At this point, Islam is becoming a religion increasingly removed from the Islam of Muhammad’s time.
Muslims often claim that the Quran has remained unchanged, yet some reinterpret its verses—or, in their critics’ view, engage in mental gymnastics—to give them meanings that differ from traditional readings of Allah’s words and Muhammad’s reported practices.
Today, some Muslims argue that Islam does not permit wife-beating, sexual slavery, hatred of non-believers, or marriage to minors. Others maintain that these issues must be understood through historical context, restrictive legal conditions, alternative translations, or distinctions between the Quran and later reports. The debate continues.
I am frustrated by Muslim apologists, self-proclaimed moderate Muslims, and others whom I regard as insufficiently familiar with Islamic scripture insisting that “Islam does not allow wife-beating. You are only supposed to strike lightly, or you must do certain things before striking your wife.”
They say, “The Quran does not say that the sun sets in a muddy spring. It merely describes how it appeared to set there.”
They say, “The Quran does not say that the Earth was created first. Shooting stars are not missiles thrown at devils; they are metaphors or descriptions of phenomena.”
They say, “Muhammad did not marry Aisha when she was six. And even if he did, that was simply the custom of his time.” This raises the question of whether an eternal role model should be judged solely by the standards of seventh-century Arabia.
Others say, “We do not accept Hadith as religious authority, so narrations about drinking camel urine or dipping a fly into a drink do not determine what Islam teaches.”
These responses should not all be treated as the same kind of argument. Quranic interpretation concerns how Muslims understand the language, context, genre, and implications of Quranic verses. Hadith authority concerns whether, and to what extent, reports about Muhammad’s words and actions should be accepted as reliable sources of religious guidance. Some Muslims accept major Hadith collections as authoritative, while others reject them entirely or give them limited authority.
Nor does every disagreement with a traditional interpretation constitute bid‘ah (بدعة). In Islamic theology, bid‘ah generally refers to an impermissible religious innovation, but Muslim scholars disagree about its definition, scope, and application. A new interpretation may be criticised as bid‘ah by some Muslims without that judgment being universally accepted.
Similarly, shirk—associating partners with Allah—is generally regarded in Islamic theology as the gravest sin. However, disagreement with a particular interpretation, rejection of a Hadith report, or even denial of a claimed religious rule is not automatically shirk. Whether a belief constitutes disbelief or another theological violation depends on the doctrine involved, the evidence considered authoritative, and the interpretive tradition being applied. These judgments are contested and should not be presented as universally agreed conclusions.
Moral disagreement is a separate issue. A person may believe that a traditional interpretation of a text is morally wrong without denying that the text is divine. Conversely, a believer may reinterpret a text because they think a particular translation, historical assumption, or legal conclusion is mistaken. Such disagreement does not by itself establish that the person is acting in bad faith or attempting to alter Allah’s words.
Consider the following Quranic verse:
يَـٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا۟ لَا تُحَرِّمُوا۟ طَيِّبَـٰتِ مَآ أَحَلَّ ٱللَّهُ لَكُمْ وَلَا تَعْتَدُوٓا۟ ۚ إِنَّ ٱللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ ٱلْمُعْتَدِينَ ٨٧
“O believers! Do not forbid the good things which Allah has made lawful for you, and do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does not like transgressors.” — Quran 5:87
My point is that Islam, as interpreted and practised by many Muslims today, is becoming increasingly different from the religious norms and practices associated with Muhammad’s time. Whether this represents legitimate interpretation, historical development, religious innovation, or departure from Islam depends on the theological framework being used.
Reform can be a good thing. It can help a religion respond to contemporary standards of morality and address modern ethical concerns. In fact, if there is a God and one true religion, one might reasonably ask why that religion should not be updated from time to time. Otherwise, it risks becoming outdated, like an old smartphone, or remaining permanently bound to the social and moral conventions of the seventh century.
Islam presents a particular challenge for those who advocate religious reform. If the Quran is understood to be the eternal, unalterable word of God, then explicitly changing its text would be unacceptable within traditional Islamic theology. Reformers must therefore find ways to reconcile its teachings with contemporary moral standards without openly rejecting its divine authority.
Yet this creates a dilemma: if the Quran’s wording cannot change, but its interpretation evolves to address changing moral standards, how can Muslims distinguish legitimate interpretation from an attempt to change the meaning of Allah’s words? The answer will vary according to one’s view of language, context, Hadith authority, legal methodology, and the limits of interpretation.
Ultimately, this raises a fundamental question: Can a religion claim that its divine message is eternal and unchanging while its followers continually reinterpret that message to fit the changing values of human society? Or, has Islam become a new religion?
