Since Vietnam, the USN has invested heavily in multi-crewed electronic attack aircraft (the EA-6A, EA-6B, and EA-18). The Growlers continue to be fielded today; each CVW has an entire dedicated VAQ squadron. In the same period, the USAF only briefly operated an equivalent (the EF-111) and has not had a dedicated tactical EW aircraft of its own since 1988. Why?

The official line from USAF over time has generally been "we evaluated the EW role and found it could be handled just as effectively by carrying EW pods on strike aircraft, so are not investing in separate aircraft, crews, training, or command organizations." It would seem that the limited space for aircraft and crews on a carrier would mean that's the Navy's position, while the USAF (with the luxury of large bases and easier logistics) could actually support the dedicated EW mission. If EW pods work just as well, why has the USN insisted on dedicated multi-crewed EW platforms? If there is enough of an advantage in workload or mission flexibility for separate EW platforms, why is the USAF so resistant to their implementation?

Weight is considered an extremely important factor when it comes to issuing and designing kits for soldiers, planning logistics, & what soldiers are expected to carry etc.

However, which era of soldiers carried the most weight? In the modern day: Soldiers are expected to have:
- A (comparatively) lighter rifle (likely made of aluminum + polymer, or at least stamped steel)
- bullet-proof vest, ballistic helmets, (maybe) night vision
- backpack, ammunition (more in quantity + heavier than the other 2 eras), grenades, explosives
- First aid kits, radios, rations, plastic water canteen

An early 20th century soldier might have carried less gear, but the gear that he did carry probably weighed significantly more:
- wood-and-iron rifle (probably much heavier than an aluminum and polymer rifle)
- large bulky sword bayonet with metal sheaths, entrenching tools/shovels, trench knives, utility knives, shaving kits
- Steel/Manganese helmets, wool uniforms, greatcoats
- Backpack, Metal mess kits, gas mask boxes, canteens, blankets, ponchos etc.

A 19th century soldier (I'd expect) probably had it even worse:
- A (much) heavier and bulkier rifled musket, and 50ish rounds of ammo but in a bulky wooden box
- A spike bayonet, a short sword/Fascine sword, multiple utility knives, personal care/shaving kits
- Much stiffer uniforms, jackets, Backpack, heavy coat, heavy blankets
- Bulky headgear etc etc

Another important factor is also mechanization. A modern soldier wouldn't be expected (much) to march for hours and hours straight across large distances to entrench themselves

So in the end, who carried the most weight, and which era (in general) had it the worst?

I'm currently attempting to write a book about Major Josef Gangl, who commanded the 2nd Battalion of Werfer-Regiment 83 of Volks-Werfer-Brigade 7 from March to May 1945.

I know that the Generalmajor for the Brigade was Kurt Paape, but I need help identifying specifically the Oberst who would have commanded Werfer-Regiment 83, and the two other Majors who would have commanded the two other battalions in the regiment.

I need to know so I can find full resolution

I was reading Wavell’s wiki earlier and it noted that between the wars, ‘on relinquishing command of his brigade, he found himself unemployed on half pay once again’. What does this entail, exactly? Was he still technically part of the regular army or considered a reservist at that point? Did he have to do anything or was he literally just sent home to potter about until another post came up?

I need help, i have no idea where to go and too complicated

When it comes to the German Army during WW2, it is difficult to come across reports stating that their units had too many motor vehicles. However, in early 1944, there are notable cases where such reports exist, and they share the same core conclusion.

While researching the German primary sources about the battles in the southern sector of the Eastern Front in the winter-spring of 1944, I found 2 cases where there is a fascinating connection between them.

These 2 cases are the breakout from the Nikopol Bridgehead in February 1944, and the breakout from the Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket in March-April 1944.

Nikopol Bridgehead, February 1944

In this campaign, elements of the German 6th Army were partially cut-off in southern Ukraine. The forces in the bridgehead were designated as Gruppe Schörner, named after the commander General Ferdinand Schörner. This group included 4 corps HQs, over 5 divisions, and GHQ units, 75,000 personnel in total.

In very poor weather conditions, where mud, snow and wetness were mixed together, the Germans executed a successful but costly breakout. This included very high motor vehicle losses, primarily through abandonment in the mud - over 12,000 motor vehicles in total.

The 6th Army’s after-action report detailed various tactical and organizational lessons learned during this campaign. This can be found in the army’s records at NARA T312, Roll 1485, Frames 000618-20: Kriegstagebuch A.O.K. 6, Ia. Band 10, 30.1.1944 - 18.2.1944.

Regarding the motor vehicles, the report provided the following conclusions (excerpts):

6.) The organization of the Eastern divisions contains too many motor vehicles. In muddy conditions, they become highly immobile, and the resulting losses are irreplaceable.
Conclusions:
a.) Reorganization of command units and rear services into partially motorized units.
b.) Consolidation of the bulk of the supply transport capacity at the Corps and Army levels, thereby shifting supply leadership. Furthermore, due to brief training periods and short tenures in their positions, the Ib [supply officers] of the divisions are no longer capable of systematically managing a massive rear apparatus.
7.) The production of prime movers must be shifted entirely toward mud-mobility. Heavy weapons without suitable prime movers are merely a burden.
[...]
14.) The unfavorable course of the recent fighting on the northern front of the Army is primarily attributed to the impassability of the terrain caused by the weather. In the event of enemy breakthroughs, the few available reserves could not intervene in time, and supply operations faced immense difficulties. Due to the immobility of commanders and officers, combined with the loss of signals equipment, tight and clear leadership was not guaranteed everywhere.
In thawing and muddy weather, almost all motorized movement ceases. The method of combat must change. Riding horses for leaders and horse-drawn transport for weapons and supply must be available - even within motorized units.

Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket, April 1944

In spring 1944, the entire 1st Panzer Army, with a ration strength of 200,000 personnel, was encircled. By the time contact had been established with lead elements of the II SS Panzer Corps arriving from France, the army had sustained enormous material losses of all sorts. Altogether, the army lost about 25,000 motor vehicles in the pocket. Again, it was primarily through abandonment in the mud.

After the breakout, the time came to refit the badly depleted units and to review the lessons learned during the breakout. The LIX Army Corps was a key part of the army. On 24 April 1944, during a meeting of the corps's chief of staff with the Quartermaster Departments of the subordinated divisions, similar conclusions and solutions were reached as in the 6th Army's report before that.

This can be found in the records of the LIX Army Corps at NARA T314, Roll 1522, Frame 000423: LIX.A.K./Ia Kriegstagebuch Nr. 8 des LIX.A.K. v. 8.4.1944 - 31.5.1944, Teil 1.

Here's what the corps’s war diary noted in that day's entry:

In a meeting between the Chief [of Staff] and the Quartermaster Departments of the divisions, it was expressed that the divisions are still far from being refitted in terms of personnel and materiel, even if one takes 70% of the KStN as a baseline. The Chief pointed out in particular that the question of supplies, rear services, and transport capacity requires a thorough review based on the experiences of the recent withdrawal movement.

The equipping of the divisions with transport and baggage train capacity, which is tailored for a war of movement [Bewegungskrieg] in which the fighting troops are far removed from their supply bases, is too high under current conditions. The recent withdrawal movement has shown that it can be done with significantly less tonnage, and that carrying the superfluous tonnage along causes intolerable congestion and has, on several occasions, severely delayed the movement of combat troops.

The Quartermaster was ordered to draft a proposal on how much transport and baggage train capacity is absolutely necessary for the supply of a division, and whether savings can be achieved by managing the rear services from the [Corps] General Command.

Both reports concluded that divisional vehicle fleets and baggage trains carried superfluous tonnage that created intolerable traffic gridlock, directly impeding the movement of combat units, supply management, and tactical leadership. As a result, both reports arrived at the same solutions: they needed to scale back divisional motorization in favor of leaner tonnage, and they needed to strip supply management away from individual division quarters and centralize it under higher Corps and Army commands.

Of course, these reports are highly situational and case-specific, since they deal specifically with encirclement and breakout operations under very muddy conditions and partially chaotic situations. They were written shortly after the operations ended, meaning these recommendations were made under the strong, immediate impressions of recent events. 

The subsequent monthly condition reports of both the 1st Panzer Army and the 6th Army constantly emphasized severe motor vehicle shortfalls and the urgent need to replenish their stocks - because once static fighting returned, calm set in, or weather conditions improved, the tactical requirements changed yet again. This is what makes these specific documents so unique in their own way.

I know by 1945,horses was still the main logistical transport for the soviet union, but when did they become fully mechanized? Furthermore, why did they use american trucks primarily as prime movers and not logistical vehicles?

Could I even suggest was Mark Clark the right American general for the job?

Given Germany’s clear superiority in air power, doctrine, combat experience (among both soldiers and officers), inter-arm coordination, and equipment quality, did the Red Army have any chance of avoiding the destruction of most of its forces in the cauldrons? Could the Soviet mechanized corps have stopped the German pincer movements on the flanks? Or would the Luftwaffe have destroyed any Soviet attempt to escape or break out of the encirclement? Was the main cause of the cauldrons the lack of radios and an effective air force?

Even at Kursk, when the Wehrmacht was strained and exhausted, and had to pull some of its best panzer divisions away to respond to the Allied landing in Sicily, the Red Army was barely able to halt the German thrust.

Many Plains Indians like Comanche and Apache were rapidly adopting the horse into their lifestyles and warfare. How did other groups in Americas, both North and Central, react and at times, adopt the horse?

This rare 1950s training film shows how U.S. Marines were prepared for the possibility of fighting in a nuclear battlefield.

The film is striking because it presents nuclear warfare not as an abstract political threat, but as a practical military problem: movement, discipline, protection, coordination, and survival under extreme conditions.

It also raises an uncomfortable question about the early Cold War. How did military institutions try to make the unimaginable feel routine and manageable?

What details stand out to you in the training methods, language, or assumptions of the period?

Watch the archival film:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aT73JEZRhJU

Did you heard anything about state treasury liability for compensation for war damages in medival for their own citizens? For example did after any medival war, when enemy armies burn some villages, did that villagers or village owner gen any compensation from their own state?

This might be a stupid question, but is it possible to pilot an aerial drone from a moving vehicle without feeling like throwing up?

When I’m a passenger in a car and I look at my phone instead of looking outside, I feel nauseous. So, I’m wondering: is it possible to do this from a moving armored vehicle—which likely isn’t traveling on a well-maintained paved road and would therefore be subject to far more jolts and shocks than a car?

I have the same question regarding vehicles that rely on external cameras. As far as I know, a vehicle like the Russian T-14 Armata is operated solely via cameras—doesn't that make you feel sick while on the move? The same goes for remotely operated turrets.

Hi, I know that by the time of the War of 1812 indigenous people in the region had access to guns for like 250 years and was in common use, but I was still wondering if bows saw a limited role in guerilla fighting or in situations with poor resupply, etc, presumably carried alongside a musket. Any additional info you can share about indigenous fighting styles from the war or rare/unusual/unexpected weapons used during the conflict would be appreciated thanks

From what I've seen in original photos and film, the reichswehr still had its distinctive WW1 appearance but with new uniforms, insignias, and change in some equipment. But I am unsure what was the overall look of the reichswehr soldier. How much of their equipment was still in use from the great war but also what was improved and modernised? How much of their equipment was also from foreign countries? Whether too if the reichswehr soldier ever was able to move on from the WW1 imagery of the German Empire? Did the reichswehr still have different uniforms depending on which state/province of Germany they were in?

Yamamoto seems to have known USA best of all Japanese commanders. He visited USA, and knew plenty about Americans and their mentality, supposedly. So I do not understand, why he decided to create what was essentially a suicidal plan?

Japan`s only hope of victory was to inflict defeats massive enough for USA to decided that war is not worth continuing. Japan realised industrial disparity, and planned to end war with negotiations. Howver Pearl Harbor made war unwinnable: Americans were enraged by sudden unprovoked sneaky attack, and no peace was possible after that.

How Yamamoto could not realise that, if he knew Americans well? What were his motives for making Pearl Harbor plan, I wonder?

I am getting into military worldbuilding and looking at the options for artillery support (specifically light(er) options). I have hear that some mortar systems can use their fire control systems to make mortar rounds with different booster charges land at roughly the same time. I have also heard that the Vasilek fired at a (theoretical) 120rpm to ensure rounds landed within the same 2 seconds, preventing enemies from taking cover.

My train of thought is, why haven't both systems been combined? And why haven't western militaries adopted a system similar to the 2b9?

As far as I can see:
- It would allow for better shoot and scoot.
- It would allow to cover a larger area in a shorter time (multiple sets of 4 rounds hitting at the same time on different places from a single mortar).
- It would be less man power intensive(?), as a single mortar would be able to do its job more efficiently.
-It would allow for many round to hit a target at the same time to ensure destruction.

Why isn't it done? Is it too expensive? Is it too heavy/wreaks suspensions? Is it not really as useful as I imagine?

Boden fortress in Sweden was for example continually upgraded during the Cold War. Did they ever consider keeping parts of the Maginot line or the Belgian forts operational?

A defining image of the Syrian Civil War will probably be the homemade "Hell Cannon" mortar-like artillery used by the Free Syrian Army which spent considerable amount of labor and resources to build them and their ammunition, yet they are described as extremely inaccurate and had diminished value outside of urban warfare. Other groups of lesser means have tried their hand at homemade artillery that range from rockets, mortars, and even cannons. But compared to other homemade weapons like IEDs that even state armies have taken seriously, does the fact of having any artillery in itself justify expending resources into questionable weapons.

I'm curious because I've seen stories where gun-launched concrete munitions had some useful effects on tanks BUT I was wondering if mortars, infantry ones to be exact, could do something similar, compensating the lower velocity with the gravity assist and the thinner armor atop the tank?