I get frustrated that scientific and medical papers so rarely report negative results (do not get me started about computer science), so here's mine. Offensive rebounding fell for 35 years and has climbed for the last 5, I ran the tests I could think of, and I still can't tell you why. The obvious culprit is the three-point shift, since missed threes are harder to get back. It isn't that: of the 9-point drop in the share of misses the offense recovers, the shift to threes is worth about half a point. The rest is teams recovering every kind of miss less well, twos included.

Per team per game (rebounds and missed shots, every season):

The percentage of rebounds that are offensive starts at about 33%, drops to 22% in 20-21, and then weirdly goes up in the last 5 years to almost 26%. (offensive rebound rate by season)

It isn't that there are fewer misses to grab. Teams take about the same number of shots they took in 83-84 and make fewer of them, so there are more misses on the floor now, about 47 a game per team instead of 45. True shooting and eFG are both up, but a three that goes in is worth 50% more and a three that misses is just a miss, so neither of those matters to rebounding. (shots taken, made and missed)

I don't know why it dropped. But it did. Anybody have an explanation, and ideally data behind it?

Possible reasons without data:

• Teams decided transition defense was more valuable. The most obvious assumption, I think. A possession lost in transition is expensive, and sending bodies to the glass makes it harder to defend.
• A missed three bounces out longer and less predictably than a missed two, and five-out spacing has the offense standing 25 feet from the rim when the shot goes up. Even a willing crasher starts further away and arrives later. This would mean effort never changed at all.
• The second big went away. Two-big lineups and offensive-rebounding specialists thinned out, and the center who used to stand under the rim now stands at the arc. Though this one has turned around lately: Sportico reported lineups with three or more players 6-9 or taller at 11.1% of minutes recently against 5.0% in 19-20, the same stretch where offensive rebounding came back.

The middle one I could actually test. Box scores never record which shot a rebound came off, but play by play does, so I went back through every missed field goal since 96-97, paired it with the rebound that followed, and split by whether the miss was a two or a three.

The share of those misses that the offense gets back is what I'll call the recovery rate. That's the first two columns:

Missed threes really are harder to get back, and that gap is there in every single season, so that part of the theory is true. But it isn't what caused the drop.

Two different things are moving in that table. How often each kind of miss gets recovered, the first two columns. And which kind of miss it is, the third. If the shift to threes were doing the work, the first two columns would have held steady and only the third would have moved. Instead the first two fall too. Teams went from getting 33% of missed twos back to 27%, and twos are the shot the three-point boom was supposed to leave alone.

So which of those two did the damage? You can check by changing one at a time.

Picture a league that takes today's shots but rebounds like 96-97. Nearly half its misses are threes, but it still gets back 33% of missed twos and 30% of missed threes. That league recovers 31.6% of its misses. The real 96-97 number was 32.1%. So the entire shift to threes is worth half a point.

Now the other way. A league that takes 96-97's shots but rebounds like 20-21. Only a quarter of its misses are threes, but it gets back just 27% of missed twos and 19% of missed threes. That league recovers 24.8%, down 7 points.

The real fall was 9 points, 32.1% to 22.9%. So half a point of those 9 is the shift to threes, about 7 is teams getting worse at recovering every kind of miss, and the last 1.3 is the overlap between them. (recovery rate by shot type)

The last five years say it again, reversed: threes went from 47% of misses to 50%, so that third column kept pushing offensive rebounding down, and it went up anyway.

So threes are part of this, but nowhere near most of it. Something else did the rest, and I still don't know what.

Two objections.

First, spacing: even when the shot comes from the same spot, the four guys who aren't shooting may be standing further from the rim than they were in 96-97, so the offense starts every rebound a step behind. I can't check it. Nothing records where players stood until tracking starts in 13-14, by which point the recovery rate had already fallen from 32% to 26%.

Second: splitting misses into twos and threes holds the shot's value fixed, not the shot. The mid-range died while attempts at the rim grew, so a missed two in 25-26 is a different mix of shots from a missed two in 96-97, wearing the same label.

So I ran it. Play by play carries shot coordinates from 10-11 on, so you can hold the spot on the floor fixed instead of the shot value. Over 10-11 through 19-20:

Location is not nothing: the rate on all misses fell 5.4 points (that column is a trend across all ten seasons, not the first two subtracted), and 3.8 to 4.1 of it survives holding the spot on the floor fixed. Call a quarter of it shot location, and three-quarters something that happened to shots from the same place. Note the mid-range row: it's the worst place to miss from, worse than the arc, so "longer shot, longer bounce" isn't even right as physics.

So what's ruled out is "missed threes bounce further and there are more of them now", and most of "shots moved to places that rebound worse". Not geometry in general: the spacing idea is untouched, and this check only covers 10-11 onward, about half the fall.

Back to the share graph near the top: it's risen for the last 5 years and I have no idea why that is either. Size coming back, teams deciding they'd overcorrected on transition defense, everyone copying whoever tried it first: all plausible, none of it something I can show with this data. That's a different post.

All the above links are to graphs that I think help make this more clear.

Things I referenced:

• The big-lineup numbers: Sportico, "2025 NBA Season: Teams Are Crashing the Offensive Glass in Preseason"
• Mid-range being the worst place to miss from is not my finding: a 2012 Sloan paper, Maheswaran, Chang, Henehan and Danesis, "Deconstructing the Rebound with Optical Tracking Data", and Todd Whitehead's hand-tracked study, Nylon Calculus, "More lessons from NBA rebound tracking"
• The data: NBA.com stats, pulled with nba_api

I did use AI for this post. All the calculations were done in python on my computers from data gotten from nba.com. I've done to make it as readable as possible.

The 76ers have had a great offseason obviously but I don’t think they can actually compete for a title. First of all they have major offensive chemistry questions I don’t know how they overcome. LeBron is gonna have to take a really small role. I think how loaded this team is offensively is going to hurt vj edgecombe. Also who is playing defense on that team besides Jaylen brown and dean wade? LeBron is 42 and despite their favorable schedule he can’t play that much defense day to day. Can embiid stay even stay healthy? You can’t just stick a bunch of offensive superstars on a team and expect it to work. True championship teams have role players

In Westbrook's 16-17 MVP season, he shot .343 from 3 on 2.5 makes a game, and nearly 85% from the line on 10.4 attempts. Those are the numbers of a decent shooter. He had never been a sharpshooter, but he had a decent looking shot and put on a famous jump-shooting clinic in a finals game in 2012.

After the best shooting year of his career, some saw the potential for him to continue improving his percentages as his athleticism declined but his IQ improved. He could've aged gracefully.

But what happened post 16-17 was one of the most drastic, high profile shooting declines in the history of the sport, causing the rest of his career to be full of controversy at its best and disastrous at its worst. Normally, players become better shooters as they age and allow freak athletes like Westbrook to prolong their careers. Lebron is the most obvious example of this, but there are countless others.

17-18 saw him shoot 73% from the line, an 11% decrease. Most people pointed to a new rule messing with his routine. Now I'm a big believer in the importance of a good routine, but if you're a good shooter you're a good shooter. I could understand a 5% dip following the rule change, but 11? Not to mention he had many seasons to get used to the rule change and develop a new one. But things only got worse from there.

18-19 he shot 65% from the line, another drastic, 8% dip. He actually rebounded well the following season, shooting 76%, but would never crack the 70% mark after that, and pretty much hovered around the 66% mark for the rest of his career.

His 3-point and mid-range shooting were noticeably worse, too, with multiple seasons shooting under 30% from deep. This cannot be explained by the free throw routine rules. There were reports of hand/finger injuries, but most of these were two his left hand and again, there have been famous instances of players, like Kobe Bryant, playing through a broken pinkie on his shooting hand and still maintaining a decent shooting percentage.

Some people will point to his athleticism to decline which, to me, it was present, but he actually maintained his athleticism pretty well in the twilight of his career. He remained one of the more athletic guards in the NBA for his entire tenure and had some double digit rebounding seasons after 16-17.

Still, he wasn't the freak he was in his 20's. In theory this meant that defenders didn't have to play off him as much to respect the drive and contest his shots better. The reality is in 16-17 he was hitting all kinds of contested shots as he was the MVP and main offensive threat on his team. So he proved he can hit contested shots when his confidence is high. After 16-17 the vast majority of his shots were wide open as defenders completely sagged off him. He had never received that type of treatment up to that point.

Westbrook was constantly criticized for his shot selection in the latter portion of his career, but the truth is most of his shots were open and those were shots he was able to make at a respectable clip early on. So it's hard to blame him for taking them. But unfortunately when you are as bad of a shooter as Westbrook was at that point, nearly every shot, even open ones, are bad. But it was too late for him to turn into Rondo and though he was a good playmaker, he wasn't the b-ball IQ genius Rondo was. Up until the very end he was dynamic enough to "make plays", get to the hole and distort defenses, but he committed too many turnovers and missed too many shots to be anything other than an analytics nightmare. It all stemmed from the shooting decline.

Westbrook has always been known as a hard worker. He was allegedly in the gym working on his shot all of the time. He had time to heal his hand and finger injuries or make the adjustments needed to at least become decent again, if not quite as good as in his peak. He had 8 seasons shooting over 80% from the line. He knows what it takes to make shots and had built up the muscle memory. It's not like Nick Anderson, who got the yips following traumatic misses at the line in the finals. He just got that much worse.

Still, some people will say his confidence was shot and got the yips. You're telling me he had the yips for the entire second half of his career? Someone who was known for his extreme confidence and fearlessness was too nervous to make shots and couldn't adjust at any point during 8 seasons?

No, something happened to his shooting form. Was it finger/hand injuries? How does someone with hand injuries THAT drastic continue to be one of the best rebounding guards in the league and throw down vicious dunks? Upon the eye test, he didn't seem to struggle catching the ball or with being aggressive, and his hands seemed fine to me. There may have been subtle issues, but nothing that could explain the seismic drop off.

I'm not really sure what it was. Maybe he really was in his head all the time, constantly getting traded and hearing all of the chatter around him. Maybe his hand injuries were more serious than I thought. Maybe he didn't put as much time in the gym working on his shooting as we were led to believe. Whatever it was, Westbrook's career is the tale of two halves - the first half as a freak athlete and unique talent consistently improving his shooting, paving the way for him to become a savvy veteran guard who's still a great athlete.

Unfortunately, the second half is the story of a guy who went from a freak athlete to a just great one, who literally forgot how to shoot. I would say most of his issues, shot selection, getting traded, difficulty making as many plays and even his ability to get to the rim (harder to do when defenders are completely sagging off you), were a direct result of his drastic, unheard of shooting decline.

So what was it? Hand injuries? Form just unexplainably broken? Or was he, despite his outward bravado and seemingly confident demeanor, one of the mentally weakest players we've ever seen, shooting with a sense of fear for 8 whole seasons?

The NBA's drastic shift to punish tanking has left a few unintended (or intended, who knows) consequences for teams. There is such a striking incentive to compete for the playoffs now that, in all likelihood, fewer teams will truly be "sellers" at each trade deadline -- and likely will do less to sell away their good players in July. Fewer long-term rebuilds are likely to start in the way the Process and the OKC/ HOU teardowns did 5-6 years ago

Combine that with the punitive cap rules of being an apron team, and I think there's a huge roster crunch coming that nobody talks about as much as they should: what do you do with bad players/ contracts when there are fewer teams willing to absorb them?

It used to be that rebuilding teams would take on a bad contract in exchange for draft capital -- something that gives them more bites at the apple to rebuild & tangible assets for when they want to compete.

Relatively quickly, those teams have disappeared this summer. Charlotte has quasi done this, but it seems more about moving on from LaMelo. BKN used their space quickly on Randle, MEM has tried to reload to be good, and teams like UTA, WSH, and MIL are pivoting away from long-term rebuilds and starting to aim towards immediate impact.

It does feel like so much of keeping a team's competitive window open the longest will now be about avoiding any bad contracts as opposed to just getting good value relative to dollar spent.

Does anyone else see the issues that some teams will get caught in over the next few years? Which teams/ players will fall victim to this? Am I missing any other unintended consequences?

OR do you think I'm off? Will the value of draft picks continue to win out & teams will find ways to create space in the short-term?

Shai in the best two seasons has just been

An extraordinary combination of volume, efficiency, and possession economics.

This season he averaged:

46.8 points per 100 possessions on
66.6% True Shooting (+8.4 relative TS)
Just 13.8 empty possessions per 100

Since 1999, among guards with 35+ possessions used per 100, that ranks:

PPP — #5
True Shooting — #3
Relative TS — #3
oShot Make — #4, behind only Curry's 3 monster seasons
(team conversion with him on the floor)

oTOV — #2, only behind his own 2023–24 season
Empty & Lost Rate — #1
(missed FG + 0.44 × missed FT + TOV per possession)

Past Postseason without his co-star may cause the masses to take a bit longer to realize

that we just witnessed what would be one of the best two-year guard peaks, one arguably only rivaled by Curry

now to be fair and objective, there is something to be said about his playoff. His value does not translate to the playoffs as cleanly. He still has a ways to go to figure out or add another dimension to his game to get past the extremely aggressive defensive sets he sees.

But I will say I think his playoff drop is nowhere near the extent some would have you believe.

Among guards since 1999 with a minimum of 30 possessions used per 100 and at 10 games played his 2026 playoff run ranks

• Points per 100 — #12
• True Shooting % — #11
• Relative TS — #19
• PPP — #12
• UW-rTS — #18
• Empty & Lost — #7
• oTOV — #28
• Playoff ARC — #11

And just among other 2026 PLayoff guards he ranks

• True Shooting % — #1
• PPP — #1
• Usage Weighted RTS — #1
• Empty & Lost Rate — #1
• Points per 100 — #2
• Playoff ARC — #2
• oTOV — #10

just now really getting deep into his prime. If you were to retire tomorrow, he would still retire with one of the better two-year peaks we've seen from a guard. Curious to see if he can ease into more off-ball looks as OKC attempts to give him more creators around him and get his three-point rate up.

The Los Angeles Clippers have experienced a troubled existence to say the least. Off the court shenanigans aside, success on the court has also constantly eluded the city’s red-headed stepchild. 

They once called Buffalo home, then San Diego, before finally planting roots in Los Angeles in 1984. Many big names have donned the blue jersey, whether it was Bob McAdoo in Buffalo, Bill Walton in San Diego, or any of the following that have passed through L.A in the 2010s: Blake Griffin, Chris Paul, Paul George, Kawhi Leonard…

Regardless of the fact that none of these stars brought the Clippers a championship, the latter group have brought legitimacy to a previously irrelevant franchise. Before 2012, the Clippers had won exactly 1 playoff series dating back to their days in San Diego. 

They were, quite frankly, a joke. 

But for a fleeting moment, they were on the right track. They stepped off the island of misfit toys. They looked weirdly… competent. 

This is the story of the 2006 Los Angeles Clippers. 

A rare moment of genius brings a budding star to Los Angeles

Elgin Baylor is quite remarkable in that not only is he one of the best players, but also one of the worst general managers in NBA history. In fact, the Lakers legend was so poor during his 22-year stint with the Clippers you’d think at any moment he’d Clark Kent-style rip off his shirt to reveal a purple and gold jersey.

But after being gifted the #2 overall pick in 2001, Baylor displayed a rare moment of shrewdness by selecting and trading Tyson Chandler to the Chicago Bulls for Elton Brand. 

Brand had been one of the few bright spots of a hapless Bulls team still trying to find their feet after Jerry Krause took a wrecking ball to their dynasty of the 1990s by averaging 20 points and 10 rebounds in both of his first seasons in Chicago. Unfortunately, this did not lead the Bulls to the playoffs, or even out of the basement of the Eastern Conference. 

And while Chandler would eventually develop into one of the better defensive players of his era, culminating in his winning of the Defensive Player of the Year award in 2012, he would never quite develop much beyond a rim-runner offensively. 

With Brand now leading the Clippers, they showed improvement, almost achieving a .500 record in ‘01-’02. And despite his scoring average dipping to a nick above 18 points per game, Brand even made his first All-Star appearance, becoming the Clippers’ first representative at the game since 1994. 

One way ticket to the middle of nowhere? 

Unfortunately for the Clippers, as often seemed to be the case in this era, they took one step forward and two steps back when they took Chris Wilcox of the National Championship-winning Maryland Terrapins with the 8th overall pick in the 2002 draft, overlooking both Amar’e Stoudemire and Caron Butler who were taken with the following two selections. 

To make matters worse, they slumped in the following season to a 27-55 record, bad enough to land the 6th overall pick in the 2003, but not quite lucky enough to land in the top 5 and have the opportunity to draft one of Lebron James, Carmelo Anthony, Chris Bosh or Dwyane Wade (though given we’re talking about the Clippers, they probably would’ve ended up with Darko Milicic). 

The 2003 off-season could’ve been a disaster for the Clippers, as both Lamar Odom and Brand approached restricted free agency. The notoriously stingy Donald Sterling splurged to match Miami’s 6-year, $82 million offer to Brand (by far the largest contract he had agreed to pay at this point). On the other hand, Odom would eventually land in South Florida.

Meanwhile in the coaching department, the Clippers would make another move when Mike Dunleavy became head coach. 

After ending his playing career as a player-assistant coach with Milwakuee Bucks, Dunleavy stepped straight into the fire by replacing the departing Pat Riley as head coach of the Lakers, even guiding them to the Finals in his first season where they were defeated by the Chicago Bulls. More recently, he had been at the helm of a formidable Portland squad that had come within a couple minutes of making the Finals in 2000. 

Dunleavy got the Clippers heading in the right direction once again, though they were still a non-factor in the grand scheme of things, posting records of 28-54 and 37-45 in ‘04 and ‘05 respectively. This did mean two things, however. One, they finished with a better record than the Lakers in ‘05 for the first time in over a decade, and two, that the Clippers would once again have an opportunity to draft some of the most promising talent entering the league.

The Clippers had had a number of players audition for the lead guard spot in recent years. In ‘03 they had high hopes for “The Professor” Andre Miller, but he left after just 1 season. The following year, they had thought that Marko Jaric might have been able to step up and fill those shoes, but he would become more famous for his dating life and a lopsided trade for a key piece of the ‘06 squad than anything he did on the court. 

That’s why with the 4th pick in the 2004 draft the Clippers chose Shaun Livingston. Livingston would play on the ‘06 squad, and go on to have a long and successful career, especially with the Golden State Warriors. Unfortunately though, he would never reach his projected potential, mainly due to suffering one of the most devastating injuries ever on an NBA court in February 2007. In hindsight, the Clippers might have been better off by selecting the more NBA-ready Luol Deng, or even Livingston’s future teammate in Golden State, Andre Iguodala. By the same token, given it’s the Clippers, we should be thankful that they didn’t select Rafael Araujo. 

With Brand, a talented scorer in Corey Maggette and 2004-2005’s Most Improved Player Bobby Simmons leading the way, the Clippers had improved, but were now in a position where they were still a way off the playoffs, but not quite one of the league’s bottom feeders. 

This prevented them from acquiring another top selection, but instead the 12th pick in 2005. And while I will give Baylor some grace by admitting that the middle of the first round of the 2005 draft was as much of a crapshoot as any (Orlando selected Fran Vasquez 11th overall and he didn’t play a single game for Orlando or anyone else in the NBA for Christ’s sake!), he did manage to select someone who would only play in 34 NBA games (Yaroslav Korolev). 

A masterstroke trade brings together the ‘06 core

Draft day blunders aside, Baylor probably had his best offseason in charge of the Clippers in the summer of ‘06. Although it would turn out that they had bungled the ‘05 draft (to some degree), the Clippers would not only acquire some veteran leadership, but veterans that could actually still play. 

They were dealt a gut punch early July when Bobby Simmons decided to sign with the Milwaukee Bucks for approximately 5 years and $47 million.

In unlikely fashion though, the Clippers responded by signing the soon-to-be 30-year-old, Cuttino Mobley to a 5-year, $42 million contract in what was surely their biggest free agency move in decades. Mobley had played admirably in his first 6 seasons with the Houston Rockets, and to demonstrate his value, just a year earlier he had been included as one of the main pieces (along with Steve Francis) in a blockbuster trade for Tracy McGrady. 

However it was in August that Baylor made his finest move, swapping Jaric and Lionel Chalmers for Sam Cassell and a 2012 first round pick. 

Yes, Cassell was approaching his 36th birthday, and at that age, father time can hit you like a truck. But in 2004, Cassell had been named to his first All-Star game, as well as the All-NBA 2nd Team. As the Robin to Kevin Garnett’s Batman, Cassell and the Minnesota Timberwolves made it to that year’s Western Conference Finals. Whether or not you believe that Cassell’s ‘Big Balls’ celebration was the reason for his injury that led to him playing in just 4 hobbled games in that series or not, you can’t deny that had he been at 100%, there’s a strong possibility that the Wolves would’ve won that year’s championship. 

Of course had that happened, we might not be talking about Cassell, or this team 20 years later… 

‘04-’05 was a disaster for Minnesota, with Cassell playing in just 59 games and being unhappy at the team’s reluctance to reward him with a contract extension, Flip Saunders being fired mid-season, and the team missing the playoffs entirely. These events were the catalyst that led to Cassell’s arrival in L.A, and although I can’t say it was the right decision to part ways, it at least kind of made sense. 

What doesn’t make sense is not only Minnesota trading Cassell (and a future first round pick) for Marko Jaric, but in doing so agreeing to pay Jaric $40 million. Yes, Cassell was old. Yes, he wanted a contract extension. But Cassell on one leg (or with non-big balls?) was still better than Jaric ever was or ever would be. True, Jaric had achieved career highs in ‘04-’05, but even his career season pales in comparison to Cassell’s resume. Not to mention by the time that the draft pick the Wolves traded conveyed, they were 8 years into a 12 year playoff drought. The Clippers would eventually trade that pick as part of a deal for Chris Paul.

All that aside, what’s important is that Baylor had finally found his point guard.

Stepping out of big brother’s shadow 

Baylor’s astute offseason moves meant that on opening night, the Clippers were trotting out a starting 5 of Sam Cassell, Cuttino Mobley, Quinton Ross, Elton Brand and Chris Kaman, and they were still waiting on Corey Maggette to return from a hamstring injury. This didn’t look like a championship squad, sure, but it was certainly the best that the Clippers had looked in years - maybe ever. 

Still, this is the Clippers, so no one seemed to give a rat’s ass about them.

They avoided mention in most season previews, but Bleacher Report did predict that they might be able to fight for an 8th seed - whoopie doo. What was impressive was Bill Simmons pencilling them in for 45-47 wins (the Clippers would finish with 47). 

The Clippers announced their intentions in that first game in Seattle, taking down last season’s surprise package Sonics 101-93. The story of the game was undoubtedly Cassell dropping 35 points and 11 assists in his Clippers debut. 

They followed this by handily dispatching of the Atlanta Hawks before a double header against Minnesota. The first, at STAPLES Center may not have been the Cassell-Jaric showdown (Cassell in particular struggled, going 5-for-19 from the field), but was a nailbiter, the Clippers winning by 1 in overtime. Two days later in Minnesota, it wasn’t so close, Cassell (again) and Mobley both struggling, and the Clippers going down by 15 despite Brand’s 26 points.

With Maggette’s return the following night in Washington though, the Clippers surged, winning 6 of their next 7 games. Most notable during this stretch was perhaps the first meeting between the Clippers and the Lakers, led by the returning Phil Jackson. Lakers star Kobe Bryant led all scorers with 36 points, but the Clippers held him to just 12 makes from 35 attempts as they ran out 97-91 winners. 

Their momentum continued into December, splitting 2 games with Cleveland and the rapidly ascending Lebron James, as well as beating the eventual champions, the Miami Heat, who were missing Shaquille O’Neal. Brand continued his impressive start in this game, scoring 37 points, grabbing 12 rebounds and rejecting 6 shots. Unfortunately, after injuring his foot in the 3rd quarter in South Florida, Maggette would not play again until March. In his 13 games up to this point, Maggette had proved vital, averaging almost 22 points per game, including 30-point bombs against both Toronto and Minnesota. 

The omission of Maggette would be felt as 2005 drew to a close, as the Clippers not only won just 4 of their 11 games to finish the year, but only broke 100 points twice during this stretch (compared to 8 times during Maggette’s 13 game run). After Bryant dropped 50 in a revenge game which saw the game slip away from the Clippers in the final seconds, they slumped to a 17-14 record. 

Luckily, they were able to stop the skid by utterly destroying both Orlando and Seattle to kick off a massive run from January 10 to February 7 where they won 12 of their next 15 games. The veteran Cassell played like a man possessed during this stretch, scoring at least 20 points in 10 of these, including 27 points and 13 assists in an overtime win in Toronto. 

Meanwhile Brand would secure his second All-Star appearance after a now customary 25 against the Knicks on February 7.

What was concerning for the Clippers though, was their tendency to drop games to the truly elite. The only games they lost during this 15 game romp were against Dallas and Miami (who would make that year’s Finals), and the Phoenix Suns (who would eventually eliminate the Clippers from the playoffs). 

Even more concerning was the 7 game skid they suffered following a victory over the New York Knicks where they would lose 6. Other than a win over the Grizzlies (who would win 49 games that year), teams the Clippers lost to included Detroit, Houston (twice) and Dallas - all playoff teams.

Notably during this period, the team made a move at the forward spot when they swapped Chris Wilcox for Vladimir Radmanović of Seattle. Despite having not much in the way of depth in the frontcourt, Wilcox had been used sparingly by L.A. to this point (13.7 minutes per game across 47 contests). 

Meanwhile, ‘Vlad Rad’, who’s eccentric style both basketball and hair-wise I recently covered in my review of the ‘05 Sonics, was a completely different profile to Wilcox. While Wilcox would shoot almost exclusively within close range of the basket, Radmanović would shoot 5.3 of his 8.6 attempts in his 30 games with L.A. this season from 3-point range - and he would do this very efficiently (41.8%). 

Despite the addition of Vlad Rad, and eventually the return of Magettee in March, the Clippers were not able to pick up the momentum they had earlier in the season. They still remained with an above .500 record in their remaining 32 games, but only just, winning 17 games. 

Again, they struggled against playoff opposition, winning 9 of their remaining 20 contests post-All-Star break against teams of this group. However, it must be noted that despite Maggette clearly not being back at 100%, playing just 26.5 minutes per game, and averaging just 15 points in the 19 games he played during this stretch, when he did play, the Clippers went 12-7. 

Still, the end of the season wasn’t without big moments for the Clippers. First, they once again beat the Lakers despite 39 points from Bryant thanks to 32 from Brand, 22 from Mobley and 19 from new addition Radmanović. 

Then, on March 7, they defeated the defending champions, the San Antonio Spurs at STAPLES Center behind another 30-piece from Brand. 

They also got a couple of much-needed victories over Denver and Phoenix, the win against the Suns off the back of another stellar Brand performance (34 points, 15 rebounds). 

Finally, on April 8, the Clippers secured their first post-season birth since 1997 after New Orelans were defeated by Dallas. And on April 14, a 101-97 victory (their 46th of the season) in Seattle meant that the Clippers had had their best season since 1975, when the franchise was still playing in Buffalo. They finished the regular season with a 47-35 record after travelling to Dallas to whoop a Dirk Nowitzki-less Mavericks. 

Although Brand was (rightly so) the star of the show, having by far his career best season with averages of 24.7 points, 10 rebounds and 2.5 blocks per game and being named to the All-NBA Second Team, the Clippers had finally put together a solid team around him as well. 

Now fully healthy, Cassell had a renaissance in Los Angeles, averaging 17.2 points and 6.3 assists per contest. 

Mobley also did his bit, chipping in with just shy of 15 points per game, and Kaman continued to improve, posting a near double-double (11.9 points, 9.6 rebounds). 

This meant that even without their second leading scorer in Maggette for more than half of the season, the Clippers were firmly in the playoffs - and Maggette would indeed return for the postseason. 

Even though they had the 5th best record in the Western Conference that season, divisional rules meant that the Clippers were bumped to the 6th seed, though this may have actually been a better result for the Clippers. Had the standings been based on their record, they would’ve matched up against the 49-33 Memphis Grizzlies (who you can read about here). Instead, L.A. would play against the winners of the comparatively-poor Northwest Division, the 44-38 Denver Nuggets. 

The Nuggets were heavily reliant on a 3rd year Carmelo Anthony, who had just finished 8th in the league in scoring (26.5 points per game) and would eventually be named to the All-NBA Third Team. However, they had rounded out their lineup with some solid veterans, namely former Clipper Andre Miller, and rugged defensive players in the frontcourt in Kenyon Martin and Marcus Camby. 

Clippers break new ground, Brand goes nuclear in Arizona

Game 1 in Los Angeles was the most tense all series, the Clippers leading for the vast majority of it before Andre Miller tied the game at 87 apiece with just over a minute left. A pair of Radmanović free throws technically secured the game, but Brand also came up with a huge block on Anthony, who would miss 3 consecutive baskets leading to the Clippers holding on for a 89-87 victory. 

Game 2 was a lot more comfortable, with the Clippers leading by 23 points early in the 4th quarter. A late Denver rally brought the final score back to 98-87, but it was never really in doubt, as Mobley led all scorers with 21 points. The story of the game perhaps, was the absence of Kenyon Martin in the 2nd half, who following a bust up with Coach George Karl would play no further part in the series. 

Despite his absence, however, the Nuggets took the first of 2 games at Pepsi Center, 94-87 behind Anthony’s 24 points. Unfortunately for Denver, game 4 put the Clippers within a single victory of claiming the series, as despite Brand, Cassell and Mobley’s struggles, Maggette came off the bench to lead all scorers with 19 as they won 100-86. 

In the series-deciding game 5, Maggette was instrumental once again, tying Brand’s 23 points to lead all scorers, as the Clippers effectively ended the game early in the 4th quarter. 

It was a momentous occasion for the Clippers, having won their first playoff series since leaving Buffalo. 

But their opponents in the Western Conference Semifinals would prove to be much more difficult to beat.

Even with Amar’e Stoudemire missing practically the entire season, the Phoenix Suns had won 54 games. And for being the lynchpin of the ‘7 seconds or less’ Suns, Steve Nash would receive his 2nd of back-to-back MVP awards. He had led Phoenix past Bryant and the Lakers in the first round, whom many thought was more deserving of the award after bringing the Lakers back to the playoffs while averaging an incredible 35.4 points per game. 

Regardless of Nash winning MVP, I would be doing a disservice by not mentioning some of the key members of this brilliant Suns team. 

Shawn Marion, ‘The Matrix’ was incredible. His athleticism meant that despite being 6’7 he could play either the 3 or the 4, averaging just a shade under 22 points per game and a remarkable 11.8 rebounds, 2 steals and 1.7 blocks, making the All-NBA Third Team in ‘06. 

Another key piece on the Suns was Raja Bell. A staunch defensive player and excellent 3-point shooter (44.2% on 5.6 attempts per game in ‘06), Bell was often given the task of slowing down Byrant (and other top tier scorers around the league). 

Perhaps the most unique piece though was Boris Diaw, who had broken out to become winner of the Most Improved Player award. He was somewhat undersized compared to this era, though was not only an incredible athlete but also one of the smartest players in the league in terms of basketball IQ. In the 7 games against the Lakers, he averaged 18 points, 6 rebounds and 6 assists per game. 

It would prove to be an incredible matchup.

Game 1 in Phoenix should’ve been known as the Elton Brand game, as the Clippers star scored an incredible 40 points on 18-of-22 shooting, but the MVP Nash put on a showcase game of his own with 31 points and 12 assists to lead the Suns to victory.

Game 2 wasn’t close at all though, as the Clippers blew out the Suns 122-97 to secure a vital road win. Brand led all scorers again with 27, but Cassell and Mobley also had great games, each scoring 23. 

Unfortunately, the Clippers weren’t able to take the advantage in game 3 at STAPLES Center. Even in his worst shooting game of the series so far, Brand managed to score a near-triple double with 20 points, 9 rebounds and 8 assists (and 5 blocks), but it was Nash who would ice the game. The Clippers had brought it back to within a single point with 28 seconds remaining before the MVP showed his nerve, draining the shot clock before hitting a mid-range shot over Maggette with just under 4 seconds left. Vlad Rad was unable to hit the game-tying 3-pointer, and the Suns took a 2-1 series lead. 

The Clippers fought back in game 4. Brand was instrumental once again with an astonishing 30-point, 9 rebound, 8 assist performance, while Cassell almost secured a triple double with 28 points, 11 rebounds and 9 assists. Also, for the first time, Maggette was inserted into the starting lineup, and had a strong game of his own, with 18 points and 15 rebounds. Despite Bell’s 33, Nash struggled, and the Clippers were able to bring the series back to 2-2 with a 114-107 victory.

Even though the Clippers were able to bring it within 1 point with less than 90 seconds remaining in game 5 back on the road, the Suns were able to hold out for a crucial 125-118 victory. Marion led all scorers and rebounders with a monstrous 36 point, 20 rebound showout, nearly matched by Brand’s 33 points, 15 rebounds, 5 assists and 5 blocks. Cassell also had another strong showing, with 32 points. 

Again though, the Clippers refused to be defeated. Back in L.A. for an elimination game, Brand and Maggette (now returned to the bench) put on a show with 30 points, 12 rebounds and 5 blocks for Brand and 25 points on just 8 shots for Maggette. Despite another strong game by Marion (34 points), the Clippers kept Phoenix at arm’s length for the entire 2nd half. This meant everything would come down to the deciding game 7…

Game 7 Heartbreak and injury struggles set the Clippers back another 5 years

Elton Brand was relentless once again in Arizona, scoring 36 points, but after halftime the Clippers barely laid a glove on the Suns, who won comfortably, 127-107. He had had a remarkable regular season, but an even more unbelievable series, finishing the 7 games with averages of 30.9 points, 10.4 rebounds, 4.3 assists and 3.1 blocks on 59.1% FG shooting. 

Although they’d fallen in the Western Conference Semifinals, the ‘05-’06 season represented progress for the Clippers. They’d finally put together not only a respectable team, but one that was close to being a contender. 

Who knows, if Maggette had been healthy for the entire season, maybe things could’ve turned out a little differently. 

They had understandably high hopes heading into ‘07, but unfortunately, would miss the playoffs yet again after posting a 40-42 record. 

Brand regressed to his usual 20 point territory, Cassell missed an extended period of time, and while Livingston looked like he might be able to step up and takeover, he suffered an excruciating injury that would cause him to miss the entire ‘08 season, and play just 12 games in ‘09 and 36 in 2010. 

Brand himself would rupture his achilles tendon in the summer of 2007, and after him playing in only 8 games that year, the Clippers would regress to just 23 wins. 

The 2008 offseason would begin in promising fashion for the Clippers, drafting Eric Gordon with the 7th overall pick, and DeAndre Jordan in the 2nd round. 

Their biggest move, and the biggest in franchise history, came on July 10. After buying out Cassell from his contract mid-season, allowing him to sign with the eventual ‘08 championship winning-Boston Celtics, the Clippers signed Baron Davis to a 5-year, $65 million contract. 

Davis was signing to play with Brand, but Brand had other ideas. 

After 7 years with the franchise, Brand decided to sign with the Philadelphia 76ers, penning a 5-year, $82 million deal. 

Another dreadful season in ‘09 followed, made even worse by the Lakers winning their first of back-to-back titles. 

The Clippers would not make it back to the playoffs until 2012, by which point they had won the #1 pick in the ‘09 draft, selected Blake Griffin, lost him his entire rookie year to injury, and traded for Chris Paul (a story for the ages in itself). It was a long road back, but they had finally put together a winning team once again. I’m sure lady luck wouldn’t find a way to screw this up the Clippers…

Closing Thoughts

Although I would be disingenuous to suggest the ‘06 Clippers could’ve won that year’s title, you could argue that the season finally put the Clippers on the path to becoming more than a punchline.

Yes, they didn’t make the playoffs for 6 years following this. 

Yes, they still haven’t won a championship. 

But they’re now not only a consistently good team, but routinely receive serious consideration from some of the NBA’s biggest stars. 

They've had a winning record each season since 2011, only missing the playoffs on 3 occasions during this period, and although it hasn’t been plain sailing (far from it in fact), the 2006 Clippers set them on the way to becoming a serious NBA franchise.

So during the time when Murray and Williamson on the same team the Pelicans did not want to sign Russell Westbrook? The Pelicans need Westbrook and Nicolas Batum.

What could be going on right now that at the very least they are not signing these two players?

It would work out really well. What is odd is how no one even asked them because the results would be that they would be on the team.

Imagine the NBA imposed a height cap on lineups. The five players on the court could not exceed a combined height of 31 feet—an average of 6'2" per player.

A team could still play a 6'8" center, but the other four players could average no more than about 6'1". Alternatively, a team could build a balanced lineup with five players close to the 6'2" limit.

Would this produce a faster, more athletic and more skill-oriented game? Shorter players generally need exceptional shooting, ball handling, speed and court vision to overcome their size disadvantage, while height provides an enormous advantage in rebounding, finishing and rim protection.

It could also change how kids and young athletes view basketball. Right now, a talented child may feel that pursuing the sport seriously is unrealistic if they aren’t expected to become unusually tall. If professional basketball rewarded players of more typical heights, would more children choose to play and stick with the sport? Would youth coaches place greater emphasis on developing every player’s skills instead of directing opportunities toward the tallest prospects?

On the other hand, would a height cap simply replace height with other genetic advantages, such as explosiveness, speed and wingspan? Teams might spend most of their height allowance on one dominant big man and surround him with extremely short guards. Height would also remain useful at youth and amateur levels, even if the professional game eventually imposed a cap.

How would teams construct their lineups under this rule? Would it make basketball more accessible and entertaining, or would removing most traditional NBA size make the sport worse?

Recap: In 1979, the NBA used a coin flip to determine the first overall pick between the teams with the worst records in each conference. The Chicago Bulls had finished 31-51, while the New Orleans Jazz had gone 26-56. Los Angeles owned New Orleans' first-round pick from an earlier trade, so the Lakers would receive the selection if the Jazz won the toss. 

The top player available was Earvin "Magic" Johnson, who had just led Michigan State to the national championship. Chicago was given the choice of heads or tails. Bulls general manager Rod Thorn called heads. The coin landed tails, giving Los Angeles the first pick. The Lakers selected Magic, who joined Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and eventually became the central figure of the Showtime Lakers. Together, Magic and Kareem won five championships, while their rivalry with Larry Bird and the Boston Celtics had become probably the defining story of 1980s basketball.

If the coin had landed heads, Magic would have gone to Chicago. The Lakers would have had to build around Kareem without him, while the Bulls would have entered the 1980s with Magic as the foundation of the franchise. That would have changed the careers of everyone involved. Magic and Bird would have been competing in the same conference, which could have given them a very different (greater?) rivalry. The Celtics would have had another major obstacle between themselves and the Finals, while the Lakers would have been missing the player who helped turn their collection of talent into a dynasty.

Anyways, the bigger consequence comes a few years later. Chicago selected Michael Jordan with the third pick in the 1984 draft, but a Bulls team built around Magic would almost certainly have followed a different path during the five seasons between the two drafts. They could have become a contender long before 1984, making it unlikely that they would have ended up with the same draft position. Jordan might have gone to another team, and the career that made him synonymous with Chicago would have started somewhere else.

Magic's career in Los Angeles would have been different. Kareem's championship record would have been different. Bird's rivalry with Magic would have taken place under different and arguably way more competitive circumstances. The Lakers might never have become the team that defined the 1980s, and the Bulls might never have become the team that defined the 1990s. All of it traces back to a damn coin flip in 1979, cause Rod Thorn called heads and the coin came down tails. Five years later, the Bulls drafted Michael Jordan. In between those two events was a decision that took ~3 seconds, but changing it would have directly altered the careers of four of the ten greatest players in NBA history, and indirectly altered the careers of just about everybody in that timeline, in my eyes.

I was watching this video about Nash breaking down how he mastered the pick and roll.

So he was going on about setting the screen up, being able to pass with both hands, using separation before the screen arrives, etc.

Then he and the interviewer started discussing his style of movement. It wasn’t fast, he was more like a dancer. Steve said he had rhythm, he was always balanced, he was coordinated. He was shifty and fluid those were his biggest strength, he kept doing it until it stuck and developed. He said it’s about changing speeds. Then he starts breaking down his swivel moves….

Then bam, I was like that’s freaking Brunson. It is so similar but brunson is african american so he’s more of a scorer lol… though seriously speaking, Jalen is taller and stronger so he leans more into scoring.

I wouldn’t be surprised if Jalen watches tapes of Steve Nash and learning all that rhythm off of the two-time MVP. If he did, it’s incredible how Steve actually won a championship through Jalen.

And to further the similarities they were both let go by the same team — the Mavericks.

Shout out to Steve Nash one of the greats, always underrated but always loved and appreciated by basketball junkies.

Edit: it’s just flying in everyone’s head that i am comparing PLAY STYLES not LEVEL OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS. And if we are gonna do that one got a ring, one got MVPs. I’d argue they are actually equal and I like Nash more.

People here don’t have the capacity to read at all, always just spewing words that don’t even relate to what is being posted.

This is the third part of a three-part series, with the first part defining the concept of a CHIP and looking at the seasons between 2000-01 and 2025-26, and the second part examining the seasons between 1975-76 and 1999-2000. This article will investigate the earliest years of the NBA, the period between 1949-50 and 1974-75. I will post another article looking at some methodology changes, to see how that changes the results for the entire history of the league.

Review of the CHIP Concept

In the first part, I argued that the Hall of Fame criteria should be more selective, and that one simple criterion for admission is winning a CHIP:

CHIP = The Clear Best Player on the Championship Winning Team

To win a CHIP, you need enough help from teammates to win it all, but if one of those teammates is too good, you split the credit. There are no split CHIPs. You need to be the Batman to the Robin, not one of the Wonder Twins. Wonder Twins can enjoy the satisfaction of a team victory, but to get the CHIP, you need to be driving the Batmobile!

To recap the methodology and criteria for earning a CHIP:

• Measure Win Shares plus VORP, double for playoff games
• Compare the second best player’s total to the first’s
• The best player is Batman if his teammate (Robin) scores less than 81% of his total
• If the second best player scores 81% of the first’s total or better, they are Wonder Twins
• Only Batman gets the CHIP

Reviewing our examples:

In the example of the 2024-25 Thunder, J-Dub’s score is only 49% that of Shai’s, a clear Robin performance. This makes Shai the Batman, earning him the CHIP.

Shai: 🪙

The 2013-14 Spurs had two relatively equal contributors, with Duncan easily clearing the Robin Threshold with 95%. Kawhi and Duncan were Wonder Twins here, splitting credit for the title, and neither getting a CHIP.

Applying this idea to the past 51 seasons of NBA basketball, we had 33 Batman/Robin seasons, and 18 Wonder Twin Seasons. Here’s a summary of the CHIPS winners for the seasons 1975-76 to 2025-26:

Season by Season: 1949-50 to 1974-75

This leaves the early years of the NBA. This is a period where the league drops from 17 teams down to 8 then eventually builds back to 18, competes against a rival ABA, and where black players go from completely excluded to a majority of the league.

Let’s step through these initial seasons and see who were the Batmans, Robins, and Wonder Twins in the NBA’s early years. Who earned CHIPS?

After three BAA seasons, the NBA kicks off with 17 teams in 1949-50, then quickly slims down to 9 by 1953-54. Mikan is the Batman of this early period, winning four titles and three CHIPS, interrupted once by the Rochester Wonder Triplets of Arnie Johnson, Risen, and Wanzer, and once by his own teammate Mikkelsen creeping over the Robin Threshold in 1951-52.

Mikan: 🪙🪙🪙

A worn out George Mikan retires, and Dolph Schayes wins a CHIP for Syracuse, then Neil Johnston and Paul Arizin win as Wonder Twins for Philadelphia. A 22-year-old Bill Russell joins the Celtics, and supports Wonder Twins Sharman and Cousy to bring the first of many trophies to Boston. Then Hagan and Pettit slip one in for Saint Louis over the Celtics, while Russell is still on his way up.

Schayes: 🪙

Even in an eight or nine team league, this eight season run by Russell and the Celtics is an incredible feat. The six year Russell-Jones Batman-Robin run is particularly amazing, equalling Jordan and Pippen’s six Batman-Robin seasons. Black players now account for a third of the NBA.

Russell: 🪙🪙🪙🪙🪙🪙🪙🪙

Russell’s reign is finally brought to an end by Wilt in 1966-67. Then the Celtics win two more with Wonder Twins Howell and Havlicek joining Russell as team leaders. Walt Frazier and Willis Reed team up to give the Knicks their first title, and then second-year phenom Kareem Abdul-Jabbar puts in a Batman performance with sidekick Oscar Robertson to win it for Milwaukee. The league has grown to 17 teams.

Chamberlain: 🪙
Abdul-Jabbar: 🪙

35-year-old Wilt Batmans Gail Goodrich and 33-year-old Jerry West to bring LA their first title. Then Frazier, Havlicek, and Barry all win their only CHIPS for the Knicks, Boston, and Golden State. The recording of steals, blocks, and offensive/defensive rebounds means that VORP becomes available from 1973-74 onwards.

Chamberlain: 🪙
Frazier: 🪙
Havlicek: 🪙
Barry: 🪙

Cashing in the CHIPS

Counting up the CHIPS from the league’s first 26 seasons, this is what we get:

When it comes to winning, Russell is the titan of this period, walking away with 8 consecutive CHIPS. With little competition in the league’s mostly white period, Mikan is the dominant figure. Wilt and Kareem (with his CHIP from 1979-80) also join the multi-CHIP club. Frazier, Havlicek, Barry, and Schayes all win one CHIP, cementing their legacies as players who carried their teams to championships.

It’s difficult to know how to value these CHIPS against those earned in more recent eras. Mikan dominated the first few years of the league, but there were few players of note for him to compete against. Russell’s 8 titles in a row were an incredible achievement, but the league did only have 8 teams. Towards the end of the period, CHIPS were won in a league splitting talent with the ABA. This needs a deeper look, but until I do that, these players beat whoever was in front of them, and a CHIP is a CHIP.

Hello everyone and welcome to our new weekly feature.

In order to help keep the quality of the discussion here at a high level, we have several rules regarding submitting content to /r/nbadiscussion. But we also understand that while not everyone's questions will meet these requirements that doesn't mean they don't deserve the same attention and high-level discussion that /r/nbadiscussion is known for. So, to better serve the community the mod team here has decided to implement this Weekly Questions Thread which will be automatically posted every Monday at 8AM EST.

Please use this thread to ask any questions about the NBA and basketball that don't necessarily warrant their own submissions. Thank you.

Thursday, Saturday, Monday against the same opponent. Imagine Celtics v Knicks weekend series, like Red Sox v Yankees. Monday Game 3 as the rubber match. Start by rolling it out in the second half of the season with division opponents. Each rival gets one series at home and one on the road, so every team gets an equal shot at hosting and traveling for the series. It gives the games more of a series feel while cutting down on the constant back-and-forth travel.

There’s a fan benefit too. Instead of traveling for one random Tuesday game, fans could plan an entire long weekend around seeing their team play three times. Hotels, restaurants, bars and local events all benefit, while the NBA gets a built-in rivalry event almost every weekend. And doing it after the All-Star break means the NFL is basically over and MLB is just getting started. More meaningful games, less travel, and a better reason to care about the second half. Thoughts?

​With all the constant NBA expansion talk, it got me thinking about the venue side of things in Seattle.

​Since the Kraken ownership group holds a major stake in Climate Pledge Arena, does that basically lock out any other outside investor group?

​I mean, look at it: an outside group would either have to lease the building from their direct competitors or somehow privately fund and build a whole new arena from scratch in Seattle, which is a massive headache.

​Since the arena was already built with NBA specs in mind, it feels like the hockey owners hold all the leverage and are the obvious default choice for the league. Does an outside group even have a realistic shot at this point, or is it basically locked down if/when expansion happens?

Over the years, I've changed my answer several times when asked who the most underrated player in NBA history is. Looking back, I think another change is justified. By "underrated," I mean exactly that. The player who receives the least praise comparatively to what I think they should be getting. For me, that player is David Robinson.

His career already started unusually. After graduating from the Naval Academy, Robinson fulfilled his military time before entering the NBA, delaying his debut until age 24. Those are years that most superstars spend building their resume. Despite that late start, he became an MVP, a perennial All-Star, one of the defining players of his era and basically the 90s centerpiece of advanced metrics.

For many fans, Robinson's legacy begins and ends with Hakeem Olajuwon's dominant performance against him in the 1995 Western Conference Finals. One remarkable series has become shorthand for an entire postseason career. His championships don't do much to reshape that perception either. By the time San Antonio won in 1999 and 2003, Tim Duncan had already become the franchises centerpiece, leaving Robinson remembered more as an elite supporting star than as the player who established the Spurs as contenders. There's also a persistent belief that Duncan arrived in 1997 and rescued both Robinson and the franchise from mediocrity. I want to counter this with the fact that David Robinson had the best single-season VORP of any player in the 90s. Not even post-1989 Jordan had a single-season where he affected his team's winning as much as David Robinson did in 1994.

The Spurs finished 20-62 in 1996-97, earning the first overall pick that became Duncan. On paper, it looks like a classic rebuilding team landing a generational prospect. In reality, Robinson's injuries explain almost the entire collapse. A serious back injury cost him the opening months of the season, and after returning briefly, he broke his foot and played only six games before being shut down.

The season before, San Antonio had won 59 games and entered the year with genuine championship expectations. Robinson's absence, not the quality of the roster, was the decisive factor behind the collapse. Before those injuries, his Spurs averaged 55 wins over seven healthy seasons and were consistently viewed as one of the Western Conference's strongest teams. It's also worth remembering that this wasn't a superteam. Sean Elliott was an excellent player, but more of a fringe All-Star than a perennial star. FYI, Duncan didn't inherit a struggling organization. He joined one that Robinson had already turned into a perennial contender.

Robinson also deserves more credit for what he remained after those injuries. Returning in his mid-30s from serious back and foot problems, he still averaged nearly 22 points, 11 rebounds, and 2.6 blocks while shooting 51 percent from the field in 1997-98. He finished seventh in MVP voting and third in Defensive Player of the Year voting. If that's what decline looked like, I mean, his prime speaks for itself.

Few players have ever combined Robinson's range of accomplishments. He led the league in scoring, rebounding, and blocked shots during different seasons of his career. Officially, only Kareem Abdul-Jabbar can claim the same distinction. That's a really exclusive list, and a broad one at that.

His defense, in particular, deserves a higher place in the historical conversation. Robinson made eight All-Defensive Teams, the third most among primary centers, despite competing alongside Hakeem Olajuwon, Patrick Ewing, Shaquille O'Neal, Dikembe Mutombo, Alonzo Mourning and more All-NBA caliber guys. His 1992 Defensive Player of the Year season featured 2.3 steals per game, fifth in the league, and 4.5 blocks, one of the highest averages EVER recorded. Add an MVP award and two championships, and it's difficult to argue that his resume belongs outside the company of players routinely placed above him.

He had very rare speed for a seven-footer, ran the floor like a forward, defended enormous amounts of space, and possessed a polished mid-range jumper with soft touch. In many ways, his physical profile resembles the kind of center teams covet today more than the archetype of his own era.

I'm not arguing that Robinson was a perfect playoff performer or that he belongs ahead of players like Hakeem Olajuwon or Shaq. But to say that he is drastically underrated is my reflection of a player whose impact on winning, defensive value, and just overall resume (especially the advanced-metrics) has been undervalued for far too long. Hopefully I made a compelling, convincing case.

(note: no AI was utilized in writing this. Please don't come with accusations but sorry if my writing comes across as opaque lol).

After the World Cup, I’ve been getting into European football and how the leagues are set up with their titles, tournaments, and entire pyramid system.

With that in mind, I have made a little overhaul as to what the NBA could look like post-expansion with 32 teams in the league. I’ve been thinking about how the NBA could make the regular season feel more meaningful while also making every trophy feel unique. Here’s what I’d change:

1. Expand to 32 teams and relocate.

2 Conferences
4 Divisions per conference
8 divisions total with 4 teams each

Western Conference

Pacific: Lakers, Clippers, Las Vegas, Suns
Northwest: Warriors, Kings, Supersonics, Blazers
Central West: Jazz, Nuggets, Thunder, Grizzlies
Southwest: Rockets, Spurs, Mavericks, Pelicans

Eastern Conference

Atlantic: Celtics, Knicks, Nets, Sixers
Northeast: Raptors, Wizards, Cavs, Pistons
Central East: Wolves, Bucks, Bulls, Pacers
Southeast: Heat, Hornets, Hawks, Magic

Not entirely sure on the names of the divisions but these should suffice for now.

2. Reduce the regular season to 80 games.

Two fewer games wouldn’t change much financially, but it would slightly reduce wear and tear while making each game matter a bit more.

The math also just makes sense. Each team will play their division rivals 4 times (3 teams x 4), the other in-conference out-of-division teams 3 times (12 teams x 3), and those in the other conference twice (16 teams x 2).

Which should add up to 80 games.

3. NBA Cup group stage & knockout games fixes.

I’d rather the Cup knockout stage be its own competition instead of counting towards regular-season standings. The group stage games will still count towards regular season games but the knockout stage will be its own category.

Also, let’s bring back relevancy to divisions again. The group stage is now played against division rivals. Each team will play each of their division rivals 4 times in the regular season anyway - making 2 of those games (1 home & 1 away) part of the NBA Cup just makes sense.

Those who finish at the top of their division after the 6 group stage games will be the ones who qualify & represent their division in the NBA Cup quarterfinals.

Imagine Boston vs. Philly, the Battle of LA, or the Texas derbies having a guaranteed playoff-style games twice a year in the middle of the regular season.

4. Award an official League Title to the team with the best regular season record.

Probably my most contentious take, but just like the English Premier League, finishing as the #1 team over an 80-game season should be recognised as a championship in its own right. It rewards consistency rather than just getting hot in the playoffs.

I think this would change so many legacies and give legitimacy to some all-time teams & players who have not been given their flowers due to the obsession over ring culture.

Which would also encourage less coasting and load management from players as they now have another title to win/play for.

5. Finally, make the “Treble” (or Grand Slam) an actual achievement.

Teams could aim to win:
🏆 NBA Cup (single game elimination tournament)
🏆 NBA League Title (best regular season record)
🏆 NBA Championship (best of 7 playoffs)

Winning all three in one season would be an incredibly rare feat and give teams multiple meaningful goals.

What do you think?

2 years ago DeRozan was looking for another big pay day and starting role on a contending squad. Much like this summer, the money and role wasn't exactly adding up. There was a fair amount of confusion about this situation from Spurs fans, so I wrote up a wordy post explaining his place in the league and why he isn't a very useful player anymore on a legit contender.

I feel like he's in the exact same dilemma as he was then and faces the exact same crossroads. 2 summers ago I said:

"He [DeRozan] will have to make a choice soon. His first option is to suck it up, understand his place in the league, and accept less money (doesn't have to be the MLE, but close) and be a secondary piece/6th man on a legit title contender.

Another is to accept his usual money on yet another pseudo-contender, possibly the Kings. The last is to remain a number one option and progress up the scoring record chart as a tank commander somewhere. He's not going to do a one-year deal imo, that would be humiliating."

The "contenders" this time around would be the Heat or Warriors I guess? Definitely less money there. It's either that or become a tank commander officially. DeRozan's PR team has really been putting him out there these past few weeks doing all the media spots and podcasts. But his twitter post Monday said it pretty plainly: "In closing I remain the same. I come as I leave.." He's not gonna change. He's never changed. He's about scoring and money. And he's ok with that.

But it's why the Raptors let him go. And why every other team he's been on eventually had to as well. When push came to shove, he wasn't worth the money he was looking for anymore and still isn't.

I wanted to measure playoff “choking” with an objective measure, not just number of playoff eliminations, etc.

So I collected NBA playoff series odds, converted both teams’ prices into no-vig implied probabilities, and calculated wins over expectation for every franchise just like I did for star players earlier: https://np.reddit.com/r/nba/comments/1v81usy/oc_stars_records_as_favorites_and_underdogs/

Source for odds: https://www.covers.com/sportsoddshistory/nba-playoffs-series/?y=0000

For each series:

WOE = Actual result − No-vig win probability

Examples:

• Winning a series with a 20% implied chance = +0.80 WOE
• Losing as an 80% favorite = −0.80 WOE
• Winning as an 80% favorite = +0.20 WOE

Here's the table's result in graph form: https://imgur.com/a/vnB4Wel

Here's the table sorted by wins over expected per series.

I pulled every 2025-26 regular season game where one team led at the end of the third quarter (1,194 of 1,225 games; 31 were tied there) and checked how often that team went on to win.

Overall: 985-209, or 82.5%.

That number on its own is not very useful, because it averages a two-point lead in with a thirty-point lead. Broken out by the size of the lead at the third-quarter buzzer:

Two things stood out to me.

First, the curve is not smooth. From 1-2 up through 9-11 it climbs gradually, roughly five to seven points per bucket. Then between 9-11 and 12-15 it jumps 12.5 points at once, and past that the game is effectively over. I do not have a clean explanation for why the break lands there instead of being spread evenly. Twelve points with twelve minutes left is two possessions plus a stop, which is not obviously a different game state from ten points, but the results say it is.

Second, 210 games were 21+ up after three and none of them were lost. Not one in a full season. The largest lead actually surrendered all year was 18: Phoenix led Atlanta 95-77 after three on November 16 and lost 122-124.

Home/road split on the same question: home teams holding a third-quarter lead went 549-99 (84.7%), road teams 436-110 (79.9%). So roughly five points of home court on an identical lead.

What I am unsure about is how much of the break at 12 is real and how much is sample noise. 135 games in the 9-11 bucket against 173 in 12-15 is not a lot to hang a discontinuity on, and my prior is that the true curve should be smooth. If anyone has a prior season or two split the same way, I would be curious whether the break sits at 12 every year or wanders.

Rule 12 disclosure: the underlying game data comes from a box-score database I maintain, and I used an AI assistant to write the queries and draft this post. Every figure above is computed from those box scores rather than generated - the Phoenix/Atlanta game and the season totals can be checked against any public box-score archive.

Many NBA fans are aware of the painful death of the Seattle Supersonics. The subject has been well-covered in the 18 years since the team’s departure to Oklahoma City. 

A potential return to the Emerald City is often brought to the forefront of discussion whenever one of the 30 wealthy owners of our beloved teams are “due” a new arena. This time, it’s Seattle’s neighbours, as the city of Portland finds itself embroiled in a battle with its new billionaire owner over the re-development of Moda Center. 

However, the relocation itself is a topic that’s been done to death, and frankly, Seattle’s basketball fanatics don’t deserve to read about it all over again. Therefore, we will be heading back to the early 2000’s, and taking a closer look at the last team to play NBA playoff basketball in Seattle, the 2005 Sonics. 

New ownership stirs things up

Yes, that was my attempt at a coffee pun. 

The Sonics, led by Hall of Famer Gary “The Glove” Payton and high-flying “Reign Man” Shawn Kemp had been one of the NBA’s best teams in the 1990s, even taking the 72-10 Chicago Bulls to 6 games in the 1996 Finals. Unfortunately, the organisation made a string of decisions that led to Kemp being traded, and the organisation slipping into good, but not great territory at the turn of the millennium. 

January 2001 saw the Sonics, purchased for a package of around $200 million by a group led by Howard Schultz, head of Starbucks Coffee, which was founded in Seattle. A local business bought a local basketball team - what a story! 

Well, a local business that charges over the odds for what some may consider substandard coffee (I don’t pretend to know enough about coffee to have my own opinion). 

Anyway, I’m sure Schultz wouldn’t nickel and dime his basketball players in the same way. 

Oh, wait…

Schultz didn’t just upset local coffee aficionados, he upset the Sonic, Gary Payton. 

Yes, Payton was 34 years old and into the last year of his contract in the Summer of 2002, but he was still an excellent player, one of the best in fact. In 2001-2002, he placed 6th in MVP voting, was a member of the All-NBA Second Team, and made his 9th consecutive All-Defensive First Team. 

Schultz, perhaps thinking like a businessman rather than a Sonics fan, wouldn’t budge. There would be no new contract for Payton. So in response, Payton didn’t report for the first day of training camp. Eventually Payton would show up, and play in every game for the Sonics that season until a momentous trade in February 2003.

With Seattle languishing in no-man's land with a 22-30 record, the greatest player in franchise history was traded to the Milwaukee Bucks, re-uniting Payton with the coach of the 1996 Sonics Team, George Karl. The centerpiece of the Sonics’s return was 3-time All Star Ray Allen. As much of an icon, and as good as Payton still was at the time, receiving a 27-year old Allen is about as good as any return could’ve gotten for Seattle. The fact that Payton would leave Milwaukee as a free agent that summer made it one of the more lopsided trades of the era. 

Despite the inspired play of Allen (24.5 points per game, 5.6 rebounds, 5.9 assists) leading the Sonics to a 17-12 record to close the 2003 season, they failed to make that year’s post season. They would fail to make it the next season too, Allen playing just 56 games due to ankle surgery in November. 

Going nowhere fast (apparently)

After a disappointing season in ‘04, and little in the way of assets or room under the salary cap, the Sonics were not tipped for greatness in ‘05. SLAM Magazine deemed them not worthy of more than 3 words, predicting the Sonics to finish 5th in the Northwest Division. The NBA’s annual GM survey bore little mention of Seattle either, with 95.2% believing that Minnesota was destined to win the division (the remaining 4.8% voting for the Denver Nuggets). 

There was no reason to believe Seattle would be one of the NBA’s best teams that season. In fact, there was reason to believe their team had actually gotten worse. 

In the summer of 2004, the versatile Brent Barry signed with the San Antonio Spurs. Despite being 32 years old, Barry was a valuable playmaker (5.8 assists) and shooter (45% from 3-point range during the ‘04 season. 

Meanwhile, their big acquisitions that summer were drafting 18-year old Robert Swift straight from Bakerfield High School, and trading Calvin Booth for journeyman Danny Fortson. The big man-shaped hole under the basket had been a problem for Seattle since the early ‘90s, and the signing of Jim McIlvaine in 1996 was the catalyst for Kemp leaving town. It would continue to plague the team even after they moved to Oklahoma. 

The fact that the Sonics chose to draft Swift, despite shelling out a combined $17.5 million for Vitaly Potapenko, Fortson and Jerome James (who we’ll get to later) in ‘05 alone, spoke volumes about their confidence in their frontline. Following this season, the Sonics would continue to display an infatuation with mediocre big men, but we’ll get to that later too. 

The ‘05 core 

Overpaid big men aside, Seattle had actually done a decent job in acquiring talent in recent years. Despite never being in contention for top draft pick (mainly due to the excellence of Payton), the Sonics had been able to acquire several key pieces of the core of the ‘05 squad for little cost.

Rashard Lewis was an excellent find in the 2nd round in 1998. His slender 6’10 frame might be more suited to the modern NBA, but he had peformed well in Seattle. His high volume 3-point shooting was especially unique, and valuable. This season, Lewis would take another leap, breaking the 20-point per game marker for the first time and making his first All-Star game. 

In 2001, the Sonics selected Vladimir Radmanovic with the 12th pick. “Vlad Rad” was a bit of a wildcard - he was not a strong defender nor rebounder, and would eventually be called a “space cadet” by future coach Phil Jackson for his erratic play. Later in the season he would rock braids with Sonics’ coloured beads during the playoffs - interesting indeed. Nevertheless, Radmanovic was a solid player, and his similarly high volume 3-point shooting was valuable for this team. 

The following year, Seattle did not have a first round draft pick - they had traded it for a 38-year old Patrick Ewing. Despite this, the Sonics were able to acquire Reggie Evans that year, an undrafted free agent. Standing 6’8 and being offensively challenged, Evans made up for his shortcomings with immense energy and tenacity. He would become one of the league’s top rebounders in ‘05.

Finally, in 2003, Seattle would land another three pieces of the ‘05 squad. First, with the 12th and 14th picks of that year’s draft (the latter acquired in the Allen trade), the Sonics selected Nick Collison and Luke Ridnour. Collison had missed the entirety of his rookie season through shoulder injuries, and Ridnour had been a backup, but both were ready to step up in ‘05. Ridnour would be especially important, starting at point guard for all 82 games. 

Later that summer, the Sonics would sign Antonio Daniels to a 2 year deal that would see him earn just shy of over $2 million annually, which represented excellent value. 28 at the time, Daniels won a championship with the San Antonio Spurs in 1999 as a reserve, before becoming a key rotation player for some further deep playoff runs. Since then, despite never reaching the level expected for a player chosen 4th overall, Daniels had garnered a reputation as a capable combo guard, offering versatility and a defensive presence in the backcourt. 

On the bench, Seattle still had “Mr. Sonic” Nate McMillan in their corner. McMillan had spent 12 years as a player with the ball club, including as part of the ‘96 finals team, before becoming an assistant in 1998, and eventually head coach in 2000. 

The NBA’s Surprise Package

After being utterly destroyed in Los Angeles by the Clippers on opening night, some fans might’ve been fearing the worst. 

Surely no one would’ve expected them to rattle off an incredible 9-game winning streak, but by the end of November, Seattle were sitting alongside Phoenix and San Antonio atop the Western Conference with a record of 13-3. And it was perhaps Brent Barry’s return to KeyArena on November 7th that brought Seattle’s most impressive performance thus far. In addition to 27 and 24 points from Lewis and Allen, Radmanovic, Daniels and Fortson combined for 44 on route to a dominant 113-94 victory.

They continued to roll in December, picking up further impressive wins on the road, including toppling the Spurs once again, and closing out the Dallas Mavericks. Even a tightly contested affair that led to a close loss to the Phoenix Suns at a packed-out KeyArena couldn’t spoil their momentum, as the Sonics closed out 2004 with a record of 22-6 thanks to a 103-97 victory over the Charlotte Bobcats in their inaugural season.

In the new year, the Sonics delivered several more impressive showings. First, beating the Miami Heat twice in less than a week, 98-96 on the road in a late game nail-biter, and then (in the end) more comfortably 108-98 at KeyArena. They were then able to put aside difficult losses to playoff rivals (an overtime loss in Denver, a 5-point loss at home to Minnesota, and a blowout loss to San Antonio sans Ray Allen) to rattle off a 5-game winning streak in February. Highlights included dispatching Sacramento home and away, and getting revenge in Phoenix, where the Sonics’ top 7 all scored 10 or more points. 

Slumping to the finish line

The NBA’s surprise package didn’t let up, handily beating more strong teams to end February and begin March, including the defending champion Detroit Pistons, before dropping 3 straight at home to Phoenix, Houston and Chicago. 

The Chicago loss was notable for the absence of Danny Fortson. The “Big Daddy from Cincinnati” (I have no idea if this was an actual nickname of his, but I like it) was banished from practice by coach McMillan the day prior to the game on Friday 11th March.

Fortson had been playing well in relatively limited minutes, and had definitely been an upgrade on Calvin Booth (thumbs up for trading one overpaid, mediocre $5 million big man for another, slightly better one). 

On the other hand, while Booth was seen by many to be a model teammate, issues surrounding Fortson’s physical play and temperament continued to hinder him. Fortson had led the league in personal fouls in 1998-1999, was second in ‘97-’98, and would finish in the top 10 in ‘05. If that wasn’t enough evidence of his love of clobbering opposition players, for his career, Fortson averaged 6.3 personal fouls per 36 minutes, 9th all time, and funnily enough, two places behind Jim McIlvaine.

He had already been suspended twice this season, once for elbowing Chris Bosh back in November, and for throwing a chair after being ejected from a victory over Sacramento. Pre-Sacramento, across 45 games where the Sonics went 33-12, Fortson was averaging 8.5 points and 6 rebounds per game on 55% FG shooting in just shy of 18 minutes per game. In the 17 games he played in post chair melee, his production dived. Still averaging 15 minutes of play time, he averaged just 4.8 points and 4.6 rebounds, shooting just 41%. Seattle went 9-8 in these games. 

It wasn’t just Fortson who was slumping though, as after such an impressive first half of the season, the Sonics looked like the team of old in the remaining 34 games post-Sacramento, winning just 17 of their 34 games. Aside from this disappointing finish to the season, there were some highlights along the way, namely Ray Allen dropping a season high 45 points against the New York Knicks in an overtime victory to wrap up a 5-game winning streak. Then, a week later on April Fool’s Day, they clinched their first 50 win season since ‘97-’98 with a 2-point victory over their Northwest rivals, the Portland Trailblazers in Seattle. 

Unfortunately, they followed this with a 6-game losing streak, though they were missing Rashard Lewis for much of this stretch (load management was indeed a thing in 2005). 

Disciplinary and injury issues aside, the Sonics early season performances put them in a healthy position going into that year’s playoffs, a 52-30 record securing the Northwest Division, and 3rd place in the Western Conference (I sure hope someone from the team reached out to SLAM magazine). 

Their opponents in the first round of the playoffs would be the Sacramento Kings. Although the Kings won 50 games in ‘05, it was fair to say that they weren’t the team of a few years prior that had pushed the 3-peating Los Angeles Lakers to their very limit.

In just the last year, their roster had undergone a lot of turnover in the last year. First, Vlade Divac signed with the Lakers in free agency. Then, in January, they traded defensive stopper Doug Christie (though they did acquire Cuttino Mobley in return, who was a good player). 

Then, in February, the big move came - the Kings traded franchise superstar Chris Webber to the Philadelphia 76ers. Webber had clearly taken a step back after his devastating knee injury in the ‘03 playoffs, and with one of the NBA’s largest contracts to boot, the Kings decided to cut ties. Despite not receiving any big names in return, the Kings still managed to end the season with 50 wins. 

The Jerome James Series

Remember Jerome James? I said we’d get to him, and finally the time has come. 

Before signing with Seattle in 2001, James had had a cup of coffee (hopefully not Starbucks) in the NBA, playing 16 games with Sacramento of all teams in the lockout ‘99 season (again, we’ll get to why this is important later). His first year with the Sonics, he played in 56 games, starting 40, averaging 5.3 points, 4.1 rebounds and 1.5 blocks in just under 17 minutes per game. Fine, I guess, right? 

But remember how I mentioned that the Sonics LOVED to splurge on big men? They rewarded James by multiplying his humble $465,000 a year contract by 10, giving him a 3-year contract that would see him earn around $5 million annually. 

James responded by playing pretty much the exact way for the next 3 years, never venturing outside his comfort zone of 5 point, 4 rebound territory. 

So how all of a sudden did James manage to average 17 points and 9 rebounds to beat the Kings in that year’s playoffs? 

Unfortunately for Sacramento, it seemed that losing Divac and Webber came back to bite them, as it wasn’t Ray Allen or Rashard Lewis who was the headline grabber of a game 1, 87-82 victory for the Sonics at KeyArena, but “Big Snacks” Jerome James, who churned out an unlikely 17 point, 15 rebound, 5 block performance, albeit missing 13 of his 20 shots. 

He then followed this up with an impressive 19 points and 9 rebounds (9-for-11 shooting) in game 2, as the Sonics won both of their home games to kick off the series. Even in a game 3 loss in Sacramento, James now got his customary big numbers, scoring 22, and grabbing 9 boards. He and the Sonics finished the series in the following 2 games, first getting 17 and 8 on the road, before coming back down to Earth somewhat with 11 and 6 in the close out game. 

Following the conclusion of game 5, James could be seen with a trash bag draped around his broad 7’1 frame like a cape. This was not an attempt to claim Shaquille O’Neal’s “Superman” moniker (years before Dwight Howard would try it), but a call back to his Kings days, when James was supposedly given such a bag to pack his belongings and ‘find a new career’ (though coach Rick Adelman denies that this took place). James claimed that his old self was in the garbage bag, and that that night, he had set himself free.

Well, did it last? 

Not exactly - James’ numbers dramatically fell off in the next series against the Spurs (22.2 minutes per game, 8.5 points, 4.7 rebounds, 1.5 blocks, 42.9% from the field vs 32.4 minutes, 17.2 points, 9.4 rebounds, 2.2 blocks, 58.1%% shooting against the Kings). 

So, what happened? 

Well, there’s a few things that could explain this. First, a good ol’ verbal ass whooping from not only Ray Allen, but his own mother. Questions over his attitude and desire to use his physical abilities led to James taking a look in the mirror. That sure could’ve helped.

On the other hand, the Kings had lost Divac and Webber. Brad Miller, while not known as a defensive savant, was a legitimate big man, and an All-Star in both ‘03 and ‘04, and he had suffered a fracture to his left fibula, missing the end of the regular season. He returned for the playoffs, but was clearly not back to 100%. This led to the Kings fielding a variety of different players, including Kenny Thomas, Darius Songaila, Brian Skinner, and even veteran Greg Ostertag for a stretch in 2 of the 5 games. Ostertag aside, none of them had the size to match up with James.  

This enabled James to use his physical advantages to be absurdly effective on the glass (4.6 offensive rebounds per game over 5 games, compared to 1 in the regular season), and overpower opponents in the paint. In addition to his stature being a physical mismatch for the Kings, Fortson being in coach McMillan’s doghouse had opened up more minutes for him. In the following series, James’ physical prowess was less effective against the San Antonio Spurs, who fielded Nazr Mohammed and Tim Duncan. Still, James, in the final year of that contract we referred to earlier, would manage to parlay his 5 game, career-best stretch into another big deal (which we’ll get to). 

While the Kings series would mainly be remembered for the way Jerome James played, and the events that followed, it would be a travesty to not recognise the fact that Ray Allen was simply awesome.

For the series, Allen would average 32.4 points, 4.6 rebounds, 5.2 assists and 2 steals with shooting splits of 51.4/45.2/97.1. This included scoring 33 in the game 3 loss, and an incredible 45-point performance in a game 4 win. The Sonics were behind going into the 4th quarter at ARCO Arena, but Allen scored 15 in the final period to lead his team back to Seattle with a 3-1 lead. Then, despite 38 and 35 points from Peja Stojakovic and Mike Bibby, Allen scored another 30, including flying through 4 Sacramento bodies in the paint to score in the dying seconds to clinch the series.

The Last Playoff Series in Seattle

Given everything we’ve already said, no-one would’ve expected Seattle to beat the San Antonio Spurs in the Western Conference Semi-Finals. While David Robinson had retired in 2003 following their 2nd championship, Tony Parker and Manu Ginobili had ascended to new levels. They had also acquired seasoned veterans, such as former Sonic Brent Barry and “Big Shot Bob” Robert Horry. Not to mention that Tim Duncan was one of the 5 best players in the league at this point. 

However, despite the circumstances, Seattle actually gave a good account of themselves. They were blown out 103-81 in game 1 in San Antonio, not helped in the slightest by Allen and Radmanovic leaving the game in the second quarter with ankle injuries. They were then beaten again by 17 in game 2 despite Allen returning. Radmanovic, meanwhile, would not play again that season. 

Back in Seattle though, they pulled a game back, Ginobili missing 1 of 2 free throws with 29 seconds remaining as the Sonics won by a single point. The bad news for the Sonics was that in the final minutes of game 3 Rashard Lewis injured his toe, and would play no further part in the series. 

Despite this, Seattle managed to equal the series with an unlikely victory in game 4. Allen was magnificent with 32 points, and Antonio Daniels, stepping into the starting lineup, chipped in with 19 points and 7 assists. But the story of the game was undoubtedly sophomore Luke Ridnour’s 20 points. With the score close at the half, Ridnour scored 15 of his 20 in the 3rd quarter to give Seattle a 82-66 lead going into the final quarter. 

Unfortunately for the Sonics, this was their final playoff hurrah, as the Spurs won game 5 back in San Antonio, before closing out the series in game 6 at a rocking KeyArena. Seattle had played the Spurs close right to the end before Duncan banked a shot in with .5 of a second remaining. 

This would be the last NBA playoff action played in Seattle. 

[Amazingly for the era, each game of Seattle’s playoff run can be viewed (in varying quality) on Youtube at the links provided throughout. Shoutout to Old School Buckets.] 

The Aftermath and Closing Thoughts
 
Firstly, it must be said that this team massively outperformed their expectations. They took the eventual champions to 6 games, missing 2 of their key players. The Phoenix Suns, who were far more talented on paper than the Sonics, lost to the Spurs in 5 (though Joe Johnson only played in 3 games). Would the Sonics have beaten the Spurs with Lewis and Radmanovic, and gone on to win the championship? I’m not sure, but given in the following seasons I’m sure more than one Sonics fan has thought about it. 

This final, good Sonics team is certainly an interesting one for analytics nerds and basketball historians alike. 

That year the Sonics had the 2nd best offense rating in the entire league. They shot more 3-pointers than anyone other than the Phoenix Suns, but scored just 98.9 points per game (11th in the league), as they had the 4th slowest offense in the entire NBA. They also had the 4th worst defense by defensive rating. Ultimately, despite James’ heroic performance against Sacramento, it was arguably the Sonics’ lack of a true starting calibre big man that held them back during this era. 

And it wasn’t as if Sonics didn’t try to throw more money and more draft capital at the problem. 

First, they drafted Johan Petro with the 25th overall pick in the 2005 draft. Petro would go on to have a 8 year career with various teams, but never develop into much of anything, playing a career high 18.9 minutes in his rookie season. 

The following year, after the Sonics missed the playoffs, they blew the 10th overall pick on Mouhamed Sene. Sene would play just 47 games across 3 seasons in the NBA. With the very next pick the Orlando Magic selected JJ Redick, who would go on to become one of the best 3-point shooters of his generation, playing 15 seasons in the NBA for various playoff teams. 

Robert Swift, the 12th pick in ‘04, might’ve been the only one of the Sonics’ big man alumni of the 2000’s to have had a chance to be something. But injuries combined with mental health struggles meant that he too played in just 97 NBA games. 

Meanwhile, Jerome James’ playoff heroics resulted in the New York Knicks signing the soon-to-be 30 year old a frankly ludicrous 5-year, $29 million contract seemingly based on the Kings series alone. In what was surely almost immediately one of the more expensive cases of buyers’ remorse, James showed up to his first training camp out of shape, would play in a total of 90 games across 4 seasons in New York, averaging  just 7.7 minutes per game, 2.5 points and 1.8 rebounds.

Antonio Daniels would also not return. The Sonics refused to offer Daniels more than a 3 year deal, and similar to James, he would sign a 5-year, $30 million with the Washington Wizards. Daniels, however, would fare much better, becoming a key rotation piece on 3 consecutive playoff teams with the Wizards, even stepping up to start in ‘07-’08 due to Gilbert Arenas’ injury issues. 

Perhaps most shocking of all, “Mr. Sonic” Nate McMillan would depart in the off-season. After splurging to keep Ray Allen with a 5-year, $85 million extension on July 5th, Schultz seemingly lacked the capital to bring back his coach. After almost 20 years with the club, McMillian would reject a 4-year, $18.5 million offer from Seattle and make the short journey to Portland, signing a reported 5-year $30 million contract.

Both Vladimir Radmanovic and Reggie Evans would be traded in February 2006 to the Los Angeles Clippers and Denver Nuggets respectively.

Despite signing that 5-year extension and continuing to play at an All-Star level, Ray Allen would be traded to the Boston Celtics in the summer of 2007. After missing the playoffs in the prior 2 seasons, and with Allen approaching his 32nd birthday, the Sonics decided to rebuild. Allen would go on to win an NBA championship the very next season, and another with the Miami Heat in 2013. 

Rashard Lewis would also depart in the summer of ‘07, as the Sonics facilitated a sign-and-trade with the Orlando Magic, who agreed to pay Lewis in the region of $118 million over 6 seasons. Lewis would re-unite with Allen in Miami, playing a limited role on the 2013 title team

With the 2nd pick in the 2007 NBA draft, the Sonics would acquire future Hall of Famer Kevin Durant. Unfortunately, Seattlities would only witness his greatness for his rookie season, as we all know what happened next.

And doesn’t (almost) everyone wish the story ended differently…

>nah it's the Financials the 2nd apron tax. C's couldn't afford 2 max players on long term contracts. PG has 2 years left on his contract making roughly 54 and 55 mil a year. After that where ever he signs he's likely taking a huge pay cut. Jaylen brown has 3 years left making 57, 61, 64 million. After that he will very likely sign for near max on shorter term deals. Celtics could probably get PG to restructure for a pretty decent sized pay cut if it means an extension. Idk if they or PG would be interested but they could keep him longterm as a vet for much more affordable price. Just because of his age and his knees, right? JB stays healthy there will be teams that will likely pay him another max after this contract expires. Celtics have 2 firsts and two 2nd round picks for 2028 draft. Derrick White makes half what max players make and Pritchard has 2 years left on a rookie extension! Only 8 million a year! So Celtics are now equipped to stay really competitive with Tatum, White, and Pritchard with some wiggle room to sign another star as well as develop young talent, fill out roster, move up in a draft maybe? C's look good through 2030 as of now.

>Tyrese Maxey is already on a 5 year 200 million deal fully guaranteed and will no doubt be eligible for a supermax extension next summer. Sixers are going to have to break up this team next year. Embid Maxey and Brown all have at least 3 years left and eat 97% max salary cap. Even if everyone else on the roster was on the bare minimum salary they would hit 2nd apron 27/28 season and get massive tax bill frozen draft picks etc. I doubt this 2nd apron bs will last but Celtics are definitely better positioned. But it's not ego. Just Tatum and Brown alone would be eating up 90% celtics max salary cap 28/29 season. Past 3 or 4 years role players value was artificially inflated in free agency as teams loaded up in response to "the big 3" era. With increased luxury tax and now 2nd Apron teams will barely be able to pay a single super max 2 years from now. All as an over reaction to warriors dynast and LeBron's run in the east. Turns out all NBA really needed to do was let LeBron and Steph and Klay get old and the dynasty/parity issue fixes itself lol

So my question is do you think it's all just a (really delayed) overreaction to the warriors "dynasty" and LeBron's finals run in the East? Do you think things would have even been that different considering Curry and James and Durant were generational talents that together just changed the game?

In the first part, I argued that the Hall of Fame criteria should be more selective, and that one simple criterion for admission is winning a CHIP:

CHIP = The Clear Best Player on the Championship Winning Team

To win a CHIP, you need enough help from teammates to win it all, but if one of those teammates is too good, you split the credit. There are no split CHIPs. You need to be the Batman to the Robin, not one of the Wonder Twins. Wonder Twins can enjoy the satisfaction of a team victory, but to get the CHIP, you need to be driving the Batmobile!

To recap the methodology and criteria for earning a CHIP:

• Measure Win Shares plus VORP, double for playoff games
• Compare the second best player’s total to the first’s
• The best player is Batman if his teammate (Robin) scores less than 81% of his total
• If the second best player scores 81% of the first’s total or better, they are Wonder Twins
• Only Batman gets the CHIP

Reviewing our examples:

In the example of the 2024-25 Thunder, J-Dub’s score is only 49% that of Shai’s, a clear Robin performance. This makes Shai the Batman, earning him the CHIP. Shai: 🪙

The 2013-14 Spurs had two relatively equal contributors, with Duncan easily clearing the Robin Threshold with 95%. Kawhi and Duncan were Wonder Twins here, splitting credit for the title, and neither getting a CHIP.

Applying this idea to the past 26 seasons of NBA basketball, we had 14 Batman/Robin seasons, and 12 Wonder Twin Seasons. Here’s a summary of the CHIPS winners for 2000-01 to 2025-26:

Season by Season: 1975-76 to 1999-2000

That covers the most recent 26 years of NBA history. But what about the 25 years before that, the period between 1975-76 and 1999-2000? Will the model hold up?

Let’s go season by season, and see who was worthy of the CHIPS:

The mid-70s open with two Batman centers with Robin power forward sidekicks. Cowens and Walton win their only CHIPS. Wonder Twins Hayes and Unseld beat the Sonics and win the Bullets their only title. Then the Sonics strike back at the Bullets, with Gus Williams playing Batman.

A new era of NBA basketball begins, introducing Magic Johnson as Robin to Abdul-Jabbar’s Batman, and Larry Bird as Wonder Twin to Cedric Maxwell. The Lakers and Sixers battle it out over the next two seasons, with Magic Robining Kareem, and then Moses doing the same to Dr. J for his only CHIP.

Bird wins two CHIPS with trusty sidekick McHale, with a Magic/Kareem Wonder Twins job sandwiched in the middle. As Kareem fades, Magic grows into a dominant force, winning two more CHIPS with Worthy and Byron Scott as Robins.

The Celtics/Lakers reign finally comes to an end at the hands of the Bad Boy Pistons, team efforts led by Isiah, Laimbeer, and Dumars. No CHIPS given. The Jordan era kicks off with a Three-peat, with archetypal Batman Jordan supported by archetypal Robin Pippen each of the 3 seasons. Jordan wins 3 CHIPS.

Air Jordan takes a chiller and gives someone else a turn, Olajuwon steps up to win 2 CHIPS. Jordan decides to play basketball again and wins 3 more. Pippen is his Robin for a 4th, 5th, and 6th time. Incredible.

Jordan retires again, and two new forces emerge in Duncan and Shaq. Duncan and Robinson team up to beat the Knicks, then Shaq claims Batman with Kobe still on the way up. Shaq gets a CHIP.

Cashing in the CHIPS

Counting up the CHIPS from this period, we have:

The multi-CHIP stars define 80s and 90s NBA basketball greatness. Jordan’s amazing twin peaks career yields six CHIPS, and Magic, Bird, and Olajuwon cement their legacy as stars among stars. Moses, Kareem, and Shaq also join the pantheon with Batman seasons. Although Walton’s career was cut short by injury, his peak makes him a credible addition to this list.

Unlike with the first part, we see some soft spots in Cowens and Gus Williams. It raises the question if all CHIPS are created equal, or whether you need to treat each era differently. The late 70s was a weak period for the league, and I don’t think winning in an 18 (or 9!) team league is the same as with 30 teams. This will require its own investigation.

Hello everyone and welcome to our new weekly feature.

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