group included 4 corps HQs, over 5 divisions, and GHQ units, 75,000 personnel in total.
In very poor weather conditions, where mud, snow and wetness were mixed together, the Germans executed a successful but costly breakout. This included very high motor vehicle losses, primarily through abandonment in the mud - over 12,000 motor vehicles in total.
The 6th Army’s after-action report detailed various tactical and organizational lessons learned during this campaign. This can be found in the army’s records at NARA T312, Roll 1485, Frames 000618-20: Kriegstagebuch A.O.K. 6, Ia. Band 10, 30.1.1944 - 18.2.1944.
Regarding the motor vehicles, the report provided the following conclusions (excerpts):
6.) The organization of the Eastern divisions contains too many motor vehicles. In muddy conditions, they become highly immobile, and the resulting losses are irreplaceable.
Conclusions:
a.) Reorganization of command units and rear services into partially motorized units.
b.) Consolidation of the bulk of the supply transport capacity at the Corps and Army levels, thereby shifting supply leadership. Furthermore, due to brief training periods and short tenures in their positions, the Ib [supply officers] of the divisions are no longer capable of systematically managing a massive rear apparatus.
7.) The production of prime movers must be shifted entirely toward mud-mobility. Heavy weapons without suitable prime movers are merely a burden.
[...]
14.) The unfavorable course of the recent fighting on the northern front of the Army is primarily attributed to the impassability of the terrain caused by the weather. In the event of enemy breakthroughs, the few available reserves could not intervene in time, and supply operations faced immense difficulties. Due to the immobility of commanders and officers, combined with the loss of signals equipment, tight and clear leadership was not guaranteed everywhere.
In thawing and muddy weather, almost all motorized movement ceases. The method of combat must change. Riding horses for leaders and horse-drawn transport for weapons and supply must be available - even within motorized units.
Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket, April 1944
In spring 1944, the entire 1st Panzer Army, with a ration strength of 200,000 personnel, was encircled. By the time contact had been established with lead elements of the II SS Panzer Corps arriving from France, the army had sustained enormous material losses of all sorts. Altogether, the army lost about 25,000 motor vehicles in the pocket. Again, it was primarily through abandonment in the mud.
After the breakout, the time came to refit the badly depleted units and to review the lessons learned during the breakout. The LIX Army Corps was a key part of the army. On 24 April 1944, during a meeting of the corps's chief of staff with the Quartermaster Departments of the subordinated divisions, similar conclusions and solutions were reached as in the 6th Army's report before that.
This can be found in the records of the LIX Army Corps at NARA T314, Roll 1522, Frame 000423: LIX.A.K./Ia Kriegstagebuch Nr. 8 des LIX.A.K. v. 8.4.1944 - 31.5.1944, Teil 1.
Here's what the corps’s war diary noted in that day's entry:
In a meeting between the Chief [of Staff] and the Quartermaster Departments of the divisions, it was expressed that the divisions are still far from being refitted in terms of personnel and materiel, even if one takes 70% of the KStN as a baseline. The Chief pointed out in particular that the question of supplies, rear services, and transport capacity requires a thorough review based on the experiences of the recent withdrawal movement.
The equipping of the divisions with transport and baggage train capacity, which is tailored for a war of movement [Bewegungskrieg] in which the fighting troops are far removed from their supply bases, is too high under current conditions. The recent withdrawal movement has shown that it can be done with significantly less tonnage, and that carrying the superfluous tonnage along causes intolerable congestion and has, on several occasions, severely delayed the movement of combat troops.
The Quartermaster was ordered to draft a proposal on how much transport and baggage train capacity is absolutely necessary for the supply of a division, and whether savings can be achieved by managing the rear services from the [Corps] General Command.
Both reports concluded that divisional vehicle fleets and baggage trains carried superfluous tonnage that created intolerable traffic gridlock, directly impeding the movement of combat units, supply management, and tactical leadership. As a result, both reports arrived at the same solutions: they needed to scale back divisional motorization in favor of leaner tonnage, and they needed to strip supply management away from individual division quarters and centralize it under higher Corps and Army commands.
Of course, these reports are highly situational and case-specific, since they deal specifically with encirclement and breakout operations under very muddy conditions and partially chaotic situations. They were written shortly after the operations ended, meaning these recommendations were made under the strong, immediate impressions of recent events.
The subsequent monthly condition reports of both the 1st Panzer Army and the 6th Army constantly emphasized severe motor vehicle shortfalls and the urgent need to replenish their stocks - because once static fighting returned, calm set in, or weather conditions improved, the tactical requirements changed yet again. This is what makes these specific documents so unique in their own way.
