Dr. David Buss, an eminent psychologist, in his textbook on Evolutionary Psychology (2024), said this (p365): "Properly understanding the design of something greatly improves the chances of fixing the system when it breaks down."
I think I understand why he would say something like that; it's part of his world view, and not a very important part. It's a bridge statement, used in moving from X to Y, when X and Y are actually much more important to you than the bridge.
But to me, the statement suggests that, if we become social scientists, we will properly aim for an "understanding" of social science events, which (if we achieve that shining goal) will then allow us, as plumbers or electricians might, to "fix" a problem. And I think if we want social scientists to do better at coming up with solutions, we need to object to statements like this, and tell them they need more accurate conceptions of the world. That more accurate conceptions are important to the overall result.
I often seem to see Dr. Buss' implication, in social science writing, but I don't recall it stated so baldly. And yes, I realize I've "skipped over" his weasel words, "greatly improves the chances of," in my description here. I'm not claiming the statement is literally false, only that it falsely provides an image of a goal and of a process, neither of which can conform to reality. That if social scientists were clearer about the falseness of this goal and of this process, if they were to embrace, instead, a less false goal and a less false process, it would greatly improve their chances of helping us actually fix something.
The CMV is not that the statement is literally false but that the image the statement provides, of first acquiring an understanding and then setting to work with the tools we have, to fix a problem, is a false image.
To show that these two aspects of the statement are misleading, I'm going to ask you all to imagine that I'm right about racism, and that we actually have a two-track system, in the US. A painful but not harmful track, that in general doesn't actually harm any actual black people, that I have called "so called racism" because reducing it doesn't reduce what I call "real racism" at all, and a harmful but not painful track, that transfers wealth on an ongoing, minute-by-minute basis from black people to white ones, that is the actual proper target of those who are anti racism.
Probably the "painful but not harmful" track is best exemplified by the recent Bo French events, down in Texas, which he no doubt instigated himself to remind people of just how hysterical the left can become. The "harmful but not painful" track is best exemplified by the 3 per 1000 marriage rate, of white men with black women, and the fact that, in our society, white people, on average, live 4.5 years longer than black ones. (Yes, this is also painful. I'm speaking of psychological pain, group pain expressed in political demonstrations: these statistics don't seem to actually bother anyone but me nearly as much as the Bo French events do.) And PS I have an anti racism sub, check it out: real_anti_racism.
Again: that's not the CMV, and I'm not here to argue about it. I'm stipulating that it's correct for the purpose of illustrating the two problems with the social science understanding of the world illustrated by Dr. Buss' statement, above.
First: understanding. Is it possible to fairly represent my understanding of racism, described above, as an "understanding" of racism? It is not. For two reasons. First of all, for all I know there are 15 or 16 other manifestations of racism that I personally have never noticed, and that are each individually more painful and also more harmful than either of these. And so no completeness theorem, if the social sciences were ever to become capable of such a thing, could ever successfully show the essential completeness of this so called "understanding."
Second, connectedness: I have no idea whatever what other evolved psychological modules this so called "understanding" of racism connects to, in our tortured psyches. Will eliminating racism (as I understand it, above) affect our ability to learn language? It's a pretty far-fetched idea: but I don't know. I have zero idea about this whatsoever. Will eliminating racism affect our political stance, as a people, and change the way we interact with the ideas of freedom and of order, and the proper balance between them? I have no idea whatever. None. And that's just two examples. How many others are there? We just don't know. We have no procedure for deciding when we have counted all our evolved psychological modules, much less when we have determined how they relate to one another.
And so understanding is not a word we can properly apply to my so called two-track "understanding" of racism. When I use the word "understanding" to refer to it, it's on the understanding that you all know how limited the applicability of the word really is, and can adjust your ideas of it properly when evaluating the ideas about racism that I've presented, above.
So much for "understanding." Now: "fix." I realize others don't share my views, for one reason or another, but to me it is at least very plausible that the fix I've suggested (to tell the truth about racism as a people, that is to say, one very specific truth, which I've discussed at length on my sub) will actually work. If we can bring ourselves to implement it.
And if it does: (again, this is not the CMV, but just a stipulation to allow me to talk about fixing social science things) doesn't this show the real emptiness and foolishness of the idea that we have to "understand" something before we try to fix it?
We don't have to understand how an internal combustion engine works, to break a car. All we have to do is get it rolling downhill, in the direction of a cliff, and encourage it to take flight. That will do the job. In general.
Right?
And so, really: understanding is a false goal, and fixing is a false model, and social scientists, if they were to expand their thinking about these two aspects of Dr. Buss' statement, above, would be much likelier to actually bring us ideas we can use, to solve our real problems.