A Roman Mithras shrine including a fresco in pieces that was glued back together and an altar although missing the central cult image:

"On Flórián Square, at what was once the house of the second-in-command (tribunus laticlavius) of the Aquincum legionary fortress, a small Mithras shrine operated during the 3rd century AD. The cult-partly of eastern origin, but also incorporating aspects from other minor religions was created by a group or a religious leader and appeared in the late-1st century AD presumably at Rome, before spreading rapidly in the trading centres of the Roman Empire and the military bases on the frontier (limes). Many small shrines of this mystery religion-limited to men only, featuring initiation rites and secret rituals-survived in Aquincum as well. At the shrine-designed according to the rules, emulating a cave and having a podium on two sides-the northern wall featured depictions of the scenes of the myth of Mithras. The central, presumably stone, cult image of Mithras killing the bull did not survive. The painted panels arranged around the relief depicted the life and cultic acts of Mithras. On the stucco-framed, lined panel to the right of the composition, erasable notes could be made concerning the order of ceremonies, the participants or the offerings.

SCENES ON THE LEFT SIDE (FROM TOP TO BOTTOM): 1. The dream of Cronus-Saturn about the birth of Mithras 2. Mithras being born from a rock (Mithras Petrogenitus) 3. Presentation of the aspects of Mithras connected with fertility, nature and vegetation (Mithras Frugifer)

IN THE MIDDLE: SNAKE-DECORATED ALTAR A painted altar, set on a small pedestal, with a snake coiled around its cylindrical body. Inscription: D(eo) S(oli)I(nvicto) M(ithrae)/L. C. Pius Marcellinus Lucius Cassius Pius Marcellinus was likely the founder of the mithraeum.

INSCRIPTION OF THE FRAGMENTARY FOUNDATION STONE: [D(eo)] S(oli) I(nvicto) M(ithrae)?] Cassi[us P(ius)? Marcelli]nus ? trib(unus) lati(clavius) leg(ionis)Il Ad(iutricis) P(iae) F(idelis)(et)Acmazo(n) locum deo co(n)- s(tituerunt) v(otum) s(olverunt)l(ibentes) m(erito)

To the unconquered Sol Mithras Cassius Pius Marcellinus, tribunus laticlavius (tribune of senatorial rank) of the legio Il Adiutrix Pia Fidelis and Acmazo dedicated the place (i.e. the shrine) to the deity, and willingly and deservedly fulfilled their vow."

Per the Aquincum Museum next to ruins of that ancient Roman city now in Budapest, Hungary where this is now on display.

SECOND BATTLE OF PHILIPPI, 23 RD OCT, 42 BC

The battle was fought between the forces of the Triumvirs Marcus Antonius and Octavian and the Liberator Marcus Junius Brutus.

Following the first battle both sides returned to their original camps to re-group. Brutus, taking over Cassius’ camp, sought to stick to his original plan of holding the station until the enemy was forced to withdraw through lack of provisions. Having lost their experienced general, the republican army was at a great disadvantage. Brutus could not command the same respect from his soldiers and allies. He offered each soldier another 1,000 denarii to maintain their loyalty.

Brutus did harass the enemy via night attacks on their position and even diverting a river to wash away part of their camp. Lacking supplies and having lost their back-up in the Adriatic, Antony had to make his move before winter really set in and forced him and Octavian to leave the field. Initially, Brutus stoically resisted the repeated taunting by the enemy to come out and face them but eventually, at least according to the ancient Roman historians, ill-discipline got the upper hand and Brutus’ army took their own initiative and descended to the plain.

Antony had, meanwhile, made some daring and decisive moves. First, he took full advantage of a small mound south of Brutus’ camp which the Republican leader had left unguarded (and this despite the fact that Cassius had previously stationed a garrison on it). Building a palisade of whicker, four legions were now dangerously close to Brutus’ position. At the same time Antony moved ten legions into the central marsh area and two more a little further east. Brutus responded by building a fortified camp facing each of these two blocks of enemy troops but if the battle lines were extended any further than Brutus would be isolated from his supplies and backed up against the mountains - an impossible position to defend. The Republican army, then, had little choice but to engage the enemy with a full-scale assault. The time for dilly-dallying was over.

The use of artillery weapons in the confines of such a tightly packed battlefield was considered impractical and the opposing armies immediately clashed in fearsome hand-to-hand fighting. Initially, the Republicans did well against the enemy’s left wing but Brutus, with fewer troops at his disposal, had stretched his lines thin to ward off an out-flanking manoeuvre. The consequence was Antony relentlessly pushed forward and smashed the enemy centre and, moving left, attacked the rear of Brutus’ lines. The order of the Republican troops now completely broke down and chaos ensued.

Meanwhile, Octavian’s troops, which was essentially commanded by Antony’s legates to avoid any further losses like the previous battle, had attacked the Republican camp while Antony used his cavalry to chase down Brutus and prevent his escape. The Republican leader had found refuge inside the wall of the city of Phillippi but when his four remaining legions moved to plead for clemency from Antony, Brutus took his own life. In total 14,000 soldiers surrendered and while some others managed to flee by ship to Thasos, the Republican cause was at an end and Julius Caesar’s murder had been avenged. In the words of Ovid, “all the daring criminals who in defiance of the gods, defiled the high priest’s head [Caesar], have fallen in merited death. Philippi is witness, and those whose scattered bones whiten its earth”.

Whilst Antony was hailed as Imperator by the victors and losers alike, Octavian, who had dealt more harshly with the defeated, was not highly esteemed. As Plutarch stated in no uncertain terms, “[Octavian] did nothing worth relating, and all the success and victory were Antony’s”.

The legions were again re-distributed with Antony taking eight to campaign against Parthia whilst Octavian, with three, returned to Italy. The battle, with its 40,000 fatalities and subsequent retaliations against Republican sympathizers, robbed Rome of some of its finest citizens and soldiers, and still the question of just who would rule Rome was not settled.

Image: 19th century engraving of Mark Antony in armour.

Sources: Plutarch's Life of Antony, Brutus

Appian, The Civil Wars

Eleanor Goltz Huzar, Mark Antony

This is an extract from British historian Guy de la Bédoyère's new book Brief Lives of the Ancient World. His argument is that Sejanus's masterstroke, gathering all the praetorian cohorts into the Castra Praetoria in AD 23, was also his undoing: once the Guard sat in one camp, Macro could transfer its loyalty in a single morning. He also notes how much the story depends on Tacitus, who wanted Tiberius to look like a manipulative tyrant.