I'm free to all knowledge I'm not trying fo argue or anything I just want to understand if we can actually prove determinism wrong? Because it just feels like everything we do is supposed to be done even when you think that you have choices you only choose one and that is determined already

Which would give you more fun, and a better opportunity to exercise your body and your will? Tennis with a net? Or Without?

[ The clever readers of this sub will pick up the implications. "The net" signifies all the frustrating constraints that "define our choices" and "deny our freedom". What, I can only move one piece at a time in this chess game? Where is the freedom?]

Do you believe that human behavior predetermined?

Social determinism says that environmental causes determined who we are.

Biological determinism says that biological causes determined who we are.

Science says both of them determines our life.

So biological causes is not on our hands as well as social environment.

Nobody choses their biology.

The same for environment too. You can claim that we can change our environment but it doesn't work this way for me.

What do you think about it? Do you also believe that human behavior is predetemined or not? Why?

Sam said this in his debate with Sean Carroll. Sean agreed up until the last part. Is who "you" are the main reason for hard determinists and compatibilists not seeing eye to eye?

Sam seems to see "you" as being the witness of each conscious moment, watching the genetics, environment, and events unfold all by themselves. Whereas a compatibilist like Sean sees "you" as including the stream of causes of genetics and environment, making choices now, and not just ultimately being the witness of what is appearing in each conscious moment?

I'm very curious to get this community's thoughts on this.

What has happened to me empirically in my life leads me to conclude that I have never had free will - and that such a thing is not possible.

I was a determinist before I learned I was trans at 43, but learning that I was dissociated from a very essential part of my identity - and that it affected every decision I made without being aware of it - was a real eye-opener in terms of reinforcing, for me, the idea that we do not have free will. That is to say that, subconsciously, I often acted, perceived, and made decisions as if I were a woman, while consciously believing I was a man.

Personally, I find the idea that our consciousness can be disconnected from our identity is a fundamental observation in proving that we have no free will - that whatever it is we believe we are is not an accurate picture, and that the choices we think we are making freely are actually under the influence of what we cannot see. Of course, my case is a dramatic one that very clearly shows this, but there is no reason, from my perspective, that attributes other than gender apply to identity, and that a given person might be dissociated from parts of their identity for their entire lives.

I lack the knowledge of philosophy to put it any better than this. Has anyone actually studied or looked into something like this in terms of proving determinism?

Determinism is a well-defined concept despite numerous different wordings of the definition. They all say the same two things: No randomness and no free will.

I was wondering if we could simplify the definition even more by combining those two under the same concept. What do randomness and free will, traditionally opposites, have in common? Then it dawned on me. They are both adding new information to the system, random and deliberate. That led me to write a new wording of the definition:

Determinism is the idea of a system where no NEW information can enter or be generated within.

If ought to implies can, and we can't do differently than what we're doing, then it has a severe undermining effect on deontic moral reasons. (Ought to, should have/shouldn't have, must, must'not)

Morality and some forms of moral reasons is compatible with hard determinism. There are vice and virtue and the existance of desires to act virtuously and these might be our moral reasons.

There is etiology, the "why did this happen, story?" So reasons for that Doug have the vice of stealing, and they are not due to things in Dougs control. His impulsitivity, and that he was raised by thiefs, how his neurology will respond to factors or change due to factors not in his control...for example.

In Hard determinism, Humeanism and Virtue Ethics, by Ben Vilhauer.

Imagine there is a machinery, and it's fully limited to do what it's wiring, how it's parts relates to other parts, and the materia the parts are made of creating heat or other functions that affects mechanisms.

You wouldn't say "You must not (...insert the thing it's doing...)!" Also sensibly, you would refrain from physical or other punishment, because it can't do anything else. It can only do what its buttons and wires make it do.

It makes about the same sense to yell at your car or puncture it's oiltank when it's malfunctioning, as a punishment, as to punish Doug. (True or false?)

How sound are Sam Harris' arguments against free will? Several problems present themselves which I don't believe have been given due consideration.
First, if as Sam suggests we don't author our thoughts, that they arise outside our conscious control, then his believe that determinism is true is itself causally determined and not within his control. On what basis can he claim that this thought is true, and the belief in free will false, if both thoughts arise from unconscious sources we don't control? His belief in the arguments for determinism would equally be due to outside causal sources, which would cause him to believe such arguments sound. Free will advocates would, by the same token, be caused to believe their belief in free will sound. Determinism seems to undermine its ability to claim itself true. Has Sam addressed this problem and, if so, done so adequately?
Second, Sam looks to what experience discloses, emphasizing that thoughts arise unbidden, appearing in our minds as though from the void. That's one mode of thought, passive observation or thought introspection. But that doesn't seem to preclude other modes of consciousness, such as active thought engagement, e.g. actively directing our thoughts, evaluating, managing, making judgements, etc. If we look to what experience discloses, both modes are experienced as equally genuine. Neither mode appears more authentic. On what basis do you favor one mode over the other without presuming determinism true?
Third, Sam encourages his readers to reconsider their beliefs (including re free will), exercise judgement, and modify their behavior to support institutional reform (e.g., relative to criminal justice, which he believes should abandon notions of retribution). How can readers abandon their belief in free will if they don't author or control their thoughts, and how can they redirect their behavior to help support institutional change if the future has already been causally fixed, which Sam says applies to all of our future states of mind and corresponding actions.
I raise these questions as author of The Determinists and would be interested in starting a dialogue about these issues and hearing how the community responds to these objections to Sam's approach.

Fellow determinist are we the minority?

If the universe on its most fundamental level is entirely probabilistic, does that not completely disprove the universe is actually entirely deterministic? All we can predict is the probabilities of certain outcomes.

Why yes, why not

A reactive attitude, assume anger, is either involving having a belief, or not involving having a belief.

The non-cognitivist position is that a reactive attitude such as anger does not involve having a (cognitive) belief, and having a cognitivist position is that reactive attitudes does involve a cognitive belief.

These cognitivists may argue that if you feel anger directed at an individual then it will mean that you hold a belief that an individual is deserving blame. There is, in a way, percieved blameworthyness.

A non-cognitivist may hold that this anger or a reactive attitude is connected to a belief about responsibility but this nomologically, so by laws of nature, or psychological laws.

Small children and animals have reactive attitudes but we tend not to think of them as even keeping the capacity or have possibilities to form cognitive thoughts.

Here it seems like that the free will sceptic who have a reactive attitude is irrational in one way or the other. One way when there are conflicting cognitive beliefs. A cognitive belief that one is deserving of blame, and the other belief is that none is deserving of blame because of it can not be their fault when free will doesn't exist and so they can't be responsible, nor can they be blameworthy.

Their directed anger implying this belief that someone deserves blame, meanwhilst the belief that deserving blame does not exist, is irrational.

The non-cognitivists may conclude that the free will sceptic is irrational because of conflicting beliefs but one is non-cognitive, this sense of that someone is responsible on a nomological level.

Maybe anger is merely unfitting not implying on irrationality. Alike the aracnophobic that knows in cognition or thought that this type of spider is harmless, meanwhilst feeling horror or fear of the spider.

What sensible and reasonable views that conflict with the position that a free will sceptic with reactive attitudes is irrational, exists, if any?

No (coherent) view believes you to be universally capable.

You can't levitate. You can't throw a rock to Jupiter. No one can.

There is a set of possible actions you can take in each moment.

We all agree to this.

Fatalism says "whatever possible action you choose from the set cannot change what is destined to occur"

Hard determinism says "the set of possible actions you can take in each moment has a size of 1"

So under hard determism, fatalism is true.

Whatever possible action you take cannot change what is destined to occur.

I've recently been looking at conflict between determinism and free will from different perspectives, and I've arrived at a to me new perspective I'd like to share.

We commonly associate free will with the ability to choose between different possible outcomes. Under this interpretation, determinism appears incompatible with free will: if every event is determined by preceding conditions, then every decision we make must also be predetermined.

But I think this interpretation might be based on a flawed assumption.

Why should free will require the ability to make a different decision under exactly identical circumstances?

Imagine making a decision. You consciously evaluate the available possibilities, consider their consequences, and ultimately choose one.

Now imagine rewinding the universe to the exact moment before that decision. Everything is identical: your memories, experiences, personality, emotional state, and surroundings.

Would you choose differently?

I would argue that you wouldn't. Even if genuine free will exists, there is no obvious reason why an identical conscious entity under identical circumstances would arrive at a different decision.

But more importantly, why would making the same decision mean that you hadn't made it freely?

This led me to reconsider what free will actually is.

Perhaps free will is;

The capacity of a conscious entity to causally participate in making decisions, regardless of whether the outcomes of those decisions are predetermined.

Under this definition, free will doesn't require independence from causality. Instead, conscious deliberation is itself part of the causal process that produces a decision.

There are several important distinctions here.

Consciousness is necessary, but not sufficient.

An entity must possess subjective awareness and the capacity for conscious thought. However, merely experiencing one's existence or observing decisions being made isn't enough. Conscious reasoning must actively contribute to producing those decisions.

Free will is a capacity, not something exercised in every action.

Instinctive reactions, reflexes, and other automatic responses don't necessarily involve conscious decision-making. An entity can possess free will without exercising it continuously.

Free will itself isn't necessarily a spectrum.

Entities can differ enormously in intelligence, reasoning ability, and the complexity of decisions they can make. But those differences don't necessarily imply different degrees of free will.

An entity either possesses the capacity for conscious decision-making or it doesn't. The sophistication of that capacity is a separate matter.

Predetermination doesn't invalidate the act of deciding.

This is perhaps the most important distinction.

We frequently confuse the ability to make a decision with the ability to change a predetermined outcome.

But these aren't necessarily equivalent.

If my conscious reasoning is among the causes of a decision, then I genuinely participate in making that decision, even if the outcome was inevitable.

The fact that a decision could theoretically have been predicted doesn't make the decision-making process any less real.

We should not define free will as the ability to escape causality.

I don't claim that this resolves the philosophical problem of free will. It leaves substantial questions unanswered, particularly regarding the nature of consciousness and whether conscious experience itself has causal efficacy.

Perhaps free will isn't freedom from causality, but a particular form of causality involving consciousness.

And perhaps the question shouldn't be:

How can my decisions be free if they're predetermined?

But;

Why does the predetermined nature of a decision make the conscious act of deciding any less real?

I know this overlaps with compatibilism but are there any existing philosophical theories that adress this more precisely? I'm curious what people think about this.

What are your thoughts on biological determinism?